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Abstract 
The present thesis is not a mere overview of the existing legal literature bearing on 
choice of law rules for marriage, nor is it a simple survey of the whole range of 
arguments endorsing one approach over another with regard to this issue: it rather puts 
forward a sustained argument towards a more appropriate way of looking at the conflict 
of law problems in marriage. Though choice of law rules for marriage has long 
preoccupied scholars and judges alike, the ever increasing antagonism between the 
preponderance of conflict values [predictability, certainty] and the growing concern to 
guarantee ajust result in individual atypical cases makes the continuous exploration of 
this particular topic both necessary and of significant legal interest. The study seeks 
essentially to establish that, contrary to what most scholars would have us believe, the 
intractable conflict problems in marriage are not inherent in the inefficiency of the 
traditional general choice of law rules, nor simply in the interrelation between different 
social, religious and legal cultures. 
Rather, they are attributable to the structure of a seemingly modem methodology that 
focuses more and more on the the attainment of ajust substantive result, the astonishing 
lack of consensus among legal systems, the disregard of coordination of policy 
considerations relevant in marriage, the parochial and nationalistic focus in choice of 
law, as well as in the application of the rule that lex fori is the only source of conflict 
norms. Further, the inappropriate application of the general choice of law rules, and 
the lasting antinomy between the international objectives [the attribution of an 
international relationship to the relevant system] and the national sources of conflict of 
laws are at the heart of the choice of law problems in marriage. The emerging academic 
movement to modernise choice of law rules for marriage, with a view to guaranteeing 
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desirable results in hard cases, defeats the very essence of conflict of laws, and renders 
illusory what little certainty and predictability the normative criteria of the com1icts 
orthodoxies may provide. The underlying reason lies in the inherent disregard of the 
practical difficulties facing the officials who have, outside the courts, to apply the law 
and to reconcile the competing goals of predictability and flexibility. 
The present writer's objective is the development of a more appropriate approach which 
can establish an equilibrium between the much needed certainty in the present subject 
and judicial appreciation of the difficulties presented in the individual atypical cases, 
without scuttling the established conflicts orthodoxies, and at the same time to eliminate 
the social evil termed "limping marriage". Finally, the domestic and intemationallaw 
reform agencies should avoid the parochial and nationalistic focus in choice of law, and 
the rule that lex fori is the only source of conflicts norms if they wish to make a claim 
that their aim is the attainment of a universal uniform body of rules which will ensure 
the universal validity of a marriage, and the maximum harmony of decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is universally established that marriage, though it takes diverse forms in the varied 
nations of the world, is a fundamental institution that is the core of personal status in all 
organised societies. Its forms and incidents reflect the necessary efforts of each society 
to rationalize and to define the conditions and the manner of entry into, as well as the 
mutual rights and obligations of the parties within, this very basic human institution 
which stands out because of its unparalleled importance in the framework of civilised 
societies. Lord Westbury said in Shaw v. Gould that: "marriage is the very foundation 
of civil society, and no part of the laws and institutions of a country can be of more 
vital importance to its subjects than those which regulate the manner and conditions of 
forming, and if necessary of dissolving, the marriage contract". (1) Marriage, though, 
is a contract in the sense that it requires the parties' consent to marry each other, yet can 
only be celebrated by a formal and public act, inasmuch as it creates a status which is of 
interest not only to the parties but to the society where they live as husband and wife. 
The celebration of a marriage by a formal and public act is the best way through which 
society ensures the protection of its interests in any change of status contemplated by its 
SUbjects. 
There is one aspect on which the judicial and academic authorities agrees: the subject of 
conflict of law problems in marriage is difficult and remains mired in mystery and 
confusion. Indeed, the requirements and the forms of entry into, as well as the effects 
of marriage, among legal systems are extremely varied to the extent that it is very 
difficult to establish any common denominator, in legal terms, to all unions called 
marriage. The logical explanation for this is that the rules relating to the entry into, 
termination and the nullity of marriage are closely connected with morality, religion and 
fundamental principles prevailing in each society. The definition of marriage in the 
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legal systems which are examined in the present thesis provides a good illustration of 
the existing diverse conceptions among legal systems. As regards Algerian law, a 
marriage may be defined as a contract which is performed in the legal forms between a 
man and a woman for life, the main objective of which is procreation. (2) The position 
is rather different in English and Scottish laws. A marriage as "understood in 
Christendom", according to Lord Penzance' s judgement in the famous case of Hyde v. 
Hyde, is a "voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all 
others".(3) 
It is clear that these definitions reflect the very basic difference between monogamy-
insisting countries and those countries where polygamy is permitted with the view to 
satisfying certain special conditions besides the normal requirements of marriage. It is 
not appropriate to discuss here the Western, particularly English and Scottish, legal 
views relating to the concept of polygamy, and to repeat the arguments for and against 
the appropriate law to determine the nature of marriage. Suffice it to say that the 
English and Scottish views as to polygamous unions rest unfortunately on a lack of 
knowledge about polygamy as practised, for instance, in the Islamic world. (4) It is 
indeed very wrong to consider polygamy as the basic rule in Islamic legal systems 
simply because a man is permitted under special circumstances to have more than one 
wife. The main reason is that polygamy in Islam has never been encouraged, and thus 
monogamy seems indeed to be the principle insofar as the Koran stipulates that: "But if 
you fear that you will not be able to do justice, and you will never be able to do so, 
among them, then marry only one".(5) Moreover, in Algerian law for instance, a man 
cannot take a second wife without obtaining a judicial authorisation to that effect. This 
permission cannot be granted unless the judge is satisfied that the husband is financially 
able to support more than wife, and there is a legitimate interest such as the attainment 
of the very objective of marriage, i.e. procreation. The husband has to inform the first 
wife and the second wife to be of his intentions and marital status respectively.(6) 
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Since marriage is a common institution among legal systems and thus whatever form it 
takes has for its object the same social and religious function, it is quite surprising that 
monogamy and polygamy must be regarded as so distinct. From a logical point of 
view it seems likely that polygamous unions are sufficiently akin to "Christian" ones to 
qualify for full recognition as legal unions. In both types, there is certainly an 
emphasis upon the proclamation of what is to be a lasting and formal relationship, the 
satisfaction of sexual needs coupled with desire for mutual comfort and support, and 
the procreation and upbringing of children within a stable family environment. The 
changes in English and Scottish laws over the last two decades are in favour of treating 
polygamous unions in the same way as "Christian" ones, indeed to the extent that a 
marriage owing its existence to a foreign law is to be equated, without further ado, with 
a domestic one for all purposes if it is valid according to the relevant conflict of law 
rules,(7) 
Accordingly, the determination of which law governs the validity of marriage in conflict 
of laws is very important. The main reason is that questions involving the existence or 
non-existence of a valid marriage may arise in almost any conceivable context, namely, 
nullity, divorce, judicial separation, claims for dower, succession, legitimacy of the 
children, and bigamy. In practical terms, the validity of a marriage is the main ground 
upon which the validity of many issues of status and of property can be decided.(8) 
Added to this is the fact of the increased mobility among populations of the world in 
these days of easy and rapid international transit that has "provided much of the context 
for the resulting conflicts problems" ,(9) Choice of law rules for marriage are therefore 
one of the main subject of conflict of laws where certainty and predictability are greatly 
required by the principle of marriage stability, and diverse legal regulations of marriage 
among legal systems. 
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Unfortunately, the outstanding characteristic of conflict of law problems in the present 
subject-matter is the astonishing lack of consensus on the goals and methods of choice 
of law rules for marriage. Uncertainty about the proper approach to conflict problems 
of marriage reigns supreme and the diverse approaches which have been proposed are 
as complex as they are unconvincing. The underlying reason is that legal systems use 
different connecting factors to determine what law governs the validity of marriage; 
factors that reflect the fundamental opposition between the principles of territoriality and 
extraterritoriality in conflict of laws. In certain countries, like the United States of 
America, the entire validity of marriage is governed by the lex loci celebrationis, while 
retaining certain exceptions to the rule.(10) In most legal systems, however, the 
position is rather different insofar as they draw a distinction between formal and 
essential validity of marriage. While formal validity is referred to the lex loci 
celebrationis, these legal systems disagree on the issue of whether the personal law to 
which essential validity is referred should be determined by domicile or nationality. 
Added to this is the fact there is no uniformity among legal systems on the question of 
characterisation of requirements of marriage as relating to form or the essence of 
marriage. What might be deemed as a mere formality in one legal system might be 
regarded as a matter affecting the morals and religious principles of society in another. 
However, the attainment of international uniformity in the present subject remains 
rather distant. The international conventions, in particular the Hague conventions, (11) 
which have been adopted to create a uniform body of rules to govern choice of law 
problems in matters of marriage have resulted neither in the success anticipated by their 
promoters, nor in the fiasco claimed by their opponents. The underlying reason is that 
the conventions have failed to recognise the relevance of coordination of relevant policy 
considerations in marriage insofar as they were concerned with the identification of 
compromises of the "lowest common denominator" that satisfy no one. Furthermore, 
the law reforms, that have been initiated at the domestic level in most legal systems, 
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have been either abandoned or resulted in parochial and nationalistic statutory changes 
which are more harmful than conducive to the proper application of the general choice 
of law rules for marriage. For instance, the English and Scotttish Law Commissions in 
their 1987 joint report have concluded, "with humility not always displayed by law 
reform agencies", that there is no need for any comprehensive legislation insofar as 
certain choice of law rules in marriage are still in the process of development that 
should be best left in the hand of the judges. (12) However, the present writer has tried 
to analyse the different approaches voiced in the subject-matter, and the relevance of all 
policy considerations relevant in marriage in order to assert with certainty the sources 
of, and to propose certain solutions to resolve, the conflict problems arising within the 
sphere of marriage. It is my opinion that great progress in the present field would have 
been achieved by now if countries could agree at least on substantial limitations of their 
traditional rules. As a result of the discussion of scholars' controversies on the subject 
as well as the consideration of the position of both Common and Civil law systems, 
jurisprudence and international conventions, the present writer hopes that he has been 
able to shed some light on many significant points within three main chapters. 
The first chapter will focus on the formal validity issues and the significance of the lex 
loci celebrationis as a generally accepted rule which governs the formalities of marriage 
at the present time. However, the first issue which falls to be considered here is the 
historical background of how and why the locus regit actwn was introduced as the 
proper rule to govern the validity of a marriage. In fact, the consideration of this rule 
from a historical point of view is of vital importance to establish its significance as an 
acceptable rule that may achieve a high level of uniformity, if it is understood and 
applied in quite the same sense among legal systems. As the interpretation of the lex 
loci rule in different legal systems varies, the difficulties which these interpretations 
cause will be given careful consideration with a view to suggesting a solution to the 
question whether the nature of the lex loci rule should be imperative or facultative . 
I 
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Besides, the present writer would also like to stress that the existence of compulsory 
civil, and religious ceremonies would certainly undermine the efficiency of the lex loci 
celebrationis as a universal rule through which the coordination of the relevant policies 
issues in marriage, and the prevention of limping relationships, might be achieved. The 
consideration of the characterisation problems arising out of the dichotomy of form and 
substance is also important, insofar as the determination of the proper law to govern the 
relevant requirement in issue depends solely on its characterisation as relating to form 
or substance. The discussion of this particular issue will be considered in the context 
of parental consent; a matter that English law (especially) and (perhaps also) Scots law 
characterise as a formality, irrespective of its classification as an essential matter under 
the relevant foreign law. More importantly, a minute examination will be given to the 
lex loci rule and its extent, as well as to the cases where its application becomes 
irrelevant. Finally, the present writer believes that the universal adoption of the 
facultative approach of the lex loci celebrationis as well as the optional system of civil 
or religious form of marriage might be the only realistic solution to the vast majority of 
practical problems to which the imperative application of the lex loci rule and the 
compulsory systems may give rise. 
The second chapter will deal with the fundamental issue of substantive validity of a 
marriage which is referred to the parties' personal laws the determination of which is 
surrounded by major difficulties. It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the special 
significance of domicile and nationality as connecting factors, and their appropriateness 
to determine the parties' personal laws. This issue has been examined with regard to 
the two different types of legal systems, namely, the Common and Civil law systems. 
It is also important not only to analyse the main existing theories but also the most 
recent flexible approaches on this topic that seems to be based on the Favor matrimonii 
principle and the inconclusiveness of the recent English judicial decisions displaying a 
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degree of flexibility hitherto conspicuous by its absence. 
However, the application of the personal law as a general choice of law rule involves 
peculiar and crucial questions which need to be scrutinised here in order to establish the 
better view leading to certainty, predictability, stability of marital status, as well as the 
attainment of justice in the vast majority of normal cases -while retaining a degree of 
flexibility to deal with the occasional outrageous result. These issues include mainly 
the change of, and the subsequent changes in, the lex causae, the relevance of the lex 
locicelebrationis as to capacity to marry, capacity to enter into a polygamous marriage, 
as well as the parochial and nationalistic focus in choice of law. More importantly, the 
issue of the effect of recognition of foreign divorce and nullity decrees on capacity to 
remarry will be considered in great detail. The reason is that the divergencies between 
choice of law rules governing capacity to marry and the recognition rules are bound to 
give rise to conflict problems, particularly where the relevant laws differ as to whether 
the remarrying party has capacity to marry. The detemlination of the incidental 
question involved here is a very difficult issue that has divided scholars, lawyers and 
judges mainly into two groups, namely, the advocates of the lex causae approach and 
the promoters of the lex fori approach. FurthemlOre, the consideration of substantive 
requirements individually is highly important in order to detennine the scope of bilateral 
impediments to which the parties' personal laws apply in cumulation. 
Finally, it appears that the existing theories, particularly the flexible approaches, on this 
topic are mainly concerned with the determination of the validity of a marriage within 
the courtroom process, as well as the attainment of justice in the individual atypical 
cases. However, the present writer's contribution seeks to clarify the importance of the 
formulation of a general conflict rule that might be applied with certainty at the time of 
the ceremony, a matter that is countenanced by the preventive function of the essential 
requirements of marriage the observance of which falls to be decided by the marriage 
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officials at that time. Although the growing concern to avoid unjust results revolves 
around the special circumstance of each individual case, there is no justification for 
neglecting the relevance of coordination of competing policy considerations in the field 
of marriage. For this and other reasons the present writer would like to show that there 
is so much play in the orthodox approach's joints that the recent flexible views can be 
regarded as the most unusual development. The discussion of the different views as to 
lhe relevant choice of law rule to govern essential validity of marriage also intends to 
shed some light on the fact that the problems, with which scholars and judges have to 
deal with in the present subject, are the very consequences of the existing fundamental 
differences among legal systems as to the nature and the purpose of the requirements in 
issue, the disregard of the importance of temporal dimension of choice of law rules, 
and above all the parochial and nationalistic focus in choice of law. In other words, 
while it may be in accordance with the principle for the lex loci celebrationis to prevent 
the celebration of a marriage which offends the policy of the lex loci, or which appears 
to the officials of the lex loci to flout the parties' personal law (s). a/avor matrimonii 
approach may yet be appropriate in cases where marriages have been celebrated, parties 
have acted on the faith of it, and its validity is to be determined ex post. 
The third chapter emphasises the issue of nullity of marriage which is closely related to 
the issues of formal amI essential validity of marriage as it is the inevitable consequence 
if the parties concerned have not complied with the formal and essential requirements of 
marriage. It is the purpose of this chapter to review the existing conflict of law rules 
concerning nullity of marriage within two different and interrelated contexts, namely, 
jurisdiction and choice of law. Jurisdiction, as the first matter for consideration in any 
nullity action, will be examined with reference to the Algerian Civil Proceedings Code 
1%6, and the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 by virtue of which the 
jurisdictional grounds have been simplified and placed on an exclusively statutory basis 
both in England and Scotland. The consideration of the distinction between void and 
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voidable marriages is of vital importance in order to understand the complex structure 
of the English and Scottish Common law rules of jurisdiction. In fact, the examination 
of the Common law rules of jurisdiction are needed for the understanding of the legal 
reforms brought into light by the 1973 Act. 
The discussion of the choice of law rules in nullity will be limited to the issue which 
have given rise to the most difficult problems, and which have perplexed the majority 
of academic authorities simply because the conflict rules in the present context are 
essentially the same as those relating to the initial validity of marriage. The most 
interesting issue concerns the conflict rule for the physical defects, i.e. impotence and 
wilful refusal to consummate. The English and Scottishjudicial authorities are far from 
being clear as to the appropriate law to govern these defects, and academic authorities 
are mainly divided between the application of the law of domicile and the law of the 
forum. It is therefore important to examine the main reasons and the appropriateness 
of using the law of domicile or the law of the forum as a choice of law rule to 
determine the effects of impotence and wilful refusal on the validity of a marriage. 
Further, if marriage for companionship is socially acceptable, the present writer would 
also like to consider the question whether impotence and wilful refusal should be 
maintained as grounds of nullity. 
Finally, the general conclusion contains the present writer's suggestions which revolve 
around the best way to create a coherent and uniform body of choice of law rules that 
might lead to an efficient resolution of the numerous difficult problems arising when the 
validity of marriage is examined ex post. The attainment of a uniform body of rules 
would remain pure theory if legal systems are not prepared to abandon the existing lax 
practice as to the enforcement offoreign laws. It is also my argument that any further 
comprehensive legal reforms, either at the domestic or international level, must give 
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particular importance to the coordination of the competing policy considerations 
relevant in marriage, and concentrate on the eradication of parochial and nationalistic 
focus in the present subject. The discussion of the subject-matter in the present thesis 
is mainly based on the consideration of four legal systems, namely, English, Scottish, 
French and Algerian laws which represent the Common and Civil law systems 
respectively. The main purpose of this thesis is to argue that it is possible to construct a 
coherent approach to choice of law in the present subject-matter with a view to 
promoting the universal validity of marriage and international uniformity of decisions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Choice of Law Rules in Relation to The Formalities of Marriage 
Introduction: 
It is of note that different forms may be required, by different legal systems, in which 
the Judicial acts should be performed. However, requirement of a special form might 
be regarded as necessary for the validity of a special act, according to one legal system; 
whereas such forms may not be required, or considered as such in accordance with 
another legal system, and the parties may be free to choose a suitable form for the 
performance of their act. 
This chapter will focus on the lex loci celebrationis as the main governing rule upon 
marriage formalities at the present time. However, a minute examination will be given 
to this principle and its extent, the exceptions in which it loses its authority over 
formalities of marriage, and the associated problems with its application to the 
determination of formal validity. For instance, limping marriages may involve the fact 
of the nature of lex loci application, namely imperative or facultative. It is the purpose 
of this chapter to offer some alternative ways of solving these problems. This will lead 
to examination of the possibility of submitting the formalities determination to the same 
law as the essentials, namely, to the national law or the law of domicile according to the 
Continental and Common Law Systems respectively; because the forms of marriage 
have no self governing natur~, on the basis of their firm pertinence to the essential 
validity, and cannot be considered separately. ( 1) 
Taking into consideration that the conflicts between states arise because of the existing 
divergences between legal systems, it is obvious that we must examine the possibilities 
for gaining international uniformity over the governing laws and recognition of the 
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validity of marriage celebrated abroad in forms which are not recognized as forms of 
ceremonies within the forum. Indeed, this will be attempted according to the 
provisions of the international conventions as being the only way to reach such 
uniformity.(2) Before discussing these matters, we must determine how the lex loci 
celebrationis, as a connecting factor, appeared in the determination of formal validity; 
and we must consider the distinction of the formalities from the essentials of marriage. 
Section One: 
Lex Loci Celebrationis And Its Authority on The Formal 
Validity of Marriage 
A- How the Lex Loci Celebrationis, as a connecting factor, appeared in 
the determination of formal validity 
It is worth noting that in the past, the governing law upon the formal validity differed 
according to each juridical act. However, the subsisting rule was that the act must be 
performed in accordance with the form required by the law to which the act was 
subject. For instance, marriages must be celebrated within the form required by the law 
of the husband's domicile, because marriage itself was an act that subject to that law. (3 ) 
No problem arose if the marriage is solemnised at the domicile of the husband, but the 
question is, what is the solution when the marriage is celebrated in another place where 
the form laid down by that law is alien to the one required by the law of the husband's 
domicile? 
Yet, it was noted that insuperable difficulties arise, for applying such form of the law of 
the place to which the marriage was subject to, when it was celebrated abroad. The 
dissimilarity offorms required in different places, and the pertinence of forms to public 
policy render the acceptance of foreign forms abroad difficult. Regarding these 
difficulties and the undesirable effects to which they lead, careful consideration has 
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been given widely to this matter. However, a new rule came into force to govern the 
juridical acts upon their forms; this is expressed: "Locus regit actum."( 4) This means 
that the juridical acts must be governed by the law of the place of their performance, 
without taking into account the forms required by the law with which the acts have their 
real connection. 
The locus regit actum rule was laid down since the 12th & 13th centuries, by the 
advocates of the theories (Glossators) and (Post Glossators) by their decision that the 
performance of a juridical act is subject to the law of the place where it is made. Hence, 
during the ancient jurisprudence, no distinction was made between formalities and 
substantive requirements. The whole requirements were subject to the locus regit 
actum.(5) The submission principle of the form to the local law, as distinct from the 
law which governs the essentials, was established by the jurist (Guillaume de Gun), 
since 14th century, who proclaimed the "locus regitforman actus" by applying it for 
testament.(6) A similar view had been reached by "Bartole" who maintained that: the 
foreigners living in a foreign territory have a right to perform their acts within the local 
law form.(7) Further, at the end of 15th century, the submission of the intrinsic 
requirements to the locus regit actum had been clarified, by an Italian jurist (Gurtius), 
on the basis of the parties' intention for the submission of their act to the locus regit 
actum, by electing to perform it in a such place. Moreover, in the 16th century, 
Dumolin thought that the basis of the submission of the intrinsic validity to the locus 
regit actum was the tacit consent of the contractors, therefore, the will of the parties 
capable of electing anotherlaw to which the essential validity must be submitted to'(S) 
Locus regit actum, as the governing rule, has been incorporated into many legal codes. 
For instance, in English and Scottish law, it is the governing rule over the formal 
validity of Bills of exchange, contracts ... etc; and it is considered as such upon the 
formalities of all juridical acts according to article 19 of Algerian civil code 1976,(9) 
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The introduction of locus regit actum has been confirmed and justified by many writers 
as follows: the main reason is the mischief and confusion to which the existing rules 
beforehand led to.(lO) Although the Locus regit actum was regarded as the most 
established rule, it is worth noting that its application is surrounded by many problems 
which may render it an intricate and difficult rule to apply upon the formalities of 
marriage. Yet, lex loci celebrationis must be complied with in regard to the formalities 
of marriage. As a general rule, the Scottish law considers a marriage celebrated abroad 
as valid if it is performed in accordance with the local form. Even though a mere 
exchange of consent, according to Scottish authorities, could confer status of husband 
and wife upon the parties, a marriage solemnised abroad without observance of lex 
loci formalities would not be considered as valid in Scotland. This view has been 
criticised as being absurd because of considering marriage in Scotland merely as a 
matter of consent,(ll) Algerian law permit celebration of marriage in the parties' 
personal law form if, and only if, they have a common nationality. 
English law has been familiar with the doctrine of supremacy in formal matters of the 
lex loci celebrationis since 1703, when the matrimonial regime issue arose in Foubert 
v. Trust. (12) It was expressed that locus regit actum was the governing law, 
therefore, " ... the said residue [being the estate in common] should go according to 
custom of Paris, in the same manner as it would have gone if no such contract had been 
made ... ,"(13) simply because the parties to a marriage depend upon the law or custom 
of the place where the marriage took place. In fact, in 1744, the doctrine was expressly 
stated in Cmvchund v. Barker by Lord Hardwicke: "so in matrimonial cases, they are 
to be determined according to the ceremonies of marriage in the country where it was 
solemnised",(13a) The doctrine had been discussed widely, for the first time, in 
Scrimshire v. Scrimshire(14) where two English minors went through a ceremony of 
marriage in France, without observance of solomnities required by French law. 
Regarding the validity of marriage, it was alleged that the marriage should be 
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determined according to English law on the basis that the parties were English subjects 
and domiciliaries. This allegation was rejected because according to English law, 
" ... English marriages are to be deemed good or bad according to the law of the place 
where they are made".(15) The judge ofthe ecclesiastical court, Sir Edward Simpson, 
had no doubt that French law was to be applied, saying: 
"It is the law of this country {England} to take notice of the laws of France, or of 
any foreign country, in determining upon marriages of this kind. The question being 
in substance this -whether, by the law of this country, marriage contracts are not to 
be deemed good or bad according to the laws of the country in which they are formed, 
and whether they are not to be construed by that law.,,(15a) 
He concluded that "all nations have consented, or must be presumed to consent, for the 
common benefit and advantage, that such marriages should be good or not, according 
to the laws of the country where they are made".(15b) Therefore, foreign law was 
accepted before an English court as applicable for the determination of the validity of 
marriage, as being the law of the place of celebration, even though the parties were 
members of the lex fori. The French nullity decree was considered as evidence of the 
French law.(16) 
To sum up, the adoption of different conflict of law rules universally results in 
conflicts. Therefore, it has been established that uniformity is needed upon conflict of 
law rules for determining marriage validity. The only applicable law which leads to the 
extirpation of the infinite mischief and confusion, that must necessarily arise to the 
subjects of all nations, with respect to legitimacy, succession and other rights, is the 
locus regit actum. This rule may be interpreted differently in different countries, such 
as the element of parental consent requirement that may be viewed differently. 
Observance of the respective laws of different countries, upon formalities, wi11lead to 
such mischief; however, this will not ensue if the lex loci celebrationis rule is 
adopted.(17) 
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1- Bases and origin of the locus regit actu1Il. 
Lex loci celebrationis is well established as one of the clearest principles of the conflict 
of laws on the basis of some evident reasons. The certainty of this rule has led to the 
dearth of attempts to explain the principle. Mendes da Costa,(l8) explained its 
acceptance on the basis that the rule is certain, "agreeable to the law of nations which is 
the law applicable to every country and take notice as such", and it is a rule "which it is 
fair to assume has been formulated with consideration for the moral and ethical well-
being of society".(19) To claim that the locus regit actum complies with the law of the 
nations is debatable because formal adequacy has been referred to other laws than this 
principle in many countries, e.g. Germany, France. Further, it is not self-evident that 
the determination of the formalities of marriage according to the lex loci rule is better 
suited to advancing society's well-being than any other possible rules. 
Yet, in the early development of the conflict of laws, it has been maintained that the 
doctrine was founded on the notion of comity. The court of the forum applies the law 
of the place of celebration to marriage celebrated abroad, in the hope that other states 
will,in turn, apply the forum's law to marriages solemnised within the forum. (20) 
This implies that the acceptance of the lex loci rule is linked to territoriality, in respect 
that the law of the forum has to govern every act which has been performed within its 
territory. The foundation of lex loci rule on the international comity has been denied, 
in England, because it is not easily reconcilable to any sound reasoning. It is said that 
reference to the lex loci rule is an obligation, therefore, "[t]he courts of the country 
where the question arises, resort to the law of the country where the contract was made 
not ex comitate but ex debito justitiae in order to explicate their own 
jurisdiction ... "(21) Hence, the application of lex loci rule in Roach v. Garven(22) and 
Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, (23) was founded on an individualistic conception of the 
purpose of the conflict of laws, in respect that the desire, to avoid mischief and 
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confusion, and to protect the rights of individuals, is clear. Recently, Professor North 
said that: "certainty, predictability and uniformity of results are achieved by the 
application ofthe law ofthe place of celebration. "(24) 
The desire to eliminate these difficulties, arising from the application of any other laws 
to formal validity, the aim of uniformity of governing rules in conflict of laws, and 
harmonization of decisions were prime factors in establishing the doctrine of locus 
regit actum. Therefore, whatever the functional bases of its establishment, it is 
accepted as "the most settled principle of enlightened jurisprudence. "(25) Further, it is 
accepted because of its accordance with the Jus gentium,(26) The question which 
should be asked therefore is, does the non-compliance with the formalities of the lex 
loci rule always lead to the annulment of the marriage? This matter arose in Ruding v. 
Smith(27) where two British subjects celebrated their marriage, in a private house at the 
Cape Colony in 1796, within the presence of chaplain of the English forces. It was 
celebrated by licence granted by the commander of the forces there, because of the 
husband's status being that of a member of the English forces. In principle, according 
to the mandatory application of the lex loci rule within the English law, the marriage 
would have been held void. But, the marriage was held to be valid because of the 
insuperable difficulties of complying with the local law , under which parental consent 
was required. Besides that, it is noticeable that the marriage validity was based on the 
parties' status being that of members of a conquering army,(28) This implies that 
members of a conquering army of a given country, have no need to comply with the 
lex loci rule,(29) The principle of the lex loci rule is confirmed in Berthiaume v. 
Dastous(30) where it has been illustrated that: 
"If there is one question better settled than any other in international law, it is that as 
regards marriage "putting aside the question of capacity" locus regit actum. If a 
marriage is good by the laws of the country where it is effected, it is good all the 
world over, no matter the proceeding or ceremony which constituted marriage 
according to the law of the place, would or would not constituted marriage in the 
country of the domicile of one or other of the spouses. If the so called marriage is no 
marriage in the place where it is celebrated, there is no marriage anywhere, although 
the ceremony or proceeding, if conducted in the place of parties' domicile would be 
considered a good marriage." 
18 
The same principle has been strongly affirmed in the case of Starkowski v. Attorney 
General(31) where it is illustrated that the rule locus regit actum laid down in 
Berthiaume v. Dastous has to be maintained as the main governing rule upon formal 
validity of marriage. And according to Starkowski v. Attorney General, the decision in 
Berthiaume v. Dastous is to be construed as referring to the content of the lex loci 
celebrationis when the case come before the forum (presumably so long as there has 
been no intervening marriage, valid as to substance and form). 
B- The Difference Between Formal And Intrinsic Validity of Marriage. 
As regards the duality of the laws applicable to the formalities and the essentials of 
marriage, a distinction should be made between matters pertaining to form, on one 
hand, and matters relating to the essence of marriage on the other. It is of note that 
locus regit actum was considered, before the middle of the 19th century, as the only 
governing law upon marriage validity. In the earlier cases up to Brook v. Brook, (32) 
although essential matters were involved, consideration was only given to the law of 
the place of celebration. Scrimshire v. Scrimshire(33) is an illustration of one of these 
decisions. It is pointed out that "These authorities fully shew that all contracts are to be 
considered according to the law of the country where they were made."(34) The 
implication which should be drawn from this case is that English law governs not as the 
parties' personal law , but as the law of the locus actum, the marriage being celebrated 
in EnglandJ35) Careful analysis shows that that distinction was indicated as early as 
1831 in Conway v. Beasley, (36) where it was shown that capacity to marry should be 
governed by the lex domicilii. It was stated that: 
"The due effect of a Scottish domicile on this decision of these cases would demand a 
very careful consideration .. , Undoubtedly, questions of marriage are "prima facie" to 
be judged of by the law of the country where they are solemnised, but I am of 
opinion that considering the second marriage, I must ascertain the capability of the 
parties to contract. ,,(37) 
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Despite this reference to the law of the domicile in this case, the ensuing decisions 
show that no changes have taken place until Brook v. Brook( 38) The main reason for 
the decision in Brook v. Brook is that it is impossible to recognise a marriage which 
contravenes the public policy of the law of domicile, even though it is valid according 
to the locus actum. Although there was authority in Story(38a) for providing 
exceptions to the rule, in particular where public policy prohibitions on marriage on the 
grounds, for example, of incest or polygamy were involved, the House of Lords 
adopted a much broader approach by virtue of which the application of the lex loci 
celebrationis to issues of essential validity was abandoned. Lord Campbell stated 
"But while the forms of entering into the contract of marriage are to be regulated by 
the lex loci contractus, .. " the essentials of the contract depends upon the lex 
domicilii, the law of the country in which the parties are domiciled at the time of 
marriage, and in which the matrimonial residence is contemplated," (39) 
In French doctrine the submission of the essentials to a different law was proclaimed by 
Guillaume De Gun who enacted the Locus forman actus rule,{ 40) Both French and 
Algerian law submit the determination of formalities to the universal established rule, 
i.e. locus regit actum,(41) and the essentials to the personal law of the parties,(42) 
The Hague convention, in relation to the conflict of laws upon marriage, of 1902 
adopted the same approach. In its article 5, it is stated that matter of forms are subject 
to the law of the place of celebration, whereas article 1 refers capacity to marry to the 
national law of each party. There is criticism that this convention is "dominated by the 
principle of nationali ty generally prevailing in continental Europe at that time" ( 4 3) 
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1- Determination of the nature of the requirements: 
The distinction between formalities and essentials pertains to the question of 
characterisation. Careful analysis shows that the nature of requirements has been 
classified differently in different legal systems. However, Dr Cheshire said that the 
basis of the determination of the nature of any requirement is the effect to which its 
non-observance leads. Therefore, if absence of a requirement leads to the voidness of 
marriage according to the law of domicile, this determine its nature as essential; 
whereas if it renders the marriage only voidable, it should be considered as a formal 
matter because of the probability of its validation by observing certain formal 
requests. (44) 
This view has been criticised on the basis that consent either affects capacity or does 
not. Relying on the effect of the lack of any requirement to decide its nature is 
unsound, because although its non-observance renders the marriage void, it may be 
classified as a formality. For instance, it is stated in the Matrimonial Causes Act,(45) 
that disregard of the appropriate formalities leads to a marriage being void, are these 
formalities to be considered as essentials? Hence, Cheshire's view was rejected by the 
Court of Appeal in Apt v. Apt( 46) where the decision was that lex loci celebrationis 
would prevail on the ground that such a requirement was a formality according to 
English law, even though the parties' absence would render the marriage celebrated in 
England void ab initio. 
As regards Brook v. Brook, (47) a different view may be deduced: the nature of a 
requirement as essential should be connected with the fact of its consideration as an 
impedimentum derimens "impediment irritant". For instance, prohibition of marriage 
between a husband and his deceased wife's sister is an impediment irritant which 
incapacitates the parties. In Sottomayer v. DeBarros it was held that the marriage is 
valid in England, even though marriage between first cousins is invalid according to the 
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Portuguese law. One reason for this decision was the application of English concepts 
for determining the nature of the requirement. However, it is clear that this view relies 
on the effects of non-observance of the requirement, according to the law imposing it, 
to decided its nature. 
It is suggested that public policy is the basis upon which the nature of a requirement 
depends. It will be considered as an essential, if it is an issue of public policy. It 
seems that Apt v. Apt!.48) is the basis of this theory, where the parties' presence at the 
ceremony arose . Lord Meriman illustrated that: 
"The contract of marriage in this case was celebrated in Buenos Airs; that the 
ceremony was perfOimed strictly in accordance with the law of that country; that the 
celebration of marriage by proxy a matter of form of the ceremony or proceeding; that 
there is nothing abhorrent to christian idea of legislation to the contrary, there is no 
doctrine of public policy which entitles me to hold that the ceremony valid where it 
was performed is not effective in this country to constitute a valid marriage."( 49) 
Accordingly, the dependency of party's presence, to be regarded as an essential, is 
related to its consideration as a matter of public policy. This decision is ambigious, 
because it is not clear whether the proxy marriage belongs to form because of its 
insufficiency to raise a public policy issue; or pertains to formalities and, therefore, lex 
loci celebrationis should govern as far as it does not infringe English public policy. I 
think the latter view fits the general rule governing formalities. It is difficult to apply 
such a suggestion on the basis that it is not a satisfactory guide for determining the 
nature of a foreign requirement. For instance, in Simonin v. Mallac, (50) although the 
respect of the foreign requirement involved was not contrary to English public policy 
according to the general rule upon which the essential validity depends, the marriage 
was held valid on the ground that the question involved pertained to formalities. We 
should now turn to an examination of the continental and the common law systems, and 
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their definition of formalities. In both systems, formalities may be described as the 
external manners for the validity of marriage. (51) 
As regards English and Scots laws, substantive requirements of marriage incorporate 
capacity to marry, statutory prohibition, the nature of marriage itself, and the parties' 
consent,(52) The crucial question, therefore, is; are those matters which vitiate parties' 
consent regarded as essentials? Clearly, consideration of these matters as essentials is 
related to their effects upon the existence of marriage. For instance, mistaking the 
ceremony as one of betrothal and not a marriage ceremony is essential because it leads 
to non-existence of a marriage/53) whereas a mistake to the nature of the marriage is 
not sufficient to render the marriage void or voidable. (54) 
Formalities are the requirements which pertain to the ceremony, the presence of an 
official, as well as his competence in territorial and personal respects. The matters 
relating to the performance of the ceremony are: the time and the place of celebration, 
the publication of banns, and the way in which the ceremony is carried out, for 
example, the parties' and witnesses presence at the ceremony, the way in which the 
parties' declaration of consent must be expressed, and the reading of some text 
concerning the duties and rights of husband and wife. (55) Besides that, according to 
English law, parental consent is a formality.(56) In Algerian law, essentials of 
marriage are: parties' consent, parental consent, capacity to marry, non-existence of any 
impediment irritants. Formalities involve the registrar's presence and his authority, the 
publication of marriage, forms of celebration, presence of parties and witnesses at the 
ceremony, and the form of the ceremony,(57) 
It is worth mentioning that, although marriage is a status, its coming to existence is 
based on consensual agreement which is embodied in the expressing of an offer and 
acceptance. The degree of strength of social interest in marriage is a basis upon which 
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the formalities and essentials are distinguished. The reason for that is that all legal 
systems give varying importance to the requirement which results in creation of a status 
according to social environment and customs. Hence, characterisation of requirements 
and their attribution to any governing rule differs according to the social interest of a 
society where the requirements are imposed. Accordingly, the degree of vitality and 
importance of the requirement to the marriage status leads to its classification as a 
formality or essential. Therefore, essential validity is involved when a requirement 
relates to the contract to marry; whereas, formal validity is involved when it pertains to 
the external conduct. 
2- Characterisation Question 
Dicey and Morris who have strenuously backed the view point of Bartin maintain that: 
II ... even if the countries of the world agreed upon uniform conflict rules, cases 
involving the same facts would still be decided differently in different countries, quite a 
part from such factors as public policy and difference in procedures, for they might 
characterize the question differently."(58) It is well known that characterisation is a 
fundamental and intricate problem in conflict of laws which has perplexed writers for 
decades. Its existence, related to that of different domestic laws, localization of 
connecting factors for each legal category, results in distinction among conflict of law 
systems. 
It is understood from the view point of Bartin that a certain uniformity is needed for the 
characterisation of legal matters into categories. To avoid classification problems and 
conflicts between different legal systems, it is not sufficient to agree upon uniformity of 
conflict rules. For instance, in marriage conflict rules; it is well established among all 
the legal systems that formalities pertain to the lex loci celebrationis determination on 
one hand, and the lex domicilii or national law of the parties is the main governing rule 
upon substantive requirements on the other. The crucial question, therefore, is the 
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differing classification of some requirements as formal or essentials, such as parental 
consent. This is considered as a formality according to English law, but it is an 
essential under French law. That leads to the application of dissimilar conflict rules, 
i.e. application of the lex loci celebrationis, and the application of the parties' national 
law respectively. 
In both Algerian and Scottish law, it is generally recognised that characterisation of any 
requirement must be determined by the law of the forum. The Algerian civil code 
provides in its article (09)(59) that the Algerian court should classify any matter arising 
in conflict of laws according to Algerian law as being the law of the forum. However, 
the submission of classification to the law of the forum leads to the consideration of 
Algerian domestic law rules in order to decide whether the matter involved is a 
formality or essential. As can be seen, this is unhelpful because of the absence of a 
distinction between the requirements of marriage,as formality or essential, under 
Islamic law, which is the basis of the Algerian family law. It transpires that the 
Algerian distinction concerning the law applicable to the formalities and essentials has 
been borrowed from French law. 
According to the authorities in Scottish Law, it is held that characterisation question is a 
matter for Scots law. It is illustrated in Bliersbach v. MacEwen(60) that: "in these 
circumstances, our law regards parental consent, not as something which can render a 
marriage funditus null, but as one of the factors relating to the celebrating of the 
marriage ceremony. The requirements regarding such consent in the case of marriage 
celebrated in Scotland therefore depend on Scots law". The marriage of Dutch persons 
lacking parental consent could proceed in Scotland, since Scotland has no rule requiring 
parental consent. 
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In English law, a characterisation problem arose for the first time in Simonin v. 
Mallac(61) where a marriage between French subjects took place in England without 
parental consent. It was held that parental consent was a matter of form on the basis 
that the court adopted English concepts to classify requirements relating to parental 
consenL<62) The same view was confirmed in Apt v. Apt(63) where the parties' 
presence at the ceremony was viewed as a formality, even though the lack of presence 
of one of the parties would render the marriage void if it was solemnised in England. 
However, it is stated that: liThe classification of the ceremony, celebration, proceeding 
or whatever word one may choose to describe the formality of marriage contract, must 
be determined by the law of this country."(64) Hence, it is accepted that it is for the 
lex fori to determine whether the parties' presence at the ceremony raised the issue of 
formal validity. Careful analysis shows that the same view was held by French courts 
and academic writers. It is worth noting that Bartin argued that it is impossible to apply 
the lex causae upon characterisation question, on the basis of its being the result of 
classification. It was held in Caraslanis case(65) that whether a religious ceremony 
raised the issue of formal validity should be determined according to French concepts 
as being the forum. 
Taking into consideration the lack of Algerian decisions relating to this question, it is 
difficult to argue that the Algerian court will not give consideration to the concepts of 
the relevant foreign law involved thereof. But a careful examination of section (19) of 
the Algerian civil code shows that it is impossible to look at the relevant foreign law for 
classifying the question involved in any case, if the parties decided to celebrate their 
marriage within the Algerian form, on the basis of the optional choice given to them. 
It is worth mentioning that according to these systems, it is for the lex fori to determine 
whether the requirement is a formality or an essential. As regards the purposes of the 
conflict of laws rules upon marriage, this is controversial and critical. However, it is 
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unsound to apply the forum law concepts to decide whether the legal element involved 
is a formality or essential, without taking into consideration the concepts of the relevant 
foreign law involved thereof. 
3- Matter of Parental Consent 
As regards the cases in which the validity of marriage is subject to a special consent of 
parents, this consent is a crucial and polemical question because of the existing 
divergences between legal systems which require parental consent for marriage. 
Problems arise when the lex loci celebrationis regards the marriage as valid, and it is 
invalid because of parental consent characterisation as essential according to the 
personal law of the parties. A question arises whether parental consent is a substantive 
requirement or a formality? 
In continental law systems, this consent is classified as a substantive requirement to a 
marriage, its absence rendering the marriage invalid. It is argued that the reasons are 
historical,(66) It is thought that minors' consent is not sufficiently mature, they are 
inexperience upon marriage and its effects, and the family has an interest; this consent 
is therefore intended to ensure protection for minors and the family interest,(67) On the 
legislation so far, the position in Algerian domestic law is that men under 21 years of 
age, and all women require parental consent for marriage.(68) The reasons which 
probably led to this position are significant. Prior to the Algerian independence, 
consent of minors should be completed by the consent of their matrimonial tutor.(69) 
Matrimonial tutor is one of the requirements of marriage, according to the Algerian 
family code. Article (9) of this code is not clear. The Arabic text of this article does 
not contain any precision: either the matrimonial tutor's consent is necessary, or only 
his presence suffices, whereas his presence at the ceremony is clearly stated in the 
French text,(70) Taking into consideration article (77) of the Algerian "Etat civil" code 
1970, the registrar or judge, to whom the function of celebrating marriages has been 
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gIven, cannot draw up a marriage certificate without the authorization of the 
matrimonial tutor.{7I) It is therefore clear that the matrimonial tutor's consent is 
essential, on the basis that the only recognised celebrant is prevented from celebrating 
marriage without the matrimonial tutor's authorisation. Further, the presence referred 
to in article (9) of the Family Code implies the tacit consent of the tutor. 
Relying on the Islamic law, as the main basis of Algerian family law, a woman needs 
matrimonial tutor's consent, even if she is major. This may be explained by the morals 
and customs of the society which does not accept the fact that a woman can have a 
direct relation with the man who wants to marry her, before the wedding ceremony. 
Hence, the matrimonial tutor is for transmitting her consent and conditions to the other 
party. Besides, the father can prevent his virgin daughter from marrying if such 
prevention is in her interest.(72) This is questionable, because this condition debilitates 
the basis of parental consent requirement; and virginity has therefore no relation with 
this fact. Further, the arguments advanced by the academic writers do not stand, 
because the inexperience of a virgin man does not result in requiring parental consent if 
he is over the age of (21) years of age. Accordingly, these provisions mentioned above 
are restricted by article 12 (1) of the Family Code. Thus, the matrimonial tutor has to 
explain his refusal to consent by advancing sufficient justification, otherwise the judge 
can authorise the celebration of marriage. (73) It is of note that in the case of an orphan 
minor, or in cases where the matrimonial tutor cannot give his consent, judicial consent 
substitutes therefore.(74) Regarding article (33) of the family Code 1984, a marriage 
celebrated without obtaining parental consent is voidable. 
The question arises, what is the Algerian court's position when the marriage involves a 
foreign element? First of all, the general rule which is established over the essentials of 
marriage is that the essential validity of marriage is a matter which must be determined 
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by the personal law of each party. It is understood from the viewpoint of Professor 
Issad, that the non-observance of the essential requirements of each party's personal 
law is sufficient to hold the marriage void before Algerian courts according to article 
(11) of the Algerian Civil Code.(75) According to Batiffol's view,(76) a marriage 
which takes place in France without parental consent, between foreigners might be 
considered valid in France where the age of majority, according to French law, is 
slightly higher than the age required by the foreign law involved thereof. On the other 
hand, foreign law which requires a higher age of majority, and parental consent, should 
be respected before the French courts. Regarding French judicial precedent, a marriage 
of foreigners solemnised in France without obtaining parental consent, is valid if the 
parties belong to a country of which the law does not require such consent. This is 
accepted, as lack of parental consent does not offend French public policy. Hence, 
parental consent is referred, as a matter of essentials, to the personal law of the parties. 
However, according to Algerian choice of law rules, there is no obstacle to the 
recognition or permitting of celebration of marriage in Algeria, without obtaining 
parental consent, of parties who are major under their personal law , even if they are not 
as such according to Algerian law. Further, the more demanding laws are respected 
before Algerian courts. In case where the personal laws of the parties do not require 
parental consent, a marriage of such parties is validly solemnised in Algeria without 
such consent. By virtue of article (13) of Algerian Civil Code(77), the situation 
becomes very intricate and precarious when marriage is between an Algerian and a 
foreign minor whose law does not require parental consent. Having regard to this 
article, the foreign minor must obtain parental consent on the basis that Algerian law 
prevails upon marriage whenever an Algerian subject is involved, except that the matter 
of capacity remains under the personal law of each party. It is clear that the fact of 
requiring parental consent is pertaining to capacity to marry, and hence, this consent 
should not be regulated by the Algerian law even if an Algerian is involved. To this 
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end, we can say parental consent should be an exception to article (13). Hence, a 
marriage between an Algerian and a foreign minor, whose law does not require such 
consent, is valid before Algerian courts, even if it is celebrated without such consent. 
Consequently, consideration of parental consent as a mere formality in the common law 
of England and Scotland has been argued upon the canon law application to marriage, 
before Temesti decree of the Council of Trent, that requires only a mere exchange of 
consent "per verba de prc:esenti" for conferring husband and wife status upon the 
parties.c78) Therefore, it is difficult to understand the ratio of considering a marriage 
celebrated abroad, between English subjects, without parental consent as valid after the 
promulgation of Lord Hardwicke's Act 1753 which put forward the celebration in 
facie ecclesic:e , and the importance of parental consent to marriage.(79) Dicey and 
Morris(SO) pointed out that because of the non-distinction between formal and essential 
requirements, and the submission of marriage validity to the lex loci celebrationis in 
earlier cases , the English court felt obliged to adopt the logically doubtful theory 
established in the earlier decisions even after the distinction between formal and 
essential validity was adopted -i.e. the issue of parental consent belongs to the marriage 
ceremony. Although Falconbridge's sugestion that the problem could have been solved 
by characterising only the English requirement as relating to form seems logical and 
reasonable,(SOa) it is believed that it would not have provided an explanation for those 
earlier decisions. (SOb) 
As regards English law, parental consent is required for enabling a minor between 16 
and 18 years of age , unless the minor is a widow or widower. The reasons of 
dissuading minors from contracting unwise marriages was buttressed by the prevailing 
policy of cutting down the number of unstable unions, are likely to be the bases of 
parental consent's requirement.(S1) Although parental consent is required, a marriage 
I . 
I 
I 
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celebrated without it will not be annulled before English courts, unless in the case of 
marriage by banns and the person whose consent is required dissented from the 
marriage at the time of publication of banns,(82) This result might be said to be against 
the basis of parental consent, because it will permit unsuitable unions. However, 
Parliament discussed this matter very recently, and there was suggested the removal of 
the English legal requirement of parental consent regardless of the domicile of the 
parties. Accordingly, a foreigner who wants to marry in England will not be required 
to obtain parental consent, unless it is the case under his or her domiciliary law. (83) 
The fact that "locus actum" remained as a governing rule upon marriage validity, and 
the persistence of consensual marriage in Scotland until 1940,(84) meant that intricate 
and difficult cases were created. Compton v. Bearcroft(85) is an illustration of one of 
these decisions. Two English subjects, both minors, solemnised marriage "per verba 
de prtEsenti", without parental consent required by English law, at Gretna Green. It 
was held valid, according to its validity under the lex loci celebrationis. This decision 
was confirmed in so many cases afterwards,(86) Accordingly a similar view was 
upheld in cases where the marriages were celebrated in England. In Simonin v. 
Mallac, (87) two French subjects went through a ceremony of marriage in England 
without parental consent. The main argument concerns the characterisation of the 
foreign legal rule involved, and whether the non-observance of such requirement leads 
to an absolute incapacity? Relying on the fact that the parties were free to marry after 
three months formal asking, no matter what the answer of their parents might be, it was 
held that the French rule incorporates an additional formality.(88) The opinions 
suggest a possibly different approach if the non-observance of such requirement were 
to result in an absolute incapacity. (89) 
This decision is questionable. Regarding the fact that parents could seek a decree of 
nullity within one year after the celebration, it is clear that the marriage was 
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voidable.(90) Hence, the French decree of nullity should have been conclusive in 
England, according to Salveson v. Administrator of Austrian Property, where it was 
decided that the courts of the husband's (or, here, common) domicile have jurisdiction 
to grant a decree of nullity if the marriage is only voidable.(91) Nevertheless, it has 
been argued that the French decree was granted on the basis that the marriage was in 
fraudem legis to French law as being the personal law of the parties. 
In my view, English concepts of characterisation, as lex fori, are used for determining 
parental consent nature, no matter what the effect of its absence by another law may be. 
This is confirmed in Sottomayer v. DeBarros [N°1](92) where Simonin v. Mallac is 
interpreted: 
"It only remains to consider the case of Simonin v. Mallac. The objection to the 
validity of the marriage in that case, which was solemnised in England was the want 
of the consent of parents required by the law of France, but not under the 
circumstances by this country. In our opinion this consent must be considered a part 
of the ceremony of marriage, and not a matter affecting the personal capacity of the 
parties to contract marriage." 
However, it is unsound to uphold that this decision is based on the consideration of 
French rule as providing an additional formality, because a similar decision was 
reached in Ogden v. Ogden, (93) even though the legal rule involved regards parental 
consent differently. Hence, it seems unlikely to hold this decision as a guide in all 
cases, dealing with this requirement, on the basis of its wide ratio and its undesirable 
effects. In Ogden v. Ogden, it appears that the question of classifying the French rule 
involved, was never considered. There was reliance on the assumption that such 
requirements relate to formalities, according to Simonin v. Mallac decision. The main 
reason for the decision in Ogden v. Ogden is that a marriage celebrated in England and 
involving an English domiciliary is not impeached by any incapacity which is unknown 
to English law. (94) 
32 
As regards Scottish authorities, it appears that Scots law recognises two kind of 
impediments to marriage: impedimentum dirimens which is fundamental, thus, 
rendering the marriage void, and impedimentum impeditivum which is of a prohibitive 
character (i.e. the parties are not allowed to marry until the impediment is removed). It 
is understood from the view point of Professor Clive,(95) that a foreign domiciliary 
who is incapable of marrying according to his personal law, under which the 
prohibition pertains to the essentials of marriage, cannot marry in Scotland. Parental 
consent is unknown to Scottish law.(96) The question, accordingly, is how the 
Scottish courts deal with a case involving such consent? In Bliersbach v. 
MacEwan, (97) it was maintained that parental consent was an impedimentum 
impeditivum, on the basis of its pertaining to the formalities.(98) One reason for this 
decision was that, the celebration of marriage being within Scotland; the effect of 
parental consent on the nature and the validity of marriage would be determined by 
Scots law as being the Lex loci celebrationis. 
No consideration was given to the effect of the impediment under the foreign law in this 
decision. This is confirmed in Lodge v. Lodge(99) where the absence of parental 
consent under the relevant foreign rule leads to an absolute incapacity. Nevertheless, 
the marriage was held valid. Even though reliance is placed on the domestic distinction 
between impedimentum dirimens and impedimentum impeditivum, it would not seem 
to be accurate to say that the effect to which an impediment leads, reflects its nature. 
Therefore, a requirement may be considered as essential, but having regard to the 
surrounding social customs, a given legal system may feel obliged to render the 
marriage only voidable. Further, this has been criticised by Professor Clive who states: 
"many countries do not have the concept of a marriage void abinitio and there is no 
necessary connection between this distinction and the form/substance distinction". (100) 
Moreover, taking such distinction as a guide in all cases would lead to intricate results 
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such as considering formalities as essentials and vice versa. Therefore, this distinction 
dilapidates the Scottish private international law principles. 
If the boot were on the other foot, a Scottish court should respect a French rule 
requiring (let us say) parental consent to the marriage of all persons of young age 
(whatever their personal law) if that marriage takes place in France.(l01) This is 
undesirable. However, "it might surely be a question.whether a protection intended for 
the rights of Dutch parents, given to them by Dutch law, should operate to the annulling 
of a marriage of British subjects, upon the ground of protecting rights, which do not 
belong, in any such extent, to a parent living in England. "(102) The case is surely 
different, and the Dutch parents have a clear interest. 
As regards the social view point, these decisions produce undesirable effects, namely 
consideration of the woman as married and unmarried in the place of celebration and the 
place of the domicile respectively. Thus, they result in the creation of a limping status, 
preventing the parties from marrying again within England or Scotland, and the 
legitimacy of the children is accepted in one place and not in the other. I think that the 
use of domestic rules to characterize a foreign requirement is unsound. The aim of 
extirpation oflimping marriage necessitates giving respect to the foreign law involved. 
Further, the lex fori has no interest in holding a marriage valid while it is declared null 
according to the personal law of the parties. Therefore, parental consent should be 
characterised as a substantive requirement. This can be argued, on the basis that 
requiring such consent is related to the matter of age of the parties, which is considered 
as a substantive requirement. Nevertheless, even if the English courts maintain the 
consideration of parental consent as a formality, a foreign decree annulling a marriage 
celebrated in England or Scotland without parental consent should be recognised on the 
basis of extirpating limping marriages, especially when English domiciliaries are 
involved (i.e.necessarily, as the party not requiring consent). 
34 
(i)- Criteria for classifying parental consent 
It worth mentioning that these decisions appear as ammunition to academic writers for 
appraising and stigmatizing the characterisation of parental consent as a formality. 
Many of the earlier theories marked out a distinction between those requirements which 
created absolute incapacity and those which do not. It is understood from the view of 
Westlake{1 03) that parental consent is not considered as a formality if it creates an 
absolute incapacity. This approach examines the provision in its context in the foreign 
law. However, Falconbridge(104) criticised this approach because it examines parental 
consent in isolation, when it should be considered in the whole context of foreign law. 
The advocates of analytical jurisprudence and comparative law theory state that the 
English court when considering a foreign requirement should give effect to the whole 
provision of foreign law. Thus, provisions relating to parental consent are regarded as 
matters of family law, therefore, they should be respected everywhere.{10S) Clearly, 
the latter view is not based on analytical jurisprudence and comparative law, but it 
stands better than the former view mentioned above. 
Falconbridge( 1 06) points out: " in order to characterise the requirement of French law, 
the English courts must examine the concrete provisions of the French law of marriage, 
not merely the relevant provision as to parental consent or other alleged ground of 
invalidity, dissociated or isolated from their context, but the whole title or group of 
chapters and articles relating to marriage." This view is upheld as correct, because it 
gives respect to the relevant foreign law involved. Accordingly, it would not seem to 
be accurate to rely on the lex fori for characterising any requirement, when the 
consideration should be given, on comity to the personal law of the parties, on the basis 
that the lex fori theory debilitates the basis of choice of law rules. 
Professor Anton, though he admits that the law of the forum must decide whether the 
relevant foreign rules relate to the formalities or to the essentials of the marriage for the 
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real issue is one of establishing a choice of law rule, had little doubt that foreign rules 
establishing impediments to marriage should be examined in their foreign setting if the 
tendency of preventing limping marriages would be achieved.(106a) One might argue 
that this process seems to be the only rational method by which full and proper effect 
can be given to the forum's choice of law rules. To this extent, the general editor of 
Cheshire and North's private international law submitted that 
"[t]o take the opposite course and uphold a marriage essentially void under the 
personal law of the parties by attributing a merely ceremonial character to a rule 
regarded as essential by that law would not only be the negation of so-called comity, 
but would incongruously debilitate the English [forum] choice of law rule". (1 06b) 
It is therefore clear that a foreign classification cannot be ignored unless it contravenes 
the forum's public policy or is repugnant to some fundamental principle of the forum. 
Finally, the Scottish Law Commission has recently suggested that the Scottish courts 
must examine foreign rules on parental consent in the light of the system of which they 
form part. The Scottish Law Commission justified its positions by arguing that it 
would be impracticable and unsatisfactory to characterise all requirements of parental 
consent automatically as pertaining to form, for such a requirement may result in a legal 
incapacity if, and only if, it is "intended to prevent the young person from entering into 
a valid marriage anywhere, in any way, just as the Scottish rule about under-age 
marriages is intended to prevent a Scottish domiciliary under the age of 16 from 
entering into a valid marriage anywhere". But it is interesting to underline that a foreign 
rule which merely delays a minor's marriage without parental consent for a period after 
consent was refused would not be regarded as resulting in a legal incapacity simply 
because it would not preclude the young person's marriage. Relying on the fact that it 
would be unsatisfactory to characterise all foreign requirements of parental consent 
automatically as requirements resulting in a legal incapacity, the Scottish Law 
Commission recommended that: 
"[a] rule requiring a person under a certain age to obtain the prior consent of a parent 
or guardian before he or she can marry should be regarded as resulting in a legal 
incapacity for marriage if, but only if, it precludes a marriage by that person 
anywhere in any f oml while under that age". ( 1 06 c) 
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One might therefore argue that the proposed rule appears to be much more consistent 
with the policy consideration behind section 3(5) of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 
which was designed to discourage "runaway" marriages by foreign minors without 
parental consent. It is also interesting to note that the proposed rule would have 
resulted in a different decision in the case of Bliersbach v. MacEwan and in the much-
criticised case of Ogden v. Ogden. 
C- Forms of Performing Marriage 
As regards the existing divergences between domestic laws of countries, a fundamental 
difference of attitude concerning forms of marriage exists between countries where 
domestic law confers on the marriage a secular nature, on one hand, and those 
countries where the marriage is considered as a sacrament on the other. Accordingly, 
the question of necessity of any ceremony and the question of the presence of an 
official at the ceremony have been characterised differently. In what follows, 
consideration shall be given to the system of compulsory civil ceremony, to the system 
of compulsory religious ceremony, and to the optional system. 
1- Civil Ceremony 
A civil ceremony necessitates intervention of a public authority or an official, and 
fulfillment of certain formalities at a definite time and place. (107) It is pointed out that 
many countries consider civil ceremony compulsory for celebration of marriage within 
their territories, without considering nationalities or domiciles to which the parties 
belong. On the other hand, they recognise marriages solemnised abroad in accordance 
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with the lex loci celebrationis, regardless of the ceremony by which they are 
celebrated.(108) A marriage between Algerians, abroad, in a local form is recognised 
as valid ifthe local form is a civil ceremony. But if the ceremony is religious and the 
parties are Muslims, the marriage will not be recognised, unless the locus actum 
requires observance of the rules of the religious denomination of the parties, i.e muslim 
ceremony for the Algerians. (l 09) 
An important question arises when foreigners celebrate their marriage within these 
countries; is the requirement of a religious ceremony required by the countries to which 
the parties belong a formality or essential? In determination of the validity of a religious 
or civil marriage celebrated within these countries between parties belonging to 
countries, at least one of them require religious form, reference should be made to that 
law for determining the significance conferred on such marriage. (110) But the result of 
such a seemingly fair-minded point of view is the dictating extra-territorium by the 
religious to the secular country as to how the latter should conduct its marriage 
ceremonies, a stance adopted by Malta and rejected by England in the Maltese Marriage 
Cases. Regarding these systems which consider civil ceremony compulsory, a 
marriage celebrated in a religious ceremony within the forum is null and void, even if 
this ceremony is the only recognizable method by the personal law of the parties. This 
is well founded on public policy of the forum locus actum. Further, the insurance of 
protecting parties' interest, the gravity of the act, and third party and society interest are 
bases of such requirement too. (111) 
Public policy as a basis of requiring a civil ceremony is questionable, and implies that 
the personal law of the parties remains in theory applicable, but its application is 
dismissed because of its contradiction of the forum concepts. Relying on the aim of 
conferring universal validity upon marriage, the forum locus actum has to admit the 
38 
exigency of a religious ceremony required by the parties' personal law, especially when 
the parties belong to common nationalities or when the personal laws of the parties 
require the same ceremony. But a marriage celebrated in a civil ceremony ought to be 
recognised by the personal law of the parties, otherwise a limping marriage will be 
created. ( 112 ) 
2- Religious Ceremony 
A religious ceremony necessitates the presence of a priest or a minister of the church or 
any authorised religious body. As regards countries whose domestic law regards 
religious ceremony as obligatory, extraterritorial application of this principle is 
required. Apparently, it appears from Greek law that any person who wants to marry 
must take into account his religious denomination's form, and then, in cases where the 
parties belong to different religious denomination, both ceremonies must be respected. 
This is based on the marriage consideration as a sacrament, and the religious celebrant 
is the representative of God. Further, religious nature is not conferred on the marriage 
only by the presence of an authorised celebrant, but relies on the parties' will to 
solemnise a confessional act by observing the requirements of their personal law . (113) 
Besides, a civil marriage, of parties belonging to these countries, abroad will not be 
recognised unless it is followed by a religious ceremony. The Hague convention on 
marriage 1902 provides that these countries can refuse to recognise as valid, marriages 
of their nationals or domiciliaries solemnised abroad in a civil ceremony. (114) 
A question arises, whether the court of the forum should recognise a marriage 
celebrated religiously without observance of lex loci celebrationis requirement. The 
court of the forum, being the lex loci celebrationis may refuse recognition of a 
marriage celebrated in a religious ceremony without observance of the local law 
preliminaries, especial when the application of the local law is imperatively 
required.(lIS) Reliance on the parties' will to solemnise a confessional act as a basis 
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of requiring a religious ceremony is questionable, and implies that the parties may 
choose to celebrate their marriage in a civil ceremony. Hence, these countries which 
require such form, as essential, have to restrict their laws, in particular when the 
marriage involves a foreign element whose law requires a civil ceremony. However, 
they should accept as valid a civil marriage entered into where only one of their 
nationals is involved, unless the personal law of the other party requires religious 
ceremony and both parties belong to a common religious denomination. Therefore, if 
the parties belong to a common nationality, or their personal laws require a religious 
ceremony and they belong to the same religious denomination, the lex loci 
celebrationis should permits such celebration on the basis of creating a universal valid 
marriage. Furthermore, these countries have to permit foreigners belonging to countries 
requiring civil ceremony to celebrate their marriages in such ceremony within their 
territories. 
3- Optional Systems 
English and Scottish laws state that provisions relating to the form of the ceremony and 
mode of solemnisation of the marriage pertain to formalities. The question of the 
necessity of a religious or civil ceremony has been examined in many cases, and it was 
held that the form of the ceremony should be determined by the lex loci 
celebrationis.(116) However, within the United Kingdom it is established that 
celebration of a marriage either in civil or religious ceremony is permissible with 
observance of some preliminaries, such as marriage notice and marriage schedule. (117) 
Moreover, the authorised celebrant must proceed to celebrate the marriage within a form 
recognised, by the religious body to which he belongs, as sufficient for the 
solemnisation of marriage. The authorised celebrant cannot celebrate the marriage 
religiously unless the parties produce before him the marriage schedule. It is therefore 
clear that a marriage celebrated without the production of the schedule will not be 
recognised. The marriage of foreigners who fail to observe the preliminaries of lex 
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loci celebrationis will be held invalid according to English and Scottish law. (118) 
It is worth mentioning that the optional system reduces limping marriages, on the basis 
that it takes into account the characterisation of the marriage as a sacrament or as a civil 
act. Further, it is based on the fact that, though the existence of celebration is 
necessary, the nature of the ceremony is not an aim in itself: the nature of the ceremony, 
as secular or religious, is less important. Therefore, the optional system should be 
adopted in a way which permits the parties to use their personal law form if they belong 
to a common nationality or domicile, or if their personal laws require the same form. 
Where such conditions are not fulfilled, the lex loci celebrationis form should be 
applied imperatively. Therefore, extraterritorial application should not be granted to the 
personal law forms, unless one of the above conditions is fulfilled, where the lex loci 
celebrationis should permit such celebration. To achieve the universality of this rule 
which will lead to universal validity of marriage, this should be incorporated in all legal 
systems, and should be stated in international conventions. 
4- Proxy marriage 
Proxy marriage may be described as a marriage which is celebrated without the 
presence of one or both parties. But his or her consent is delivered by a special 
authorised agent or a proxy appointed to participate in the marriage ceremony on behalf 
of his or her principal. The main criteria of a proxy marriage is that it requires a formal 
celebration with the assistance of a civil registrar or a religious celebrant. 
The proxy marriage question was widely discussed in Apt v. Apt, (119) where a proxy 
marriage was celebrated in Argentine. The power of attorney was executed in London. 
It was argued that the issue involved was one of essential validity. This was rejected 
on the basis that" ... the method of giving consent as distinct from the fact of consent is 
41 
essentially a matter for the lex loci celebrationis and does not raise a question of 
capacity."(120) Therefore, the lex loci celebrationis is the governing rule upon 
determination of all questions relating to the power of attorney and formalities 
applicable to marriage, if proxy form is permitted. (121) Taking into consideration the 
question of determining the place of celebration, it is argued in this case that there is no 
locus contractus as both parties to the marriage were not present at the ceremony. It 
was held that the place of celebration is the place where the proxy participates in 
marriage ceremony and that the marriage certificate seems to be conclusive as to the 
place of celebration. Accordingly, if the proxy marriage is regarded as valid in that 
country, there is no appropriate reason for its non-recognition in third countries. From 
the view point of Professor Palsson, it is understood that the opposite view states that 
the place of celebration of a proxy marriage is the place where the power of attorney is 
executed, on the basis that the consent of the represented party is really given when and 
where the proxy is appointed. Therefore, the communication of the consent by the 
proxy at the ceremony is only for establishing the marriage relation. (122) 
Palsson's rival view seems unfounded because the consent of the represented party is 
not decisive before its communication at the ceremony. Hence, the place where the 
consent are exchanged and where the transaction takes place is the place of 
celebration. (123) 
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Section Two: 
Application of Locus Regit ActulIl Rule 
A- Nature of the Lex Loci Celebrationis 
Locus regit actum with regard to marriage is a commonly found maxim, but it has been 
subject to varying interpretations in different places as a result of the existence of 
different religions, morals and customs. What might be deemed as a mere formality in 
one place might be regarded as a matter affecting the essential validity of marriage in 
another. It is stressed in many countries that "the law of a country where a marriage is 
solemnised must alone decide all questions relating to the validity of the ceremony by 
which the marriage is alleged to have been constituted,"(124) and, therefore, the 
personal law of the parties is irrelevant whether or not it coincides with the local law . 
Whether any ceremony constitutes a formally valid marriage depends exclusively on the 
law of the place of celebration, and thus, non-compliance of the ceremony with the 
existing formalities of local law results in the formal invalidity of the marriage even 
though the ceremony is recognised as a way of performing a valid marriage under the 
personal law of the parties.c 125) 
The imperative approach of lex loci celebrationis has been confirmed and justified by 
many academic writers. In the past, it was maintained that the concept of sovereignty is 
one of the bases upon which this approach stands. This is related to the territoriality 
doctrine under which it is thought that the local form is the most convenient because of 
its enactment according to the morals and customs of the "locus actum" state. Local 
forms are applicable within the forum where they are enacted and upon the subjects of 
the state who are residents ofthejorum, irrespective of the duration of their residence. 
Therefore, the lex loci rule must be of imperative application on the basis that 
compliance with the local forms produces their effects even if the parties' personal law 
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requires different forms. (126) This is questionable; enactment of local forms according 
to the morals and customs of the forum locus actus appears to be a most convenient 
basis for applying the law on the ground of personality principle since it is unsound to 
subject a person to foreign morals and customs. Further, application of the law of the 
forum locus actum upon a foreigner residing temporarily within the territory of the 
forum is not well founded. Therefore, this approach is inconsistent with the existence 
of personal status. ( 127) 
Public policy and the need for the intervention of public authority or an official are 
adduced to justify this approach. Formalities of marriage are characterised as public 
form relating to public policy on the basis of the gravity of marriage and its importance 
to the parties and society as being a family matter. The society, however, has an 
interest in the submission of marriage celebration to the local forms within the territory 
of the forum. (128) For instance, if marriage is regarded as secular (only) results in 
preventing any religious body from solemnising marriage within the territory of the 
place where such a rule is adopted and vice versa.(129) Intervention of an official or 
public authority is required for marriage celebration, and, therefore, the form should be 
governed by the law to which the authority belongs," lex magistratus". It has been 
suggested that lex loci celebrationis cannot be applied facultatively in cases bearing on 
public policy because the intervention of a marriage officer is a principle of public 
law,(130) As regards the fact that the place of celebration may be accidental and 
uncertain, as, for instance, when the marriage is celebrated aboard a ship, public policy 
reasoning is unfortunate because it implies that the personal law should, in principle, 
determine the formal validity, and the lex loci rule is applied alternatively in accordance 
with the role of public policy in the ancient choice oflaw rules.( 131) 
On the authorities so far, English and Scottish laws regard the lex loci rule as an 
imperative rule, and therefore, a marriage involving Scottish or English subjects and 
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celebrated abroad without compliance with 'locus actum' will be held void, even 
though the form in which it is solemnised is considered as a good form for performing 
a valid marriage under Scottish and English laws.(132) This matter arose in the case of 
MacCullock v. MacCullock, (133) which concerns two Scottish domiciliaries who went 
to the Isle of Man and cohabited there for [06] months. It was held that the marriage 
was void on the ground that cohabitation with habit and repute does not constitute a 
legal marriage in the place of celebration. It is evident that English and Scottish Court 
felt obliged to follow the decisions granted at the time when the principle of submitting 
the entire validity of marriage to the lex loci celebrationis was prevailing. The 
imperative approach was confirmed as early as 1752, when the Courts decided that 
"[o]ne rule in these cases should be observed by all countries -that is, the law where the 
Contract is made."(134) It is illustrated that lex loci celebrationis is the most 
convenient and certain law to be applied upon formalities of marriage on the basis that 
application of parties' personal law results in infinite mischief and confusion. (135) 
Indeed, the local law is the most convenient law to ascertain the validity of marriage, in 
particular if the parties are from different countries and different forms are required by 
their personal laws. But holding convenience and certainty of the rule as a basis for 
imperative approach is not easily reconcileable to any sound reasoning because 
uncertainty is not one of the effects of a facultative approach. Even if the facultative 
approach is adopted, the parties would still have to respect and satisfy the chosen law. 
Further, lex loci rule loses its certainty in cases where the parties belong to a system 
conferring upon the ceremony the character of essential requirements because of its 
(lex loci) incapacity to confer a universal validity upon marriage.(136) 
In Taczanowska v. Taczanowski(137) and Kochanski v. Kochanska,(138) it is 
stressed that application of 'lex loci' rule depends solely upon a presumption that the 
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parties intended to submit the question of formal validity to the local law. Thus, it 
leads to the assumption that the lex loci is not applicable whenever the parties rebutted 
the presumption. It seems, however, that the parties' decision for celebrating their 
marriage abroad within their personal law forms should be considered as a presumption 
of the parties' intention to subject their marriage celebration to their personal law. 
Mendes da Costa stated that the presumption referred to in Scrimshire decision does not 
mean "that the parties intended the law of France to apply", but they intended only to 
confer jurisdiction upon French Courts.(139) 
The other main approach to the rule is the facultative approach under which the parties 
have an optional choice to comply, either with the local law or their personal law when 
they perform a contract.(140) It is reasonable to conceive that the lex loci celebrationis 
is a permissive rule in private international law . Generally, it is admitted that the parties 
performing a contract have an optional choice to observe the forms of either local law or 
the law governing essentials of the act. 
A question arises; why is this view not taken, a fortiori, concerning the marriage 
contract of which the essentials and formalities are more tightly linked? Relying on the 
marriage as a contract, it is suggested that locus actum should be a facultative rule 
upon marriage inasmuch as it is applied for other Contracts.(141) This has been 
criticised on the basis that assimilation of marriage to an ordinary contract is not 
reconcileable to any sound reasoning because of its aspect of creating a status of which 
the effects cannot be limited by a consensual agreement, and the intervention of a 
marriage officer is very important in protecting social interest. (142) However, contrary 
to what has been said, my opinion is that assimilation of marriage to other contract will 
not confer upon the parties entire freedom inasmuch as to limit the marriage effects, but 
it confers only the option of choosing the forms which confer upon their marriage 
universal (formal) validity. 
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The preliminary publications to a marriage are adduced for protecting social and family 
interest, and thus permit any person having any reason to submit an objection to 
marriage as, for instance, that the parties are within the prohibited degrees. However, 
preliminary pUblications as a formality are designed for the respect of an essential 
requirement,(143) This leads to say that lex loci should be applied facultatively upon 
formalities, for the place of celebration might be accidental. It has been also established 
that where the use of local forms is precluded by some circumstances, compliance with 
the Common Law of England or Scotland will suffice for holding the marriage valid 
according to the English and Scottish laws. It is said that the use of local form is 
impossible where these forms are inconsistent with the social and cultural environment 
to which the parties belong.( 144) From the standpoint of logic, it would seem that this 
argument should be a basis for establishing the facultative application of lex loci rule 
upon formalities of marriage. The fact that countries should take notice and respect the 
laws of each other with respect to marriage is a great support to this view. 
By virtue of the Algerian Civil Code, article 19,0 45) celebration of marriage according 
to the forms of the common personal law of the parties is permissible. Therefore, there 
is no obstacle to validating a marriage solemnised in Algeria within the forms of the 
parties' personal law if this is necessary for the international validity of the marriage. 
The difficulty lies, however, in the implementation of such a possibility. According to 
Article 71 of Algerian Civil Status Code,(146) the registrar and "Cadi" judge are the 
only competent authorities for celebrating marriages within the territory. However, 
marriages celebrated before "Cadi" are usually regarded as religious marriages. This is 
doubtful because the "cadi" is not a minister. These marriages are regarded as such on 
the basis of the substantive rules which govern the essentials. It is reasonable, 
therefore, to conceive that the same procedure could be admitted for marriages of 
foreigners solemnised before ministers of their religion who would have the same 
authority as "Cadi."(147) 
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As regards the Hague Convention of 1976, the facultative approach adopted earlier is 
dismissed.(148) It is provided that the formal adequacy of marriage shall be 
determined sufficiently by the law of the state of celebration, and thus, if that state 
permits celebration of marriage according to the parties' personal law, the marriage 
should be recognised by third states as valid.(149) This convention, therefore, has 
been criticised on the basis that it does not provide respect for systems under which the 
religious ceremony is compulsory,(150) 
In conclusion, it may be said that application of lex loci celebrationis imperatively 
shows a lack of consideration to certain religious orders which are required as essential 
in accordance with some legal systems. Furthermore, it debilitates the basis upon 
which the lex loci rule is introduced because it leads to the same undesirable effects to 
which the existing rules before its introduction led. Thus, this approach does not take 
into account the existing divergences between legal systems whose domestic laws 
regard the marriage, on the one hand, as a sacrament, and legal systems adopting the 
secularisation nature of marriage. For instance, such a case would occur where two 
Greek nationals wish to marry in France. According to Greek law, Greek subjects 
must marry in accordance with the formalities of their Church irrespective of the 
provisions of the lex loci celebrationis, whilst under French law a civil ceremony is 
compulsory. This type of situation may lead to a limping marriage, and it would seem 
that the only solution, as suggested by Savigny,O 51) is that the parties must go 
through both ceremonies in order to affect a universal valid marriage. Although this 
might not seem an undue hardship -and perhaps not a precaution which it would be 
unreasonable to suggest - a better (optional) rule can be devised. 
One might argue that the facultative application of lex loci rule satisfies the concept 
divergence between systems which regard the marriage as a sacrament, those 
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considering it as a civil act, and those which do not require any formalities for 
marriage, i.e. consensual marriage system. In MacCullock v. MacCullock, for 
instance, the marriage would have been held valid before Scottish Courts if the 
facultative approach was adopted'< 152) Besides, the introduction of locus regit actum 
rule in 16th century so as to facilitate celebration of marriage constitutes the major 
argument and reasoning of this approach. The desire to confer a universal validity 
upon marriage buttressed by the prevailing policy to eliminate limping marriage status, 
and the existence of consular forms might be invoked as bases for this approach. It is 
reasonable to conceive that for avoiding criticism, the permissive approach must be 
lessened by some restricting conditions, i.e. the parties may use their personal law 
forms if they belong to a common personal law, or if the forms of their personal law 
coincide. Therefore, the lex loci rule becomes imperative in cases of mixed marriages 
if, and only if, the personal laws of the parties require different forms. The law of the 
place of celebration, however, would have to admit the exigence of religious ceremony 
required by the parties' personal laws and vice versa. Furthermore, the states which 
require such forms, as essential, would have to restrict the application of their own law 
to marriages solemnised between parties both of whom owe allegiance qua personal 
law to that state. To achieve international uniformity, this should be taken into 
consideration in international conventions so as to ensure respect for every legal 
system, and it should be the prevailing view under every legal system. 
B- Marriages celebrated within the F orulIl 
It has been established that formal validity of marriage is a matter to be determined by 
the lex loci celebrationis, the law of the state where the marriage ceremony takes place, 
which reflects one of the general principles of the conflict of laws, i.e. locus regit 
actum. Non-compliance, however, of the marriage ceremony with the formalities of 
the lex loci celebrationis is sufficient to hold the marriage void before Scots 
Courts.(lS3) However, observance of formalities, either of the place of celebration or 
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of the parties' personal law, if they belong to a common nationality, suffices for the 
validity of marriage before the Algerian Courts.(154) 
From the view point of Professors Anton and Clive,(155) it is understood that a 
marriage celebrated in Scotland between parties domiciled abroad, inasmuch as it 
complies with a sufficient form under Scottish law, will be held valid in Scotland, even 
though the ceremony, if it is conducted in the country of the parties' domicile, would 
not constitute a valid marriage and vice versa. This rule is confirmed in many cases 
which consider the question of validity of marriage containing a foreign element 
celebrated in Scotland. For instance, reference may be made to Miller v. Deakin,(156) 
where the Lord Ordinary held that the marriage was null and void on the ground of 
non-compliance with Section 1 of Marriage (Scotland) Act 1856 which provided that 
any irregular marriage celebrated in Scotland after 31 st December 1856 will be valid if 
one of the parties had his usual residence there or had lived in Scotland for 21 days 
preceding the marriage'c 157) It appears in this case that the parties are domiciliaries of 
England, and it is clear from the evidence given that neither of them had his or her usual 
residence in Scotland, nor lived there for 21 days before the marriage. 
In Tallarico v. The Lord Advocate, (158) an Italian native met an English woman in 
London when he was staying there temporarily. Thereafter they became engaged in 
1917. An agreement was reached about choosing Scotland as a place of celebration of 
their marriage. Afterwards, she went there and resided for 21 days prior to the 
marriage. The ceremony took place in a solicitor's office, in the presence of his clerk, 
where they accepted each other as husband and wife. A declaration recording their 
mutual consent had been signed by them. It was held that the marriage was formally 
valid, and a decree of declarator was granted on the ground of compliance of the 
marriage with the requirements of Scots law, as being confirmed by the evidence which 
was given to the Court. 
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As regards Scots law as it stands after the coming into force of the Marriage (Scotland) 
Act 1939, a marriage celebrated without proclamation of banns or publication of notice 
of intention to marry was considered as a void marriage.(159) In Brade1y v. 
Mocherie, (160) a marriage celebrated without either pUblication of banns, or notice of 
intention to marry as required under Marriage (Scotland) Act was held a null act. A 
question arises as to whether the marriage is valid in cases where the preliminaries were 
carried out on the basis that the parties supplied the Registrar with wrong information 
concerning their status. The answer is in the affirmative if the false statement is not 
related to capacity to marry. For instance, the fact that the Registrar has been supplied 
with false information concerning the parties residence is not sufficient to hold the 
marriage void according to Section 1(4) of Marriage (Scotland) Act 1939 which 
provides that: "any marriage contracted in accordance with the foregoing provisions 
shall, unless there is a legal impediment thereto, be valid and regular marriage in all 
respects."(161) Therefore, a marriage celebrated without the presence of the parties at 
the ceremony, or publication of notice or proclamation of banns, or presence of a 
competent authority is formally invalid. 
According to the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, as amended by the Law Reform 
(Miscelaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1980, a marriage formally defective is valid 
under Scots law provided the parties were present at the ceremony and the marriage 
registration has duly taken place. It is stated in Section 23(A) of the Marriage 
(Scotland) Act 1977(162) that: 
"subject to Section (1 & 2), without prejudice to Section 24 (1), of this Act, where 
the particulars of any marriage at the ceremony in respect of which both parties were 
present are entered in a register of marriage by or at the behest of an appropriate 
Registrar, the validity of that marriage shall not be questioned in any legal proceeding 
whatsoever, on the grounds of failure to comply with the requirement or restriction 
imposed by, under or by virtue of this Act." 
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The validity of a formally defective marriage is not questioned in any legal proceeding 
unless there is a legal impediment to it, as, for instance, the parties are within the 
forbidden degrees. Therefore, it might be said that the validity of a formally defective 
marriage is questionable in any legal proceeding if it is not registered before its validity 
is questioned. 
In the case where one of the parties resides in England or Wales, submission of an 
approved certificate issued by an English Superintendent Registrar may be a substitute 
for the submission of a normal notice of intention to marry. Thus, the marriage will be 
valid even if the other party resides in ScotlandJl63) Further, a foreign domiciliary is 
required, if it is possible, to produce to the Registrar a certificate issued by a competent 
authority in his or her domicile state in order to ascertain that "he is not known to be 
subject to any legal incapacity (in terms of the law of the state) which would prevent 
his marrying. "(164) Non-submission of such a certificate is not regarded as a basis for 
invalidating a marriage, unless there is a legal incapacity under the personal law of the 
foreign party. The main reason, as Professor Clive has suggested, is that "Not all 
countries issue Certificates of no Impediment. ,,( 165) It is worth pointing out that if the 
reason for not issuing such a certificate is that the lex domicilii does not recognise the 
party's divorce or annulment, granted by a Court of a civil jurisdiction in Scotland, or 
such as would be recognised in Scotland, the marriage can be celebrated without such a 
certificate. (166) 
Since the Algerian law regards the formal validity of marriage as a matter either for the 
lex loci celebrationis, or for the common personal law of the parties, it concedes that 
foreigners may marry in Algeria according either to the form of Algerian law or to the 
forms required by their common nationality law.(167) In cases where the parties 
choose to comply with Algerian formalities, the marriage is upheld valid before the 
Algerian Court, even if the marriage will be void according to the parties' common 
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nationality law. Furthermore, a marriage celebrated in accordance with the forms of the 
parties' common personal law is valid, especially if such a celebration is needed for 
conferring international validity upon marriage in the view of the personal law . 
As regards Article 71 of Algerian Civil Status Code(168), foreigners may solemnise 
their marriage in Algeria according to Algerian forms, provided one of the parties has 
resided there for a month preceding the ceremony. Therefore, no marriage between 
foreigners shall be solemnised in Algeria, unless one of the parties had at the date 
thereof his or her domicile there, or had resided in Algeria for a month preceding the 
marriage ceremony. It is worth noting that the Code contains no provisions about the 
effects of non-compliance with the residence requirement. However, it is assumed 
from Article 77, alenia 2( 169) that non-compliance with such a requirement would not 
invalidate a marriage solemnised, unless there is a legal impediment to it under the 
personal law of the parties. 
In addition, if a woman has been married before and her marriage has been dissolved, 
she must submit to the Registrar a copy of the divorce or annulment decree. A widow 
must submit the death certificate of the former husband.(170) Nevertheless, non-
submission of such a certificate is not a basis for annulling a marriage of a foreign 
woman solemnised in Algeria unless her marriage subsists at the time of the celebration 
of the second marriage, provided the second marriage is not consummated. (171) But, 
a marriage celebrated in Algeria without compliance with the prescribed formalities 
cannot be invoked in Algeria as valid unless it is registered after a decision of the court 
stating that it is valid.(17 2) 
In conclusion, it might be said that a marriage is formally valid before Algerian and 
Scottish courts even if the marriage would be void under the parties' personal law in 
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cases where the lex loci celebrationis' formalities are complied with. The practical 
difference between the Algerian and Scots laws is that the latter shows lack of 
consideration to certain requirements which might be regarded as essential under the 
parties' personal law. Consider, for instance, Bliersbach v. MacEwan,(173) where 
parental consent was a matter of capacity in accordance to the law of the parties' 
common personal law. Nevertheless, the marriage was held valid before Scottish 
Courts on the basis of characterising such a requirement as a formality under Scottish 
law. Let us suppose that the case comes before the Algerian Courts, what would be the 
decision? Applying the Algerian concepts of characterisation, the marriage would be 
held void because an essential requirement, according to the personal law of the parties, 
is not satisfied. Furthermore, Algerian law gives the opportunity for the parties to use 
their personal law formalities, if it is the only recognisable way of performing marriage 
under their common personal law . For instance, in Caraslanis case( 17 4 ) the marriage 
would be held valid before the Algerian Courts on the basis of complying with the 
parties' personal law formalities. 
The present writer believes that it is unreasonable to consider a marriage valid because 
of its compliance with lex loci celebrationis, whilst it is invalid under the law with 
which the marriage has its real connection, i.e. the law which will be asked to govern 
the effects of that marriage. Universal uniformity of conflict of law rules needs co-
operation between all legal systems. Each of the systems has to respect and take into 
account the others, as far as they do not offend its public policy. From a logical 
standpoint, the consideration of parties' personal law formalities within the 'locus 
actum' is not an offence to the public policy of the forum. Therefore, a marriage 
celebrated according to forms of the common personal law of the parties should be 
regarded as valid, especially if such a celebration is needed for rendering the marnage 
universally valid. 
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c- Marriages celebrated abroad 
The basic rule is that every marriage celebrated abroad without observance of the lex 
loci celebrationis formalities will be held void ab initio and will be regarded as such 
before Scottish courts, unless it falls within the exceptions mentioned below. (175) A 
marriage involving either Scottish elements or foreigners celebrated abroad within the 
formalities of the place of celebration will be held valid, even though the form in which 
it is celebrated, if it is conducted in Scotland, will not constitute a valid marriage under 
Scottish law. In Warrender v. Warrender, (176) for instance, the validity of marriage, 
between a Scotsman and an English woman celebrated according to the law of England, 
i.e. lex loci, was upheld before the Court of Session. Furthermore, a proxy marriage 
solemnised abroad would likely to be recognised as valid in Scotland provided this 
method of celebration is acceptable in the place of celebration.(177) 
On the other hand, the Scottish Court would be likely in certain circumstances to 
dismiss recognition of the validity of marriage celebrated abroad if there has been no 
compliance with the formalities of lex loci celebrationis. In MacCullocK v. 
MacCullocK( 178), for example, the validity of a marriage by cohabitation with habit 
and repute (a matter of form, it would seem) which took place on the Isle of Man, was 
considered. On proof that cohabitation with habit and repute was not recognised there 
to constitute a legal marriage, it was held that the marriage was void. It was established 
in Johnstone v. Godet,(179) that a marriage celebrated in a religious ceremony in a 
legal system where such form is not recognised, would not be held valid in Scotland. 
This issue arose in the case of Elbaz v. Elbaz, (180) where a woman, English 
domiciliary, solemnised a marriage with a Jewish man, an Israeli domiciliary, in Israel. 
The ceremony was Jewish. Moreover, the rabbinical authorities in Israel had been 
deceived by the woman into believing that she was Jewish. The Israeli law recognises 
only marriages in Jewish form in Israel, if both parties were born of a Jewish mother, 
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or who were converted to Judaism. From the evidence, it appears that she was not a 
member of Judaism and she had never been one. Hence a decree of nullity was granted 
on the basis that the ceremony which the parties had entered into was of no effect 
because lex loci requirements were not taken into consideration therein. As regards the 
religious ceremony, the lex loci celebrationis must be complied with if it requires 
observance of the rules of the religious denomination to which the parties belong, 
otherwise, non-compliance with its formalities does not affect the validity of a 
marriage. ( 181 ) 
The same view was held in Salvesen (Vonlorang) v. Administrator of Austrian 
Property, (182) where a Scotswoman domiciled in Scotland went through a form of a 
marriage with an Austrian subject in France, where residence and publication were the 
conditions of constituting a valid marriage. On the evidence, it appears that these 
formalities had not been complied with, and a court of the common (German) domicile 
of the parties granted a decree of nullity. Although the question before the Court was 
that of recognition of the nullity decree, it might be deduced that the marriage was held 
to be void before the English and Scottish Courts on the basis of recognising the nullity 
decree. It merely happened that the conflict rule of the foreign German forum was the 
same as that of Scotland. 
As regards Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, a Scottish resident who wishes to marry 
abroad can obtain a certificate of no impediment if the law of the place of celebration 
requires the submission of such a document.(183) There is, however, no decision 
which actually sustains the validity of a marriage solemnised without obtaining such a 
certificate. In order to sustain the validity of such a marriage, Scottish Courts would be 
likely to refer to the law of the place of celebration for ascertaining the effect of the 
absence of such requirement upon the validity of the marriage. Therefore, it would be 
inaccurate to hold the marriage valid, if it is void under the lex loci celebrationis. 
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The question which should be asked, therefore, is whether a marriage solemnised 
without observing local forms of the place of celebration will always be held void 
before Scottish Courts. The answer should be in the negative. However, a marriage 
solemnised in a form which is sufficient under the lex loci celebrationis will be held 
valid.(184) For instance, a marriage between two British subjects, solemnised in 
Algeria, in an English or Scottish form is a valid marriage according to Algerian 
law.(185) It woud be inaccurate to regard the marriage before the Scottish Courts as 
void inasmuch as such a decision will promote limping marriages, and the Scottish 
Courts therefore should follow the rules of the Algerian lex loci celebrationis. 
The rigidity of 'locus regit actum' rule under English and Scottish conflict of laws, the 
adoption of the rule as a facultative one under many legal systems, and the desire to 
gain international uniformity of decisions in order to eliminate limping marriages 
strongly led to the acceptance of 'renvoi doctrine' for sustaning the formal validity of 
marriage.(186) In Taczanowska v. Taczanowski, (187) a marriage took place in Italy 
between two Polish subjects, in a form which did not constitute a valid marriage in 
accordance with the domestic law of the lex loci celebrationis. On the proof, Italian 
conflict of laws would recognise the validity of marriage celebrated according to the 
parties' personal law. It was assumed that an English Court would be prepared to refer 
to the national law of the parties. Further, in Hooper v. Hooper, (188) English law 
was applied on the basis of renvoi. A marriage between two British subjects was held 
to be void on the basis that no banns had been published according to the Marriage Act 
1949. (The marriage had taken place in Baghdad, where there was a requirement of 
compliance with the parties' nationality).{189) This case, therefore, may be treated as 
authority that renvoi is accepted by English and Scottish Courts in relation to the formal 
validity of marriage. 
The renvoi doctrine in relation to the formal validity of marriage has been discussed 
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recently by the English and Scottish Law Commissions.(190) Importance has been 
given to the factors which favour the application of renvoi. It was shown that 
application of renvoi leads to desirable effects, such as promoting uniformity of status 
and preventing creation of limping marriages. Furthermore, it is conceded that it is 
consistent with the principles of favor matrimonii and harmonisation of decisions. (191) 
Therefore, reference to the lex loci celebrationis "should be construed as a reference to 
the whole law of that Country (including its rules of private international law) and not 
merely its domestic rules.,,(192) It is stressed that reference to the lex loci 
celebrationis should be, primajacie, a reference to its choice of law rules. Hence, the 
reference to the lex loci cannot be regarded as alternative reference to either its 
domestic rules or its conflict law rules, because: 
"such an alternative reference would be convenient for the parties and would 
obviously support the policy in favour of validity of marriages, but it would do so at 
the expense of producing a "limping marriage as between the country of celebration 
and our own."( 193) 
In explaining how the alternative reference would create a limping marriage, it is said 
that: 
"In practice, the relevant question in any given case should be whether the formalities 
prescribed by the law of the country of celebration have been complied with for that 
case; and there would be something odd in upholding a marriage on the ground that it 
complies with the law of the foreign country of celebration when the Courts of that 
country would regard the marriage as void. ,,( 194) 
Hence, it might be said that: 
"A marriage should not be held to be formally valid on the ground that it complies 
with the domestic rules of the foreign country of celebration if the choice of law 
rules of that country requires the parties to observe the formalities prescribed by some 
other legal systems." ( 195 ) 
f 
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The Scottish Law Commission has recently suggested that reference of the formal 
validity by the law of lex loci celebrationis to some other law by way of renvoi is 
acceptable, and that the rule should be considered as part of the law of the place of 
celebration. The Scots Law Commision has therefore recommended that there is no 
need or necissity to state expressly in any future codification of the law that renvoi is 
permitted. (195a) 
In line with this view, one might think that the acceptance of renvoi leads to a lessening 
in the rigidity of locus regit actum as an imperative rule under English and Scottish 
conflict of laws. Further, it will tend "to bring about a certain rapproachement to those 
countries whose conflicts systems admit a choice between lex loci and the personal 
law ."( 196) Finally, it might be assumed that if the English and Scottish courts do not 
recognise the validity of a marriage celebrated according to whatever system is referred 
to by the choice of law rule of the lex loci, the decision would be inconsistent with the 
imperative nature of the lex loci rule under English and Scottish laws. 
According to Algerian law, application of a universal established rule, i.e. locus regit 
actum lies in Article 97 of Civil Status Code( 197) and article 19 of the Civil Code.( 198) 
In the former, it is stated that Algerian Courts should recognise the validity of a 
marriage celebrated according to the lex loci provided the required essentials (i.e. 
capacity) under the personal law of the parties are complied with. Compliance with lex 
loci, however, is sufficient to hold a marriage valid before Algerian Courts unless it 
requires observance of the rules of a religious denomination to which the parties do not 
belong. For instance, Algerian Muslims celebrating a marriage abroad in a religious 
form other than the Muslim ceremony is void in Algeria.(199) Besides, the validity of 
the marriage cannot be invoked in Algeria unless it is registered by the decison of the 
Court which is delivered by a Judge after satisfaction that the marriage is valid. 
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Furthermore, there is no doubt that the validity of a marriage will be recognised before 
the Algerian Court, if the form required is a civil ceremony. 
As the permissive approach is adopted in Algerian law,(200) the form needs not to be 
the one required by the lex loci, but the marriage is regarded as valid before Algerian 
courts if it is celebrated in a form which is sufficient to constitute a legal marriage under 
the lex loci celebrationis. A marriage solemnised in Italy, for example, between two 
Greeks in a religious form required by the Greek Law will be recognised as valid. 
Furthermore, although the lex loci celebrationis would not recognise a marriage 
celebrated within its territory in the parties' personal law form, it would be regarded 
before Algerian courts as valid provided the personal law of the parties holds its 
validity. In case of a marriage between parties, one of whom is a national of the state 
of celebration, the solution (lex loci form) adopted in Article 91(1) of Civil Status 
should apply.(201) Therefore, it might be assumed that the same solution should apply 
to the marriage between foreigners from different countries. 
From a logical standpoint, recognition of a marriage, considered as void under the lex 
loci celebrationis, as valid before an Algerian Court will produce a limping marriage as 
between the country of celebration and Algeria. In order to gain international 
uniformity of decisions and of a status, consideration should be given to the foreign 
lex loci, especially if the common personal law of the parties considers the marriage 
void. In that case, Algerian law would not recognise the marriage because it is 
unreasonable to hold it as valid when under the law which will be asked to govern its 
effect it is regarded as invalid. 
As understood from Professor Issad,(202) the case of a marriage between an Algerian 
woman and a foreigner abroad is missed out in the Article 97 of the Civil Status Code, 
on the basis that reference is only made to the marriage between Algerians themselves, 
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and Algerian men with foreign women.(203) This may be explained by the prohibition 
of marriage between Muslim women and non-Muslims which exists under Islamic law. 
In line with Issad, this omission is ill-founded on the basis that application of Article 97 
itself is sufficient for holding such marriages void, inasmuch as recognition of the 
validity of marriage is based on the respect of the required essentials under the 
personal law of the parties, because such prohibition is an essential of marriage.(204) 
In conclusion, it might be said that the practical difference between Algerian and 
Scottish laws is that the validity of a marriage celebrated according to the formalities of 
the parties' common personal law is upheld under the Algerian law, even if the 
ceremony is not recognised according to the lex loci. The Scottish law regards a 
marriage celebrated in a such form as valid, however, only if the parties' personal law 
is appointed by the lex loci choice of law rules. 
D- Time element: Do any changes in the Lex Loci Celebrationis after 
solemnisation affect the marriage validity? 
"Time becomes an important factor in the solution of a conflict of laws problem, where 
a change occurs ... in the content of substantive law of the foreign legal system selected 
under the appropriate conflict rule of the forum. ,,(205) It is well established that since 
the law of any country is a changing body of rules, and the legal acts need certainty as 
to their validity, the choice of law rules should therefore determine the legal system 
which is applicable, and the relevant time at which reference to that law should be 
made.(206) 
So far as the formalities of marriage are concerned, it is generally believed that the 
formal validity is a matter of lex loci celebrationis as it stands at the time of the 
ceremony. According to this view, any later changes in the lex loci celebrationis' 
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provisions either positive or negative have no effect on the validity of marriage. One 
reason for that is that the state of marriage should be determined with certainty, and 
acceptance of any retrospective change in the law of the place of celebration will result 
in the insecurity of the relationship between the parties.(207) It appears from the cases 
concerning marriage that this has been the prevailing view in English and Scottish laws 
until the time the question of the effect of a subsequent validating legislation carne 
before the court. It was held that the formal validity remains a matter of the law of the 
place of celebration as it exists at the time when the ceremony took place, but may be 
affected by a subsequent validating legislation in certain circumstances. 
In Starkowski v. Attorney General, (208) two persons of Polish domicile and origin 
went to Austria where they were married at a Roman Catholic Church according to their 
religious rites in May 1945. On June 12, 1945, a daughter, "Barbara", was born to 
them. Expert evidence indicated that a purely religious ceremony would not have 
constituted a valid marriage under Austrian law at that time. However, while the parties 
remained resident there, new legislation carne into force on June 30, 1945 providing 
retroactive provisions for validation of certain marriages, those performed according to 
rites, upon an entry in the family book as made by the Registrar. For unknown 
reasons, the registration had been delayed until 1949, by which time the parties had 
acquired a domicile in England. They lived as husband and wife until 1947, when they 
separated. Towards the end of 1947 and early 1948, she met another Pole by whom 
she had a child in 1949. A year later they went through a ceremony of marriage at the 
Registrar's office in Croydon. 
It is clear from the evidence that there is no doubt that the Austrian marriage was void 
according to the lex loci celebrationis for not being solemnised in a civil ceremony as 
required by the Austrian law which was in operation at the time of solemnisation. 
"Before 1949," said Lord Reid, "it was really not disputed that if the question of their 
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status had arisen when they first became domiciled here neither the law of Austria nor 
the law of England could have regarded them as legally married.,,(209) 
The crucial question, therefore, was whether the subsequent validating legislation 
would have the effect of validating the Austrian marriage before the English court. The 
suggestion that subsequent legislation as being repugnant to public policy, and to the 
well established principle, "that the court of one country will not recognise the extra-
territorial effect of foreign legislation on the status of a person neither domiciliary nor 
national of the legislating state," should not have effect upon the status of English 
domiciliaries was ruled out. The reason is that there are numerous English statutes 
enacted dealing with formally defective marriages solemnised in England, and neither 
the domicile nor the nationality of the parties have had effect upon its operation. Lord 
Tucker, therefore, said: 
"It would seem to be in accord with comity and with principle that our court should 
recognise the validity of similar foreign laws dealing with an aspect of marriage, viz, 
formality, which has always been recognised as governed by the lex loci 
celebrationis. There are other reasons for accepting this view, the most cogent of 
which are I think, as follows: (i) since a marriage, even if valid by the law of 
domicile, is regarded as invalid if not in conformity with the law of the place of 
celebration, it would seem illogical if the same law cannot retrospectively cure the 
invalidity. (ii) The legislature of the place of celebration is more cognizant of the 
informality, and accordingly, more likely to afford the necessary statutory 
relief.,,(210) 
It is also pointed out that the argument to the effect that the state of marriage should be 
determined with certainty, and that the foreign retrospective legislation should therefore 
not be given effect unless the parties consent to its operation is not convincing. It was 
illustrated that such retrospective legislation "has no concern with the state of affairs at 
the time when it is enacted: its purpose is to validate the original ceremony, and if there 
was then the necessary consent to marry, that is all that matters.,,(211) 
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Therefore, it was held that a formally defective marriage which has been subsequently 
validated by a retrospective legislation ofthe lex loci celebrationis would be recognised 
as valid by English law. The reason is that the balance of justice and convenience was 
leaning towards recognising the validity of such retrospective legislation under such 
circumstances. However, according to Lord Reid, "once it is settled that the formal 
validity of marriage is to be determined by reference to the law of the place of 
celebration, there is no compelling reason why the reference should not be to that law 
as it is when the question arises for decision. ,,(212) One might venture to suggest that 
there may be a caveat -viz so long as there has been no marriage in the intervening 
period valid as to form and essentials by the law of the forum. The Scottish Law 
Commission, in the 1992 report on family law, seems to be of opinion that the lex loci 
celebrationis should be applied in the light of any retrospective changes made in it in so 
far as the retrospective changes lead to validating invalid marriages. The Commission 
has therefore recommended that there is no need for inserting such a rule in any future 
statutory provisions simply because it is obvious that a reference to the law of the place 
of celebration after such changes have occured would have to take account of it. (212a) 
The decision in Starkowski v. Att. Gen. can be explained, "as a complete departure 
from the judicial tradition associated with the case of Lynch and Aganoor,,,(213) on the 
basis that acceptance of foreign retrospective legislation is related to the surrounding 
circumstances in each case, and it might be refused recognition in certain cases, for 
instance, in cases where the parties of the second marriage are domiciliaries or nationals 
of a country which denies recognition to retrospective validating legilsation.(214) 
Desire to eliminate limping marriage status might be a dominant motive in reaching a 
decision in favour of holding a second marriage valid if the earlier marriage is void and 
has not in the interval been validated. Furthermore, a general rule as to state that formal 
validity is determined by the lex loci as it stands at the time of the proceeding cannot be 
inferred from Lord Reid's statement mentioned above.(215) However, it might be 
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deduced that retrospective legislation should have effect as far as it is consistent with 
balance of justice, otherwise the general rule of Berthiaume v Dastous(216) will remain 
unchallenged. 
Indeed, the present writer agrees that registration is a mere administrative act, and 
therefore, the consent of the parties to its operation is irrelevant, but the parties must be 
informed that their marriage is validated by registration, especially when one of them 
had inquired of the Registrar and had been told that his or her marriage was 
nullity.(217) The reason for this is that a void marriage needs no decree to be declared 
null, and the parties to a such marriage may marry without obtaining a decree of nullity. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the wife had inquired was ignored in this decision. It seems, 
however, that the decision was based on the parties' residence in Austria at the time 
when the legislation was enacted.(218) 
As regards the certainty which the marriage needs, operation of a retrospective 
legislation retroactively should be restricted by a limited period of time. In Pilinski v. 
Pilinska, (219) for example, subsequent legislation operating retrospectively ceased to 
have effect after a period of time if the marriage has not been registered within that 
specified period of time. Therefore, the marriage, in this case, was held to be void. Dr 
Mann(220) thinks that giving effect to retrospective legislation should be based on the 
continuation ofthe relationship between the parties at the time of registration. This has 
been criticised because it does not give consideration to a temporary separation, and it is 
unreasonable to base determination of a child's status on the fact of continuation of its 
parents' relationship at the time ofvalidation.(221) 
The question that remains to be answered is whether retrospective legislation would 
have the same effect, if such legislation or the ensuing registration of marriage had been 
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preceded by the re-marriage of one or both parties, or a nullity decreee had been granted 
by a competent jurisdiction beforehand. The overwhelming weight of opinion among 
academic writers is that the forum should not give effect to a retroactive legislation 
preceded by a second marriage of one of the parties.(222) One can argue that the 
validity of the second marriage in such circumstances is unchallengeable on the ground 
that "a new relationship would have to come to existence and been consummated which 
the lex loci celebrationis could not injustice undo.,,(223) It is worth pointing out that 
acceptance of retrospective legislation in such a case would be a source of a great 
injustice and inconvenience. Therefore, this conclusion does not have to depend on a 
vague notion of public policy,(224) but it is sufficient to say that at the date of the 
second marriage, there is every reason to uphold it (the second marriage). Further, the 
retrospective legislation is irrelevant in this case not because of application of any 
conflict principle or rule (though it would not be hard to find one), but it is hard and 
undesirable to accept any subsequent legislation which may jeopardise the validity of 
the second marriage, especially if the parties have cohabited and acted in the reasonable 
belief that they were husband and wife. The arguments of justice, convenience and 
comity in favour of recognition cease to be relevant here. However, it is necessary to 
consider more closely the parties' interest that justice be done, especially when the 
second marriage is likely to be validated by the personal law of the parties and the lex 
loci celebrationis. (225) 
Consequently, this analysis is appropriate if either party sought a decree of nullity prior 
to the promulgation of the subsequent legislation or prior to the registration of the 
marriage and the non-recognition has been granted on the ground of the finality of the 
decree.(226) It seems that recognition should be denied not only because of the finality 
of the decree, but because the decree had brought to light the status of the parties. 
Therefore, such legislation would be of no avail especially if the parties had remarried 
other partners. The denial of recognition is strongly approved in cases where foreign 
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legislation purports to invalidate an initially valid marriage.(227) Public policy and the 
prevailing policy of validation favor matrimonii are a great support to this view. 
As regards English law, it is not entirely clear whether the House of Lords was inclined 
to restrict the application of the decision in Starkowski v. Attorney General to foreign 
retrospective validating legislation or whether the converse case is included. However, 
"the prevailing extrajudicial opinion is against any extension of that case to a situation in 
which the foreign law invalidates an initialy valid marriage.,,(228) Nevertheless, a 
foreign retrospective invalidating legislation should be recognised if the parties are 
nationals or domiciliaries of the foreign legislating state,(229) or of a third state 
recognising the effect of the invalidating legislation. 
The question of recognising a foreign retrospective legislation changing the nature of 
marriage from potentially polygamous marriage to a monogamous one arose in 
Parkasho v. Singh. (230) In this case, the parties went through a ceremony of a 
potentially polygamous marriage in India according to the sikh religious rites. The 
marriage became a monogamous one under the provisions of Indian law which came 
into force in 1955. It was held that legislation converting a potentially polygamous 
marriage into a monogamous one should be recognised in English law. Therefore, the 
proper time for ascertaining finally the character of marriage is the time of proceeding 
and not the time of its inception. To support this view, Sir Jocelyn Simon said: 
"if legislation can be recognised as retroactively changing the character of a union 
from void to valid marriage, I can see no reason at all why legislation may not be 
recognised as at least prospectively changing the character of a marriage from 
potentially polygamous to monogamous. ,,(231) 
Taking into consideration the lack of Algerian decisions relating to the question of time 
in conflict of laws, it can be inferred from Article (6) of the Civil Code(232) that a 
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change in the substantive law of the legal system appointed by the Algerian conflict of 
law rule may be recognised before Algerian courts if it validates an originally invalid 
marriage, especially when the marriage has been consummated and an Algerian subject 
is involved. Additional support from domestic law is that a formally defective marriage 
cannot be annulled after consummation, if only one formality has not been complied 
with.(233) On the other hand, in cases where a second marriage took place, or a decree 
of nullity was granted prior to the promulgation of the foreign retrospective legislation 
or prior to the registration of the former marriage, the second marriage will be upheld as 
valid, and the retrospective legislation will be denied recognition before Algerian 
courts. 
A new law incapacitating a person has no effect on transactions passed before its 
promulgation.(234) It seems that a formally valid marriage cannot be affected by a 
retrospective legislation invalidating the marriage unless the parties are domiciliaries or 
nationals of the legislating state, or of a third country recognising the effect of a foreign 
retrospective invalidating legislation. 
- ---
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Section Three: 
Exceptions to the lex Loci Celebrationis 
Although the appropriate law to which questions concerning matters of formal validity 
is to be referred is the lex loci celebrationis, a marriage which has not been celebrated 
in accordance with the local form is still regarded as valid under some exceptional 
cases. These exceptions include consular marriage, service marriage, and cases where 
the local form is inappropriate and impossible. Consular marriage,(235) and cases 
where celebration within local form is impossible are the main concern of this section. 
It will be established that these exceptions to the lex loci celebrationis provide 
sufficient and convincing grounds for the appropriateness of the facultative approach to 
locus regit actum.(236) 
A- Formal Validity of Consular Marriages 
It appears essential for many states, even those adopting the lex domicilii as a 
connecting factor, (237) that their nationals abroad may celebrate marriage before their 
diplomatic or consular representatives according to their national law ,possibly relieving 
them from restrictions imposed by foreign laws. The use of such form lessens in 
certain cases the rigidity of the imperative application of the locus regit actum, and 
expresses the facultative application of the rule in a sense that a limited option is 
presented to the parties, and the chosen form must be scrupulously respected.(238) 
The practical need for such exception appeared in the world of conflict of laws in the 
19th century by which time the more demanding form of celebration was established, 
i.e. civil ceremony. Accordingly, insuperable difficulties arose in applying the local 
form based on religious conceptions alien to the parties. The non-availability of local 
form to foreigners in some countries due to legal, moral and religious reasons, 
I , 
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buttressed by the expansion of immigration and the rise of civil ceremony may be 
invoked in support of consular marriages.(239) Apart from this, the validity of 
consular marriages has been based to a great extent on the principle of extraterritorality, 
by virtue of which the diplomatic premises are considered as part of the sending state 
territory.(240) Perhaps, the most significant grounds the doctrine of extraterritoriality 
is justified on are the inviolability of the diplomatic premises and the comity of 
intemationallaw. (241) As regards the latter argument, it was said that 
"By the comity of international law, embassies are considered extratenitorial of the 
country in which they are locally situated, and to be part of the country which the 
Ambassadors represent, and applying this principle, a marriage may be celebrated 
within such ambassador's house or chapel according to the law of the country which 
such ambassador represents -at all events if one or both of the parties married are 
subjects of such ambassador's sovereign or state,,,(242) 
As regards English and Scots laws, there is some early authority to the effect that a 
British Embassy or Consulate abroad is considered extraterritorial to the country where 
it is situated. In Hay v. Northcote, (243) it was stressed that "[t]he Consulate must for 
this purpose be considered as English territory. The English legislature cannot make 
French territory English but it can say that acts done there in a certain manner shall have 
the same effect as if the territory were English.,,(244) Therefore, a French decree 
annulling a marriage between a French subject and an English subject celebrated before 
the British Consul at Bordeaux, was not recognised.(24S) 
It is indisputably a rule of law in all legal systems that the extraterritoriality doctrine is 
only a fiction of law, which cannot be a basis for explaining the competence of 
diplomatic or consular agents concerning marriage celebration, because it implies that 
the diplomatic envoys are not within the receiving state territory where they have to 
fulfil their duties, but they are within their own countries where their presence is 
useless.(246) Recently, the overwhelming weight of opinion among academic writers 
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disfavour the doctrine on the ground that the premises are not to be considered foreign 
territory for the reason oftheir inviolability, pertaining to the priviliges and immunities 
the diplomatic envoys enjoy, because the object of such immunities is to enable them to 
fulfil their duties.(247) Hence, "the real property [of diplomatic premises] is subject to 
the laws of the country in which it is situated,,,(248) and the premises remain subject to 
the local law for many purposes. The more recent decisions in England and Scotland 
have been inclined to favour this view. In Radwan v. Radwan, (249) where the origin 
and development of the doctrine were examined, it was demonstrated clearly that the 
doctrine was now obsolete, and could not be recognised as a basis of consular marriage 
inasmuch as the diplomatic premises were to be regarded as a receiving state territory. 
It is the view of the present writer that the consular form is widely accepted in order to 
lessen the rigidity of lex loci celebrationis rule which, in the past, led to the nullity of 
many marriages. It is therefore reasonably clear that the necessity of creating 
universally valid marriages, the existing policy of validity and the desire to co-ordinate 
between legal systems, would seem to be a reasonable basis and a dominant motive for 
upholding the validity of consular marriages. In both Scots and Algerian laws, it is 
generally recognised that celebration of marriage before diplomatic or consular agents is 
permissible. But the difference lies on the object of such marriage. Scots and English 
laws show that the object to such form is enabling British subjects residing abroad to be 
legally married without being put to too much inconvenience. It may be, though, that 
the rule is designed to maintain the imperative nature of the lex loci rule because 
celebration of consular marriage under the Foreign Marriage Order 1970 is subject to 
the existence of insufficient facilities under the local law . (250) 
As regards Algerian law, though sufficient facilities exist under the local law, parties 
are permitted to marry in a consular form.(251) According to this view, consular 
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marriage seems to be an option, or a service, offered by the sending state to its subjects 
on the ground of the increase in international tourism and world travel. To support this 
view, it has been suggested that 
"[a]side from any question of the legal possibility of using the local form, it is 
natural for an act of such importance and personal character as marriage that the 
parties often desire to avail themselves of the familiar form of their own law even 
when they have decided to marry abroad. ,,( 2 5 2) 
1- The Formalities required for the celebration of Consular Marriage 
A question which requires consideration in connection with this matter is whether the 
local law should prevail upon consular marriage. According to the view adopted by the 
overwhelming majority of Courts and authors, such marriages should be celebrated in 
accordance with the prescribed formalities ofthe law of the sending state. (25 3 ) 
The lex magistratus principle seems to be the most appropriate reason to explain why 
the sending state's law should prevail. This is because diplomatic and consular agents 
have to lend assistance to the celebration of marriage in conformity with the law of the 
sending state from which they derive their authority.(254) Furthermore, such a view 
derives its main argument and reasoning from the introduction of consular form in the 
19th century so as to facilitate celebration of marriage for the parties.(255) However, 
the universal validity principle, the prevailing policy of validation, and the desire to 
eliminate limping marriages have been inclined to be in favour of this view that mainly 
prevails in countries where the continental law system is adopted, such as France and 
Algeria.(256) The law of the sending state is widely recognised as the most appropriate 
law to be applied upon the formal validity of consular marriage. The Hague 
Convention of 1902 which was designed to regulate the conflict of laws in regard to 
marriage, provides for recognition of consular marriages in conformity with the 
legislation of the country to which the celebrant belongs, as being valid as to form, if 
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the state of celebration does not oppose the marriage, and neither of the parties is a 
national of that state. (25 7 ) 
With respect to Algerian law, it is reasonably clear that Algerian diplomatic or consular 
agents are authorised to solemnise marriages in conformity with Algerian law. (258) On 
failure to comply with the formalities required by Algerian law, any marriage celebrated 
at the diplomatic premises abroad will not be recognised as being valid as to form 
before Algerian courts. The question that remains to be answered is whether the same 
rule applies in cases of foreign consular marriages celebrated in Algeria. It is generally 
believed, though there is no explicit rule to that efect, that the reciprocity of the rule in 
question must lead to the validation of foreign consular marriages solemnised in 
accordance with the law of the sending state. (259) One might argue that the application 
of Algerian law upon consular marriages solemnised in Algeria is not easily 
reconcileable with any sound reasoning because of the adoption of the facultative 
approach inasmuch as consular form is an efficient way of implementing the facultative 
application of lex loci rule. Besides, the ratification of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations 1963 implies that foreign diplomatic or consular agents are 
authorised to celebrate marriages of their subjects in Algeria by a rule of public 
internationallaw.(260) 
The confident statement of the principle that the formal validity of consular marriage is 
governed by the law of the country to which the marriage officer belongs is based on 
the general view of judges and academic writers alike that it represents both English and 
Scots laws in as far as celebration of consular marrige before a British marriage officer 
is concerned. This view is supported by a case involving the validity of a marriage 
between a French man and an English woman celebrated before the British Consul at 
Bordeaux, in which the formal validity was determined by English law.(261) 
Moreover, the most recent decision in England, concerning the validity of consular 
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marriage, has been inclined to favour the view referring the formal validity of British 
consular marriages to be determined by the Foreign Marriage Act 1892. (262) 
The Foreign Marriage Act 1892 contains various requirements as to formal and 
procedural matters.(263) Section 8 of the Act, however, seems to be the most 
important section, and provides that a consular marriage may be celebrated according to 
the rites of the Church of England,(264) or in such other form as the parties see fit to 
adopt. The ceremony must take place at the official house(265) of the marriage officer, 
with open doors, and in the presence of two or more witnesses. The question 
concerning the effect of non-compliance with the required formalities under the Act was 
considered in Collet v. Collet, (266) where a marriage between a British subject and a 
Bulgarian one was solemnised at the British Consulate in Prague in 1948. It was held 
that the requirements embodied in Sections 2,3,4,7 and 9 were directory in nature, and 
as all the essential requirements of Section 8 had been complied with the marriage was 
valid. The decision is consistent with Section 13 of the Act, which enacts that failure to 
comply with certain formalities such as parental consent, residence, authority of 
marrige officer, will not render the marriage invalid.(267) From this it would seem to 
follow that a marriage performed according to the provisions of the Act, though the 
formalities of lex loci were not observed, is regarded as being valid as to form. In 
order to prevent conflict with the receiving state and limping marriages, a marriage 
officer must not solemnise a marriage, or allow it to be solemnised in his presence, if 
he is satisfied that it would be "inconsistent with international law or the comity of 
nations. ,,(268) 
The matter of formal validity of a marriage solemnised in a foreign embassy or 
consulate abroad has been recently considered in Radwan v. Radwan [N° 2],(269) a 
case involving a marriage celebrated in a polygamous form at the Egyptian Consulate 
General in Paris, between an Egyptian national and an English woman domiciled in 
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England. Relying on the reason advanced in Radwan v. Radwan [N° 1],(270) the 
almost unanimous view of the judicial authority was that English law regarded the 
Egyptian Consulate General in Paris, where the marriage took place, as French and not 
Egyptian territory. Accordingly, the formal validity of such a marrige must be 
determined by French law as being the lex loci celebrationis, and as there is no 
"decisive evidence (of French law) to rebut the presumption that this was a valid 
marriage,,,(271) the marriage was valid in England. It is therefore reasonably clear that 
English and Scots courts will recognise as valid as to form a marriage celebrated at a 
foreign embassy or consulate abroad, if the receiving state regards the marriage valid no 
matter what the formal requirements followed in the celebration. 
The question of the formal validity of a marriage solemnised before a foreign diplomatic 
or consular agent accredited in the UK has not arisen yet for decision before English or 
Scots courts. Judicial opinion is not entirely clear, even though there is some early 
authority which indicates that such marriages in conformity with the law of the sending 
state are valid in England and Scotland if the parties are nationals, and perhaps 
domiciliaries of the sending state.(272) The opinion which has been expressed at the 
diplomatic level seems to be in favour of upholding the validity of a consular marriage 
solemnised at a foreign embassy in the UK in accordance with the law of the sending 
states, if the parties are members of that state. Apart from diplomatic conventions, 
however, all other marriages at embassies, and all marriages at foreign consulates are to 
be void unless the requirements of English or Scots laws have been complied 
with.(273) 
This view can be criticised on two bases: narrowly from the construction of the Foreign 
Marriage Act 1892, 1947, and on a much broader front from consideration of the bases 
of introducing consular marriage. Looking at the spirit in which the Act was made, it is 
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meant to facilitate rather than to discourage British subjects' marriages abroad, and to 
try to prevent limping marriages. However, submission of the formalities of marriages 
celebrated at foreign embassies and consulates to be determined by English or Scots 
law seems to be an obstacle against the possibility of achieving the Foreign Marriage 
Acts' objective on the basis of the comity of international law which will be the basis of 
foreign states' objections to the celebration of marriages at British Embassies or 
Consulates. This view is inconsistent with the Foreign Marriage Order 1976 which 
enacts that a marriage officer cannot celebrate marriage if the receiving state objects to 
its celebration.(274) Looking at the basis upon which consular form is introduced, it 
would not seem to be accurate to impose local form to be observed in the celebration of 
a marriage at any embassy or consulate, because this implies that consular marriage 
hardly mean the change of the celebrating authority and nothing seems to be done to 
prevent limping marriages. Therefore, on the ground of reciprocity and favor 
matrirnonii principle, this view is probably an unsatisfactory instrument for securing 
the achievement of consular marriage objective. 
In conclusion, it is clear that the validity of such marriages at embassies or consulates is 
of universal concern and it is obviously desirable that states approach the issue with the 
same view in order to avoid limping marriages. Therefore, based on the comity of 
nations principle, English and Scots courts ought to recognise consular marriages 
celebrated in accordance with the law of the sending state, secus conflicts will ensue. 
It seems more appropriate to attach weight to the practical implications of each view. 
On such ground it is believed the predominant view whereby the law of the sending 
state is decisive deserves preference. The rival view would entail great complications 
and render the ensurance of international recognition of the validity of consular 
marriage exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. This is because each state would have 
to object to the solemnisation of marriage within its territory, at other states' embassies 
or consulates on the ground of comity. 
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2- The Authority of Diplomatic and Consular Officers 
It is now universally acknowledged that the prevailing policy of avoiding controversies 
and conflicts between states, and that of ensuring the international recognition of the 
validity of consular marriage, especially in the receiving state, is in favour of limiting 
the diplomatic envoys' authority by certain conditions. A valid consular marriage 
would only come into existence if, besides being permitted by the law of the sending 
state (which will in any case be a condition for diplomatic envoys of that country to 
lend their assistance to it), it was also sustained by the law of the receiving state where 
the officer exercises his functions. 
1- Al!.tb.£?!:i§~ti~o.p.Y_Tb~~.fll£lill~§!~tS: The authorisation that should be granted by the 
sending state to permit diplomatic or consular officers to act as a marriage officer is 
widely established as a central prerequisite for the validity of a consular marriage under 
the laws of most states, though the nature of such authorisation differs considerably. 
However, if a diplomatic or consular officer is not duly authorised, any marriage 
celebrated before him is regarded as invalid. (27 5) As to the question of the scope of 
the authorisation, a fundamental difference of attitudes exists between English and 
Scots laws on the one hand, and the Algerian law on the other. 
As regards the former, it is generally believed that the authority to solemnise marriages 
is conferred by individual authorisation, i.e. marriage warrant, issued by a Secretary of 
State, even though certain persons may be authorised to act as marriage officers without 
any warrant.(276) This might be explained on the basis of the purpose of the 1892 Act 
as to provide facilities for marrige only where the local law is inappropriate or 
inapplicable. Therefore, authorisation of every ambassador to act as a marriage officer 
seems less persuasive under the terms of the Act.(277) A marriage officer, therefore, is 
the holder of a marriage warrant from the Secretary of State, or any officer, who under 
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the marriage regulations, is authorised to act as a marriage officer without warrant. In 
fact, a warrant is issued normally to a "Post" or "District" ,(278) but there have been 
occassions where it has been allocated to a specified diplomatic person.(279) The 
general principle deserves preference because of its consistency with the objective of 
consular marriage. Furthermore, allocation of a warrant to the name of a diplomatic 
person would render the consular marriages' objective exceedingly difficult to achieve. 
For instance, a temporary officer occupying a post where a named warrant applies is 
not legally authorised to solemnise marriage, unless a fresh warrant is issued to him. 
Consequently, the Algerian law demonstrates clearly that the authorisation is granted by 
operation of law "de plein droit", and is lodged in the diplomatic or consular office as 
such without any reference to the individual officer or the country where the officer is 
serving.(280) Marriage officers for the purpose of the Act, however, are heads of 
diplomatic missions "pourvus d'une circonscription consulaire", and heads of consular 
posts.(281) Furthermore, Vice-Consuls can be authorised to substitute in a permanent 
manner the head of consular post following individual authorisation (decision) issued 
by the Foreign Affairs Officer. Moreover, consular agents can be authorised in the 
same manner as Vice-Consuls to act with the full powers of a Registrar.(282) 
However, the only question arising in this connection is whether a marriage solemnised 
before unauthorised officer can be regarded as void. By virtue of the Foreign Marriage 
Act 1892, as soon as the celebration has taken place, it is no longer necessary to give 
any proof of the authority of the marriage officer and no evidence is needed to prove his 
authority in any proceeding touching the validity of the marriage.(283) It seems that the 
introduction of such a provision rests on the desire to assure the validity of marriage, 
where some impropriety in the appointment of the officer occurs, or where he 
solemnises a marriage without warrant. The Algerian law position, on the other hand, 
is entirely unclear. Although there is no explicit rule, it may be suggested that such a 
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marriage celebrated before a Vice-Consul or any consular agents without being 
authorised shall be regarded as valid to form, especially if it is consummated, so as to 
safeguard the marriage from any impropriety in the appointment of the officer, which 
has no relation with the parties' interest unless the parties know that he is not 
authorised. The legal significance of the authorisation is to create competence in the 
consular officer to solemnise marriages wherever some requirements are complied 
with. These requirements, though their scope varies considerably, are consistent with 
the policy of avoiding conflicts with the receivmg state, and of ensuring the 
international recognition of the validity of such marriages. (284) 
2- N~Lo_l!.aJU:l'_of.!ll~Pllrti~~: Possession of the sending state's nationality by the parties 
or one of them seems to be the primary condition for the authority of diplomatic or 
consular agents to act as marriage officers under the laws of most states. Generally, a 
marriage officer is only authorised to solemnise a marriage when the parties are both 
nationals of the sending state.(285) But in practice, many states permit their agents to 
solemnise a mixed marriage providing that one of the parties possess the nationality of 
the sending state.(286) By the British Foreign Marriage Acts, it is sufficient that one of 
the parties is a British national. Section 1 of the 1892 Act provides that: 
"All marriages between parties of whom one at least is a British subject solemnised 
in the manner provided in this and any foreign country or place by or before a 
marriage officer shall be as valid in law as if the same had been solemnised in the 
United Kingdom with a due observance of all forms required by law.,,(287) 
The first point to note is that this section is entirely unclear as to what the nationality of 
the other party should be. The prevailing policy of preventing conflicts with the 
receiving state seems to require that neither parties should possess the nationality of the 
receiving state. This is because the receiving state is unwilling to consent to a consular 
marriage involving one of its subjects, but if it does consent the marriage will be 
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recognised as valid to form. From this, it seems to follow that double nationality might 
be a bar for the solemnisation of a consular marriage where one of the parties possesses 
also the nationality of the country of celebration.(288) Article 6 of the Hague 
Convention(289) provides for the recognition of such marriages as being valid as to 
form, if neither party is a national of the receiving state, and this state does not oppose 
the marriage. 
Subsequently, by virtue of Algerian Civil Status Code 1970, a general competence to 
celebrate marriage between Algerian nationals is conferred by operation of law in 
diplomatic or consular agents. Nevertheless, a provision has been made for the 
authorisation of consular marriages involving an Algerian man and a foreign woman if 
the ceremony takes place in a country determined by decree.(290) It is noteworthy that 
such a decree is not promulgated yet, and the question arises as to cogency of this 
decree. This solution is introduced in France on the basis that French subjects cannot 
use local law in certain Muslim countries where the religious ceremony is the only 
prescribed form.(291) The possibility for an Algerian Consul to celebrate a mixed 
marriage will depend either on an international agreement, such as the Algerian-French 
Convention 1974, or on the receiving state's regulations in conformity with the Vienna 
Convention. Furthermore, it is worth noting that Algerian law permits the celebration of 
a mixed marriage before diplomatic or consular agents only if the husband is an 
Algerian. It has been suggested that this distinction rests on the assumption of 
predominance of the husband's nationality. The ratio of this distinction is laid down in 
Article 18 of the Algerian Nationality Code, which enacts that Algerian women acquire 
the nationality of their husbands by the fact of the marriage. (292) 
3- P,2(l~t~llS~_oj'Jll§Yf.fi~i~,!l!f~si1.itj~~Y..I!.c!.eJ.tlt~_~Q.~~_~~~: By virtue of the Foreign 
Marriage Acts, a consular officer who is a marriage officer should, prior to celebrating 
a marriage, inquire whether or not sufficient facilities exist under the local law of the 
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receiving state for the solemnisation of a marriage to which a British subject is a 
party. (293) It has been the practice that where sufficient facilities exist under the law of 
a foreign state, a marriage officer should not celebrate marriages, this being a situation 
that was deemed to be inconsistent with the imperative approach of lex loci rule.( 294) 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the onus of deciding if sufficient facilities exist 
under the local law rests in the hands of the Secretary of State. This is so in view of his 
capacity to refuse to grant the marriage warrant to a consular officer officiating where 
sufficient facilities exist under the lex loci celebrationis. One might say that 
insufficient facilities exist under the local law where a polygamous form is the only 
form available in the place of celebration and the parties are domiciled in the United 
Kingdom, or where practical difficulties in complying with the local law arise. 
Therefore, a marriage officer and hence secretary of state has complete discretion to 
decide whether or not sufficient facilities exist under the lex loci . Finally, it might be 
said that this provision is designed to maintain the imperative approach of lex loci 
celebrationis as well as to prevent limping marriages. But one might argue that, 
though sufficient facilities exist under the local law , a marriage officer should be able to 
celebrate marriage in consular form if the receiving state does not object to such a 
celebration. 
4- ReS.£>iJIiti20_oJ.t!ts-,~~i<!i!l: .£lf .r!HH:ri'l~~ ll!1~SI l'l~ _~f. ~~l!l,lt.rLe_s.t.£l_ ~ !ti~1! S~5ibJl'lrJ~ 
!?~lq,n.,g,.s: Although the authorisation by the sending state and the consent of the 
receiving state suffice in recognising the marriage as being valid as to form, the consent 
of the countries to which the parties belong is still required. This requirement is of 
paramount importance in so far as it strengthens the policy of ensuring the universal 
validity of such marriages.( 295) This is apparently the position in England and 
Scotland where it is maintained that the marriage officer must be satisfied that the 
81 
parties will be recognised as validly married by the law of the country to which each 
party belongs. Recently, the Law Commission stressed that "the law of the country to 
which each party belongs" should be amended as to refer expressly to the law of each 
party's domicile on the basis that essential validity of marriage is covered by Article 
3(1)(d).(296) 
5- £=_oJl~SlltQttqeJ}SE~b'jU~.§.!~te: The authorisation granted by the sending state is not 
legally sufficient to hold a consular marriage as being valid as to form. This is because 
consular marrige involves issues of public international law as diplomatic or consular 
officers exercise a public authority within the receiving state's territory.(297) 
Therefore, the prevailing policy of avoiding conflicts and preventing limping marriages 
seems to require the consent ofthe receiving state.(298) Consent by the receiving state 
to a consular marriage is granted expressly or tacitly. The express consent may be 
incorporated in an international convention, either bilateral or multilateral treaty,(299) 
or in a unilateral act or a declaration addressed to the sending state. A tacit consent is 
nevertheless very difficult to ascertain. Where no objection has been raised, this 
consent may be deduced from the judicial practice of the receiving state. (300) 
As regards English and Scots law, the onus of inquiring into this is in the hands of the 
marriage officer. The marriage officer is not empowered to celebrate a marriage under 
the Foreign Marriage Act 1892, unless he is satisfied that the authorities of the receiving 
state will not object to the celebration of the marriage.(301) It is suggested that 
whatever the grounds for the objection, this must be taken into consideration by the 
marriage officer. Under the Algerian law,on the other hand, there is no statutory 
provision that states expressly that the consent of the receiving state is required. But 
the Algerian practice seems to suggest that the consent of the receivng state is required. 
For instance, the Algerian-French Convention(302) states clearly that a consular officer 
may celebrate marriages only between parties belonging to the country he represents. 
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Such a requirement should be introduced in the Algerian legislation with a view to 
achieving the universal validity of such marriages. 
Finally, one might say that the universal validity of such a marriage is strongly ensured 
if, and only if, the authorisation is granted by the sending state and the consent of the 
receiving state is given. Furthermore, this principle will be jeopardised if one of these 
requirements is not satisfied because "the position of third states will vary with the 
private international law policies of each country. ,,(303) 
3- The Status of Consular Marriages 
1- ~b~Le)J~!l.!. Pi1It.i~~~\.e_Me_IlJ~~IJl_Q.f.t,!ls_~~l!.djD~_SJi1t~: As regards English and Scots 
law, there is evidence, expressed at the diplomatic level, to suggest that marriages 
solemnised at foreign embassies are valid providing that the parties are subjects of the 
sending state. This was the opinion expressed by the Royal Comission on Marriage in 
1868: "We think that it would be proper that the law should except from its operation 
marriages in the chapels or houses of foreign ambassadors only when both parties are 
subjects of the foreign country. ,,(304) 
Although there is no clear case law or statutory intervention in the subject, it has been 
suggested that there is some early authority to the effect that such marriages are 
regarded as being valid as to form if both parties are members of the foreign 
country.(305) It appears that this suggestion was based on Petreis v. Tondear,(306) 
where a marriage had been celebrated in the chapel of the Bavarian Ambassador in 
London, between parties neither of whom was a member of the foreign state; it was 
held that the marriage was void. Therefore, the practical result of this decision is that it 
implies that embassy marriages involving parties both of whom are nationals or 
domiciliaries of the sending state will be upheld. Recently, the Law Commissions have 
considered the question, and it was pointed out that the validity of such marriages 
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should be based on the bilateral treaty between the foreign state and the U.K. 
government. But in the absence of such an agreement, there is an additional 
requirement to marriages solemnised in foreign embassies or consulates in England and 
Scotland, namely, that they are valid only if they comply with the locallaw.(307) 
The Algerian law position as regards foreign consular marriages is not clear inasmuch 
as no statutory provision has been promulgated to deal with this matter. Article 96 of 
Algerian Civil Status Code 1970 provides for recognition of Algerian subjects' consular 
marriages abroad as being valid as to form. By analogy, foreign consular marriages 
should be recognised as such if the parties are members of the marriage officers' state. 
The Algerian-French Convention 1974 appears to be a conclusive evidence for the 
recognition of such embassy marriages. 
2- JYb~t.e. 2Ut'. 2U~~! !Q.~ ~!!t.ti~s)§.a.I,!l~ro2~r.<ltt;.h.~ .s.e,!l£liug.§!'ltS: Many domestic laws 
as well as international agreements are content to require only one of the parties to be a 
national of the sending state to authorise diplomatic or consular agents to act as 
marriage officers.(308) Such marriages are the most difficult to evaluate in that there is 
no clear authority to suggest the recognition of these marriages' validity. Under 
English and Scottish laws in general, the tendancy has been to uphold such marriages 
when the requirements of English or Scots law have been complied with, or when there 
is an agreement between the sending state and the U.K. government even if the local 
law is disregarded. The Royal Commission in 1868(309) stated clearly that when a 
British subject is involved, a marriage solemnised at a foreign embassy or consulate 
could not be recognised as legally valid, unless it is solemnised in the presence of a 
minister of religion duly authorised to solemnise marriages in the U.K. 
One can argue that foreign consular marriages where only one of the parties is a 
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member of the ambassadors state should be recognised as valid on the basis that 
English and Scots courts recognise marriages in British Embassies and consulates 
abroad under the Foreign Marriage Act 1892, where only one of the parties is a British 
subject.(310) Therefore, English and Scottosh courts should recognise embassy 
marriages in England and Scotland. The grounds of comity of nations and reciprocity 
seem to demand this. 
Subsequently, a unilateral rule concerning marriages at Algerian embassies and 
consulates abroad where one of the parties is Algerian is embodied in Article 97 alenea 
2 of the Civil Status Code. (311) This article provides for the recognition of marriages 
solemnised between an Algerian man and a foreign woman if the latter is not a subject 
of the receiving state, provided that the celebration takes place in a country designated 
by decree. The reciprocity of this article is clear evidence suggesting recognition of 
marriages at foreign embassies and consulates in Algeria, between parties of whom one 
at least is a subject of the consular officer's country.(312) 
B- Service marriages 
Both common and continental law systems make special provisions for marriages of 
members of the armed forces serving in foreign territory: such marriages have to be 
performed by a person deriving his authority from the law of the country to which the 
forces belong. The origin of this exception was founded on the doctrine of 
extraterritoriality on the ground that members of conquering forces cannot be expected 
to submit themselves to the laws of the conquered state, which for many reasons may 
be unacceptable and repulsive.(313) The common law view expressed in the early 19th 
century was that members of the British Army serving in a foreign territory carried 
with them English Law, and therefore they were exempted from the locus actus. To 
this extent, Lord Ellenborough said that: 
"considering it as a malTiage celebrated in a place where the law of England prevailed: 
For I may suppose that in the absence of any evidence to the contrary that the Law of 
England ecclesiastical and civil was recognised by subjects of England in a place 
occupied by the King's troops, who would impliedly carry that law with 
them. ,,(314) 
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Before the promulgation of the 1823 Minister's Act which was titled "An Act to relieve 
His Majesty's subjects from all doubt concerning the validity of certain marriages 
solemnised abroad", the position of service marriages was governed by the Common 
Law of England. In the early 19th century marriage cases, the English Common Law, 
as the personal law of the parties, was applied.(315) However, members of 
conquering forces may celebrate a marriage without complying with the law of the 
conquered state, and it will be recognised as valid as to form before English and 
Scottish courts if it complies with the requirements of Common Law. The only formal 
requirement for a Common Law marriage was the exchange of consent per verba de 
prasenti. In 1843 a further requirement was added in that the ceremony should be 
performed by an episcopally ordained priest. (316) The unanimous opinion was that the 
rule in R. v. Millis does not apply to marriages celebrated abroad. The position of 
service marriages is now determined by Section 22 of the Foreign Marriages Act 1892, 
as amended by the Foreign Marriage Acts of 1947 and 1988, provides that: 
"A malTiage solemnised in any foreign territory by a Chaplain serving with any part 
of the naval military or air forces of Her Majesty serving in that telTitory, or by any 
person authorised, either generally or in respect of the particular malTiage, by the 
Commanding Officer of any part of those forces serving in that telTitory shall, 
subject as hereinafter provided, be as valid in law as if the marriage had been 
solemnised in the United Kingdom with a due observance of all forms reuired by law. 
(lA) Subsection (1) above shall not apply to a malTiage unless:-(a) at least one of the 
parties to the malTiage is person who - (i) is a member of the said forces serving in 
the foreign telTitory concerned or is employed in that territory in such other capacity 
as may be prescribed by Order in Council; or (ii) is a child of a person falling within 
sub-paragraph (i) above and has his home with that person in that territory; and. (b) 
Such other conditions as may be so prescribed are complied with. (lB) In 
determining for the purposes of subsection (lA) above whether one person is the 
child of another - (a) it shall be immaterial whether the person's father and mother 
were at any time married to each other; and (b) a person who is treated by another as a 
child of the family in relation to any marriage to which that other is or was a party 
shall be regarded as his child,,(317) 
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The important point to note is that the problems and difficulties, encountered by Section 
22 of the Foreign Marriage Act 1892, as to the interpretation of the phrases: "within the 
British lines",(318) "British Army Abroad,,(319) and the phrase "officiating under the 
Orders,,(320) have been resolved under the re-enacted Section 22 of the Foreign 
Marriage Act 1947. A further difficulty in regard to the interpretation of Section 22 of 
the 1892 Act was whether the section applies to marriages solemnised outside the 
United Kingdom or outside Her Majesty's Dominions. This has been cleared up in the 
1947 Act, where the term "Foreign territory" is characterised as referring to any 
territory occupied by the British Forces excluding Her Majesty's Dominions, and 
including ships in foreign waters.(321) 
It is generally believed that the central pre-requisite of the validity of a service marriage 
is that it must be authorised by the law of the country to which the armed forces belong. 
British Foreign Marriage Acts 1892-1947 and 1988, for example, provide for the 
recognition of a service marriage as valid if it is celebrated by a Chaplain serving in any 
foreign territory with the naval, military or air forces in such territory, or by anyone 
authorised by the Commanding Officer of such forces, provided that certain formalities, 
such as the giving of notice to the Commanding Officer and the presence of at least two 
witnesses, have been complied with.(322) As to the effect of non-compliance with 
these requirements, it has been suggested that once a marriage has been solemnised 
under Section 22 of the Act it is no longer necessary to prove the authority of the 
person by or before whom it was solemnised nor shall any evidence to prove his want 
of authority be given in any legal proceeding touching the validity of the marriage.(323) 
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The question arises as to whether one of the parties must be a British subject. It is 
noteworthy that Section 22 of the Act does not contain any restriction on nationality. 
Therefore, Hodson, L.J. pointed out in Taczanowska v. Taczanowski, (324) " ... it 
would seem anomalous that while aliens may serve in the British Forces, they should 
not have the privileges conferred by the Section." It is sufficient for the celebration of 
marriage to take place under the Act that one of the parties to the marriage is a member 
of Her Majesty's Forces or a person employed in such capacity in that territory as may 
be prescribed by order in council.(325) Recently, suggestions have been made to 
extend the categories of persons who may celebrate their marriage under Section 22, as 
to include United Kingdom civil servants and civilians accompanying the forces and 
also the children of members of the forces and such civilians.(326) 
It is of note that the unanimous opinion of academic writers and courts is that Section 
22 of the Act is not limited in its terms to marriages of British subjects, but it does 
include marriages of members of forces associated with the British army. 
Taczanowska v. Taczanwski(327) is an illustration of cases where this rule has been 
considered. In this case, the parties were Polish nationals who went through a 
ceremony of marriage in Italy in 1946. The husband was an officer in the Polish 2nd. 
Corps which was a part of the Allied forces of occupation in Italy. The ceremony was 
performed by a Polish army chaplain according to the rites of the Roman Catholic 
Church. The marriage was invalid according to Italian domestic and private 
international law which referred to the lex patriae of the parties. In support of the 
marriage, it was argued that it came within Section 2 of the 1892-1947 Acts, which 
allow marriages within the British lines to be solemnised by any chaplain officiating 
under the orders of a Commanding Officer of a British Army serving abroad. Although 
Hodson, L.J. was of the opinion that Section 22 of the Act was not restricted to 
marriages of parties of whom at least one was a British subject,(328) he rejected the 
argument in favour of the validity of the marriage on the basis that the Polish army 
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chaplain was not serving under the order of the Commanding Officer of a British army 
serving abroad. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal upheld the marriage as being a valid Common Law 
marriage on the basis that the parties were members of belligerent forces in occupied 
territory, the court being of the opinion that conquerors are not deemed to submit 
themselves to the law of a conquered state and therefore are free to marry according to 
English common law. Hodson, L. J. stated that: 
"The principle in Scrimshire's case, that the parties by entering into a marriage 
contract in a foreign country subject themselves to have the validity of it determined 
by the laws of that country, does not apply in the case of a contract performed in an 
occupied country by a member of the occupying forces. ,,(329) 
In the older cases, Common Law marriage as an exception to the rule of locus regit 
actum has been confined to marriages between British subjects abroad. Taczanowska 
v. Taczanowski was the first instance where the common law marriage theory has been 
extended in its application to marriages between foreigners. Hodson, L.J. remarked 
that: "The Common Law conception of marriage knows no distinction of race or 
creed. ,,( 330) 
This case, however, has been SUbjected to vigorous criticism by academic writers 
which expressed doubts as to the astuteness of the extension of the common law 
marriages.(331) It is clear that the decision relied on Scrimshire v. Scrimshire, (332) 
the Court being of the opinion that the rule of locus regit actum applies on the basis of 
the parties' presumption to subject themselves to the law of the place of celebration. As 
to this, Sir Simpson meant that the parties may select the place of marriage and thus, 
indirectly the law governing the marriage, but they cannot rebut the lex loci rule and 
appoint another law other than that of the place of celebration. He maintains that, 
"As both the parties, by celebrating the marriage in France, have subjected 
themselves to the law of that country relating to marriage; and as their mutual 
intention must be presumed to be that it should be a marriage or not, according to 
the laws of France, I apprehend it is not in the power of one of the parties, by 
leaving the place, to draw the question of the marriage or contract, ad alilld eXalllell, 
to be tried by different laws than those of the place where the parties contracted. 
They may change the forum, but they must be tried by the laws of the country which 
they left.,,(333) 
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Indeed, Sir Simpson did not intend such interpretation of his words as was found in 
Taczanowska, because later in the judgement he expressed the imperative approach of 
the lex loci rule: "it is of equal consequence to all, that one rule in these cases should 
be observed by all countries, i.e., the law where the contract is made. By observing 
this law no inconvenience can arise, but infinite mischief will ensue if it is not.,,(334) 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that English Common Law was applied in the older 
cases, where British subjects were involved, as being the paries' personallaw.(335) 
As regards marriages of foreigners abroad, the general opinion of academic authorities 
was that such marriages would be valid if celebrated in a form recognised as sufficient 
in the circumstances by the law of their common domicile. Professor Dicey suggested 
that "when compliance with the local law is impossible, our courts will hold the 
marriages of foreigners valid, at any rate if held good by the law of the country where 
the foreigners were domiciled. ,,(336) However, the significance of the law of the 
domicile was expressly denied by Parker, L.J. in Taczanowska who stressed that: 
"we should not, in such cases as this, look to the lex loci, nor do I see any reason 
why we should look to the law of the domicile of the spouses at the time of the 
marriage. Indeed, if English law were to look at the law of the domicile, what would 
be the position where the spouses had different domiciles. In my judgement there is 
no authority or reason which requires us to look to any other law, once the lex loci is 
inapplicable. ,,(337) 
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As regards the objection put forward for denying application to the lex loci, it has been 
suggested that the difficulties which would occur where the parties had different 
domiciles would be overcome by applying both domiciliary laws.(338) It is of note 
that common law of England was applied in this case as being lex fori: "If it be said 
that since the parties are not British subjects, the common law of England does not 
apply to them, my answer is that such is the law prima facie to be administered in the 
courts of this Country.,,(339) 
It is submitted that the application of English common law, as it existed in the early 
18th century, to determine the formal validity offoreign marriages between parties who 
have no connection with England is not in line with modern private international 
principles. Dicey pointed out that "it is indeed a remarkable proposition that a marriage 
celebrated in a foreign country between persons domiciled in another foreign country 
who have never visited England in their lives can derive formal validity from 
compliance with the requirements of English domestic law as it existed 200 years 
before the marriage.,,(340) The only point, and it is admittedly a weak one, which 
could be made against this stance is that some connection with United Kingdom may be 
likely if the parties are members of H.M. forces. 
It is the opinion of the present writer that the decision in Taczanowska v Taczanowski, 
though consistent with favor matrimonii principle, is in conflict with the prevailing 
policy of universal validity of marriage, the desire to eliminate limping marriages, and 
creates conflicts between English law and foreign laws. This is so because: 
"A marriage that is void by the lex loci celebrationis and by the personal law of the 
parties will scarcely attract universal recognition merely because it satisfies the law 
of England, a country with which they had no connection at the time of the 
ceremony, more especially when it is not the existing law of England that is called in 
aid, but that which was abolished in 1753 by Lord Hardwicke's Act. ,,(341) 
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Therefore, the lex domicilii, as an alternative rule should apply in such cases because it 
is the most appropriate law which will lead to the harmonisation and uniformity of 
decisions and assist certainty in conflict of law cases. 
c- Where the local form is impossible 
I t is a principle of English and Scots laws that a marriage celebrated without observance 
of the local law form is void ab initio. Nevertheless, it has been established that where 
the local form is not available to the parties, or its use is impossible, a marriage 
solemnised under such circumstances will be valid, though the form prescribed by the 
lex loci has not been observed, if the requirements of common law marriage have been 
complied with.(342) Common Law marriage, as being an exception to the lex loci 
where insuperable difficulty existed, was established as early as 1811 in Lord 
Cloncurry's case,(343) where Lord Eldon was of the opinion that the marriage was a 
valid common law marriage because unsuperable difficulty in complying with lex loci 
arose, since no Roman Catholic priest would have been permitted to marry the parties. 
The same principle has been expressed in most recent cases, as for instance Wolfenden 
v. Wolfenden. (344) In this case, two English domiciliaries went through a ceremony 
of marriage in the Chinese province of Hupeh. The ceremony was performed by the 
local minister of the Church of Scotland. It was held that the marriage was a valid 
common law marriage, although no episcopally ordained priest was present at the 
ceremony. To this extent, Lord Merriman, was of the opinion that the rule in R. v. 
Millis was confined to marriage celebrated in Ireland and England, said: "In such a 
territory as this there is, so far as the requirements of English law are concerned in 
relation to a common law marriage, no obligation that the ceremony shall be performed 
in the presence of an episcopally ordained priest. ,,(345) 
It is to be noted that the Common Law prevails only where compliance with the local 
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law has been precluded by insuperable difficulty. A mere difficulty in complying with 
the requirements of lex loci is not sufficient for the application of common law. In 
Kent v. Burgess/346) for example, where the parties did not comply with the 
residence requirement (six months residence in that country before celebration of 
marriage), it was held that the marriage was void on the basis that compliance with the 
local law was possible. The question that remains to be answered is what are the 
situations under which one might say that compliance with the local law is impossible. 
It has been suggested that insuperable difficulty in fulfilling the local law exists where 
there is no local form, or where the local form is not available to foreigners, or is 
opposed to the parties' religious convictions.(347) Dicey illustrates that: 
"The impossibility may arise either because such local forms of marriage as exist are 
completely alien to the social and cultural environment to which the parties 
belong,or because the form provided by the local law is one which it is morally or 
legally impossible for the parties to use.,,(348) 
In conclusion, it might be said that the circumstances under which the local law is 
impossible to apply are similar to the scope of the consular form. The latter applies 
where the local form is inappropriate and impossible: the Foreign Marriage Order 1970 
restricted the application of consular form to cases where insufficient facilities exist 
under the locallaw.(349) It is reasonably clear that the circumstances mentioned above 
are in favour of applying lex loci facultatively, and thus, the consular form deserves 
preference as it is one of the most appropriate ways to implement the facultative nature 
of lex loci rule. 
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Chapter Two 
Essential Validity of Marriage in Conflict of laws 
Introduction 
It is worthy of note that the consideration of marriage as a matter of contract before the 
19th century, both in common and civil law countries, has led to the application of the 
lex loci celebrationis as the most appropriate law to determine the entire validity of 
marriage in conflict cases. ( 1) This rule was applied in a number of early cases in which 
it was held that the universal validity of a marriage is to be based upon its validity in the 
place of celebration.(2) The reference of the questions involved in these cases to the 
lex loci rule was subsequently explained and justified through their recognition as 
matters relating to the formal validity. Although this rule has the "undoubted attraction 
of simplicity", and provides a clear and certain solution easily ascertainable in practice, 
the submission to it of matters of essential validity would promote limping marriages, 
since it would enable the parties to evade the restrictions imposed on them by their 
personal law. Furthermore, it would render the parties' freedom to choose a place of 
celebration not only as a mere fact, but as the main basis for determining the governing 
law upon the validity of marriage, a matter which concerns the society to which the 
parties belong.(3) 
However, it was only much later, with consideration of marriage as a matter of status, 
that most legal systems saw the need for applying the parties' personal law (to 
determine the substantive aspects of marriage) arising out of the more enduring interest 
that the country to which the parties belong has on marriage as being a family matter 
affecting the morals and ethical well-being of society.( 4) Although it is now 
universally acknowledged that capacity and essential validity is a matter determinable by 
the personal law of the parties, the practical difference between common and civil law 
countries lies in the criterion that is to be used for determining the personal law. While 
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domicile is used as the most appropriate connecting factor in common law [i.e. English 
and Scots laws],(S) nationality as a connecting factor deserves preference in the 
continental law system [i.e. French and Algerian laws].(6) Moreover, the acceptance 
of the duality of the choice of law rules governing marriage carried with it the 
implementation of the distinction between formal and essential validity. It must be 
pointed out that the practical significance of such a distinction varies considerably, since 
each legal system adopts its domestic law distinction within the sphere of private 
international law. Perhaps the best existing example that clearly illustrates such 
difference is the requirement of parental consent which the English courts characterise 
as a mere formality in deciding conflict cases, regardless of its characterisation by the 
relevant foreign law.(7) Nevertheless, the category of essential validity is generally 
regarded as embracing certain important issues, viz. non-age, prohibited degrees of 
relationships, previous marriage and physical incapacity, and lack of parties and 
parental consent. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the reasons for the special significance of 
using domicile and nationality as connecting factors, and their appropriateness for 
determining the personal law of the parties. The application of the personal law as a 
choice oflaw rule, however, involves peculiar and crucial questions which need to be 
scrutinised here in order to define the better view leading to certainty and predictability, 
as well as the stability of marital status. One of the most important issues arising here 
is whether the change of lex causae, or subsequent changes in the lex causae affects 
the validity of marriage celebrated before the occurrence of the changes. Another 
question which requires consideration is whether a marriage should be held void on the 
sole ground offailure to comply with the rules as to essential validity of the law of the 
place of celebration. In the light of the more recent English decisions, it has been 
suggested that a party who has obtained a decree of divorce or annulment entitled to 
recognition in England is free to remarry even if the divorce or the nullity decree is not 
117 
recognised in the country of the domicile as defined by the English law (a rule 
confirmed by statute)'cS) Therefore, it is interesting to analyse the problem of the 
incidental question which gives rise to many difficulties in our subject matter. As 
regards the view that the parties' personal laws apply in cumulation where a bilateral 
impediment is in issue, examination of the substantive requirements individually is 
highly desirable for defining the scope of bilateral impediments. Finally, it is 
interesting to note that the existing views are concerned with the determination of the 
validity of marriage at the time of the proceeding. However, it is the present writer's 
intention to base the present thesis on the determination of the capacity to marry at the 
time of the celebration so as to empower the marriage officer with a discretion for 
refusing to celebrate a marriage if he is satisfied that one of the parties is under 
incapacity according to his or her personal law. But if the incapacity imposed by the 
parties' personal law is contrary to the public policy of the lex loci celebrationis, the 
marriage officer must celebrate the marriage. Furthermore, international uniformity 
upon the governing law, and harmonisation of decision within this field are matters of 
great importance in private international law. Therefore, the thesis which will here be 
submitted is that the choice of law rule governing the essential validity should have a 
preventive function in order to gain a certain uniformity of decisions, since the 
international conventions, in particular the Hague convention of 1902 and 1976 which 
have been adopted to bring about uniformity and coordination in this subject have 
resulted neither in the success anticipated by their promoters, nor in the fiasco claimed 
by their opponents. 
Section One 
The Doctrine of Personal law And The 
Ambiguity on The Criterion used For Its Determination 
A- Domicile as a Connecting Factor in English and Scots. laws 
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It is only with the decision in Brook v. Brook(9) that domicile has been clearly 
established as the main connecting factor according to which the personal law of the 
parties is determined. The House of Lords, therefore, held that while the interest of the 
lex loci celebrationis in determining formal validity remains unchallengeable, the 
essential validity of marriage must depend on the lex domicilii, "the law of the country 
in which the parties are domiciled at the time of the marriage, and in which the 
matrimonial residence is contemplated".( 1 0) 
The inconclusiveness of this decision, as it is submitted,o 1) has caused some 
controversy over the years as to whether the lex domicilii in this context refers to the 
domicile of the parties at the time of the marriage, or to the matrimonial domicile. 
Academic authorities, however, have convassed two theories within the sphere of 
English and Scots conflict of laws, i.e. the dual domicile theory, and the intended 
matrimonial home theory. Moreover, in the light of the more recent English decisions 
the determination of the governing law upon essential validity has become even more 
complicated and unclear. This is because the English Courts are moving towards a 
mere flexible choice of law rule according to which the essentials of marriage should be 
determined by the law of the country with which the marriage has its real and 
substantial connection. (12) 
The point which will be submitted here to evaluate these theories is that the marital 
status requires stability and certainty not only because of considerations in the 
individual case, but also because of its being a matter of public concern. The desire to 
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establish a policy preventing marriage conflicts that may arise at the time of the 
proceeding clearly demands the adoption of a rule that may ascertain the validity of the 
marriage at the time of the marriage ceremony. It is, however, necessary to analyse the 
existing views in the light of the various policy objectives for choice of law rules to 
determine how far they have gained the judicial authorities' support. 
1- Dual Domicile Theory and the English and Scots' Judicial Practice 
According to the orthodox view, which appears to be adopted by the overwhelming 
majority of courts and writers, the essential validity of marriage is a matter to be 
determined by the parties' antenuptial domiciliary laws. Professor Dicey indicates, 
however, that the parties' prenuptial domiciliary laws are applied distributively where 
the parties have separate domiciles: each party must comply with the essentials required 
by his or her own law. It is therefore Dicey's claim that: 
"Capacity to marry is governed by the law of each party's antenuptial domicile ... A 
marriage is valid as regards capaci ty when each party has, according to his or her 
antenuptial domicile, the capacity to marry the other. .. No marriage is valid as regards 
capacity when either party has not, according to his or her antenuptial domicile, the 
capaci ty to marry the other." ( 13 ) 
Suppose that an English domiciliary celebrated a marriage in Germany with his 
deceased wife's sister, a German domiciliary, under whose law the marriage is valid. 
According to this view, the marriage is invalid since the husband has no capacity to 
marry his deceased wife's sister under his prenuptial domiciliary law, i.e. English 
I (14) aw. 
Dr. Morris has noticed that there are policy arguments which clearly indicate the legal 
significance of the dual domicile theory. Indeed, it has been argued that the law of each 
party's premarital domicile is the most appropriate law here because a person's status is 
a matter of public concern, and therefore, the country to which each party belongs at the 
time of marriage has a more enduring interest to decide by what means the protection of 
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public and parties' interests will be fully asserted.(lS) Hence, the protection of the 
English public interest was obviously the main reason upon which Brook v. Brook was 
decided. Lord Campbell has expressly stated that: 
"It is quite obvious that no civilised state can allow its domiciled subjects or citizens, 
by making a temporary visit to a foreign country, to enter into a contract to be 
performed in the place of domicile, if the contract is forbidden by the law of the 
place of domicile as contrary to religion, or morality, or to any of its fundamental 
institutions". (16) 
Moreover, it is reasonably clear that a forum's court applies a foreign rule of essential 
validity out of comity, and the desire to gain uniformity of status and decisions. (17) 
Subsequently, Jaffey in a stimulating recent article has noted that the law of the parties 
prenuptial domicile has no interest to be applied for protecting the public interest if the 
matrimonial horne is established in a third country. "If for instance the public interest 
which a particular country's domestic rule is designed to protect can only be affected if 
the matrimonial horne is in that country, then a choice of law rule which requires the 
application of that domestic rule on the basis that one of the parties was domiciled in the 
country before the marriage, although the parties do not live there after it, will nullify 
marriages quite unnecessarily."(l8) Certainly, this view holds true in the case where a 
marriage officer under his discretion has permitted the celebration of the marriage on the 
basis that the impediment imposed by the parties' antenuptial domiciliary law is 
contrary to the public policy of the lex loci celebrationis as being of discriminatory 
nature, and where the marriage validity is questioned ex post. But the obvious 
objection to this view is that it debilitates the possibilities of implementing a choice of 
law rule that may prevent conflicts in marriage cases straight away at the time of the 
ceremony. 
Furthermore, certainty and predictability are frequently adduced as basic policy 
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considerations underlying the advantages of the dual domicile test, as being a test which 
permits the parties to ascertain their marriage validity at the time of the ceremony, 
especially if one considers that a void marriage needs no decree to be declared null and 
void'c 19) To this extent, it has been submitted that: 
"Any rule under which it is impossible to predicate at the date of the marriage with 
knowledge of all material facts whether it is valid or invalid is, ... undesirable, 
especially in view of the fact that the destination of interest in property may depend 
on the validity of the marriage. ,,(2 0) 
However, the present writer believes that the requirements of certainty and security of 
legal relations are likely to be advanced as arguments for the implementation of a choice 
of law rule under which a marriage officer has a discretion by which he may refuse to 
celebrate a marriage if he is satisfied that that parties are known to be subject to any 
legal impediment under their personal law or laws. Therefore, the only rule under 
which it is possible for the marriage officer to carry out, at the time of the marriage 
"with knowledge of all material facts", the uniformity of status and decisions, and the 
prevention oflimping relations is the parties' premarital personal laws. 
Undoubtedly, the dual domicile rule deserves preference even in the world of today, 
where the sex equality principle is clearly established, and where the common rule of 
law that the wife acquires automatically the husband's domicile on marriage has been 
abolished because of its being based on a "completely outmoded legal concept", i.e 
consideration of the husband's country as the "true seat of the marriage relation".(21) 
This is because it gives equal right for the parties' antenuptial domiciliary laws to 
protect their public interests. A choice of law rule governing essentials of marriage 
should provide an answer to the question whether the parties have capacity to marry 
each other; a question which requires, in the view of the policy objectives of choice of 
law rules, examination at the time of the ceremony. 
An additional argument in support of this rule is deducible from the Brook's 
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decisionJ22) The House of Lords' view surely suggests that this test would render the 
evasion of the restrictions imposed by the parties' premarital domiciliary laws 
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Lord Campbell pointed out: 
"If a marriage is absolutely prohibited in any country as being contrary to public 
policy, and leading to social evils; I think that the domiciled inhabitants of that 
country cannot be permitted, by passing the frontier and entering another state in 
which this marriage is not prohibited, to celebrate a marriage forbidden by their own 
state ... ,,(23) 
On the authorities so far, English and Scots laws clearly favour the dual domicile rule, 
though some recent decisions appear to reject it under some special circumstances. In 
Brook v. Brook, (24) for instance, the invalidity of a marriage celebrated in Denmark 
between an English domiciliary and his deceased wife's sister, whose domicile was 
also English, was upheld before English courts, although the lex loci celebrationis 
recognised the marriage as valid. English law was decisive in this case by reason of its 
being the law of the parties' prenuptial domicile. Dr. Cheshire has strongly submitted 
that the Brook's decision is "rather inconclusive", insofar as the marriage in issue was 
void both by the parties' antenuptial domiciliary laws, and their intended matrimonial 
home as being congruent.(25) 
But Cheshire's view is not easily reconcilable with any sound reasoning on the basis 
that Lord Campbell conceded that no civilised country can allow its subjects to celebrate 
a marriage whenever it is forbidden by its own law.(26) It is legally understood, 
however, that a person cannot be a domiciled of choice in a certain country until he or 
she settles there with the intention of residing as far as he can see ahead.(27) A party to 
a marriage can be considered to be subject only to the personal law of his or her 
domicile (being the domicile at the time of the marriage). Therefore, the country where 
the parties intended to settle their matrimonial home cannot claim them as its subjects, 
nor to have an interest in determining their marital status, since determination of the 
123 
matrimonial domicilerelies,primafacie, on the decision whether the parties are validly 
married. It is reasonably clear that: 
"In Brook v. Brook. the references in Lord Campbell's judgement to the law of the 
matrimonial residence were merely incidental, and if they were intended to add 
anything they were not supported by Lord Cranworth and Lord St. Leonards, who in 
their judgements in the case laid down the dual domicile rule in unqualified 
terms.,,(2S) 
Even if we concede that Cheshire's view of Brook's decision is right, the subsequent 
cases(29) have proved beyond any doubt that the dual domicile theory deserves 
preference according to English and Scots laws. In Sottomayer v. De Barros [N° 
11, (30) the dispute concerned the validity of a purported marriage celebrated in England 
between first cousins. On the evidence, it appears that the parties were domiciled in 
Portugal the law of which considers the marriage of first cousins illegal as being 
incestuous. Conton, L. J. reasoned that essentials of marriage, "as in other contract" 
must depend on the law of the domicile, and the marriage therefore ought to be declared 
null and void. (31) The ambiguity surrounding the applicable law upon essentials, 
where the parties have separate domiciles, has been clarified in the case of Re 
Paine. (32) The Facts in this case were as follows: an English woman domiciled in 
England went through a ceremony of marriage with her deceased sister's husband, a 
German domiciliary, in Germany by which law such marriage were valid. Bennett, J., 
in his judgement expressly adverted to the decision in Mette v. Mette/ 33) and took the 
view that the disability of either party to the marriage invalidated the marriage. On the 
proof that the wife was under incapacity according to her law of domicile, the learned 
Judge held the marriage void because by English law " ... the lady had not the capacity 
to contract it.,,(34) 
Moreover, the decision in Pugh v. Pugh, (35) where a marriage between an English 
domiciliary and a domiciled Hungarian girl, 15 years of age, had been concluded in 
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Austria, lends even more supports to the dual domicile test. This is because Pearce, J. 
held that the marriage was void, "since by the law of the husband's domicile it was a 
marriage into which he could not lawfully enter.,,(36) The decision, it is submitted, 
looks weak as an authority in support of the dual domicile test, as it is quite simply 
based on the statutory interpretation of the Age of Marriage Act 1929.( 3 7 ) Indeed, the 
case was decided in the first place through a direct reference to this Act, but it was 
confirmed as in accordance with the rules of English conflict of laws, inasmuch as the 
learned Judge had expressly adverted to Mette v. Mette, and also quoted the case of Re 
Paine the decision of which illustrated that the courts' concern is the application of the 
lex domicilii to the essentials, not only where it is English, but as the most appropriate 
law to govern the matter.(38) 
It is undoubtedly true that the decision in Padolecchia v. Padolecchia(39) has 
prominently laid down the dual domicile as the most appropriate rule carrying out the 
policy objectives underlying English conflict of rules. In this case, a marriage between 
an Italian domiciliary and a domiciled Danish woman was celebrated in England. Sir 
Jocelyn Simon P. submitted that the marriage was void since the husband had no 
capacity to marry according to his premarital domiciliary law, i.e. Italian law, under 
which the divorce decree obtained by the husband in Mexico would not be recognised. 
The Scots conflict of laws' position as regards capacity is broadly similar to that of 
English law. The almost unanimous view of academic authorities and of the courts is 
that capacity to marry is primarily ruled by the law of each party's premarital domicile. 
In Lendrum v. Chakravarti, (40) for instance, Lord Mackay has stressed the position of 
Scots law "on the question which really touches merely the capacity of a party to enter 
into the marriage in question, the capacity of each spouse is ruled primarily by the laws 
of his domicile, but also (agreeing on this with Westlake) he must be able to satisfy the 
law of capacity for marriage of the lex loci celebrationis." This view has been 
reaffirmed in Rojas case, (41) where the Sheriff court refused to grant a decree of 
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mandamus. This is because Italian law, as being the premarital domicile of the 
woman, at that time did not recognise the Mexican divorce. The learned Judge, 
however, had this to say: 
"The fundamental principle of Scots law is that the law of domicile governs personal 
status. The relevant law in this case is Italian law. By that law, according to the 
evidence I have heard, the Mexican divorce is not recognised. The female applicant is 
therefore -and it seems too clear for argument- a married woman. That is a legal 
impediment to her going through a form of marriage with another man."( 42) 
It can be said that the dual domicile test has also gained support of the English and 
Scots' statutory provisions. (43) The first of these is the Marriage (Enabling) Act 1960 
which has amended the English rules of affinity by permitting a man to marry his 
former wife's sister, aunt or niece, and a woman to marry her former husband's 
brother, uncle or nephew. Section 1 (3) provides that nothing in this Act shall validate a 
marriage, if "either party to it is at the time of the marriage is domiciled in a country 
outside Great-Britain, and under the law of that country there cannot be a valid marriage 
between the parties.,,(44) Secondly, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 seems of added 
weight here, since it renders an actually or potentially polygamous union celebrated 
abroad void if "either party was domiciled in England at the time of marriage".(45) 
More recently, the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, though it does not contain express 
provisions adopting the dual domicile test, reinforces its position in Scots conflict of 
laws. Section 2 of this Act, for instance, stipulates that a marriage solemnised abroad 
is void if the parties are within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity according to 
Scots law, and either party was domiciled in Scotland at the time of the marriage.(46) 
Professor Dicey's thesis has been criticised. Dr Cheshire has argued that the dual 
domicile test is greatly exaggerated and that it leans too heavily in favour of the 
invalidity of marriage. ( 47) Indeed, this is right if, and only if, the main concern of the 
choice of law rule governing essentials is the examination of the marriage validity ex 
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post. But it would not seem to be accurate to speak of invalidity as an undesirable 
effect to which the dual domicile test leads, since the parties' capacity to marry should 
be tested at the time of the marriage ceremony, and before the marriage relation comes 
into existence. Moreover, Dr. Cheshire believes that the dual domicile theory cannot 
provide a workable and practical test for the choice of law rule governing capacity, on 
the basis that it acknowledges its own evasion. (48) He openly states that it is sufficient 
for an English domiciliary who wishes to marry her uncle, a domiciled Egyptian, to 
acquire a domicile of choice in Egypt before the marriage. By so doing, the validity of 
the marriage will be upheld according to English conflict of laws. Thus, it has been 
said that the dual domicile test creates a certain anomaly because 
"if the policy of the English rule is not infringed when she abandons her English 
domicile shortly before the marriage, it is scarcely infringed when she abandons it 
shortly after the marriage. Indeed, in such case, although the wife necessarily remains 
domiciled in England at the time of the marriage, she has already ceased, to all intents 
and purposes, to be a member of the English community. ,,( 49) 
This is questionable, for the practical difference between the two proposed situations is 
that in the former she has already acquired a new domicile and severed all her relations 
with her English domicile. Whereas in the latter she has only an intention to acquire a 
new domicile which has no legal effect unless implemented, and therefore she will 
remain an English domiciliary until she acquires a new domicile according to English 
law, since intention is only one of the conditions of acquiring a domicile. Moreover, 
reliance on the intention of the parties to determine the applicable law upon a public 
matter will introduce the will of the parties as a basis of choice of law rule. It is 
reasonably clear that the intention of the parties does not suffice for the acquisition of 
domicile, as well as for being a basis upon which the marriage officer will test the 
parties' capacity to marry. However, in Scottish conflict rules, motive is not a bar, so 
the acquisition of a new domicile will be effective if only the test of animus and 
factum are satisfied. In the days when divorce was harder to obtain, the Scots court 
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accepted that the motive for change of domicile might be the obtaining of the 
divorce.< 49A) However, the court had to be satisfied according to the normal rules, 
which were and remain, strict that domicile had been established animo et facto. 
Hartley has remarked that English law of domicile "does not always indicate the 
country to which the parties really belong", because of unsatisfactory rules concerning 
the acquisition and loss of domicile, such as the revival of the domicile of origin. Thus, 
it has been suggested that the policy arguments for applying the law of domicile are 
deemed to wane away, since its application may lead to the examination of parties' 
capacity to marry by the law of a country they have never visited.(50) "Such criticism 
may, however, provide a reason for changing the rules relating to domicile, rather those 
concerning capacity to marry.,,(51) 
The present writer believes that the purpose of a choice of law rule governing essential 
validity should be the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage with certainty at the 
time of the ceremony. Certainty, predictability, international uniformity of status and 
decisions, and the desire to eliminate limping marriages seem to demand this. The dual 
domicile theory, therefore, is the only test which applies the law to which the parties are 
subjected at the time of the ceremony; and it seems too clear for argument that it 
provides a workable and practical test for the choice of law to govern capacity to marry 
at the stage of the formation of the union. 
2- Intended Matrimonial Home Theory and the Dec~n in Radwan v. Radwan 
The alternative theory, which is simply based on the presumption that marital capacity 
is governed by virtue of the husband's antenuptial domiciliary law, assumes that once it 
can be inferred that the parties at the time of the marriage have the intention to live 
elsewhere, the law of their intended matrimonial home should apply if, and only if, the 
intention has in fact been implemented within a reasonable time after the marriage.(52) 
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It is therefore reasonably clear that, according to this view, incapacity imposed by the 
wife's pre-nuptial domiciliary law has no effect on the validity of marriage unless it 
becomes the intended matrimonial home.(53) This is because the husband's domicile 
is regarded as the "true seat of marriage relation", since the husband is universally 
regarded as the head of the family, a fact which deprives the community to which the 
wife belonged to before the marriage from having any interest in the marriage. (5 4 ) 
However, it is interesting to note that the original common law rule, according to which 
a woman acquires automatic.ally her husband's domicile by the mere fact of marriage, 
has played a major role in the formulation of the present approach. The consideration 
underlying this is the basic presumption whereby the law of the husband's ante-nuptial 
domicile is declared to be decisive, where the genuine intention of the parties cannot be 
ascertained, or where the parties' intention have not been implemented shortly after 
marriage. Therefore, this view seems to suggest that the law of the husband's domicile 
is the normal rule determining essential validity, but its applicability is rebutted 
wherever the parties intended to set up their matrimonial home elsewhere. 
Dr. Cheshire, the leading advocate of this view, has persuasively argued that the law of 
the parties' intended matrimonial home is the most appropriate law to govern essential 
validity, since marriage intimately concerns the public policy and social morality of the 
community in which the parties perform their duties and obligations of being husband 
and wife. The learned author believes that "whether the intermarriage of two persons 
should be prohibited for social, religious, eugenic or other like reason is a question that 
affects the community in which the parties live together as man and wife.,,(55) In the 
course of his reasoning, he openly states that the Royal Commission on Marriage and 
Divorce has expressed the same view in their 1956 report: 
"The status of marriage pre-eminently affects society in the country where the parties 
live together as husband and wife .. .!l seems socially undesirable that a union which 
is regarded there as not detrimental to the community should be pronounced void, 
merely because one or other or both of the parties were formerly connected with a 
country in which a different view prevails. ,,( 5 6) 
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Dr. Cheshire's statement as to the view of the Royal Commission is, however, 
somewhat doubtful, since there is ample evidence in the same report to the contrary, 
indicating that the Commission proposes the application of the law of the parties' 
intended matrimonial home, as being relevant only where the marriage would be invalid 
under the dual domicile test. To this extent, the Commission has expressly said: 
"If the marriage is alleged to be void on ground other than that of lack of formalities, 
that issue shall be determined in accordance with the personal law or laws of the 
parties at the time of marriage ... ; provided that a marriage which was celebrated 
elsewhere than in England or Scotland should not be declared void if it is valid 
according to the law of the country in which the parties intended at the time of 
marriage to make their matrimonial home and such intention has in fact being carried 
out.,,(57) 
Accordingly, it has been suggested that the law of the parties' intended matrimonial 
domicile avoids the difficulties arising when the parties, at the time of the marriage, are 
domiciled in different countries, and thus is more likely to lead to validation of the 
marital unions which have been contracted and performed in good faith. By contrast, it 
is obviously clear that the application of dual domicile test upon a case where an 
English woman, domiciled in England, married her Egyptian domiciliary uncle, and 
they have established their matrimonial home in Egypt the law of which recognised the 
validity of such union, will render the marriage void.(58) Moreover, the adoption of 
this single-law system rule, it is submitted, renders the distinction between unilateral 
and bilateral impediments, which is of vital importance under the dual domicile test, of 
no avail here on the ground that only one single law is applicable according to the 
present view.(59) 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the policy of giving effects to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties as to the law governing their marital status is better achieved 
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by the application ofthe parties' intended matrimonial horne, the law with reference to 
which the parties assume the validity of their marriage. This is apparently because 
when the parties enter into marriage they are looking forward to a married life in the 
country in which they intend to live together. It has been submitted that to destroy the 
assumption of the parties as to the validity of their marriage "unexpectedly can result in 
quite natural sense of injustice. "e 60) Besides that, the policy of upholding the validity 
of marriage (Favor matrirnonii) is also adduced to support this view, as being more 
effectively achieved if the law of the parties' intended matrimonial horne is applied to 
the essential validity of the marriage. To this extent, Jaffey believes that "choice of law 
rules as to the validity of marriage should, so far as possible, be such that a marriage, 
duly celebrated between willing parties, will not be held invalid without good 
reason. II( 61) Indeed, the intended matrimonial horne test is the most convenient one to 
ascertain the essential validity ex post, for the purpose of protecting the reasonable 
expectations of the parties, and of achieving Favormatrimonii principle. But holding 
the greater chance of invalidity to be a basis for rejecting the dual domicile test is not 
easily reconcileable to any sound reasoning, since the present view may destroy the 
reasonable expectations of the parties, Favor matrimonii principle, and will lead to the 
invalidation of marriage if the parties, wrongly advised, establish their matrimonial 
horne in a country the law of which regards the marriage as void. The suggested 
answer which leans towards the validity of marriage therefore is the recognition of the 
marriage as valid if it is so either by the intended matrimonial horne, or by the law of 
the parties' premarital domicile. (62) 
Authority, though scanty, exist for the proposition that the English and Scots courts 
have been prepared to apply the law of the parties' intended matrimonial horne in 
determining the essential validity of marriage. In fact, most of the relevant decisions in 
our subject matter are reconcileable with the intended matrimonial horne test, but it 
appears to be the ratiodecendi of none of them.(63) However, the law of the intended 
131 
matrimonial home test has been given further prominence in an important dictum of 
Lord Green M.R. in the case of De Reneville v. De Reneville. Lord Green M.R. has 
expressed himself thus: 
"The validity of marriage so far as regards the observance of formalities is a matter 
for lex loci celebrationis. But this is not a case of forms. It is a case of essential 
validity. By what law is that to be decided? In my opinion by the law of France, 
either because that is the law of the husband's domicile at the date of the marriage or 
(preferably, in my view) because at that date it was the law of the matrimonial 
domicile in reference to which the parties may have been supposed to enter into the 
bonds of marriage. ,,( 64) 
Moreover, Lord Bucknill has expressly stated the opinion of the courts, as to what law 
should govern essential validity, even more strongly: 
"To hold that the law of the country where each spouse is domiciled before the 
marriage must decide as to the validity of the marriage in this case might lead to the 
deplorable result, if the laws happened to differ, that the marriage would be valid in 
one country and void in the other country. For this reason I think it is essential that 
the law of one country where the ceremony of marriage took place and where the 
parties intended to live together and where they in fact lived together should be 
regarded as the law which controls the validity of their marriage. ,,(65) 
It is submitted, however, that De Reneville v. De Reneville decision has no effect on 
the existing choice of law rules relating to the essential validity of marriage, since it is a 
decision that concerns the jurisdiction of the English courts as to the nullity of marriage. 
Therefore, his Lordship's view has no bearing on the choice of law matters because it 
has not been considered as an important authority in the subsequent cases on capacity to 
marry.(66) Less comment is made upon the fact that Lord Bucknill refers to marriages 
which take place in a country where the parties intend to continue living as man and 
wife. The learned Lord, therefore, would appear to be more in favour of the law of the 
actual matrimonial home, rather than that of the intended matrimonial home, 
determining the substantive validity. 
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Dr Cheshire and North are of the opinion that some of Lord Denning L.J.'s comments 
in the case of Kenward v. Kenward(67) support the view that capacity to marry 
depends on the law of the parties' intended matrimonial home. Denning L.J., 
however, refers to the case where the parties belong to different countries, and has said 
that the essential validity of the marriage in this case is determined by the law of the 
country where they intend to live together. It must be emphasised that Denning L.J.'s 
dictum cannot be construed as supporting Dr Cheshire's contention suggesting the 
intended matrimonial home as a general choice of law rule, on the ground that his 
Lordship's dictum is confined to the case where the parties have separate domiciles 
and has no effect on the traditional choice of law rule in the case of common domicile. 
Certain more recent English decisions have been inclined to favour the intended 
matrimonial home test. In Radwan v. Radwan [N°2],(68) the facts of which briefly are 
mentioned above, it was argued that the marriage was void on the ground that the 
wife's ante-nuptial domicile was in England the law by virtue of which the wife lacked 
capacity to enter into such a marriage as being of polygamous nature. Cumming-Bruce 
J. considered the line of cases supporting the dual domicile test as not being a safe 
guide to the case before him, and held that the intended matrimonial home rule applied 
to determine capacity to enter into a polygamous marriage.(69) His Lordship expressly 
stated that the wife, though her premarital domicile was English, "had capacity to enter 
into a polygamous union by virtue of her prenuptial decision to separate herself from 
the law of her domicile and make her life with her husband in his country, where the 
Mohammedan law of polygamous marriage was the normal institution of 
marriage.,,(70) However, it is worthy of note that Radwan's decision is not a clear cut-
authority providing support for the intended matrimonial home test as a universal rule 
governing essential validity: the learned judge confined his decision to the matter of 
capacity to enter into a polygamous marriage, for he openly states that: "Nothing in this 
judgement bears upon the capacity of minors, the law of affinity, or the effect of 
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bigamy upon capacity to enter into a monogamous marriage. ,,(71) 
Yet, this decision has been heavily criticised on the ground that capacity to contract 
polygamous marriage is only one facet of general capacity to marry, and thus there is 
no sound reason to distinguish it from the capacity to enter into a monogamous 
marriage which is, according to the overwhelming judicial and extrajudicial opinion, 
referred to the parties premarital domiciliary laws.(72) It is therefore reasonably clear 
that the practical significance of Cumming-Bruce, 1.'s decision, if it has any, is that 
there is clearly a strong desire to uphold the validity of a long-standing relationship.(73) 
Dr Cheshire's contention as to the intrinsic merits of the intended matrimonial home test 
as a universal rule determining essential validity has been strongly criticised. The 
obvious practical objection, it is submitted, is that it leads to uncertainty as to status, 
since it is a choice of law rule based on subsequent events occurring after the 
celebration of marriage. In fact it is impossible, according to this view, to predicate at 
the time of the marriage whether it is valid or invalid. It is therefore reasonably clear 
that the intended matrimonial home rule is an unacceptable choice of law rule on the 
ground that: 
livery serious practical difficulties are likely to arise if the validity of a marriage has 
to remain in suspense while we wait and see [for an unspecified period] whether or 
not the parties implement their [unexpressed] antenuptial intention to acquire another 
domicile. This is especially true if interests in property depend on the validity of 
maniage, as for instance where a widow's pension ceases on her marriage. 11(7 4) 
It has been argued that the present approach is bad in principle on the basis of its wide 
reliance on the parties' intentions which are generally considered as being irrelevant to 
the question of their legal capacity to enter into a marriage. Moreover, Cumming-Bruce 
1., in giving his judgement in Ali v. Ali, has pointed out that personal intention of the 
parties is irrelevant to the consequences of a validly solemnised marriage.(7 S) This is 
consistent with Lord Macnaghten's statement in Cooper v. Cooper's Trustees:(76) 
"It is difficult to suppose that Mrs Cooper could confer capacity upon herself by 
contemplating a different country as the place where the contract was to be fulfilled, 
if that be the proper expression, or by contracting in view of an alteration of personal 
status which would bring with it a change of domicile." 
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The present writer believes that reliance on the parties' intention as a basis for choice of 
law rule governing essentials of a marriage, might lead to the deplorable result of 
introducing the proper law approach [loi d'autonomie 1 to govern the validity of 
marriage which is a matter of intense public concern as being a status affecting the 
social morality of the society to which the parties belong at the time of the marriage 
ceremony. The protection of public interest's policy would seem to demand the 
rejection of the parties' intention as a test, since it would lead to evasion and to a great 
movement of people from one country to another, undermining the purpose of the rule 
that essentials of marriage are based on religious and morals of each society, and are to 
be referred thereto for adjudication. 
Indeed, the parties' intention is not a safe guide for determining the law governing 
essential validity of marriage. This is because the parties, though intending at the time 
of the marriage to set up their matrimonial home in a given country, may change their 
minds and settle down elsewhere, or the intention may remain unfulfilled at the time of 
the proceedings, or they may have no such intention at all or, possibly, the intentions of 
each party may not be the same. Furthermore, the intended matrimonial home rule is 
not a suitable rule in sham marriages cases.(77) The suggested answer, propounded by 
Cheshire, is simply that of reliance on the husband's pre-marital domiciliary law to 
govern capacity in these cases, as being the true seat of the marriage relation.(78) 
However, it is submitted that such a solution is arbitrary and unjustifiable in principle, 
since the common rule upon which it was formulated has been abolished in the world 
of today as being based on an "outmoded legal concept." It is therefore important to 
emphasise that this solution fits badly in modern legal systems as being a 
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discriminatory rule which is inconsistent with the modem established principles, i.e. 
equality between sexes, and the wife's freedom to acquire a separate domicile from her 
husband's domicileJ79) 
It is equally true that the intended matrimonial horne rule leans towards evasion of law, 
since it enables the parties to evade the law of their ante-nuptial domicile, which has a 
legitimate concern in their marital status, by contemplating their married life. However, 
Professor Palsson claimed that: 
"Even if it is recognised that the interest of a country whose only contact with the 
marriage is that one of the parties was domiciled there until the time of the 
celebration is less significant than that of the country of the matrimonial home, 
however, it is hardly realistic to expect that the former country will be prepared to 
give up all claim to control, at all events if the question arises in that country 
itself. ,,(80) 
It is submitted that the dual domicile test is the most appropriate rule to govern the 
incapacities imposed in the interest of the parties, such as the age of marriage.(81) It is 
reasonably clear that the evasion to which the intended matrimonial horne approach 
leads will promote limping marriages, and will create a great mobility of people from 
one state to another which will distort the specific rules containing impediments based 
on the social and religious background of each society. 
Finally, it would be inaccurate to hold the intended matrimonial horne rule as the most 
appropriate law to govern essential validity of marriage because of its ultimate concern 
with the examination of the marriage validity ex post. The advocates of the "intended 
matrimonial horne" view, however, believe that the examination of the question of the 
validity of marriage hardly ever arises at the time of the marriageJ82) It has been 
suggested that the crucial question to which a choice of law rule should provide an 
answer, is whether the parties have capacity to marry each other or not at the time of the 
ceremony. Certainly, the consideration of the essential requirements at the stage of the 
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ceremony is of vital importance, inasmuch as it provides a satisfactory rule by which 
the policy of preventing conflicts will be established as far as the impediments imposed 
on the parties by their personal laws are not contrary to the public policy of the lex loci 
celebrationis. Therefore, any rule which concerns only the examination of essential 
validity ex post is bad in principle, since it does not provide an answer to the basic 
issue concerning the capacity of the parties to intermarry, and ignores the importance of 
the temporal dimension of choice of law rules. 
3- Flexible approaches to the law governing ~ntial validity of maniage 
It is worthy of note that there are judicial and extrajudicial opinions in more recent years 
indicating the departure of English and Scottish conflict of laws from the authoritative 
position that domicile, as a jurisdiction-selecting rule, holds at common law as being 
the main connecting factor determining the law governing essential validity of marriage. 
These opinions connote also the adoption of more flexible connecting factors that 
highlight the importance of the policy of Favor matrimonii, as well as the policy of 
giving effects to the parties' expectations. This is because domicile, it is submitted, is a 
complex and problematic connecting factor by reason of its notorious ambiguity and 
undesirable state in English and Scots conflict of laws. (83) These approaches, which 
will be discussed briefly below, incorporate the real and substantial connection test, 
alternative reference test, and elective domicile test. 
(i)- Real and substantial connection test: 
According to this view, the questions of essential validity are governed by the law of 
the country with which the marriage has its real and substantial connection. In 
Vervaeke v. Smith, (84) a Belgian decree annulling a sham marriage was refused 
recognition before the English court on the basis of public policy, since the marriage 
had substantial connection with England. Lord Simon endorsed the proper law 
approach, claiming that 
"The criterion of a real and substantial connection seems to me to be useful and 
relevant in considering the choice of law for testing, if not all questions of essential 
validity, at least the question of the sort of quintessential validity in issue in this 
appeal -the question which law's public policy should determine the validity of the 
maniage.,,(85) 
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More recently, the same view has been applied in Lawrence v. Lawrence,(86) where 
the question of capacity to remarry after a foreign divorce was brought before the court. 
Antony Lincoln J., following Lord Simon, characterised the issue in question as a 
matter of quintessential validity, and adopted the proper law approach to govern the 
question of capacity to remarry after a foreign divorce. The learned Judge therefore 
held the marriage valid, on the ground that" In the eyes of [English] law the Nevada 
divorce is to be fully recognised and that the Nevada marriage had a real and substantial 
connection with England and is valid by the law ofthis country.,,(87) 
As regards the criterion to be used for determining the best connected law, it IS 
submitted that it is easily ascertainable where an established matrimonial home IS 
visible, i.e. the law of the actual matrimonial home. This is because the country of the 
matrimonial home is intimately concerned with marriage by the reason of its being the 
country where the parties perform their matrimonial duties and obligations.(88) 
Moreover, it has been suggested that the parties' common domiciliary law seems to be 
the best connected law where no matrimonial home is visible. But the determination of 
the best connected law becomes increasingly difficult and doubtful where the parties 
have separate domiciles and no matrimonial home is discernible. Lord Simon, 
however, seems to suggest that the place of celebration and the domiciles of the parties 
are important factors for determining the best connected law in such cases. Therefore, 
his Lordship, in Vervaeke v. Smith where the question of sham marriage was at issue, 
decided that English law was the best connected law on the basis that the ceremony 
took place in England, the husband was a British national and domiciliary, and the wife 
was to become permanently resident in EnglandJ89) However, the decision is 
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controversial, because there were strong connections between the wife and Belgium. 
It has been argued that the present approach actually possesses a good measure of 
certainty, since the best connected law usually amounts to the law of the parties' 
established matrimonial home. Fentiman has claimed recently that "domicile is far less 
certain than a real and substantial connection test for marriage, at least in so far as the 
latter is represented by a matrimonial home. "(90) This is questionable, in so far as the 
question whether the parties can marry each other must be examined at the time of the 
marriage. Fentiman has examined this question and has openly stated that "If the 
substantial connection test is available one might simply advise a couple to marry 
anyway and set up their home in a country which would validate the marriage; if the 
marriage came to be tested at a later stage it would then be valid. ,,(91) However, one 
should note that Fentiman's opinion assumes that the purpose of a choice of law rule 
governing essential validity is whether the marriage is valid at the time of the 
proceeding. It is therefore reasonably clear that this view is misleading, as the purpose 
of a choice of law rule as to essential validity is the prospective situation, i.e. whether 
the parties can marry each other. 
Subsequently, justice and the protection of the parties' reasonable expectations as to the 
validity of their marriage are, it is thought, interesting grounds supporting the 
substantial connection test.(92) To this extent, it has been submitted that the law of the 
matrimonial home is the appropriate governing law on the basis that the parties expect 
its application upon their marriage. From the social viewpoint, the law of the country 
in which the parties live together as husband and wife is the best connected law to 
govern and decide whether the parties are validly married.(93) 
Finally, the Law Commissions have recently rejected the substantial connection test on 
grounds that 
"[ilt is an inherently vague and unpredictable test which would introduce an 
unacceptable degree of uncertainty into the law. It is a test which is difficult to apply 
other than through the courtroom process and it is therefore unsuitable in an area 
where the law's function is essentially prospective, i.e. a yardstick for future 
planning. ,,(9 4) 
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Dr North, as a general editor for the most recent edition of Cheshire's private 
international law in 1992, has expressed the position in even stronger terms: "It does 
seem to be a retrograde step to introduce into the field of validity of marriage a test 
which, because of its inherent uncertainty, was abandoned in the field of divorce 
recognition in 1971".(95) 
It is the view of the present writer that the substantial connection test does not provide a 
workable test in the prospective situation, i.e. whether the parties have legal capacity to 
marry each other. The main reason for that lies in the fact that the approach leads to 
very prolonged investigations, especially where no matrimonial home is visible, and 
most criteria advanced for assessing the best connected law have been rejected by the 
legal theorists in so far as they cannot constitute on their own a choice of law rule 
governing essential validity,(96) 
(ii)- Alternative Reference Test: 
Relying on the consideration of the dual domicile test as leaning towards the invalidity 
of the marriage, Jaffey has suggested that, apart from the incapacities imposed for 
protecting the parties' interest -such as non-age- the marriage's validity should be 
upheld if it is valid under either the dual domicile test or the intended matrimonial horne 
test.(97) Accordingly, the validity of the maniage, wherever an incapacity designed in 
the interest of the parties is involved, should be exclusively determined by the dual 
domicile test. This is because determination of the protection which the parties require 
is solely the function of the domiciliary laws of the parties at the time of the marriage 
ceremony.(98) However, it appears that this approach is undoubtedly based on the 
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policy of giving effect to the parties' reasonable expectations and of upholding the 
validity of marriages. Lincoln, L.J., though he has left open the case where the 
marriage is valid under the dual domicile test and invalid under the substantial 
connection test, seems to be in favour of the alternative test.(99) 
Certainly, this approach results in validating more marriages whenever there is no good 
reason to do otherwise; but it is an unacceptable test since it renders the process of 
investigation as to the governing law even more complicated as it requires the 
examination of the substantive rules of three legal systems. Moreover, it would be 
innacurate to promote Favor matrimonii principle into a governing rule, because of its 
being only in favour of the validity of marriage whenever there is no good reason for 
the invalidation, and it is of no avail in prospective situation where the question is 
whether a marriage should be celebrated or not. More recently, the English and the 
Scottish Law Commissions were of the opinion that "it would be contrary to principle 
to adopt the dual domicile (or the intended matrimonial home) test and then to refuse to 
give effect to it if it results in the invalidity of the marriage. ,,( 1 00) 
(iii)- Elective Dual Domicile Test: 
As regards the importance of Favor matrimonii principle when the marriage validity is 
examined ex post, it has been suggested that the marriage, though essentially 
defective, should be declared valid if it is so under either party's domiciliary law. 
However, it is submitted that the dual domicile test, i.e. the application of the less 
favourable law to the marriage, should prevail where the question arises before the 
celebration of marriage. This is because the policy of validation is without significance 
atthe time of the ceremony.(lOl) Hence, the elective dual domicile test promotes the 
policy of protecting the parties' reasonable expectation and of validation. This 
approach, however, has been criticised on the basis that it gives prominence to the 
favourable law without any policy justification that might be a fundamental basis of the 
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choice of law rules. Moreover, it is a test, though it leads to the validation of 
marriages, that results in evasion and limping marriages. It is therefore reasonably 
clear that the policies of promoting uniformity of status, and the desire to eliminate 
limping marriages outweigh the policy of validation. (I 02 ) 
4- Conclusion 
At the present date, Scottish and English cases and writing appears definitely to support 
the dual domicile theory, although there are occasional eruptions of interest in other 
approaches, which serve to cause a ripple on the surface.(103) According to the 
traditional approach, however, certainty, predictability, desire to eliminate limping 
marriages and the policy of promoting international uniformity should be the 
fundamental bases of the choice of law rule governing essential validity, whereas the 
alternative views, which are suggesting a flexible test accommodating the needs of each 
case, appear to elevate the policy of upholding the parties' expectations and of 
validation into a governing law. It is reasonably clear that the rival views have missed 
the point that a choice of law rule should provide an answer to the question whether the 
parties of a given proposed marriage have capacity to marry, and thus whether the 
celebration can take place. The main reason is undoubtedly that essential requirements 
are based on religious and morals grounds that require the prevention of illegal and 
immoral marriages at the time of celebration. 
More recently, English and Scottish Law Commissions{ 1 04) have examined the choice 
of law rule for the essential validity of marriage and suggested the retention of domicile 
as a connecting factor for determining the personal law. Moreover, nationality as a 
connecting factor in this field has been considered and rejected on the basis of its 
undesirability in the United Kingdom where different laws exist [England & Wales, 
Scotland, and North Ireland]. Habitual residence as a connecting factor is also rejected 
on the basis that it "does not represent such a strong connection between a person and a 
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country as would always justify a person's civil status being determined according to 
the law of that country".(1 05) However, the possibility of discarding the personal law 
as the law governing essential validity and replacing it by some other connecting factors 
-such as the law of the forum or the lex loci celebrationis,has been considered and 
rejected. As to the law of the forum, it has been submitted that it is a vague and 
unpredictable choice of law rule which will introduce uncertainty into the law, and will 
promote limping marriage relationships. In explaining the undesirability of the lex 
fori, it has been said that: 
"It would be unfortunate indeed if a marriage were to be held valid or invalid 
according to which country's courts adjudicate on the issue . .. it is surely a matter of 
some importance that the initial validity of a marriage should, in relation to all 
matters except form and ceremony . .. , be consistently decided .. . and that consistency 
cannot be attained if the test is lex Iori. lIe 1 06) 
Moreover, the lex loci celebrationis is regarded as an unacceptable connecting factor 
here, since it promotes the evasion of law and has no interest in marriage, except the 
interest that it has in governing formalities. (107) 
However, the intended matrimonial test has been rejected on the basis that it leads to 
serious practical disadvantages, mainly, that it is an unworkable test at the time of the 
marriage ceremony. And the intentions of the parties are irrelevant to the question of 
essential validity of the marriage. Moreover, it has been suggested that the dual 
domicile deserves preference as being a workable test in the prospective situation which 
ascertains with certainty whether the parties have capacity to marry each other at the 
time of the marriage.( 1 08) 
B- Nationality as a criterion determining the personal law of the parties 
Contrary to the widely held common law opinion which uses domicile as the most 
appropriate criterion for determining the personal law, civil law countries' position 
highlights the importance of nationality as the prominent connecting factor by which the 
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personal law is appropriately determined. ( 109 ) The predominance of nationali ty as the 
law governing the personal status and capacity of persons rests on the comparative ease 
of ascertaining nationality as compared with other criteria and its enduring nature. 
Moreover, the existence of unilateral legal systems, and the narrow sense of domicile, 
in civil law countries seems of added weight for the position that nationality holds as a 
connecting factor in those countries.( 11 0) The Algerian law position is also explained 
by historical reasons: the French influence, and the consideration of the status and 
capacity of persons, according to the Islamic religion, as a matter governed by the 
religious law which becomes now one of the main bases of the legislation in 
Algelia.(111) 
Since marriage belongs to the core of personal status, it is submitted that its essential 
validity must be determined by the parties' national law. This has been established in 
the Algerian civil code; article 10 provides that the laws concerning status and capacity 
of persons govern Algerians, whether they temporarily reside or have established their 
domiciles abroad.(112) Accordingly, the same unilateral rule has been expressed 
earlier in the article 97 of the Algerian civil status code which provides for the 
recognition of marriage celebrated abroad, between Algerians or between Algerians and 
foreigners, as being valid if, and only if, the essentials of marriage required by the 
Algerian law have been complied with. (113) 
As regards French Law, the unilateral rule expressed in the article 3(3) of civil code has 
been interpreted by the overwhelming weight of judicial and extrajudicial opinion as 
being a bilateral rule in a sense that the status and capacity of foreigner is governed, 
mutatis mutandis, by their personallaw.(114) It is therefore reasonably clear that the 
Algerian rule must be construed as to apply also for determining the essential validity of 
marriages of foreigners, since it is universally established that conflict rules are of 
bilateral nature. Thus, the rule should be extended by analogy for reasons of 
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reciprocity to call for the application of the national law of aliens to questions of their 
status and capacity. 
This solution has been clearly expressed in article 11 of the Algerian civil code which 
provides that the conditions with relation to the validity of marriage are governed by 
each party's national law . (115) It is worthy of note that the rule contained in this article 
seems simple, but the question arises as to whether the expression "Les conditions 
relative a la validite du mariage" includes the formal requirements. However, it is 
believed, though the wording of the article's text is imprecise, that the national law of 
each party governs only the essential requirement of marriage, leaving aside the formal 
requirements to the well established rule, i.e. lex loci celebrationis. This may be 
inferred from the context of article 97 of the civil status code which states clearly the 
limitation of applying each party's national law within the sphere of the essential 
validity ofmarriage.(l16) 
Consequently, the application of the national law as to the essential validity of marriage 
may give rise to difficulties related to mixed marriages, and the determination of the 
appropriate national law in some special cases. These incorporate the case where one 
of the parties has a double nationality, the case where the parties belong to a federal 
country, and where the parties are stateless or refugees. 
1- Mixed Marriages and the Law Governing Essential Validity: 
The mixed marriage phenomenon is a complicated problem which has led to difficulties 
in defining the applicable law for determining essential validity of marriage. Bartin has 
suggested that the husband's national law is the pre-eminent law which is intimately 
interested in the marriage relation, and thus that the capacity to marry of both spouses 
should be determined by that law alone. The main reason, however, is that the woman 
acquires automatically the husband's nationality by the mere fact of marriage.(117) 
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Bartin's thesis is questionable, since, according to the twentieth century trends in 
nationality law, women typically retain their nationality on marriage, unless they 
expressly renounce it. Moreover, a number of national constitutions and international 
conventions contain provisions as to equality of sexes, so that it would be difficult 
under modem conditions to justify adoption of such a rule in modem conflict of 
laws. (118) Moreover, the present writer therefore believes that giving preference to the 
husband's national law on the basis of its being the parties' common national law after 
the marriage is not easily reconcileable to any sound reasoning, since apart from other 
considerations the acquisition of the husband's nationality by the wife supposes, a 
priori, the validity of the marriage. (119) 
Another view, propounded by Niboyet, consists of giving preference to the lex fori 
where that law is the national law of one of the parties.(120) This rule, though it is 
considered as being anomalous, still receives some support in some modem legal 
systems such as Algerian law. According to article 13 of the civil code, the essentials 
of marriage are determined by the Algerian law alone, except that capacity in a narrow 
sense remains determinable by each party's national law , if at the time of the marriage 
one of the spouses is Algerian.(121) However, the rule seems hard to justify in 
principle, since it leaves open the case where neither of the parties is a national of the 
forum, and it leads to limping marriages. (122) Moreover, consider the applications of 
Article 13 where the marriage of parties, one of whom at least is an Algerian national, 
takes place outside Algeria. The prevailing view, which is greatly espoused by the 
contemporary legal doctrine, is the distributive application of the parties' national laws, 
in a sense that each party must satisfy the essential requirements of his own law. ( 123 ) 
This rule, like the dual domicile rule, gives equal rights to the parties' national laws to 
determine essential validity as being the only laws to which the parties are clearly 
subjected at the time of marriage. However, it is unanimously the view of the French 
judges, though the unilateral nature of article 3(3) of the civil code, that the distributive 
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application of the parties' national laws should prevail, since it is relatively easy to 
apply in the prospective situation where the question is whether the marriage can be 
allowed to take place. (124) Hence, in accordance with the generally established system 
in private international law , the text of article 11 of the Algerian civil code suggests that 
the essentials of marriage are to be determined by each party's nationallaw.(125) 
Nevertheless, there are some difficulties with this solution, and it is scarcely to be 
expected that it will prevail in cases involving impediments which have been termed 
bilateral. The main reason for this is that such impediments concern the marriage 
relation itself more than the parties. (12 6 ) It is therefore reasonably clear that bilateral 
impediments are exceptionally determined by the application of the parties' national 
laws in cumulation, in a sense that it is sufficient to hold the marriage void if one of the 
laws involved imposes such kind of impediments. Suppose, for instance that an 
Algerian wishes to marry his niece, of Egyptian nationality. Although the Egyptian law 
permits uncle and niece marriage, the marriage will not take place for the reason that 
Algerian law imposes a bilateral impediment.(127) Hence, it seems that the Algerian 
law has adopted the prevailing solution in French law, i.e. the cumulative application of 
both parties' national laws in cases of bilateral impediments. (128) 
2- Nationality And The Case Of Dual Nationality 
It is worthy of note that determination of essential validity of marriage by the parties' 
national law presents difficulties where one of the parties holds more than one 
nationality. The prevailing view, in French contemporary legal doctrine and in the 
Algerian law, suggests that essential validity of marriage must be determined by the lex 
fori whenever one of the nationalities involved thereof is that of the forum 
country.(129) Moreover, the doctrine of effective nationality is the most appropriate 
solution for determining the applicable national law if the competing nationalities are 
foreign,(130) However, the solution which gives preference to the forum's nationality 
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appears to be anomalous and hard to justify in principle because of its nationalistic bias. 
It is therefore submitted that the doctrine of effective nationality should prevail in all 
cases as being the most appropriate and less rigid rule, since it is based on objective 
criteria that outweigh all other dubious and discriminatory factors. (131) 
3- Nationality and the Case of a Composite Legal System 
The principle of submitting the essential validity questions to the parties' national law 
provides no objective solution to the question of capacity of a person who possesses 
the nationality of a federal country the states of which have separate legal systems. 
However, it is the unanimous view of academic authorities that the applicable law here 
should be determined by the internal conflict of law rules at the federal level if they 
exist, or by using some other criteria, such as domicile or residence, which may 
ascertain the state with which the party is connected.(132) According to the Algerian 
civil code, article 23 provides that where the foreign national law to which the Algerian 
conflict rules point is the law of a composite legal system, the internal conflict rules of 
that system determine the applicable law.(133) One must emphasise that the rule 
embodied in this article of the civil code may lead to the deplorable result of denying 
justice, since the renvoi doctrine is rejected by the Algerian law. 
Let us suppose that an Algerian court is asked to determine the validity of a marriage 
celebrated in Algeria between an American and a French national. In doing so, the 
court should rely on the American conflict rules to determine the state with which the 
American party is connected. According to the American conflict rules the entire 
validity of marriage must be determined by the lex loci celebrationis, and thus the 
Algerian law normally should apply in this case. Relying on the rejection of renvoi 
doctrine, however, the question will be left unsolved if there is no other adequate 
criteria which may clearly indicate the state to which the American party belongs, 
because of non-existence of Federal Law of marriage in the USA. Professor Issad has 
expressly argued that it would be difficult to apply Algerian law to an American, as in 
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this hypothetical example, since it is based on Islamic religious principles. (13 4) 
4- DomicHe as an Alternative Connecting Factor: State~ and Refugees 
Nationality as a connecting factor has been proved beyond any doubt inadequate in 
cases involving the status and capacity of persons lacking any adherence to any 
nationality. The suggested answer, however, is the use of domicile or habitual 
residence in such cases, as alternative connecting factors. Hence, it is generally agreed 
that the law of domicile or habitual residence must determine the status and capacity of 
stateless persons.(135) Moreover, the New York convention 1954 adopted the same 
solution in its article 12.(136) It is interesting to note that the solution embodied in 
article 22(3) of Algerian civil code seems to be consistent with the New York 
convention 1954 which was ratified by the Algerian government in 1964, since it gives 
freedom to the judge to determine the applicable law in such cases. It is the view of the 
present writer that the Judge's freedom should be limited to the determination of the 
place of domicile or habitual residence of the stateless persons, and thus the law of that 
place exclusively determines their capacity to marry. Furthermore, the Algerian law 
qua lex fori applies alternatively in such cases if, and only if, no domicile or habitual 
residence is visible.(137) 
The same solution has been universally suggested to apply as regards political refugees, 
though they still possess their nationalities, because they do not enjoy the protection of 
their government. The Geneva Convention, article 12 states clearly that status and 
capacity of political refugees must be determined by the law of their domicile, or their 
habitual residence.c 138) It seems that the same solution prevails in Algerian law, since 
the Geneva Convention was ratified by Algeria in 1963.(139) However, the present 
writer believes that the validity of political refugees' marriages celebrated before the 
exile decision must be determined by their national laws at the time of marriage on the 
basis of favor matrimonii principle. This is because the law of their domicile after the 
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exile decision may invalidate theirmarriages.( 140) 
The principle of submission of essential validity to the parties' national law has been 
rigorously criticised on the basis of the many intricate problems arising in the course of 
its application; for example, in cases where the parties are subject to different personal 
laws,C141) In contrast to this principle, Le Doyen Louis-Lucas, being in favour of the 
seductive idea of a single law system has suggested that the lex loci celebrationis 
should govern the entire validity of marriage. Moreover, the learned writer seems to be 
aware of the possibility of the place of celebration being accidental, and thus suggested 
that the parties may naturalise their marriage as soon as they establish a domicile 
somewhere else.(142) However, it is interesting to note that the present view appears 
to be based partly on the "instruction generale relative a l'etat civil 1955" under which 
French marriage officers are not required to take account of foreign law of their own 
motion, and partly on the principle according to which French judges are not required 
to apply foreign laws ex officio. (143) This view has been criticised on the basis that it 
elevates the parties' freedom to choose a place of celebration into a governing rule. 
Relying on the lex loci rule to determine essential validity is unsound, inasmuch as it 
may render application of certain essential requirements quite unnecessary, such as the 
prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity. It is a system which would enable 
parties to evade such restrictions.(144) 
Influenced by the increase of immigration, Niboyet is in favour of adopting a rule 
which may permit the assimilation offoreign immigrants living permanently in France. 
However, he has suggested the continuation of the application of the existing rules to 
French citizens, as well as to the foreign immigrants residing in France temporarily. 
But the status and capacity of foreign immigrants residing permanently in France 
should be determined by the law of their domicile, i.e. French law.(145) It might be 
argued that this view embodies a unilateral preference for the law of domicile qua lex 
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fori and gives a nationalistic bias to French private international law. Furthermore, 
while French law applies when it is the domiciliary law of a foreign immigrant residing 
permanently in France, no corresponding preference for the foreign law is admitted in a 
case where a French national resides permanently in a foreign country. it is therefore 
reasonably clear that this rule is, to use Falconbridge's words, "unworthy of a place in 
a respectable system of the conflict of laws" . 
In conclusion, one might say that the seductive idea of submitting the entire validity to a 
single law system is anomalous, since the issue of capacity should be examined before 
the celebration of marriage. However, the only single law system existing at that time 
is the lex loci celebrationis which the overwhelming weight of judicial and extrajudicial 
opinions reject because of its inadequacy to govern a family matter affecting the moral 
and ethical well-being of a society. Hence, it is submitted that the existing rule, i.e. the 
parties' national law at the time of the marriage, should be maintained. The desire to 
prevent conflict between legal systems, to eliminate limping marriages, and to reach 
international uniformity of status and of decision would seem to demand this. 
C- Conclusion And Evaluation Of The Conflict Approaches 
The determination of the choice of law rule as to the essential validity of marriage has 
attained special prominence in the doctrine and the practice of conflict of laws because 
marriage is so closely connected with the morals and religious attitudes which vary 
considerably from one state to another. However, consideration of marriage as a matter 
of great importance to the parties, as well as to society, has rendered the achievement of 
international uniformity even more difficult. It is interesting to note that the main 
initiatives at the international level have "proved a complete failure. ,,( 146) The Hague 
convention to regulate the conflict oflaws in regard to marriage of 1902 was the first to 
result in serious controversy, the difficulties with its interpretation causing certain 
countries to denounce it.(147) The convention's main basis, namely the principle of 
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nationality, has led to its description as an endorsement of "continental European 
parochialism which mistook Europe for the world.,,(148) 
Subsequently, the Hague convention of 1976, which promotes ''favor matrimonii" 
principle, has been characterised as laying down choice of law rules as to essential 
validity which are "far from being a complete set of rules."(149) Article 3 of the 
convention is somewhat illusory, since it deprives the relevant foreign law from being 
applied, if the parties satisfy the substantive requirements of the lex loci celebrationiis, 
and one of the parties is a national of, or habitually resides in, the country of 
celebration. It has been argued that the convention renders the extirpation of limping 
marriages difficult if not impossible. The application of the convention would create 
obvious difficulties both to common and civil law countries,050) 
As regards the existence of conflicting theories, the present writer believes that the 
difference in the conflict approaches is the product of a very fundamental difference in 
the interpretation of the nature and the purpose of essential requirements; in addition the 
importance of the time element has been completely ignored. It has been argued that the 
new approaches fail to provide a satisfactory solution which may promote international 
uniformity, extirpate limping marriages, and determine with certainty the law governing 
substantive validity at the time of the celebration. This is because of their being 
strongly influenced by policy considerations which should not be raised to the higher 
purpose of determining the applicable law. Certainly, the idea of submitting essential 
validity to a single law system rule existing at the time of the marriage, i.e. lex loci 
rule, is highly undesirable. It has been submitted that reliance on the law of the place of 
celebration enables the parties to evade their personal laws, and would oblige the 
countries to which the parties belong to recognise the validity of the marriage 
notwithstanding its being contrary to their public policy. (151) 
Furthermore, the policy of upholding the reasonable expectations of the parties and of 
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upholding the validity of marriage are inappropriate, since it would be innaccurate to 
speak of validity or invalidity at the time of the ceremony where the question is whether 
the parties have satisfied the legal requirements of bringing a marriage into existence. 
Reliance on the intended matrimonial home and the real and substantial connection test 
would open the door widely for a great movement of people from one state to another 
in order to defeat the restrictions imposed on them by the law of their home state. This 
movement would render useless the non-universal restrictions, and would even 
undermine, to some extent, the universal restrictions, such as the age of marriage which 
varies considerably. Hence, the new approaches would be a danger to the preservation 
of morals and religious attitudes of all societies. If two English domiciliaries, uncle and 
niece, celebrate a marriage abroad, they would be obliged to settle in a country where 
such a union would be valid. They would be fortunate in the sense that the rules of 
domicile permitthem to achieve their aim, but their freedom of choice of home would 
be circumscribed. ( 152) 
It is sufficient, for the purpose of determining the most appropriate law, to base the 
arguments on the proposition that the fundamental conflict approach must reflect the 
basic preventive nature of the substantive requirements of marriage. However, the 
choice of law rule as to the essential validity should be, as far as possible, a rule that 
provides an answer to the question of what legal requirements the parties must satisfy at 
the time of the marriage ceremony in order to contract a valid marriage. The existing 
personal laws of the parties at the time of the marriage, whether determined by domicile 
or nationality, seem to be the appropriate laws to govern the substantive validity of 
marriage effectively as they recognise the preventive nature of such requirements. The 
great merits of the test is, that it provides an effective and helpful guide for marriage 
registrars to determine with certainty whether the parties have complied with the 
essential requirements of the personal laws of each. In R. v. Brentwood Marriage 
Registrar, for instance, the English Court prevented the creation of a limping marriage, 
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since the Italian party had no capacity to marry, as being of a married person's status 
according to Italian lawJ153) The test would necessarily entail a certain respect 
between legal systems, promote international uniformity, and would eliminate limping 
marriages. Furthermore, the idea that essential validity may legitimately be referred to 
the parties' personal law is well supported by authority. (15 4 ) 
Accordingly, it is interesting to note that the impotent role of marriage registrars, under 
the present legislation, render the purposes of applying the parties' personal law 
exceedingly difficult to achieve. The existing French rule is a good illustration. 
According to this rule, French marriage registrars are required to celebrate marriages 
whenever French domestic law requirements are fulfilled, notwithstanding that the 
certificate of customs (Le certificat de coutume) produced by the parties reveals the 
existence of any impediment under the relevant foreign law.(155) The greatest 
objection is that this rule seems to diminish the preventive function of the relevant 
conflict rules, since it substitutes the lex loci celebrationis for the parties' personal 
law.(156) Moreover, it is assumed that, though there is no statutory provision to that 
effect, it is not the normal practice for marriage registrars in England to seek to satisfy 
themselves that there is no legal impediment to the marriage under the parties' 
domiciliary laws. The English position is rather different from the French rule on the 
ground that the marriage registrar is required to give effect to any legal impediment 
brought to his notice if, and only if, it is one which, according to English conflicts 
rules, would invalidate the marriage. 
Marriage registrars must play an effective role as to prevent illegal and incestuous 
marriages. This is because invalidation of marriage expost may have undesirable 
effects, as many issues' validity depend upon whether persons are married or not. 
Hence, it is necessary to stop the coming into existence of such marriages, since the 
usual sanction for failure to meet the requirements of marriage at the time of celebration 
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is limited to the denial of celebration. Marriage registrars must be required to inquire 
into the relevant foreign law by their own motion to find out whether the parties' 
personal law permits such unions or not. Being aware of the marriage registrar's 
disfavourable position for carrying investigations into foreign law, many legal systems 
have created certain devices by which the registrar can easily ascertain the question 
whether the parties have satisfied the essentials of marriage under their personal 
law.(157) The most important of these devices is the certificate of capacity by which 
the marriage officer transfers the burden of inquiring into foreign law to the foreign 
country authorities. Unfortunately, the status of such devices in the present legislation, 
and its non-universal character would result neither in the correct application of the 
relevant foreign law, nor in the achievements of international uniformity and 
harmonisation of decisions.(158) 
Yet, creation of a coherent and completely satisfactory solution is only possible if each 
legal system shows its willingness to respect foreign laws, and to provide foreign 
registrars with a survey of the proposed marriage, in every case, which may help them 
to apply its rules without misinterpretations. However, a marriage must not be 
celebrated if it is unlikely to be recognised by the lex causae. Suppose that a foreigner 
wishes to marry his first cousin, a Scots domiciliary, in Scotland the law of which 
recognises such a marriage,(159) According to the relevant foreign law (of the man), 
the parties have no capacity to intermarry as being within the prohibited degrees of 
consanguinity. Hence, the marriage officer should not celebrate the marriage, since it 
would create a limping marriage. Acceptance of such impediment might be thought to 
work injustice to the local party, and thus it should be disregarded.(160) But, the 
celebration of marriage would work injustice even more to the local party as depriving 
him or her from remarrying, if the other party has succeeded in obtaining a decree of 
nullity which is not recognised by the local law. In other words, the only satisfactory 
approach is the proper adherence to the Dual Domicile Theory. 
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However, it is submitted that the marriage registrar should proceed nevertheless with 
the celebration of marriage if, and only if, the foreign impediment by the domicile is 
fundamentally contrary to the lex loci public policy. The question which should be 
answered here is whether the parties' personal laws at the time of marriage will receive 
application, if the validity of such marriages is raised before the court ex post. There 
is every reason of policy and logic to sustain the marriage once it has come into 
existence, if it is valid according to the law of their matrimonial home, or their 
nationality at the time of the proceeding. Favor matrimonii principle and the policy of 
upholding the reasonable expectations of the parties seem to demand this. For instance, 
the decision reached in Radwan v. Radwan seems to be consistent with the 
consideration of marriage as a long-standing relation which requires recognition. (161) 
Penal and religious restrictions would seem to fall under the head of public policy, but, 
since the aim of this thesis is the desirability of having a rule designed to permit testing 
of a marriage's validity at the point of celebration (or refusal of celebration), the 
incidence of such "policy" exceptions would be small, it is hoped. 
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Section Two 
Special Issues And The Law Governing Essential Validity 
A- The Rule In Sottomayer v. De Hanus [No.2] And The Article 13 of Algerian Civil 
Code 
The general principle, both in common and civil law countries, is certainly that the 
parties' personal law, which is determined by domicile and nationality respectively, 
governs the essential validity of marriage. It is therefore submitted that the disability of 
either party, under his/her personal law, may render the marriage void, or may preclude 
its celebration, provided that the impediment is not contrary to the lex loci celebrationis 
public policy.Cl 62) The decisions in Mette v. Mette and Sottomayer v. De Barros 
[No.1](163) favour this rule, although the decision in the latter case has been confined 
to the case where both parties have at the time of the marriage a common domicile the 
law of which prohibits their marriage. However, the Learned Judge has expressly said 
that the decision in Sottomayer v. De Barros [No.1] cannot be "relied on as an authority 
for setting aside a marriage between a foreigner and an English subject domiciled in 
England on the ground of a personal incapacity not recognised by the law of this 
country", if the acceptance of such a foreign incapacity would work injustice to the 
English subjects.(164) 
Accordingly, the general principle in English law has undergone a modification to the 
effect that a marriage celebrated in England between parties, one of whom is an English 
domiciliary, is not affected by any incapacity flowing from the foreign party's personal 
law if it does not exist under English law qua lex loci celebrationis and lex domicilii of 
one of the parties. This is the rule in Sottomayer v. De Barros [No.2],(165) where a 
marriage between first cousins was celebrated in England. On the evidence, it appears 
that the husband's domicile was English, whereas the wife's domicile was in Portugal, 
the law of which prohibits first cousins' marriages as being incestuous unless a papal 
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dispensation was granted. Sir James Hannen, P., being concerned with the injustice 
which would be done to an English party, held the marriage valid, despite the wife's 
disability under her domiciliary law, i.e. the law of Portugal.(166) The learned Judge, 
however, has ignored the vital distinction between formal and essential requirements 
drawn in Brook v. Brook and Sottomayer v. De Barros [No.1], and thus the decision 
seems to be based on the earlier decisions reflecting the supremacy of lex loci 
celebrationis as the law governing the entire validity of marriage'(167) Moreover, it is 
interesting to note that the alleged prohibition in this case seems to be considered as 
being contrary to the forum's public policy, insofar as it is compared with prohibition 
based on race or religion,(168) Such reasoning is unfortunate, since the wide ratio of 
invoking public policy as a ground for rejecting foreign rules accommodates all cases 
whenever they are alien to theforum 's conception of status and capacity.(169) 
The existence of Sottomayer v. De Barros [No.2] exception in Scots law, though there 
is some suggestions in the Scottish authorities to that effect, is a matter of great 
uncertainty.(170) It is understood from Professors Anton and Clive that the decision in 
Macdougal v. Chitnavis appears to be an endorsement of the second Sottomayer rule in 
Scots law, since it approves the English decision in Chetti v. Chetti as being in 
conformity with the law of Scotland. (171) In MacDougal v. Chitnavis, a marriage was 
celebrated in Scotland between a Scottish domiciliary and a Hindu man domiciled in 
India, the law of which prohibits the marriage of a Hindu person with a non-Hindu. 
Although the decision approves Chetti v. Chetti, it is clear that the foreign incapacity is 
denied recognition because of its being alien to the Scots law and the Scottish 
conceptions of status and capacity.(172) 
Conversely, Lord Mackay has clearly rejected the second Sottomayer decision in 
Lendrum v. Chakravarti where he applied the general rule as to capacity to marry.(l73) 
Assisting this viewpoint are the persuasive provisions of Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 
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in which no recognition has been given to this exception. According to Section 5 (4) 
(f), for instance, a marriage between two parties one of whom is not domiciled in 
Scotland would be void abinitio on a ground, other than one mentioned in paragraphs 
(a) to (e), existing under the law of the domicile of that party. (17 4) Furthermore, the 
Scottish Law Commission has recently recommended that the Sottomayer v. De Barros 
rule should have no place in any future statutory restatement of the choice of law rules 
in marriageJ 17 4a) 
Although Dicey has emphasised the absurdity of the second Sottomayer decision, he is 
of opinion that it must be recognised to be good law, which forms an ungainly 
exception to the dual domicile rule: 
liThe validity of a marriage celebrated in England between persons of whom the one 
has an English, and the other a foreign, domicile is not affected by any incapacity 
which, though existing under the law of such foreign domicile, does not exist under 
the law of England. lI ( 175) 
This exception has been subject to severe criticism as being anomalous and "unworthy 
of a place in a respectable system of the conflict of laws, ,,( 176) on the basis of its 
nationalistic bias. Moreover, it is respectfully submitted that it is a unilateral rule which 
gives no preference to the foreign law when it is the lex loci celebrationis et lex 
domicilii of either party. In Re Paine, (177) for instance, a marriage celebrated in 
Germany between an English domiciliary and her deceased sister's husband, a German 
domiciliary, was deemed void, even though it was valid under German Law qua lex 
loci celebrationis et lex domicilii of the husband. The most notable defect of the rule is 
that it leads to the promotion of limping marriages which undermine the purpose of 
coordination between legal systems that the international community so desires to 
achieveP 78) Thus, the failure of the Hague Convention of 1976 might be explained, 
it is thought, on the basis that it preserves this undesirable ruleP 79) 
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More recently, the Law Commissions have criticised the illogical nature of this rule on 
the ground that it renders the structure of the choice of law rules unduly complex. In 
explaining the complexity of this rule, it is said: 
"Where the marriage is celebrated in England and neither party is domiciled here, the 
law applicable to questions of capacity is the law of domicile. Thus, if one (or both) 
of the parties is domiciled in a country where first cousin marriages are prohibited, 
the marriage will be void, even though such incapacity does not exist under English 
law. If, however, one party is domiciled in England and marriage takes place here, the 
issue of capacity will be governed by English law. Thus, in the example given 
above, the marriage will be valid, even though it is void under the foreign 
domiciliary law of the other party. Further, if the marriage takes place abroad, the 
essential validity will be determined by the parties' domiciliary Imvs ... ,,(180) 
Hence, it has been submitted that: "The rule in Sottomayer v. DeBarros [No.2] should 
be abolished. ,,( 181) In line with this view, the present writer believes that the reason of 
the fear of injustice which would be done to the forum's subject, as a basis for 
rejecting foreign rules invalidating the marriage, is dubious on general principles, if the 
rule is not contrary to the forum's public policy. This is in view of the fact that 
ignorance of foreign incapacity would work even more injustice to the forum's subject 
as to deprive him of his rights, especially if the foreign courts should declare the 
marriage void and null, and such a decree is not recognised in the forum. 
There is a rule in Algerian Law to the effect that the lex fori should prevail whenever it 
is the lexpatriae of one of the parties, no matter where the marriage is celebrated. To 
this end, article 13 of the Algerian Civil Code(182) provides that the essential validity 
of marriage, save capacity to marry in a narrow sense which remains under the 
competence of each party's national law , is governed by the Algerian law alone, if one 
ofthe parties is an Algerian national at the time of marriage. However, it is interesting 
to emphasise that the acceptability of this unilateral rule is debatable as it gives a 
nationalistic bias to Algerian private international law, and it seems quite unnecessary 
since the application of the general rules as to capacity would achieve the same result. 
--------- - ------ ------
160 
For instance, the application of the rule in the article 97 of civil status 1970 suffices for 
refusing recognition to a marriage celebrated abroad between an Algerian woman and a 
non-Muslim, before Algerian courts, insofar as the prohibition of such marriages is an 
essential requirement.(183) The introduction of such a rule in favour of the lexjori, as 
being the lex patriae of either party, would seem to be a sign of an exaggerated 
mistrust as regards the role of the general conflict of law rules. It is equally true that 
there is no sound reason for applying the Algerian law at the stage of the formation of 
the union since nothing exists between the said spouses; hence the uselessness of article 
13.(184) Accordingly, the determination of essential validity according to Algerian law 
in such cases would lead to a deplorable result of submitting non-Muslim foreigners to 
a law which is, primajacie, based on Islamic religion. Therefore, there is every 
reason oflogic and convenience suggesting the abrogation of the rule, inasmuch as its 
illogical and arbitrary nature would result neither in the extirpation of limping 
marriages, nor in the achievement of international uniformity of status and decisions. 
B- Capacity To Marry And The Relevance Of The Lex Loci Celebrationis 
The overwhelming weight of judicial and extrajudicial opinions suggest that non-
compliance of the parties with essential requirements of their antenuptial personal laws, 
whether determined by domicile or nationality, suffices for rendering the marriage void, 
notwithstanding that the rules of the lex loci celebrationis as to essentials have been 
satisfied. (185) For instance, the marriage in Re Paine, (186) though valid by the law of 
the place of celebration, was held void since the woman lacked capacity to marry her 
deceased sister's husband under her domiciliary law, i.e. English law. However, the 
question which arises is whether a marriage is invalid if the parties, though they have 
capacity to marry by their premarital personal laws, lack capacity under the law of the 
place of celebration. More fundamentally, the question arises whether the parties are 
obliged to satisfy the essentials of marriage required by the lex loci celebrationis in 
addition to those of their prenuptial personal law . 
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As regards English and Scottish laws, it has been submitted that there is no clear-cut 
authority to the effect that the parties to a marriage must have capacity to marry by the 
law of the place of celebration as well as by their respective premarital domiciliary laws, 
insofar as a foreign marriage is concerned.(187) Nevertheless, Dr. Morris has 
suggested that Karminski, 1. in Breen v. Breen "was prepared to hold that incapacity 
by the lex loci was fatal to the validity of marriage.,,(188) In Breen v. Breen,(189) 
two English domiciliaries celebrated a marriage in 1953 in the Republic of Ireland 
during the lifetime of the husband's former wife. The husband had obtained in 
England a decree of divorce dissolving his first marriage in 1952. The second wife 
argued that the marriage was null and void since her alleged husband's first marriage 
was subsisting at the time of the second marriage according to Irish law, insofar as the 
English divorce could not be recognised in the Republic of Ireland,090) However, 
Karminski 1., convinced that Irish law recognised the English divorce decree, decided 
that the marriage was valid.(191) It is remarkable that the learned judge in this case 
devoted so much of his judgement to providing an answer to the allegation of the 
petitioner as to the effect of Irish constitutional law on the marriage's validity without 
giving the reasons which render that law at all relevant for determining the capacity of 
English domiciliaries. However, Dicey states that "it is unlikely that Karminski 1. 
would have dealt with what was a difficult question oflrish constitutional law unless he 
had been of opinion that capacity by the lex loci celebrationis is necessary for the 
validity of a marriage. ,,( 192) 
Bradshaw,(193) in a stimulating recent article, has submitted that there is no clear 
evidence in Karminski 1.'s jUdgement which might be construed to the effect that 
incapacity "imposed by a foreign lex loci celebrationis is apparently fatal to the 
validity of the marriage". Moreover, it may be argued that Dr. Morris' contention is ill-
founded on the basis that the learned judge did not examine the effect of a party's 
incapacity by the lex loci celebrationis on the marriage validity, as he ignored the 
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decision in the will of Swan's case(194) in which the question of the relevance of the 
lex loci celebrationis as to capacity to marry was directly in issue. In this case, the 
marriage, though the husband lacked capacity to marry his deceased wife's niece by the 
lex loci, was held valid. It is therefore reasonably clear that Breen's decision is "a 
sorry and inarticulate precedent [which] should be considered insufficient to establish a 
rule of a very doubtful merit".(195) 
Conversely, it has been submitted that the lex loci celebrationis "must be looked at to 
see if the parties were capable of marrying in that country because, if not, they had no 
right to use the forms of marriage prescribed by that country".(196) Professor Anton 
believes that this rule has the practical merit "of reducing the possible occasions for 
limpingmarriages".(197) Certainly, the suggested view seems to be right to the extent 
of applying the rule at the time of the marriage celebration, as the only effect which 
would result, if the marriage registrar refused to perform the ceremony, is the denial of 
celebration. Relying on the fact that the parties may have no more than a transient 
connection with the country of celebration, application of this rule, when the marriage 
validity is examined expost, would rather promote limping marriages. The main reason 
is that it is unlikely that the country of the parties' domicile would be prepared to 
invalidate the marriage merely because they lacked capacity to marry by the lex loci 
celebrationis. 
However, the almost unanimous judicial view in commonwealth countries appears to 
be in favour of rejecting completely the relevance of the lex loci celebrationis as to 
essentials of marriage. Thus in Reed v. Reed, (198) two first cousins married in the 
state of Washington whose law prohibits such marriages. Although the marriage was 
invalid in the place of celebration, it was held valid since the parties had capacity to 
marry by their domiciliary laws.(199) It is interesting to note that Harvey Co. Ct. 1. 
expressly stated that Karminski 1.'s judgement in Breen's case "in no way supports the 
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proposition that incapacity by the lex loci celebrationis .. .is fatal to the validity of a 
marriage".(200) Moreover, the more recent decision of the Bahamas Supreme Court in 
Re Estate of Hewitt(201) has been inclined in favour of ignoring any incapacity 
imposed by the law of the place of celebration. In this case, a man domiciled in Ontario 
married his first cousin Laura in the state of Ohio, in 1985. The marriage was valid in 
Ontario, but was invalid in the state of Ohio, whereby first cousins had no capacity to 
marry each other. Adams J. concluded that "the law of the domicile is sufficient to 
determine marriage capacity". Therefore, the marriage was held valid simply because 
"consanguinity was a matter of capacity which was governed by the lex domicilii, 
... and the parties were legally capable of inter-marrying".(202) 
As far as marriages celebrated in England and Scotland are concerned, it has been 
suggested, though there is no binding authority (though consider the requirements of 
the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1997, infra), that the parties must satisfy the essentials of 
marriage of the lex loci qua lex fori as well as those of their prenuptial domiciliary 
laws. This is because "the English court could hardly disregard its own law on such a 
vital matter and hold valid a marriage which that law prohibited, even if it was valid by 
the law of the parties domicile".(203) However, it is significant to note that this view is 
exclusively based on Westlake's doctrine which renders compliance with the lex loci 
rules as to capacity absolutely necessary for the validity of a marriage.(204) Viewed in 
its historical context, this view evinces the enduring influence of the principle, which 
was prevailing in English law before Brook's decision; of the ascendancy of the lex 
loci celebrationis as being the ultimate law governing the entire validity of marriage. 
The rule also preserves the notion of the predominance of the lex fori in English and 
Scottish laws, since it application is confined to locally celebrated marriages. 
The only existing commonwealth authority, in which a locally celebrated marriage was 
in issue, is apparently opposed to it. In Schewebel v. Ungar, (205) a man domiciled in 
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Ontario married there a divorced Israeli domiciliary whose divorce was valid by Israeli 
law. It was urged before the Ontario court of appeal that the marriage was void, since 
the woman's divorce did not meet the condition for recognition under Ontario law. The 
marriage was held valid, despite the fact that the woman lacked capacity by the lex loci 
celebrationis et lex fori. Nevertheless, Professor Graveson has argued that the rule is 
relevant on the ground that its effect "is to maintain minimum, not maximum, English 
standards of essentials of marriage" .(206) Accordingly, it is submitted that assuming 
that there is no incapacity under the English or Scottish laws, the marriage will be 
declared valid if, and only if, it is considered as such by the parties' prenuptial 
domiciliary laws. The Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 contains provisions which are in 
accordance with, and reinforces, this rule. Thus it is interesting to note that section 
1(2) of that Act provides clearly that: "A marriage solemnised in Scotland between 
persons either of whom is under the age of 16 shall be void" .(207) Furthermore, a 
marriage celebrated in Scotland is void if the parties are within Scottish prohibited 
degrees set out in the schedule (1) of the 1977 Act.(208) Here it is contained a clear 
demonstration of the Scottish requirement of compliance with its rules qua lex loci. 
The same results are achieved in certain countries, where the public policy reasoning is 
always accorded "a broad sphere of operation" so as to invalidate a marriage celebrated 
in the country of the forum even if the parties have capacity by their national laws. In 
French law, for instance, a marriage celebrated in France between parties under the age 
required by the domestic law, or within the prohibited degrees there, is void on the 
basis of public policy.(209) As regards the Algerian law, the same solutions would 
seem to be retained by the Algerian courts for protecting the domestic conceptions of 
marriage. It is interesting to note that the intervention of Algerian public policy is of a 
limited scope, as the Algerian law permits polygamy.(21 0) 
In conclusion, it may be argued that a rule, requiring the application of lex loci rules as 
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to capacity merely because it coincides with the lex fori, seems undesirable as being of 
illogical and discriminatory nature which may create limping marriages, a situation 
unacceptable both in the fOnlm and the parties' lex domicilii. Moreover, the overriding 
effect of the lex fori public policy may achieve the same results, and thus the existence 
of such a rule is quite unnecessary. The English and Scottish Law Commissions, 
being convinced that international comity considerations denote the genuine interest of a 
foreign lex loci, have recently recommended that "[a] marriage, whether celebrated in 
the United Kingdom or abroad, should not be regarded as valid in the United Kingdom 
if either of the parties is, according to the law of the country of celebration, under an 
incapacity to marry the other". (211) It is worth noting that the rule (requiring capacity 
by lex loci), though in its generalised form, has little to recommend it, in so far as it 
invalidates marriages actually celebrated and performed in good faith. Such a rule is 
hard to justify in principle, "since essential validity is not a matter of ensuring certainty 
or pUblicity, but it is concerned with upholding social policies and, in certain cases, 
protecting the interests of the parties". Hence, "there is no policy justification for 
applying this rule which would create an additional obstacle to the validity of the 
marriage".(212) Accordingly, it is sufficient to establish that before the solemnisation 
of marriage, the registrar must not celebrate a marriage unless he is satisfied that there is 
no obstacle to its celebration in the lex loci. It is therefore reasonably clear that once 
the marriage has in fact been performed and the parties lived in the reasonable belief that 
they are husband and wife, there is every reason both of logic and of convenience for 
holding the marriage valid, notwithstanding that the parties lacked capacity under lex 
loci celebrationis. The policy of validation and the desire to prevent limping marriages 
would seem to demand this. 
c- Time Factor: Re~tive Changes in the Law Governing Capacity to Many 
A problem identical to that examined earlier in relation to the formal validity of 
marriage(213) arises where the substantive rules of the personal law governing the 
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capacity of one or both of the parties have been changed after the celebration of 
marriage by a new legislation purporting to have retroactive effect. The question arises 
whether such subsequent legislation should be given effect, before the forum IS courts, 
to operate retrospectively for validating or invalidating marriages solemnised before its 
promulgation. It is well established in most countries that the governing foreign law 
should be applied as it stands at the time of the proceeding, inclusive of its transitional 
rules. This is because, it is thought, the specific reference to time in the conflict rule as 
to capacity to marry serves solely to clarify that "the relevant domicile or nationality is 
that at the point of celebration, but it does not purport to "petrify" the designated law as 
they were at that time".(214) 
Although the decisions in which this view has been followed as to capacity to marry are 
scarce, it is suggested that a subsequent legislation should have effect, in the situation 
most commonly occurring in practice, i.e. where it validates an initially invalid 
marriage. The almost unanimous view among English and Scottish writers is that the 
marriage will be regarded as valid, even though the parties were incapable of marrying 
under their pre-marital domiciliary laws, if it is subsequently validated by retrospective 
legislation enacted after the celebration of marriage in the state of domicile.<215) 
Certainly, the acceptance of a subsequent validating legislation is consistent with the 
balance of justice, "Favor matrimonii" principle and the desire to eliminate limping 
marriages. Accordingly, the application of subsequent validating legislation is strongly 
supported in the case where the marriage has been celebrated, even though an 
impediment exists under the premarital personal law of the parties on the basis of its 
being contrary to the lex loci celebrationis public policy. For instance, an Algerian 
woman wishes to marry a non-Muslim in Scotland. Notwithstanding the existing 
prohibition in the Algerian law, (216) the marriage will be solemnised in Scotland, since 
the prohibition of marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim is contrary to 
the Scottish public policy. Suppose that, after the celebration of the marriage but before 
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its validity is called in issue, retroactive validating legislation has been enacted in 
Algeria. Certainly, the application of that legislation would promote international 
uniformity, as well as eliminate an existing limping marriage as between Scotland and 
Algeria. 
On the other hand, the overwhelming weight of opinion among commentators suggests 
that retrospective validating legislation should have no effect at all, if the parties had 
obtained a decree of nullity before its enactment. This is because the finality of the 
decree "may appear to call more imperatively for the setting in motion of the doctrine of 
public policy", if it is granted or recognised by the lex jori.(217) An analogous 
solution applies in the event of a retroactive validating legislation being preceded by the 
remarriage of one or both of the parties, if the first marriage was void abinitio,(218) 
These exceptions are strongly justified in principle, on the basis that the acceptance of 
the retrospective validating legislation here would be productive of injustice, and would 
leave the validity of marriage in suspense. Moreover, it may lead to the deplorable 
result of holding the second marriage of either party void, although at the time of its 
celebration there is no compelling reasons to hold it as such. 
It is interesting to note that the unfortunate decision in Ambrose v. Ambrose(219) 
seems to be in favour of refusing recognition to retroactive legislation validating a 
decree of divorce, the application of which leads to the validation of a second marriage 
celebrated by one of the parties. In this case, a woman had obtained an interlocutory 
decree of divorce from her first husband in the court of California, where they were 
domiciled in 1930. By some oversight, the decree was not made final until 1939 -
without retroactivity-on the court's own motion. In 1935 while the first marriage was 
still subsisting, she went through a ceremony of marriage with her second husband, 
who was domiciled in British Columbia, in Washington. After the ceremony, the 
parties lived as husband and wife in British Columbia until they separated in 1956. The 
wife, being then aware of the true state of her divorce, took advantage of the 1941 
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Californian statute and obtained a nunc protunc order from the court of California, by 
which the divorce was retrospectively backdated to 1931. Meanwhile, the second 
husband alleged before the court in British Columbia that his marriage was bigamous, 
and thus ought to be declared null and void. The marriage was therefore held void on 
the ground that the retroactive validating Californian statute ought not to be applied in 
this case, since neither party was domiciled in California at the time of its enactment, 
nor did it precede the Washington ceremony. 
It is undoubtedly clear that the court failed to weigh the effect of the Californian 
legislation removing retroactively an impediment to the second marriage, as the wife's 
divorce was made retrospectively final. The fundamental defect of the decision in 
terms of the policy issues relevant in marriage is that it fails to recognise the 
significance which the policy of validation has when the validity of marriage is 
examined ex post. However, the grounds relied on by the court would seem perfectly 
justifiable, if the Californian statute concerned the validation of the first marriage rather 
than the divorce decreeJ220) But, the effect of the retroactive Californian legislation 
was to make it quite clear that there was no reason to hold the marriage which took 
place in 1935 invalid. Hence, the decision to the contrary in this case has been 
stigmatised as "unfortunate examples of mechanical jurisprudence",(221) which 
"demonstrates clearly the complete inability of the courts to handle conflicts problems 
when there is no guiding principle provided either by the courts themselves or by 
commentators" . (222) 
It remains to consider whether a foreign retrospective legislation purporting to 
invalidate an initially valid marriage, for reasons of essence, should be recognised in 
the forum. Although there is no direct decisions on this question, the balance of 
academic opinion is that the foreign invalidating legislation should not be recognised in 
the forum on the basis that it would be unjust to deprive a couple of their married status 
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once they had satisfied the existing conditions of their personal law at the time of the 
marriage, merely because the legislation has been changed. As a general rule, the 
acceptance of retroactive invalidating legislation is undesirable since it would make 
every valid marriage conditionally invalid.(223) Public policy considerations 
buttressed by the prevailing policy of validation (Javor matrimonii) suggest strongly 
the rejection of such foreign legislations,(224) Nevertheless, a retroactive invalidating 
legislation may be recognised where the parties remain subjects of the legislating 
country, if it is in no way contrary to the forum IS public policy.(225) 
D- Renvoi 
A special problem arises where the choice of law rule of the foreign law, which is 
designated as the lex domicilii by the forum IS conflict rules, renvoi the issue in 
question either to the lex fori or to a third law as being the lex patriae of the parties or 
vice versa. The question which arises is whether the forum IS reference to the foreign 
law should be taken as a reference to the whole of that law, inclusive of its conflict 
rules. The overwhelming weight of opinion generally is in favour of applying the 
relevant foreign law, including its choice of law rules. It follows that the forum must 
give effect to the relevant foreign conflict rule whenever it refers either to the domestic 
law of that country, or to another law which it regards as the appropriate law by which 
the issue of capacity must be determined.(226) It is interesting to note that limping 
marriages and conflicting decisions will ensue, if the forum IS authorities apply the 
domestic law of the designated lex causae without taking into consideration its relevant 
choice of law rule. 
The practical significance of using renvoi has been argued on the basis that it achieves 
international uniformity of status and decisions. Furthermore, the desire to prevent 
creation of limping marriages appears to be a dominant motive in favour of accepting 
renvoi, so the forum IS authorities should permit the celebration of a marriage or hold it 
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as valid if, and only if, it is recognised as such by the relevant lex causae. "Since such 
recognition depends, in the first place, on the conflict rules of the relevant foreign law, 
those rules must be taken into account by the forum.,,(227) It is respectfully submitted 
thatthe acceptance of renvoi is perfectly justified if the "purpose and the policy of the 
forum's reference to the personal law .. .is to prevent the creation of limping status", 
and to achieve uniformity of decisions.(228) 
Although there is no binding Scottish authority, Section 3 (5) of the Marriage 
(Scotland) Act 1977 implies that renvoi might be used as far as essential validity of 
marriage is concerned. A person domiciled outside the United Kingdom "may, where 
under the law of the state in which he is domiciled his personal law is that of another 
foreign state, submit in lieu of the said certificate [of capacity] a like certificate issued 
by a competent authority in that other state.,,(229) Moreover, the English decision in 
R. v. Brentwood registrar(230) demonstrates clearly that English courts accept renvoi 
as to essential validity of marriage. In this case, an Italian citizen domiciled in 
Switzerland, where he had obtained a divorce from his first wife, wished to marry in 
England a Spanish national also domiciled in Switzerland. The registrar refused to 
celebrate the marriage on the ground that the husband lacked capacity to remarry by 
Swiss law, the law of his domicile referring the question to Italian law, as being his 
lex patriae, under which the husband's divorce was not recognised. The parties then 
applied to the Divisional Court for an order of mandamus against the registrar ordering 
him to issue a certificate and licence enabling the marriage to be solemnised. Accepting 
renvoi from Swiss law to the Italian law, the English court upheld the registrar's 
decision, and thus dismissed the petition since the husband's remarriage would be void 
everywhere. The possibility that a marriage solemnised in England between the would-
be spouses might be recognised in Switzerland was rejected as the Swiss reference to 
Italian law is compulsory, notwithstanding the divorce recognition in Switzerland.(231) 
Thus, it appears that the desire to gain uniformity of status and decisions as well as 
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international comity are the main basis of this decisionJ232) 
The decision has been criticised on the basis that "comity requires only the recognition 
of a country's claim to the application of its own law, not its right to designate the law 
of a third country.,,(233) Accordingly, it has been suggested that the decision should 
not be considered as authority for the acceptance of renvoi as a general rule for 
validating and invalidating a marriage. Certainly, application of renvoi may well 
produce uniformity of status and decisions, but they may be with the wrong countries if 
the parties have changed their domicile after the celebration. This is because "it is more 
desirable to obtain uniformity with the country in which the parties are domiciled at the 
time of the proceeding than with the country of a previous domicile.,,(234) Relying on 
the significance of the validation policy, it has been submitted that renvoi must only be 
accepted to allow the celebration, or to uphold the validity of a marriage.(235) This is 
questionable on the basis that the essentials must be determined at the time of the 
marriage, as the purpose of such requirements is to prevent the creation of illegal and 
incestuous marriages. Since the effects of refusing celebration are minimal, there is 
every reason both of logic and convenience for the acceptance of renvoi, whether it 
permits or prevents the celebration at the time of the ceremony before the marriage 
comes into existence. More recently, the English and Scots Law Commissions have 
recommended, without putting forward any restrictions, that "a reference to the law of 
domicile should be construed as a reference to the whole of that country (including its 
private international law) and not merely to its domestic rules" .(236) 
Conversely, the application of renvoi as to essential validity of marriage has been 
rejected by the Algerian law. Since Algerian family law is mainly based on religious 
principles, the acceptance of renvoi, where the lex causae refers back to the Algerian 
law, will lead to the undesirable result of applying a religious law to determine the 
status of persons belonging to a religious denomination other than Islam.(237) 
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Furthermore, it may also promote limping status, and may undermine uniformity of 
status and decisions. Suppose that a married British national, originally domiciled in 
England, wishes to marry an Egyptian woman in Algeria, where they are domiciled. 
The Algerian choice of law rule indicates English law, but under English conflict rules 
capacity to marry is governed by the lex domicilii. However, if the case came before 
English court, the English domestic law would be applied, and thus the marriage is 
invalid on the basis that it is contrary to the English conceptions of status. Suppose that 
the Algerian court accepts renvoi, the marriage will be valid since polygamy is 
permitted by the Algerian law; there will be a limping marriage. Thus, if the Algerian 
court refuses renvoi, it will decide the case exactly as the English court would do, 
applying English domestic law to hold the marriage invalid. This is true if the 
application of English domestic law has not been refused as being against the Algerian 
conception of status. 
E- Capacity To Enter Into A Polygamous Marriage 
It is worth noting that the concept of polygamy in English and Scottish private 
international law covers not only actually polygamous unions, but also a marriage 
which is celebrated abroad in a polygamous form, as being potentially polygamous, 
even though it is a de facto monogamous union and the parties belong to a 
monogamous country. Until recently, the prevailing view in common law is that the 
determination of the polygamous or monogamous nature of a marriage was entirely a 
matter for the lex loci celebrationiis, irrespective of whether the husband has, under his 
personal law, capacity to contract a polygamous marriage,(238) 
It has been respectfully submitted that such a view, which is the outcome of the earlier 
English decisions in which de facto monogamous marriage were refused recognition, 
is justified on the basis that the nature of a marriage should depend on the parties' 
intentions. Thus, if the parties' celebrate a marriage in the local form of a country 
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where polygamy is the cornerstone of matrimonial law, it would be presumed that the 
parties in question intended the marriage to be of polygamous nature.(239) 
Undoubtedly, this submission appears to be inconsistent with a dictum of Lord 
Brougham in Warrender v. Warrender: 
"The marriage-contract is emphatically one which parties make with immediate view 
to the usual place of their residence. An English man marrying in Turkey contracts a 
marriage of an English kind, that is, excluding plurality of wives, because he. marries 
with a view of being a married man and having a wife in England, and for English 
purposes ... ,,(240) 
On the other hand, one might argue that this view of classifying the marriage according 
to its nature in the lex loci fails to give adequate consideration to the fact that the issue 
of whether the husband is entitled to take a plurality of wives is a question of capacity 
and ought to be determined by the parties' personal laws. If this view is taken, then 
characterisation of a marriage as being potentially polygamous on the sole ground of its 
being celebrated in a polygamous form is anomalous, as it would promote limping 
status. The application of the latter view, as we shall see below, has had an important 
effect on the English and Scottish view as to capacity to enter into a polygamous 
marriage (241) 
According to a widely held opinion, the question of capacity to contract a polygamous 
marriage is, like capacity to marry generally, governed by the parties' antenuptial 
personallaws.(242) It has been widely assumed that an English or Scottish domiciliary 
at common law lacks capacity to enter into a valid marriage which is, under the lex loci 
celebrationis either potentially or actually polygamous.( 243) It is submitted that 
several common law authorities seem to indicate that the dual domicile rule applies to 
capacity to contract a polygamous marriage. The decision in the Re Bethel case which 
is not concerned with capacity, it is thought, implies that an English domiciliary cannot 
validly contract a polygamous marriage, on the basis that this is the only interpretation 
through which it can be reconciled with the other English decisions.(244) Similarly, 
~~ 
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Chitly J. in Re Ullee has expressly said that a marriage celebrated in England between a 
married Indian domiciliary and a domiciled English woman is "not a marriage binding 
on any spouse of English domicile" .(245) 
Moreover, Dr. Morris has pointed out that Lord Mackay's statements in Lendrum v. 
Chackravarti(246) indicates a preference for the same choice of law rule. In this case, 
the marriage was solemnised in Glasgow between a man of Indian domicile and single 
status and a domiciled Scots woman. The wife alleged that under Scots law, as the law 
of her domicile, she lacked capacity to enter into such a marriage although the 
husband's domiciliary law permitted polygamy. The Learned Judge, holding the 
marriage monogamous and invalid on other grounds, said obiter that: 
"if the contract between these two [persons] parties was one which recognised the 
defender's right to enter into subsequent and co-incident marriages, then it was not a 
Christian marriage or a monogamous one, and it would offend the law of capacity of 
the wife. She could not entertain such a contract.,,(247) 
It seems clear that a woman domiciled in Scotland cannot enter into a marriage which is 
characterised, by Scottish law, as being polygamous in nature. A further support to 
this view, it is submitted, may be inferred from Mohamed v. Knott(248) in which the 
court has recognised the validity of a marriage celebrated abroad in a polygamous form 
on the sole ground that it was valid by the parties' prenuptial domiciliary laws, 
notwithstanding that the parties had, soon after the ceremony, established their 
matrimonial home in England. It is worth mentioning that the Matrimonial Causes Act 
1973 contains provisions which are in accordance, and reinforces the common law 
rule. Section 11(d) of this Act provides clearly that a marriage solemnised in 
polygamous form abroad after 31 st July 1971 is void ab initio if either party was at the 
time of the marriage domiciled in England, notwithstanding its being a de facto 
monogamous marriage.(249) 
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Conversely, in Radwan v. Radwan [No.2](250) capacity to contract a polygamous 
marriage was distinguished from capacity to contract a monogamous marriage and held 
to be governed by the law of the intended matrimonial domicile. In this case, a 
marriage between a domiciled English woman and a domiciled Egyptian man, who was 
already married polygamously, took place in 1951 at the Egyptian Consulate in Paris. 
At that date he had had two wives already, but only one of those marriages was still 
subsisting. The parties had previously agreed to live in Egypt the law of which 
permitted polygamy, and subsequently established their matrimonial home there until 
they moved to England in 1956. It was argued that the marriage was void, since the 
wife lacked, by the law of her prenuptial domicile, capacity to enter into a polygamous 
marriage. Cumming-Bruce J., being attracted by the desire to uphold a long-standing 
relationship, believed that in common law capacity to contract a polygamous marriage 
depended upon the law of the intended matrimonial domicile; and since the wife had 
capacity by virtue of her decision to separate herself from the land of her domicile, the 
marriage was valid.(251) 
The learned Judge rejected the contention of counsel for the Queen's Proctor that 
Parliament had declared the dual domicile test as the only test applicable, on the basis 
that the common law rights of the wife "are not to be cut down by any misapprehension 
about the common law entertained by the law commission, by the government, or by 
parliament"J252) Accordingly, it has been submitted that the decision would have 
been the same even if the marriage had been celebrated after July 31st 1971, since 
Section 4 of the 1972 Act(253) is a rule of English domestic law, and it is, under 
Section 4(1) of the 1971 Act,(254) inoperative, if the validity of marriage is by the 
English conflict rules governed by a foreign lawJ255) This is questionable because 
Section 4(1) of the 1971 Act [re-enacted by s.14(1) of 1973 Act] does not imply 
precisely that the intended matrimonial home test governs capacity to enter into a 
polygamous marriage. But it does simply mean that English courts cannot invalidate a 
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marriage on the sole ground of Section 1 of the 1971 Act [as amended by s.4 of 1972 
Actl(256) if the parties belong to a foreign country the law of which recognises the 
validity of the polygamous marriage. Certainly, the decision would have been more 
attractive if the marriage had been upheld on the basis that it had become monogamous, 
as the husband divorced his second wife before he moved with the petitioner to 
England in 1956,(257) This decision has been strongly criticised, mainly on the 
ground that there is no substantial policy considerations requiring the submission of 
capacity to contract a polygamous marriage to a different choice of law rule from that 
which applies generally to the question of capacity to marry. This is because a 
woman's ability to marry her cousin or uncle raises the same issues as her capacity to 
marry a married man,(258) 
As stated above, Section 11(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provides that no 
person domiciled in England has capacity to contract a polygamous marriage, whether 
the marriage is actually or potentially polygamous. There is no doubt that this view is 
solely based on the dubious common law rule according to which the nature of a 
marriage is exclusively determined by the lex loci celebrationis, notwithstanding that 
that matter is affected by the lex domicilii, the rule which determines the question of 
capacity to marry,(259) It is clear that all marriages celebrated abroad by persons 
domiciled in England in accordance with the local law would be void if that law 
permitted polygamy, regardless of the fact that English law prohibits polygamy. 
Accordingly, it might be argued that the policy objective behind this rule seems to be 
the prevention of an English domiciliary, whose religious or cultural traditions permit 
polygamy, and who wishes to seek a bride from his country of origin, from marrying 
in his own manner abroad, inasmuch as this affects the strict policy of immigration 
adopted by the government. 
The rule in Section 11(d) of the 1973 Act has been described as "a legislative error," 
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and has been criticised by academic commentators, most notably by Poulter, who 
stigmatised it as being "a serious interference with the customs of ethnic minority 
communities, especially those from the Indian sub-continent whose practice of arranged 
marriages quite often involves seeking a bribe from a family still living in that part of 
the world" ,(260) The rule seems hard to justify in principle since it ignores, though its 
phraseology seems to indicate, that capacity to marry polygamously is a matter for the 
lex domicilii of the parties, and that this should have an effect upon the character of the 
marriage. Thus, it is difficult to see why a marriage should be categorised as a 
polygamous marriage in nature and invalidated simply because it is solemnised in a 
polygamous form, if neither of the parties has capacity to contract a subsequent 
marriage during its subsistence. Moreover, it would be incongruous to categorise a 
marriage, which is potentially polygamous at its inception, as a valid monogamous 
marriage simply because the husband has acquired a domicile of choice in England 
afterwards, if the English domicile of that husband at the time of the marriage cannot 
confer on it an initially monogamous character.(261) A rule which makes the validity 
and the nature of a marriage depend on the form in which it happens to be celebrated in 
the country of celebration seems highly unsatisfactory and undesirable. 
In the more recent English decision in Hussain v. Hussain, (262) the Court of Appeal 
has considered, and fully shown the unjust and socially undesirable consequences of, 
the rule in Section 11(d) of the 1973 Act. In 1979 a marriage was solemnised in 
Pakistan in accordance with the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 between a 
domiciled English man and a woman domiciled in Pakistan. On the breakdown of the 
marriage, the wife petitioned the English court for a decree of judicial separation. 
Counsel for the husband argued that the wife is not entitled to the decree she sought, 
since the marriage having been solemnised in a polygamous form, it was a polygamous 
marriage within the meaning of Section 11(d) of the 1973 Act, and void because the 
husband was domiciled in England at the time of the marriage. However, the Court of 
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Appeal rejected this line of reasoning, and held that as a result of the husband's English 
domicile the marriage was monogamous and valid. Accordingly, the decree of judicial 
separation was grantedJ263) Ormord L.J., who pronounced the judgement, assumed 
that the nature of a marriage at its inception is affected by both the lex loci celebrationis 
and the husband's domiciliary law. However, the Learned Lord Justice has submitted 
that a marriage can only be potentially polygamous if one, or both of the parties has 
capacity to marry again during the subsistence of the first marriage. 
As under the Muslim law the wife cannot take a second spouse, and the husband is 
similarly incapacitated by his personal law, i.e. English law, the marriage is not even 
potentially polygamous since neither party has capacity to enter into a subsequent and 
co-incidentmarriage.(264) His Lordship, therefore, concluded that the rule in Section 
1I(d) of the 1973 Act is designed to prevent the celebration of a marriage abroad in a 
polygamous form between a domiciled English woman and a man whose personal law 
at the time of the marriage permits polygamy. Nevertheless, as a matter of practical 
significance, it may be argued that such a marriage must be held monogamous and valid 
if the husband, without having remarried and before the validity of the marriage is 
called in issue, acquires a domicile of choice in England.(265) Moreover, if it is 
admitted that the consequences of applying the invalidating rule would be far-reaching 
and very serious, with wide spread and profound repercussions on the Muslim 
community, it is difficult to imagine any sound reason why Parliament, in an 
increasingly pluralistic society, should have thought it necessary to prevent persons, 
whose religious traditions permit polygamy, from marrying in their own manner abroad 
simply because they are domiciled in England. Having assessed the relevant facts, the 
Learned Lord Justice concluded that it was not the purpose of the Act to prohibit 
English domiciliaries "from entering into marriages under the Muslim Family Laws 
ordinance or under similar laws which permit polygamy" ,(266) provided that neither 
party has capacity to marry polygamously. 
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Yet, it is beyond any doubt that the decision has remarkably alleviated the vast majority 
of practical problems to which the unfortunate concept of potentially polygamous 
marriage may give rise. Nevertheless, the Law Commission and Scottish Law 
Commissions have recently submitted that the decision cannot form the basis of any 
sound statutory reform for various reasons. In the first place, it has been argued that 
the reasoning in Hussain v. Hussain differentiates between the sexes for no seemingly 
good reason, as Section ll(d) remains operative to invalidate a marriage celebrated in a 
polygamous form between a domiciled English woman and a man the law of whose 
domicile permits polygamyJ267) Therefore, it has been suggested that this result is 
anomalous, discriminatory and undesirable because it is inconsistent with the modern 
notions of sexual equality, and may infringe the provisions of the European Convention 
on Human Rights which prohibit any discrimination based on sexual grounds.(268) 
Hence, it has been proposed that a marriage which is entered into by a man or a woman 
domiciled in England should not (if English law is applicable thereto in accordance with 
English conflict oflaw rules) be invalidated by reason of the fact that it is entered into 
under a law which permits polygamy, provided that neither party to the marriage is 
already married.(269) Secondly, it is further pointed out that the decision in the 
Hussain case concerns only marriages falling within the scope of Section ll(d), which 
has no application in England to marriages celebrated before 31st July 1971. Since 
these marriages are governed by previous common law, it is uncertain whether the 
English courts would achieve the same conclusion as the Court of Appeal. Therefore, 
the proposed legislation, it is thought, should be retrospective so as to validate 
marriages celebrated before the date of its coming into existence. Nevertheless, a 
marriage solemnised before the retrospective legislation comes into force should not be 
validated if it has been declared void by a decree of nullity, or if either party to the 
marriage has subsequently contracted another marriage with a different partner which 
would be rendered invalid by the retrospecti ve validation of the first marriage. (270) 
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Similarly, it has been argued that the Scottish courts, as there is no provision in Scots 
law equivalent to Section 11 (d), may not achieve the same result as the Court of Appeal 
in Hussain v. Hussain, inasmuch as the common law governing capacity to enter into a 
polygamous marriage is uncertain and undeveloped. (271) Hence, it is proposed that a 
person domiciled in Scotland should not lack capacity to contract a marriage by the sole 
reason that the marriage is entered into under a law which permit polygamy.(272) 
In conclusion, it is interesting to note that the English and the Scots Law Commissions 
in their 1985 combined report have proposed a uniform approach within the United 
Kingdom by suggesting that a man and a woman domiciled in England, or in Scotland, 
should have capacity to contract a marriage in a polygamous form abroad, provided that 
neither party to the marriage is already married.(273) These recommendations would, 
if implemented, introduce some rationality and certainty into what has become a 
somewhat confused area of conflict of laws. In fact, the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous provisions) Act 1995 has been enacted to that effect. As regards 
English law, section 5(1) of this Act provides clearly that: "A marriage entered into 
outside England and Wales between parties neither of whom is already married is not 
void under the law of England and Wales on the ground that it is entered into under a 
law which permits polygamy and that either party is domiciled in England and 
wales ... "J273a) Further, Section 7 of this Act has also clarified the Scottish position 
within the present subject. This section provides that: "(1) A person domiciled in 
Scotland does not lack capacity to enter into a marriage by reason only that the marriage 
is entered into under a law which permit polygamy ... ".(273b) It is thus clear that a 
marriage is valid in Scotland and will be treated in the same way as a union entered into 
in a monogamy-insisting country as long as neither parties remarries during the 
subsistence of the marriage, irrespective that it has been entered into under a law which 
permits polygamy. These statutory changes are to be welcomed for they bring about 
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the English and Scottish positions in line with the rest of Western legal systems, 
eliminate limping marriages, and they are consistent with the policy considerations 
relevant in marriage. 
Section Three 
Determination of the Substantive Requirements of the Marriage 
It is universally established that the essential validity of mixed marriages is determined 
by applying the parties' personal laws distributively, in a sense that each party should 
only satisfy the requirements imposed by his own law and not those of the other party's 
personal law . It is therefore sufficient for holding a mixed marriage valid if each party 
has capacity to marry by his own law, according to the dual domicile [nationality] 
doctrineJ274) Nevertheless, it is generally believed that there are policy considerations 
requiring the application of the parties' personal laws in cumulation, inasmuch as 
certain substantive requirements are characterised as bilateral impediments the objective 
of which cannot be achieved if the parties' prenuptial personal laws are applied 
distributively.<275) Suppose, for instance, that an Algerian subject wishes to marry 
her uncle who is an Egyptian national. While Egyptian law permits such marriages, the 
Algerian law provides that a marriage between uncle and niece is prohibited on the 
ground of consanguinityJ276) If the Algerian provision is, however, interpreted as 
simply preventing the uncle who is an Algerian subject from marrying his niece, the 
distrubitive application remains possible and the marriage will be valid. But, if it is 
interpreted as prohibiting the marriage of uncle and niece, in other words neither of 
them has capacity to marry the other under the Algerian law, the marriage cannot be 
validly celebrated. 
The concept of bilateral impediments, under the continental law system, connotes the 
existence of certain marriage impediments which affect both parties, so they must be 
considered not only when they exist in relation to the party subject to the law imposing 
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it but also when they exist in regard to the other party, notwithstanding that the personal 
law of that party itself ignores those impediments.(277) The obvious result of this 
view, however, is that each party must comply not only with the essentials of marriage 
required by his own law but also with those requirements, characterised as bilateral 
impediments, of the other party's personal law . It is interesting to underline that there 
is no objective test by which the unilateral and bilateral character of any particular 
impediment can easily be ascertained, and this is in view of the fact that an impediment 
existing in one legal system is not necessarily the same as that of an identical 
impediment in another legal system. The distinction in question, it is submitted, 
depends generally on the interpretation of the objective policies of the domestic law 
laying down the respective impediments. Arguably, the impediments which are solely 
designed to protect the parties' interests are to be considered unilateral, and thus must 
be satisfied by the party who is subject to the law establishing them. On the other 
hand, the impediments concerning the public interests and the marriage relationship 
itself are termed bilateral, as they apply even to the party who is not subject to the law 
of which the respective impediments form part.(278) 
Professor Issad assumes that the present distinction is maintained under the Algerian 
law, and stresses that the fundamental problem consists of classifying the impediments 
in one of the two categories. However, the learned author suggests while the essential 
requirements of age, parental consent and parties' consent are beyond any doubt 
unilateral impediments, as they concern the individual ability of each party to enter into 
a marriage. The prohibited degrees of consanguinity, affinity and fosterage, and the 
monogamous or polygamous character of marriage are generally classified as bilateral 
impediments,(279) It is thus reasonably clear that the bilateral or unilateral character of 
any impediment must be determined by the law imposing it, provided that it is not 
within the scope of article 13 of the civil code or, contrary to the Algerian public 
policy.(280) 
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Although the unilateral-bilateral dichotomy is not commonly used in the common law 
countries, there are statutory provisions and judicial authorities to the effect that the 
realism of this distinction is also recognised in English and Scots laws endorsing the 
dual domicile rule. However, it is a rule of English and Scots laws that a person 
domiciled in England and Scotland is not only prohibited from remarrying while he is 
bound by a previous, valid and subsisting marriage, but also from marrying a married 
person, even though the marriage is recognised as valid by the married person's 
personal law which accepts polygamy.(281) Furthermore, Sir Jocelyn Simon P. has 
expressly pointed out obiter, in Padolechia v. Padolechia, (282) that neither a married 
person can validly contract a marriage in a monogamous country, nor can a single 
person validly contract a marriage with a married person in a monogamous country, if 
either party is already married by either's personal law . It is also interesting to note that 
Mr. Stone, in his note on Pugh v. Pugh, seemingly endorses the approach in question, 
for he said: 
"Cases of prohibited degrees involve a pre-existing relationship between the parties of 
consanguinity or, more usually (since most of the cases concerned maniage with the 
surviving spouse of a deceased sister or brother), of affinity, whereas in Pugh v. 
Pugh the incapacity was peculiar to one party to the marriage alone. ,,(283) 
Certainly, the unilateral-bilateral dichotomy expresses the existing divergences between 
legal systems as to various impediments' construction, and covers a reality recognised 
nearly by all legal systems adopting the dual domicile [nationality] rule. Nonetheless, 
the present approach has been stigmatised as being too conceptualistic, for it ignores the 
complexity of the problem requiring consideration of various circumstances.(284) It is, 
however, anomalous to base the distinction in question on the interpretation of the 
relevant domestic law rules which are generally enacted with the view to the domestic 
situations and to those involving foreign elements. It is therefore inconceivable to rely 
on the context of domestic provisions for classifying marriage impediments within the 
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sphere of conflict of laws. Moreover, reliance on the objective and the policy of the 
provision establishing the impediment give rise to difficulties not only because the 
purpose of the policy behind the same impediment may vary considerably from one 
legal system to another, but also the same prohibition may have several functions 
within one legal system.(28S) 
A- Age of Marriage Requirement 
It is worth noting that the minimum age for marriage varies considerably among legal 
systems, as much as many years for persons of the same sex, and it varies in the 
domestic laws of several countries between members of the different sexes. Generally 
speaking, these variations seem partly to bear out the "differences in the natural 
conditions affecting the age at which physical and mental maturity is reached, but in 
part they are only explicable against the background of historical tradition, in particular 
a strong influence of religious law and concepts.,,(286) However, the minimum age 
established in many legal systems usually reflects a legislative decision as to the age at 
which almost sexually normal children of the particular sex will have reached puberty 
and as to the age of informed consent, for they prohibit marriages below that age. 
Conversely, the minimum age established in some other legal systems can be construed 
as reflecting not the age of puberty, but the age at which a person is capable of giving 
true consent to the marriage, since they provide for dispensations allowing persons 
below that age to marry in case of serious reasons. 
It is well settled, both in common and civil law countries, that the marriageable age is a 
matter affecting capacity to marry, and thus fall to be determined by the parties' 
domiciliary, or national, law respectively in accordance wi th the personal law doctrine. 
The justification for referring to the personal laws of the parties is that the policy and 
the purpose of the marriage age requirement is the protection of immature persons from 
the "stresses, responsibilities and sexual freedom of marriage and the physical strain of 
childbirth", and thus the country to which the parties belong at the time of the marriage 
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IS the most appropriate law to determine what protection they require.(287) 
Accordingly, the almost unanimous view in continental law countries is that the age of 
marriage requirement is a unilateral impediment, so each party must satisfy the 
minimum age for marriage prescribed by his own law, notwithstanding the 
marriageable age established by the other party's personallaw.(288) It is worth noting 
that a different view has been taken in the main English authority on choice of law in 
the case of non-age, even though the overwhelming weight of English academic 
opinion has been inclined to be in favour of treating the requirement in question as a 
unilateralimpediment.(289) In Pugh v. Pugh, (290) a marriage between a domiciled 
Englishman and a girl of 15 years, whose domicile was Hungarian, was celebrated in 
Austria in 1946. Although the marriage was valid by the wife's domiciliary law and by 
the lex loci celebrationis, it was held to be void on the ground that: " by the law of the 
husband's domicile it was a marriage into which he [though he was of full age] could 
not lawfully enter."(291) The decision was mainly based upon section 1 of the Age 
MarriageAct 1929,(292) the wording and the context of which was interpreted, by 
Pearce J., as stipUlating that a marriage is void if either of the parties, not necessarily 
the party whose domicile was English, is under the age of sixteen (16), regardless of 
the place where the marriage was performed. Pearce J.'s judgement is not easily 
reconcileable to any sound reasoning, on the basis that there is no sufficient reason for 
English law to protect foreigners whose own law deemed such protection unnecessary, 
and also the policy of the age rule should not be extended to protect " middle-aged 
colonels from the wiles of designing hungarian teenagers.',(293) Since children may 
develop socially, emotionally and even physically at different rates in different 
environments, it seem therefore sensible for English court to rely on the judgement of 
the law of the country to which a party belongs for the decision whether he/she is 
mature enough to marry.(294) 
On this point, however, Scots law is different in so far as a Scottish domiciliary who is 
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over the age of 16 has capacity to marry a foreign domiciliary who is under that age, 
provided that the ceremony takes place abroad and the foreign party has capacity under 
his or her lex domicilii and, probably, under the lex loci celebrationis. The reason is 
that the rule in section 1( 1) of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 demonstrates clearly 
that the minimum age set out in that section affects only the capacity of Scots 
domiciliaries, for it provides: "No person domiciled in Scotland may marry before he 
attains the age of sixteen,,(295) Thus, a person of 15 years of age, whose domicile is 
Scottish, has no capacity to contract a marriage anywhere in the world, even if the law 
of the foreign lex loci celebrationis permits the celebration of marriage between 
persons who are under the age of 16. Moreover, section 1(2) of the 1977 Act states 
that a marriage solemnised in Scotland between persons either of whom is under the 
age of 16 is void,C296) Accordingly, a foreigner who is under the age of 16 has no 
capacity to enter into a marriage in Scotland, even if he or she has such capacity under 
his or her lex domicilii, in accordance with the general rule that each party must have 
capacity to marry both by the lex domicilii and the lex loci celebrationis. It is further 
submitted that although the parties are over the age of 16, they cannot celebrate a 
marriage in Scotland if one or both of them are under the age required by their lex 
domicilii. (297) Since the 1977 Act refers specifically to a marriage celebrated in 
Scotland, it is too clear for arguments that a marriage celebrated abroad between 
foreigners either of whom is under the age of 16 is recognised as valid in Scotland, 
provided that it is as such under the parties' antenuptial domiciliary laws. The same 
view has been taken in a recent English case, i.e. Mohamed v. Knott, (298) where a 
marriage between a man and a girl of 13 years, both domiciliaries and nationals of 
Nigeria, was celebrated there and shortly afterwards they moved to England. Although 
the wife was under the age required by the lex fori, the marriage was held to be valid in 
England because the wife had capacity to marry by her lex domicilii, i.e. Nigerian law. 
As regards Algerian law, the minimum age for marriage is set out above the age of 16, 
187 
and varies between members of different sexes. However, article 7 of the Algerian 
family code provides that an Algerian man and an Algerian woman have no capacity to 
marry before he and she attains the age of 21 and 18 respectively. Nevertheless, a 
judge [the competent authority] may grant a dispensation as to age, for serious reasons, 
in the interest of the intending spouse.(299) It is interesting to underline that the age of 
marriage under the Algerian law is an aspect of capacity to marry referrable to the 
national law of the parties, so that each party must have capacity by the law of his or 
her antenuptial national law . As in Scottish law, it may be conceded that a marriage 
solemnised abroad between foreigners who have capacity by their respective national 
laws is recognised in Algeria, even if the parties are under the age required by the 
forum. Moreover, the application of the personal law of a foreigner who wants to 
celebrate a marriage in Algeria must be accepted by the competent authority celebrating 
the marriage and by the courts if, and only if, that law requires a higher age for 
marriage than the minimum age required by the forum. Conversely, if the personal law 
of that foreigner permits marriage at a lower age than the forum, the marriage can never 
be sanctioned by the marriage officer, or upheld by the courts, on ground of public 
policy'<300) The present writer believes that this view is too strict, since the age for 
marriage required by the Algerian law is subject to dispensation in domestic cases. 
Hence, the limit below which the application of more liberal foreign laws will not be 
tolerated should be fixed at the age below which the Algerian law does not provide for 
the possibility of dispensation from the requirement in question.(30 1) 
B- Consent of the Parties 
It is generally agreed that the reality of consent, as distinct from the manner of 
expression of consent, is a basic element, and a matter of the essential validity of 
marriage.(302) However, a marriage will not be valid if either party has not freely and 
truly consented to it, whether in consequence of duress, fear, fraud, error, coercion, 
misrepresentation, etc.,or if the parties have consented to enter into it not for living 
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together in matrimony but for some extraneous purpose, e.g. to avoid immigration 
rules. Although the defects of consent are nearly the same everywhere, it is interesting 
to underline that domestic laws of different countries are at considerable variance as to 
the fact constituting these defects which may vitiate the consent.(303) 
It is clear that, under the Algerian domestic law, there can be no valid marriage unless 
each party consented to marry the other. As a matter of principle, a marriage will be 
void if either party's consent is vitiated by error, or obtained as a result of duress 
[violence] or fraud [dol].(304) Professor Issad has pointed out that matters affecting 
the parties' consent are to be treated as unilateral, so that each party is only subject to 
the conditions of consent established by his own personal law, and not to those of the 
other party's personal law. Since consent of the parties is a matter of the essential 
validity, and the rules as to the defects of consent exist, primafacie,in the interest of 
the parties, the question of whether the consent of either party is defective should be 
determined by reference to that party's lex patriae.(30S) Thus, for example, a French 
person goes through a ceremony of marriage in Algeria with a Scottish woman, 
believing it to be merely a betrothal ceremony. Supposing that the mistake as to the 
nature of the ceremony is not a defect of consent under French law, the French party 
cannot rely on such mistake to invoke the nullity of the marriage, even if that mistake 
renders consent defective under Scottish law.(306) 
The application of the relevant foreign law designated by the Algerian conflict rule does 
not raise any problems where it is more stringent than the Algerian law as being the lex 
fori. Suppose, for instance, a marriage was celebrated in Algeria between an English 
domiciliary and an Egyptian national under whose law the error to the qualities of a 
party to the marriage operates to vitiate consent. Although, mistake as to the moral and 
social qualities, under the Algerian law, is not a defect of consent unless it is induced 
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by the fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment of facts by the spouse concerned, 
the Egyptian law will be applied as being more exacting than the lex fori, and thus the 
marriage is voidJ307) 
Conversely, if the relevant personal law is less exacting than the lex fori, public policy 
is likely to be concerned, especially where the marriage is solemnised in the forum. 
However, it has been submitted that such a marriage can never be solemnised by the 
marriage officer or upheld by the Forum's courts, if either party's consent is 
overborne by duress or fraud under the lex fori, regardless of the personal law of the 
party whose consent is alleged to be defective. This is because the consent requirement 
of the Algerian law !l are considered to represent a minimum level below which it is not 
possible to go when the marriage takes place in that country." Accordingly, the validity 
of a marriage celebrated abroad in compliance with the relevant foreign laws will be 
recognised before the Algerian courts , even if the consent of the parties, or one of 
them, is defective by the standards of the lex fori provided that it is recognised as such 
by the parties' personal laws. To this extent, !lit seems reasonable to assume that public 
policy will not interfere to require the annulment of such marriage.,,(308) 
So far as Scottish law is concerned, the overwhelming weight of judicial opinion is that 
a marriage shall be void if either party did not freely and truly consented to it, whether 
by reason of insanity, intoxication, force, error, fear or otherwise.(309) In Johnstone 
v. Brown,(310) for instance, the marriage was held to be void on the basis that the 
petitioner at the time of the ceremony was so inebriated, and thus lacked capacity to 
consent truly to the marriage. The Scottish decisions on the choice of law governing 
the validity of marriage, which is alleged to be void on some grounds vitiating the true 
consent of the parties, present a rather confused picture. The question what law 
governs defects in consent is not conclusively answered, since Scots law was applied 
in all decided cases without giving indication as to the ground on which it was 
applied.(311) Professor Clive has pointed out that in all cases where consent of the 
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parties was in issue, the Scottish law "was the law of the place of celebration, the law 
of the forum and the law of the domicile of a party whose consent was allegedly 
defective.,,(312) 
It is worth noting that here as in the part of the conflict of laws relating to the legal 
capacity, the judicial and extrajudicial authorities, both in England and Scotland, 
indicate preference for various choice of law rules, namely the lex loci, the lex fori, 
the lex domicilii, and the law of the country with which marriage has the most real and 
substantial connection. In the first instance, it has been argued that the reality of the 
parties' consent is to be determined by the lex loci celebrationis, on the basis that the 
respective issue is a contractual defect invalidating the parties' agreement, as well as the 
ceremony if it is overborne by duress, force and fear, etc.(313) In Di Rollo v. Di 
Rollo, the only Scottish case in which the issue of choice of law was discussed, Lord 
Ordinary expressly stated that "the question whether the pursuer gave a true consent to 
the marriage is to be decided by the law of Scotland as the lex loci celebrationis.,,(314) 
This view has been strongly criticised, mainly on the ground that "to say that the 
ceremony is nullified seems to be simply another way of saying that the marriage is 
void." However, the proposed rule is in glaring inconsistency with the reason given for 
many of the relevant judgements, and fails to take into consideration the distinction 
made between the mode of giving consent and the fact of consent itself.(315) Thus, 
"The method of giving consent as distinct from the fact of consent is essentially a matter 
for the lex loci celebrationis, and does not raise a question of capacity or essential 
validity.,,(316) The application of the lex loci to the defect of consent would prevent 
the parties from relying on the defects of consent existing under their domiciliary laws, 
if such defects do not constitute a part of the domestic law of the country of celebration, 
to invoke the nullity of their marriage. (317) It is therefore beyond any doubt that this 
view would promote limping marriages, since the courts of the domicile would strike 
down a foreign marriage entered into under duress, fraud, and fear, etc., where that 
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defect was considered as fundamental under their own law, whether or not a nullity 
decree would have been granted by the the Lex loci celebrationis. Since the proposed 
rule is not accepted as a choice of law rule with regard to the legal capacity issues, and 
since the fact of consent is a substantive issue, it would be inappropriate and 
undesirable "to refer a substantive issue exclusively to the law of a country with which 
the parties may only have a fortuitous or fleeting connection.,,(318) 
Conversely, Professor Clive has suggested that the consent of the parties is to be 
governed by the law of the forum, since its application generally seems to be 
consistent with the actual English and Scottish decisions on the respective issue, even 
though the reasons given by the courts in some cases contravene such a rule. As Dicey 
has pointed out, the main reason for referring to the lex fori is that "the question 
whether a union is voluntary is a matter of fact, and that, before considering the legal 
effect of a marriage ceremony, the court must first be satisfied as to the fact of 
marriage".(319) This is questionable and less than convincing on the ground that the 
reality of consent, though it is a matter of fact, involves also "the legal issues of 
whether the facts found amount to a defect in consent and of the effect of this on the 
validity of the marriage".(320) On the policy ground, it may be argued that the 
application of the lex fori, as a choice of law rule in this context, would lead to 
uncertainty, limping marriages, and would promote forum-shopping because "the 
outcome of the proceedings would be dependent on the pititioner's choice of 
forum".(321) It is therefore reasonably clear that the lex fori rule is undesirable and 
hard to justify in principle, inasmuch as it would facilitate the invalidation of marriage. 
Nevertheless, the lex fori has an important role to play in refusing recognition to a 
capacity conferred by the applicable law, especially where the marriage is celebrated 
locally. Thus, for instance, a marriage celebrated in England or Scotland would be 
invalid, if either party's consent is overborne by mistake as to the identity of the other 
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party, regardless of its validity under the relevant foreign law. Where, conversely, the 
applicable law is more exacting, the forum's courts might be prepared to apply it, and 
thus to invalidate the marriage, e.g. on the ground of mistake as to the moral and social 
attributes which is not a defect of consent under the law of theforum.(322) 
Professor Clive, being aware of the arbitrary result to which the application of the lex 
fori would lead, has submitted that the" best rule would be to apply the law with 
which the marriage had at the time the most substantial connection".(323) In Vervaecke 
v. Smith,(324) where the question of sham marriage was in issue, Lord Simon was of 
opinion that the "quintessential validity" of a marriage is determined by the law of the 
country with which the marriage has the most real and substantial connection. It has 
been argued that the present approach is a vague test which may "produce an 
unacceptable degree of uncertainty into the law"( 325) 
However, the almost unanimous view of judicial and academic authorities is that the 
personal law of the parties, i.e. lex domicilii, is the most appropriate law to govern the 
reality of consent as being a matter of the essential validity of marriage. The argument 
in favour of the parties' prenuptial domiciliary law, for Dicey, is that the question of 
consent "is analogous to one of capacity, in that marriage is essentially a 'voluntary 
union', and the question whether a union is in law voluntary should depend upon the 
personal law to which each of the parties was subject at the date of the ceremony" .(326) 
In Szechter v. Szechter,(327) a Polish domiciliary divorced his wife and married his 
secretary for the sake of getting her out of prison and enabling her to reach the west 
where she could obtain urgently medical treatment. The wife, on arrival to England, 
brought nullity proceedings before the English court on the basis that she did not 
consent to the marriage by reason of duress. Although the parties' antenuptial 
domiciliary law and the lex fori were the same as to the effect of duress, the learned 
judge stated clearly that the marriage was void because it was as such under the Polish 
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law as being the law of the parties domicile,(328) 
It remains to consider whether the parties' personal laws, in the case where they are 
domiciled in different countries, should be applied in cumulation or distributively. 
Professor Dicey seems to suggest that the issue of consent is a bilateral impediment to 
which the parties' prenuptial domiciliary laws apply cumulatively, for he said: "No 
marriage is (semble) valid if by the law of either party's domiciles he or she does not 
consent to marry the other.,,(329) Thus, a party to a marriage may invoke the nullity of 
the marriage if he did not consent under his own, or under the other party's premarital 
domiciliary law. This is questionable on the basis that the policy behind the 
requirement of consent is the protection of the party's interest whose consent is alleged 
to be defective. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine any sound reason "why, if a party's 
own law considers that he has validly consented to the marriage, he should nevertheless 
be entitled to avoid the marriage on the basis of his lack of consent under the other 
party's domiciliary law". (330) Hence, it has been submitted that the better view is the 
application of the party's domiciliary law whose consent is allegedly defective, so that 
whether he does not consent under the other party's personal law is irrelevant. (331) 
C- Parental Consent 
It has been already indicated that the requirement of parental consent is the selective area 
where conflict of law problems commonly arise, insofar as the characterisation of that 
issue varies considerably from one legal system to another. While it is characterised 
under English and Scottish laws as a matter of formal validity referrable to the lex loci 
celebrationis, it is regarded by the Algerian law as a matter affecting capacity to marry 
and thus must be determined by the parties' lex patriae.(332) The overwhelming 
weight of opinion among continental writers is that parental consent is to be treated as 
unilateral, so that each of the parties is only subject to the requirements imposed by his 
own law.(333) The argument in favour of applying the party's law requiring parental 
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consent is that the policy of such provision is generally to protect the party whose law 
establishes that condition from his own immaturity, and the parents' interests. 
Unlike the other unilateral requirements, the relevant foreign law will be applied even if 
it is more liberal than the lex fori in the sense that it permits its own subject to marry 
without the parental consent. Thus, a marriage which takes place in Algeria without 
parental consent, between foreigners whose laws require age of majority slightly lower 
that the age required by the Algerianforum, would be valid before the Algerian courts. 
This is because the public policy has no overriding effect on the conflict of law rule for 
the questions of parental consentJ334) Moreover, it is usually agreed that effect must 
be given to the relevant foreign law importing a more exacting regulation of this matter 
than the lex fori,as to require parental consent at a higher age limit that the forum. 
However, a marriage celebrated in Algeria between two foreigners aged 23 without 
parental consent would be held invalid before the Algerian courts on the ground of 
comity, if it is regarded as such by their personal law or laws. 
D- The Prohibited Degrees of Relationship 
Although it is generally recognised that the prohibitions against marriage b~tween 
persons standing in a certain relationship to each other are of universal character, the 
kinds and the degrees of relationships which constitute legal impediments to marriage 
vary considerably among legal systems. The existence of such wide variations reflects 
the differences in the social, moral and religious concepts upon which the rules as to the 
prohibited relationships are predominantly based. While the prohibitions, both in 
Scottish and Algerian laws,(335) are mainly based on consanguinity and affinity, the 
difference lies in that the prohibitions in Scots law extend to the relationships by 
adoption,(336) whereas in Algerian law they extend, not to the adoptive relations, but 
to the relationships by fosterage [Allaitment].(337) The reason of such rules, however, 
seems to be the prevention of marriage relationships which are destructive of the 
morality or religion prevailing in the states concerned, and may be also, in cases of 
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consanguinity, to reduce the risk of conceiving physically or mentally handicapped 
children. One might think that the policy objective of such impediments is the 
protection of the society from the feeling of disgust to which certain relationships may 
give rise and the family concerned from disturbing sexual relations.(338) 
It is well established, both in common and civil law countries, that the prohibited 
degrees of relationships are matters affecting capacity to marry referrable to the parties' 
personal laws, i.e. the law of their domicile or nationality at the time of the marriage. 
The reason for referring to the personal laws of the parties is that the main purpose of 
the prohibiting rules seems to be the protection of public interest. As a matter of 
principle, a marriage will be void if the parties are within the prohibited degrees of 
relationships set forth by their personal law or laws; even though it is valid by the law 
of the Jorum qua lexJori et lex loci celebrationis.(339) This rule holds equally true if 
the law of either party considers their relationship as constituting a legal impediment to 
the marriage, notwithstanding the marriage validity under the other party's personal law 
as the parties are not within the forbidden degrees of relationship or, the impediment is 
unknown to that legal system or it has been removed by dispensation.(340) To that 
extent, it has been pointed out that the rules prohibiting marriage between certain 
categories of relatives are to be characterised as necessarily bilateral because the 
disqualifying fact refers to circumstances in respect of the quality or capacity of both 
parties to the relationship. If, for instance, Algerian law forbids marriage between 
uncle and niece, it goes without saying that the marriage will be barred whenever one of 
them, whether the uncle or the niece, is an Algerian national; for a marriage can only be 
lawfully solemnised if both parties have capacity to marry each other. (341) 
So far as the Algerian law is concerned, it appears that the general rule as to capacity to 
marry applies also here, so the prohibited degrees of relationship, being a substantive 
requirement of marriage, must be determined by each party's personal [national] law. 
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However, it is undoubtedly clear that a marriage, though celebrated abroad, between 
persons related in degrees specified in the family law code 1984, (articles 23-29) will 
be void before the Algerian courts not only if both parties are Algerian subjects, but 
also if either the husband or the wife is an Algerian citizen at the time of the 
marriage.(342) The question that arises is whether a marriage of an Algerian with a 
foreigner whose law regards the marriage invalid for reasons of consanguinity or 
affinity, whether celebrated locally or abroad, will be held valid before the Algerian 
courts on the sole ground that the would-be spouses are not within the prohibited 
degrees set forth by the family law code 1984. According to the general principles of 
private international law , the answer seems negative because the impediments based on 
the degrees of relationships are characterised as bilateral impediments which affect not 
only the individual capacity of the parties, but mainly the marriage relationship that is to 
be created. The reason is simply that effect must be given to the rules of the relevant 
foreign law which establishes wider degrees or other kinds of forbidden relationship 
than the forum. 
But the wording and the context of the article (13) of Algerian civil code 1976, as 
interpreted by Professor Issad, seems to suggest that the marriage in this case will be 
held valid, regardless of its invalidity under the other party's national law; for it 
provides clearly that the Algerian law is the only applicable law whenever an Algerian 
subject is involved thereof.<343) The rule in question is not easily reconcileable to any 
sound reasoning on the basis that there is no sufficient reason for Algerian law to be 
applied exclusively to determine the validity of the marriage where a bilateral 
impediment is in issue, for a marriage can only be recognised as valid if both parties are 
free to marry each other. However, the proposed rule is irrational inasmuch as the aim, 
or at least one of the aims, of the reference to the foreign law is to ensure that the 
marriage will be recognised as valid by that law. Furthermore, it is commonly accepted 
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that it is undesirable to give special preference to the forum law qua lex fori et lex 
patriae of one of the parties, because of the limping marriages that must inevitably 
result. One might therefore think that the article (13) should be interpreted as providing, 
not for an exclusive application of the Algeria law, but for a cumulative application of 
that law along with the relevant foreign law. The universal validity principle, the 
prevailing of harmonisation and uniformity of decisions, and the desire to prevent the 
creation of limping marriages would seem to demand this. 
The application of the relevant foreign law rules, designated by the Algerian conflicts 
rule, does not give rise to any difficulties whatsoever where it imports a more exacting 
regulation of this matter than the Algerian domestic rules as being the forum, whether 
because the kinds, or the degrees of the prohibited relationships of that law are wider 
than those provided for by the lex fori. The reason is that the application of such rules 
is, it is thought, of no concern to the forum's public policy, and the legitimate interest 
of the country to which the parties belong in the application of its domestic policies 
should be upheld. However, a marriage prohibited by the parties' national law is, 
though valid by Algerian domestic law, invalid in Algeria, whether solemnised locally 
or abroad. It is well established that this holds equally true for cases where the 
marriage is void by the national law of either party, provided that the other party is not 
an Algerian subject.(344) Although, for instance, marriages between first cousins are 
lawful in Algeria, persons so related will be debarred from marrying each other there if 
they are, or one of them is of Portuguese nationality, since the application of the 
prohibitory rule of the law of Portugal is not offensive to the Algerian notion of public 
policy.(345) 
Conversely, the relevant foreign law will be refused application on the ground of public 
policy if it is less exacting that the lex fori, permitting marriage between persons who 
are within the prohibited degrees as set out by the law of the forum. This is because, 
to use Palsson's words, lithe consideration of religion, morality and social policy 
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underlying the rules as to prohibited relationships are often held to carry such force as 
to demand the application of those rules in respect of all marriages celebrated within the 
enacting country and to exclude the enforcement of foreign law based on different 
policies.,,(346) However, one might say that the marriage impediments based on the 
prohibited degrees of relationship, as prescribed by the Algerian law, are usually held 
to form part of public policy and so require application in respect of all marriages 
solemnised in Algeria, since such impediments are all regarded as being of absolute 
nature. Suppose, for example, that two German nationals, uncle and niece, desire to 
celebrate their marriage in Algeria. Although German law permits marriage between 
uncle and niece, the marriage can never be sanctioned by the marriage officer, or upheld 
by the courts on ground of public policy in accordance with the civil code 1976, article 
24, insofar as marriage between uncle and niece are deeply offensive to the Algerian's 
ideas of justice and morality.(347) Despite the application of the local prohibitions, by 
virtue of public policy, seems to be well justified when the celebration takes place in 
Algeria, it is worth stressing that public policy considerations will rarely intervene to 
defeat the recognition of the validity of a marriage solemnised abroad in compliance 
with the relevant foreign law even if it conflicts with an absolute prohibition of the 
Algerian law. This is because public policy is an exceptional jurisdiction which must 
be exercised with extreme cautionJ348) It is undoubtedly clear that the suggested 
solution is in glaring consistency with the prevailing policy of protecting existing 
marriages [favor matrimonii] , promotes uniformity of decisions, and seems to have the 
advantage of reducing the possible occasions for limping marriages. One might 
therefore conclude that reasons of public policy would not be adduced to deny 
recognition to such marriages, if valid by the parties' personal (national) law, unless the 
parties are so closely related, such as marriages between brothers and sisters, which 
hardly even occur in the practice of conflict of laws.(349) 
As regards English and Scottish laws, the prevailing view is that the prohibited degrees 
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of relationships, as being matters of substantive validity, are to be governed by the law 
of each party's domicile at the time of the marriage. In Sttomayer v. De Barros 
[N°l],(350) the facts of which have already been stated, the court of appeal held that a 
marriage celebrated in England between first cousins domiciled in portugal is, though 
valid in England, void because the parties have failed to comply with the relevant 
foreign law, i.e the law of their domicile at the time of the marriage. This decision, 
though is confined to the case where both parties are domiciled in the same country at 
the time of the marriage, seems to be the prevailing view also where the parties are 
domiciled in different countries, for the application of the decision in Sottomayer v. De 
Barros [N°2] (351) is restricted to the case where an English domiciliary is involved 
thereof. Furthermore, the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, with increasing explicitness, 
has inclined to favour the dual domicile doctrine, for it provides that a marriage between 
persons related in degrees specified in schedule I of the Act is void if either party is 
domiciled in Scotland.(352) 
By taking a different course of arguments, Jaffey has suggested that the intended 
matrimonial home rule would seem to deserve preference here as the policy behind the 
prohibited degrees of relationships is the protection of public interests. Accordingly, he 
has pointed out that "A country's policy on these matters will not be affected by a 
marriage where the matrimonial home is abroad, even where one of the parties had his 
antenuptial domicile in the country. So, for example, English policy does not require 
the invalidation of marriage between an English domiciliary and her Egyptian uncle, if 
the matrimonial home is in Egypt,,(353) Nevertheless, the learned writer believes in the 
correctness of the matrimonial home rule as a subsidiary rule applicable only where the 
parties have, within a reasonable time after the ceremony, established a matrimonial 
home in a country the law of which regards their marriage valid. It is therefore 
reasonabl y cl ear that J aff ey' s view implies that the dual domicile rule remains applicable 
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where the parties have not established a matrimonial home within a reasonable time 
after the ceremony, seems to have the advantage of meeting the demands of favor 
matrimonii principle, and lessens the conflict of interest arising between the countries 
to which the parties belong at the time of the marriage and the country of their 
matrimonial home. 
The strong weight of authority establishes that a marriage between English or Scottish 
subjects or, an English or a Scots domiciliary and a foreigner, will be void where the 
parties are within the prohibited degrees of English or Scots laws, not only if the 
marriage is solemnised locally but also if the celebration takes place abroad. In Re 
Paine, (354) it will be recalled, the marriage was held void on the basis that the parties 
being a woman and her deceased sister's husband incapable of intermarriage according 
to the law of England where she was domiciled at the time of the ceremony. To the 
same effect, the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 states clearly that a marriage is void if the 
parties are within the prohibited degrees set out in the Act, provided that one of them is 
domiciled in Scotland at the time of the ceremony.(355) Moreover, it has been 
submitted that this rule applies also where the marriage, whether celebrated locally or 
abroad, is prohibited by the law of the country where both parties are, or one of them 
is, domiciled at the time of the marriage. Section 2 (3) (a) of the Marriage (Scotland) 
Act 1977, however, makes it clear that persons related in degrees not specified in 
schedule (1) to the Act may lawfully marry, but without prejudice to the effect which 
such degrees not so specified" ... may have under the provisions of a system of law 
other than Scots law in case where such provisions apply as the law of the place of 
celebration of a marriage or as the law of a person's domicile."(356) 
One might therefore say that foreign marriages, whether the ceremony takes place in 
England, Scotland or abroad, are valid before English and Scots courts if the parties are 
capable of intermarriage according to their antenuptial domiciliary laws. Nevertheless, 
such marriages will never be sanctioned by the registrar or upheld by the English and 
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Scots courts if the parties are within the prohibited degrees set forth by the local 
domestic laws, provided that the marriage is solemnised locally. The 1977 Act 
provides clearly that a marriage solemnised in Scotland is void if the parties are within 
the forbidden degrees of Scots law, notwithstanding its validity under the law of the 
domicile of the parties.(357) The justification for this exception is that it would be 
contrary to public policy to allow people within the prohibited degrees to conclude a 
valid marriage in Scotland even if they had induced the marriage registrar to solemnise a 
purported marriage. 
As regards marriages celebrated abroad, it seems to be common ground that their 
recognition by English or Scottishforum will not be affected by the fact that the parties 
are within the prohibited degrees of the lex fori,.as long as they are valid by the 
parties' domiciliary laws. In Cheni v. Cheni, (358) for instance, a marriage solemnised 
in Egypt, between a Jewish uncle and niece domiciled there, was recognised in England 
on the sole ground that it was valid by the relevant Egyptian law, as being the law of 
the parties' domicile. Sir Jocelyn Simon P. expressly declined to accept the view that 
such a marriage, being invalid in England, must be rejected as contrary to the forum's 
public policy on the basis that a denial would perpetrate injustice and affront 
conscience. The learned judge therefore pointed out that the courts, in deciding the 
question whether a marriage is so offensive to the public policy, 
"will seek to exercise common sense, good manners and a reasonable tolerance. In 
my view it would be altogether too queasy a judicial conscience which would recoil 
from a marriage acceptable to many people of deep religious convictions, lofty 
ethical standards and high civilisation,,(359) 
Professor Clive, though accepted Sir Jocelyn Simon P.'s view, has suggested that the 
Scottish courts would decline to recognise certain child marriages and marriages 
between persons so closely related, such as marriages between brothers and sister, for 
they are so offensive to the Scottish notions of morality and public policy.(360) The 
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general editor of the current edition of Dicey and Morris on the conflict of laws 
observes that "A marriage between [for example] a half-brother and half-sister, would 
be for most purposes refused recognition in England on the grounds of public policy, 
even if it is valid by the lex loci celebrationis and by the law of each party's antenuptial 
domicile"(361) The main reason for this exception, it is submitted, is that recognition 
of such marriages would affront conscience, as well as offending the forum's notions 
of substantial justice. 
In conclusion, the present writer believes that public policy considerations might be 
adduced only to justify the forum's position , as being the law of the place of 
celebration, to the extent of forbidding a marriage registrar to solemnise a marriage 
within the absolutely prohibited degrees of relationship set out by his own domestic 
law. The Justification for this solution is that the use of public policy at the time of the 
ceremony would only result in the denial of celebrating the marriage. Furthermore, the 
application of public policy to refuse recognition to the existing marriages would 
promote limping marriages, undermine the favor matrimonii principle, and would 
render the structure of choice of law rules unduly complex, especially if one of the 
parties has decided to remarry in the forum: would his capacity to remarry still to be 
determined by his personal law or not. It might therefore be said that the courts of the 
place of celebration should not refuse to recognise the validity of a marriage, though it 
is within the prohibited degrees of its own domestic law, if it has been celebrated 
nevertheless in accordance with the parties' personallaws.(362) 
E- Prior SUbsisting Marriage 
Prior subsisting marriage has recently been characterised as the main selective area 
where conflicts of law problems commonly arise in monogamy-insisting countries, 
inasmuch as the international mobility has led, this century, to an increase in the 
number of cases concerning the breakdowns of marriages involving a foreign element, 
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with the consequence that the parties' capacity to remarry depends on the recognition of 
divorce or nullity decrees by the relevant laws. The general prevailing view in such 
legal systems is that a married person has no capacity to contract a valid union with a 
third party whilst his or her first valid marriage is still subsisting under the parties' 
personal laws or, probably, the lex loci celebrationis. This is because the matter [prior 
subsisting marriage] is deemed to be such a fundamental part of public policy affecting 
the ethical well-being and the moral concepts of the society concerned. If a married 
person, for instance, has attempted to remarry or remarried in England or Scotland the 
marriage will be void ab initio before the English or Scottish courts, notwithstanding 
its validity by the parties' domiciliary laws which permit polygamy.(363) 
However, the almost unanimous view of judicial and academic authorities maintains 
that monogamy is an essential requirement referrable to the parties' domiciliary 
[national] law at the time of the marriage ceremonyJ364) In Shaw v. Gould, (365) a 
marriage solemnised in England between two English subjects was dissolved in 
Scotland where the wife married a domiciled Scotsman afterwards, and lived with him 
there. The recognition of the divorce was denied in England on the basis that the first 
husband never lost his English domicile of origin. Since the first union was not 
dissolved under the law of the parties' antenuptial domicile, they had no capacity to 
enter into a subsequent marriage. The House of Lords held that the second union was 
void. notwithstanding its validity by the law of the second husband's domicile and by 
the law ofthe intended matrimonial home.(366) 
It is also established beyond any doubt, both in common and civil law countries, that 
bigamy is to be classified as necessarily a bilateral impediment requiring consideration 
not only when the married person is a subject of the law imposing it, but also when it 
forms part of the other party's personal law. This is because the main purpose of this 
impediment is the protection of the basic principle of monogamy the achievement of 
I 
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which would be impossible if it is only applicable where the married party is subject to 
the law imposing it.(367) However, it is a rule of law in England and Scotland that a 
domiciled English or Scottish person is not only prohibited from remarrying when he is 
bound by a prior, valid and subsisting marriage, but also from marrying a married 
person whether the proposed union is to be solemnised locally or abroad. Section 11 
(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, therefore, provides clearly that "A marriage 
celebratedafter31st July 1971 shall be void on the following grounds only, that is to 
say ... (b) That at the time of the marriage either party is already married ... ,,(368) 
It has been submitted in white v. white, (369) that there never can be any conflict of 
laws between monogamous countries with reference to bigamy, as the relevant laws 
always agree that bigamy is an impediment preventing the solemnisation of a marriage 
between parties one of whom is already a party to a prior, valid and subsisting union. 
Certainly, the issue cannot give rise to any conflict of law problems in cases where the 
capacity to marry of the parties is governed by the lex fori as their personal law. 
Suppose, for instance, that both parties to a proposed union in Scotland are domiciled 
there. The husband was previously bound by a valid union which has been dissolved 
by a divorce granted by an Italian court where the wife was domiciled. It is very clear 
that the question whether the first union was dissolved, and thus the husband is free to 
remarry depends on Scottish law, i.e its rules for the recognition of foreign divorces, 
which is decisive in such cases as being the lex fori et lex causae (370) 
But where the capacity to marry of both parties, or one of them, is subject to a foreign 
law, the above submitted view is not equally self-evident. The underlying justification 
lies on the existing divergences between different legal systems as to the validity of a 
marriage or a divorce, with the consequence that the remarrying party may be regarded 
by one of them as being bound by a prior marriage but not so bound by another. 
Suppose, however, that the parties to the proposed marriage in the above example are 
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and intended to remain domiciled in France. The Italian divorce decree, though it is not 
recognised by Scots law, is entitled to recognition in France the law of which governs 
capacity to marry of the parties to the proposed union according to Scots conflicts rule. 
The main problem, therefore, is whether the validity and the continued existence of the 
prior marriage, as a preliminary question, should be determined by the lex fori 
including its choice of law rules or, by the relevant foreign law applicable to the main 
question, namely, capacity to marry. it is worth noting that the decision in such a case 
would differ according to which law applied to determine the existence of the prior 
union; as it dissolved in France and valid by Scotts law. 
It is therefore clear that bigamy may give rise to conflict of law problems in a number of 
instances, especially where the validity or the subsistence of a previous marriage is in 
doubt, for the reason that it is a limping one or has been terminated by a divorce, or 
declared void by a decree of nullity, whose international recognition is in issue. In 
what follows we shall first examine the situations which occur more frequently in legal 
practice, namely, where the prior marriage is valid and subsisting in the eyes of the 
relevant foreign law applicable to the parties' capacity to marry, but not so regarded by 
the lex fori. The converse situation, where the prior union is regarded as valid by the 
forum, but not so treated by the appropriate foreign law, will also be examined here. 
These situations, in particular where the recognition of a divorce or a nullity decree is in 
issue, can give rise to the general problem known in the modern conflict of laws as the 
incidental question. This is because the existence of the prior union arises for decision, 
not independently, but in the course of deciding the principal question of capacity to 
marry of the parties to the proposed marriage. This problem may squarely be presented 
if the principal question is governed by a foreign law under the forum's conflict rule; 
the incidental question is capable of existing as a separate issue which can be referred to 
an independent conflict rule; and the determination of that question under the forum's 
conflict rule must lead to a different result from that provided by the conflict rule of the 
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appropriate foreign law governing the principal question. (371) 
The incidental question in bigamy cases and capacity to remarry have been a subject of 
much controversy and have produced an ample body of case law and legal literature in 
the modem conflict of laws. However, the judicial and academic authorities have 
canvassed two methods of solution within the doctrine of the incidental question, i.e. 
the lex fori method and the lex causae method, the scrutiny of which is very important 
here in order to establish whether it is possible and desirable to adopt a general rule 
according to which the incidental question will be determined in every case. The 
solution of the subsidiary question is rather complicated and perplexed by the existence 
of conflicting policy objectives and disederata that mainly concentrate on the 
international harmonisation of decisions and internal consistency within the forum, 
which favour the application of the lex causae approach, and the lex fori approach 
respectively. It is thus the present writer's view that the evaluation of the existing 
views must rather centre on the intimate interrelation of the incidental question and the 
principal one, the advantages and disadvantages of each solution judged in the light of 
the existing relevant policies, and the proposition that a general conflict rule within this 
subject must reflect the preventive nature of the essential requirements of marriage. 
Another situation which must be adverted to is the conflict of laws problems arising 
from the restrictions on remarriage imposed upon one or both parties to the properly 
dissolved marriage. Since the policy objectives underlying the prohibitions against 
remarriage after divorce vary considerably, it is necessary to analyse the main 
restrictions in order to find out whether they are to be accorded extraterritorial effect, or 
to be rejected on the ground of public policy. 
1- The existence of a prior marriage recognised by the relevant foreign law, but denied 
by the law of the forum: This situation has been identified as the most frequently 
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occurring case in legal practice. It mainly concerns a remarriage after a divorce validly 
granted or recognised by the forum, but not so recognised by the relevant foreign law 
governing capacity to marry of the parties to the proposed union as being the lex 
causae according to the forum IS conflicts rule. But the first instance of the present 
case, which rarely occurs in practice, is where the first union has not been dissolved by 
divorce but limps from the outset being valid by the relevant foreign law; invalid by the 
lex fori. It has already been submitted that the prevailing view in English and Scots 
laws maintains that incapacity of either party under his or her antenuptial domiciliary 
law may render the marriage void or, may primarily preclude its celebration, provided 
that the impediment is not contrary to the public policy of the lex loci.(372) One 
might, however, argue that although capacity to marry under the lex loci is required 
when the marriage is celebrated locally, it is hardly convincing that the forum will 
permit the celebration, or recognise the validity of a marriage on the sole ground that the 
parties possess capacity to marry by the lex loci celebrationisJ373) 
It is therefore clear that a party to a marriage has no capacity to marry in England or 
Scotland if he is regarded as already married by the law of his antenuptial domicile, 
notwithstanding his capacity by the English or Scottish laws where the first union is 
void ab initio, since bigamy is not contrary to the local public policy. Suppose, for 
instance, that both parties to a proposed marriage in Scotland are domiciled in Greece. 
The man was previously married in France by means of religious ceremony. The 
marriage is valid by Greek law but is regarded as being void in Scotland since it is not 
solemnised according to the lex loci the law of which considers the civil ceremony as 
the only recognised form in which a marriage should be celebrated there. It is 
undoubtedly clear that the proposed union will never be solemnised in Scotland, or will 
be regarded there void if it has been celebrated nevertheless, because the invalidity of 
the first marriage in Scotland does not form a sufficient basis for conferring capacity on 
the parties whose prenuptial domiciliary law regards the prior union as valid and 
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subsisting. To this extent, Carter,(37 4) in a stimulating recent article on the capacity to 
remarry after a foreign divorce, has submitted that it is hardly conceivable that an 
English court would be obliged to regard a person free to marry simply because, 
according to English conflicts rule, the previous marriage would have been regarded as 
void ab initio. 
Jaffey, being attracted by the need to avoid the consequence of a single person being 
held incapable to marry, has recently pointed out that the incidental question of the 
validity of the prior union must be determined by the forum's conflicts rule. (37 5) This 
view, however, seems to be based on the fact that the application of the lex causae has 
the serious disadvantage of condemning a single person to "perpetual celibacy", as well 
as on the growing international trend towards the right to marry free of unjustified 
restrictions as being a fundamental human right the protection of which should be 
guaranteed on both national and international bases.(376) It is interesting to note that 
neither of these reasons seems particularly compelling. In the first place, it appears to 
be scant justification in the instant case to speak of a single person being condemned to 
a forced celibacy because it is in the power of the married party to remove the 
impediment existing under his personal law by obtaining a valid divorce. Secondly, the 
argument of the protection of the right to marry is not very convincing as the 
international conventions on human rights concern only the protection of such right 
from unjustified restrictions, and not from restrictions which are intimately related to 
the basic institution of monogamy.(377) 
It is thus clear that Jaffey's view is inconsistent and in direct conflict with the basic 
principles of English and Scottish conflict of laws according to which the essential 
validity is a matter for the parties' antenuptial domiciliary laws. However, the 
application of the lex fori qua lex loci celebrationis to permit the celebration of a 
marriage between parties one of whom is already married by his personal law is hard to 
justify in principle, inasmuch as the foreign incapacity based on the existence of a prior 
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union is not discriminatory, penal or offensive to the forum's ideas of justice and 
morality so as to be within the scope of the only existing exception to the general 
conflict rule, i.e. public policy.(378) Moreover, the existing judicial authorities 
delivered by English courts in other contexts imply clearly that English, and probably 
Scottish, courts would not recognise the validity of a marriage solemnised abroad 
between parties one of whom is a married English or Scots domiciliary, even though 
the prior union is void ab initio by the lex fori qua lex loci,(379) 
The most important situation occurring within the present case is where the prior 
marriage has been ended by a divorce which is validly granted or recognised by the 
forum but it is not recognised by the personal law of both parties, or one of them, to 
the proposed marriage. Until some years ago the prevailing view in monogamy-
insisting countries is that a divorce validly granted or recognised by the lex fori is not a 
sufficient ground for conferring capacity to remarry on the parties if it is not recognised 
as validly dissolving the first union by the law governing capacity of one of the parties 
to the fresh marriage (380) 
The common position in England and Scotland, before the coming into force of the 
1971 Act, is that a person whose divorce is not entitled to recognition under his 
antenuptial domiciliary law has no capacity to remarry, even though the forum does 
recognise the divorce as dissolving the prior union. This view has been clearly adopted 
by the Divisional court in R. v. Brentwood Superintindent Registrar of Marriages, ex 
parte Arias, (381) in which the problem is complicated by the introduction of renvoi. 
The facts leading to the decision in this case were that an Italian national domiciled in 
Switzerland, where he had obtained a divorce from his first wife, sought to marry in 
England a woman of Spanish nationality, both intending after the marriage to set up 
their matrimonial home in Switzerland. The marriage registrar, by referring the parties' 
capacity to Swiss law, and accepting renvoi, declined to issue a marriage certificate as 
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there was a lawful impediment within section 32 (2)(a) of the Marriage Act 1949, since 
the husband lacked capacity to remarry by Swiss law, as well as Italian law, being the 
lexpatriae referred to by Swiss conflicts rule, under which the Swiss divorce was not 
recognised. The parties then applied for an order of mandamus against the registrar 
ordering him to issue a certificate enabling the marriage to be solemnised. The 
Divisional court dismissed the petition because the divorce, though validly pronounced 
by a court of common domicile, and recognised in England in accordance with the 
English rules on recognition of foreign divorces, was invalid by the husband's lex 
patriae, the law governing capacity to marry according to his antenuptial domiciliary 
law,(382) 
It was argued that the Swiss incapacity was offensive to the conscience of the English 
court in these circumstances and not worthy of recognition in England because" of its 
discrimination between husband and wife(383) or because it was penal or because it 
involved factors, religious or otherwise, which this country would disregard" .(384) 
Sachs LJ, who delivered the judgement of the court, had strongly rejected this line of 
arguments on the basis that, to use the phraseology of Pearce J. in Igra v. Igra, (385) 
"Different countries have different personal laws, different standards of justice and 
different practice. The interest of comity are not served if one country is too eager to 
criticise the standards of another country or too reluctant to recognise decrees that are 
valid by the law of domicile" ,(386) The learned Lord Justice stressed that, even if he 
had been satisfied that the Swiss incapacity was so inherently abhorrent to English 
public policy that it should be ignored in this country, mandamus would not have been 
available. This is because 
"whether an order of mandamus issues is always a matter of discretion; and even if 
the registrar had erred in law it would be wholly wrong to issue such an order simply 
to assist the parties to the proposed marriage to circumvent personal laws valid in 
another country relating to status. That view applies even if the law of that country 
does not conform with the views held in this country".(387) 
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Thus, it is reasonably clear that the decision was mainly based on the fact that both 
parties were domiciled and intended to establish their matrimonial horne in Switzerland, 
that it is "no part of the functions of an English court to arrogate to itself the task of 
seeking in effect to impose on another country its views as to what should or should 
not be the law in relation to the capacity of the parties domiciled there to marry" ,(388) 
and the undesirability of promoting limping marriages. 
The same view has been applied in Scotland by the Sheriff court in Rojas case,(389) 
where an Italian national domiciled in Italy, who had been divorced from her first 
husband by a decree pronounced by a Mexican court, wishes to marry in Scotland the 
Venezuelan consul in Naples where he lives. The Sheriff court refused to grant her a 
mandamus because the wife had no capacity to marry as her Mexican decree was not 
recognised by Italian law, as being her antenuptial domiciliary law according to Scottish 
conflicts rule. Thus, it has been pointed out that the existence of the wife's previous 
marriage under the law of her premarital domicile constitutes a "legal impediment to her 
going through a form of a marriage with another man".(390) 
In support of the wide reference approach, it has been submitted that the application of 
the lex causae to determine the incidental question of the validity of a divorce in 
remarriage cases is regarded as the inevitable consequence of the rule that capacity to 
marry and the essential validity of a marriage is governed by the parties' personal laws, 
whether determined by domicile or nationality. Whether a subsisting marriage 
constitutes a bar to a second union is an essential requirement affecting capacity to 
marry of the parties, as well as the public interest of the society to which each party 
belongs at the time of the marriage, for the impedimentum legaminis is a corollary of 
the monogamy principle. It should be emphasised too that the validity of a divorce 
purporting to dissolve a prior marriage, so as to set the parties free to remarry, becomes 
significant here only "because it is made so by the applicable foreign law, which (it is 
212 
assumed) insist on monogamy". Therefore, it would be contrary to the principles and 
inconvenient to fragment the question of essential validity and to apply, say, the law of 
the forum to the issue of bigamy. "If the forum were to reserve the issue for an 
independent determination by its own law, it would (in the situations interesting us 
here) come to affirm a person's capacity to marry in the teeth of the lex causae of that 
matter, thereby distorting the applicable law, and violating its own conflicts rule". (391) 
It has been argued that the application of the lex causae approach would lead to internal 
inconsistencies within the forum's legal system, as the marriage authorities and the 
courts would be compelled to disregard their own divorce decree. Moreover, it would 
be anomalous and contrary to the reasonable expectation of the parties, if a divorce 
which is validly granted by the forum does not automatically carry with it the right to 
remarry at least in that countryJ392) The critics of the wide reference approach seem 
somewhat exaggerated as the application ofthe relevant foreign law to deny a person's 
right to remarry does not connote the denial of recognising the divorce for other 
purposes. The underlying justification is that the right of remarriage, being a legal 
consequence of divorce, "is held to be separable from others and not to be necessarily 
inherent in the decree; it is only produced by virtue of and to extent sanctioned by the 
applicable rules of substantive law, the reach of which in its tum depends on the rules 
of the conflict of laws" .(393) From this realisation has emanated the conviction that the 
forum, by referring capacity to marry to the parties' personal laws, has impliedly 
admitted the limitation of its divorce decree authority by the law so designated. 
Accordingly, 
"it is no true inconsistency for the forum on the one hand, to affirm the validity of 
the divorce and, on the other, to deny the right of remarriage of one or both of the ex-
spouses. Nor is there, in the opinion of eourts and writers reasoning on these lines, 
any other tenable ground for excluding the normally governing foreign law from 
application". (394) 
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This line of reasoning has been rejected as being irrelevant because it is not established 
whether the determination of the validity of a divorce purporting to dissolve a prior 
marriage is referrable to the lex causae governing capacity to marry. Furthermore, it 
has not been ascertained whether an initial choice is made in favour of the lex causae to 
determine the right of remarriage, so as to say that the forum has accepted the 
corresponding limitation on its divorce decree authority.(395) This argument is 
questionable inasmuch as the overwhelming weight of judicial and academic authorities 
has classified the impedimentum legaminis,being a corollary of the principle of 
monogamy, as an essential requirement, designed to prevent affront to public opinion 
on moral and religious grounds, the determination of which is referred to the law of the 
country to which each party belongs at the time of the ceremony. On might argue that 
the internal inconsistency to which the wide reference approach may lead is not a 
sufficient ground for the forum to permit the celebration of a second marriage on the 
authority of a locally valid divorce. This is because the forum, in its capacity as the 
personal law of one of the parties, would not recognise the validity of the second union 
of that party celebrated in a foreign country where his first marriage has been ended by 
a valid divorce that is not recognised by the forum's rules. Shaw v. Gould, (396) 
furnishes a good illustration. Although the wife's second marriage was celebrated in 
Scotland where she had been divorced from her first husband by a locally valid 
divorce, the House of Lords held the second marriage void ab initio as the Scottish 
decree was not entitled to recognition under the wife's antenuptial domiciliary law, i.e. 
English law. 
Quite apart from this dogmatic consideration, it is submitted that there are sound policy 
reasons to support the view that the incidental question ought to be governed by the 
Lex causae approach. In the first place, it has been maintained that the application of 
this approach is supported by the notion of international comity. However, the courts 
and the marriage authorities of the forum recognise the interest of the relevant foreign 
214 
country in the application of its own law out of comity. Thus, the lex causae has a 
claim to govern the incidental question in remarriage cases on which the answer to the 
principal question of capacity to marry depends. 
Secondly, seeing that the main purpose of the choice of law rule referring capacity to 
the parties' personal laws is to ensure the marriage validity everywhere, or at least in 
the country to which each party belongs by domicile or nationality respectively, it 
seems necessary to accept that the lex causae's application to determine the incidental 
question in the present case [in particular at the time of the second union] serves the 
interest of preventing limping marriages and promoting international uniformity of 
status and decisions. Thus, this solution helps to a certain degree to bring about a 
harmony of decision as between the courts of the forum and the courts of one or more 
foreign countries. However, it is Palsson's claim that this purpose 
"would obviously be frustrated if the forum were to permit the celebration of a 
second marriage on the authority of a locally valid divorce which is not recognised by 
the relevant foreign law; for such a marriage would be invalid for bigamy in the 
country of that law, and possibly in third countries as well" .(397) 
The decision in R. v. Brentwood Registrar, for instance, has achieved uniformity of 
decisions and status in England with the countries of the husband's domicile and 
nationality, since any remarriage by the husband would be void in English law, as well 
as by Swiss and Italian laws. One might argue that since the remarriage would be 
ineffective in Switzerland, where both parties are and intended to remain domiciled, "it 
would not really benefit the parties to allow them to celebrate it, in fact an English 
marriage certificate might mislead third parties in Switzerland" ,(398) 
This policy argument, it is submitted, fail to carry conviction on the ground that it is 
impossible to achieve international uniformity of decisions; if the parties belong to 
different countries the laws of which give conflicting solutions. Suppose, for instance, 
215 
that an Italian domiciled in Italy has divorced his first wife, whose domicile is in France 
where he remarries a French woman also domiciled there. (399) The second marriage is 
valid in France but void in Italy where the French decree is not entitled to recognition. 
However, there is no logical and convenient reason in this case, as Hartley pointed out, 
"why an English court should try to reach conformity with one rather than the other 
legal system"."( 400) This reasoning is dubious on general principles as the attainment 
of international uniformity of decisions remains possible in the present context, not 
with the parties' personal laws at the time of the marriage but, with the law of the 
parties' actual matrimonial home at the time of the proceedings.( 401) The underlying 
reason lies in the policy of validation which comes into operation once the marriage has 
been performed. One might therefore suggest that English and Scottish courts, when 
examining the marriage validity ex post, should take into consideration the position of 
the country where the parties have established their matrimonial home. If the parties in 
the above example have established their matrimonial home in Italy or in any country 
where the French divorce is not recognised, it is hard to find any policy reason why an 
English or Scottish court should declare the marriage as nevertheless valid.( 402) 
It has also been argued that the problem in applying this criterion in the present context 
is that "international harmony is dearly bought at the price of internal dissonance".( 403) 
This is questionable on the basis that it is unlikely that the parties' personal laws would 
be prepared to recognise the marriage as valid simply because it has been celebrated to 
achieve internal consistency among decisions in the forum qua lex loci celebrationis. 
Russell v. Russell, (404) provides a good example. In this case, a British subject, 
whose domicile was in England, divorced his first wife in Nevada where he remarried 
shortly afterwards. Although the internal harmony in Nevada had been achieved by the 
celebration of the marriage, the House of Lords declared the marriage void ab initio, 
and found the husband guilty of bigamy, for the excellent reason that his first union had 
not been dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction. Hence, it would not seem to 
216 
be accurate to speak of preventing internal dissonance in the present case because the 
celebration of the marriage in the forum may endanger the remarrying party's life in 
case he returns to his home country where he may be prosecuted and convicted for 
bigamy.(405) 
Nevertheless, it has been submitted that the dangers associated with limping marriages 
vary considerably with the circumstances of every single case, since the chances seem 
remote that the marriage will ever be confronted with a foreign law under which it is not 
recognised as a valid union. Although this proposition may be true, one might argue 
that it is not a sufficient ground for the forum to permit the celebration of a marriage on 
the authority of locally valid divorce in view of the fact that the risk of its being 
confronted with a legal system which is opposed to its validity cannot be excluded with 
certainty at the time of the ceremony. This is because "events may later come to take a 
course which was not to be foreseen". Accordingly, "the only way in which this 
uncertainty can be avoided is if, following the wide reference approach, the marriage is 
not allowed to be celebrated". (406) 
The common law position in England and Scotland, as to the effect on capacity to 
remarry after the recognition of divorce, underwent a modification to the effect that a 
person whose divorce is entitled to recognition in England or Scotland is free to 
remarry locally, even though the divorce is not recognised, and thus the prior union still 
subsists, by the law of the parties' domiciles. This rule is embodied in section 7 of the 
Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971 which was the first attempt to 
deal with capacity to remarry in the u.K. after recognition of a foreign divorce and, 
intended to implement article 11 of the 1970 Hague convention. This section, as 
amended,(407) provides that: 
"where the validity of a divorce obtained in any country is entitled to recognition by 
virtue of sections 1 to 5 or section 6 (2) of this Act or by virtue of any rule or 
enactment preserved by section 6 (5) of this Act, neither spouse shall be precluded 
from remarrying in the United Kingdom on the ground that the validity of the divorce 
would not be recognised in any other country". 
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The effect of this provision, it is submitted, was to reverse the decision in R. v. 
Brentwood Registrar denying the right of remarriage when the divorce was not 
recognised by the relevant foreign law governing the principal question [capacity to 
marry]. (408) 
Although section 7 of the 1971 Act is restricted to remarriage in the U.K. after a 
recognised divorce, it seems that it affords the strongest possible persuasive authority 
for the same solution as to the case of a divorce validly granted by English or Scottish 
courts. This is because English or Scottish courts could hardly disregard their own 
divorce decree in view of the fact that may lead to internal inconsistency within English 
or Scottish legal system. Consequently, it is argued, it is indeed difficult to imagine 
any conceivable policy reason for such chauvinistic distinction the effect of which is 
that a domestic divorce would not be entitled to the same degree of authority as a 
foreign one for the purpose of remarriage.( 409) 
It is to be observed that the principle embodied in section 7 renders the recognition in 
the u.K. of a foreign divorce as the conclusive factor in determining the capacity of the 
spouses to contract a subsequent union locally, and thus any incapacity under the lex 
domicilii said to be due to the existence of the prior marriage is irrelevant. The 
wording and the context of this provision make it clear that primacy is given to divorce 
recognition rule of the forum to determine first the validity of the divorce before 
dealing with the issue of capacity to remarry governed by the foreign law. One might 
submit that this rule seems hard to justify in principle since it is a unilateral rule 
showing preference only for the English or Scottish law as being the law of the forum. 
Thus, English or Scots law prevails to determine the capacity of a foreigner whose 
divorce is recognised in the U.K. when he remarries locally, but no corresponding 
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preference for the foreign law concerned is admitted when the facts are appropriately 
reversed. It has been already indicated that the House of Lords declared that a 
remarriage of an English subject, whose foreign divorce is denied recognition in 
England, would be regarded as a void union, even though the divorce is recognised in 
the foreign country where the second marriage is solemnisedJ410) Moreover, it is 
regretful that the recognition of a foreign divorce in the forum has been considered as a 
sufficient ground for permitting the remarriage of a person whose first union still 
subsists in the eyes of the lex domicilii, but the recognition of a divorce under the 
parties' domiciliary laws, as we shall see, (411) has not given any prominence in the 
converse situation where the first marriage subsists only in the forum qua lex loci. 
It has been submitted that section 7 does not cover remarriage in the U.K. after a 
foreign annulment which is entitled to recognition under the common law rules. In 
Perrini v. Perrini(412) this very situation arose. The facts leading to the decision of Sir 
George Baker P. in this case were as follows. An Italian domiciled in Italy married an 
American woman there by a civil ceremony in 1957. The woman returned immediately 
after the ceremony to New Jersey, U.S.A., where she obtained a decree of nullity in 
1960, on the ground of non-consummation which rendered the marriage void ab initio. 
Although the New Jersey court assumed jurisdiction on the wife's bonafide residence 
within the jurisdiction for at least six months, there was evidence that she had in fact 
resided there for more than three years before instituting the proceedings. In 1967 the 
man, while still domiciled in Italy where the nullity decree was not recognised, married 
in London an English woman domiciled in England. After the London ceremony the 
parties went immediately to live in Italy, and remained there until December 1967 when 
they moved to England intending to, and did in fact, establish their matrimonial home 
there. 
It was urged in this case that the marriage was void because the husband had no 
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capacity to marry by his antenuptial domiciliary law, i.e. Italian law under which the 
New Jersey decree was not recognised, and thus the husband's prior union was valid 
and subsisting. Accordingly, the nullity decree would not be recognised by the English 
courts since it was not granted or recognised by the courts of the husband's domicile. 
This line of argumentation was decisively and very properly rejected by the court. Sir 
George Baker P., though he did not deny the authority of the dual domicile theory upon 
questions of capacity, held that the quality of the wife's residence in New Jersey where 
the decree was granted was such as to entitle the decree to recognition. The learned 
President pointed out that the decree would be recognised since the party, who had 
obtained the decree, had a real and substantial connection with the court exercising 
jurisdiction. Moreover, it would be contrary to principle and inconsistent with comity 
if English courts refused to recognise a jurisdiction which mutatis mutandis they 
claimed for themselves. This is because there was evidence, though The New Jersey 
court had assumed jurisdiction on a different basis, that facts existed at the time of the 
proceedings upon which English courts would have assumedjurisdiction.(413) 
The learned President, having held that the foreign decree should be recognised in 
England, had no hesitation in declaring: "Once recognised [the decree] it must be taken 
to have declared the pretended marriage a nullity, with each party free to marry,,(414) 
Therefore, it was held that the second marriage was valid because the husband had in 
English law capacity to marry. The fact that the husband could not remarry in Italy, the 
country of his domicile was considered as no bar to his remarriage in England where 
the decree was recognised, and thus was free to remarry. In effect Sir george Baker P. 
had treated recognition as the primary matter and relegated capacity to the incidental 
question: English law regulated both the principal question of recognition and the 
incidental question of capacity to marry. Although the learned President's reasoning 
leaves much to be desired, the decision seems right, not because the recognition of the 
foreign decree in England has conferred on the parties capacity to marry, but because 
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the second marriage has the most real and substantial connection with England at the 
time of the proceedings. One might therefore submit that the policy justification for 
upholding the validity of the second marriage in this case derives from the fact that it 
was celebrated in England, the wife was domiciled there and, more important, the 
parties have established their matrimonial home in that country.(415) However, it is 
reasonably clear that the decision in this case cannot be regarded as an authority for 
English courts and marriage authorities to permit the celebration of a marriage when the 
validity of the prior union is questioned at the time of the ceremony. Nor there is any 
policy considerations to hold a marriage valid in a similar case where the parties have 
established a matrimonial home in a country the law of which regards it as void ab 
initio, unless they have capacity by their antenuptial domiciliary laws at the time of the 
mamage. 
It has been submitted that the scope of section 7 of the 1971 Act is limited to cases of 
remarriage in the U.K.,(416) and does not cover cases where the remarriage has taken 
place abroad. This situation has recently been considered in the case of Lawrence v. 
Lawrence, (417) the facts of which are as follows. A Brazilian woman domiciled in 
Brazil married there in 1944 an American national also domiciled in Brazil. By 1968 
they were separated, and the wife met in Switzerland another American citizen 
[hereinafter referred to as the second husband] who was domiciled in England. In early 
1970 they decided to marry once the wife obtained a divorce, and agreed that their 
future matrimonial home would be in England. In July 1970 the wife and the second 
husband, being aware that she could not obtain a divorce in Brazil, and under the 
guidance oflegal advice, went to Nevada and resided there for more than six weeks [a 
sufficient foundation for jurisdiction under the Nevada law]. The Nevada court, having 
assumed jurisdiction on the ground of six weeks residence regarded there as domicile, 
granted her a decree of divorce. On the following day she went through a ceremony of 
marriage with the second husband. Shortly afterwards they went to England according 
, 
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to their agreed plans and established a matrimonial home there. Two years later, the 
marriage broke down and the wife returned to Brazil. The second husband petitioned 
for a declaration that the marriage celebrated in Nevada was a valid and subsisting 
marriage. The wife by her amended answer sought a declaration that the marriage was 
null and void. 
It should be noted that the Nevada divorce was not recognised by the Brazilian law, the 
law of the wife's domicile, which recognises a foreign decree granted to a Brazilian 
national only as a decree of separation. However, it is argued that there is no doubt that 
the English courts are statutorily obliged to recognise the Nevada divorce by virtue of 
section 3 of the 1971 Act, either on the ground of the first husband's United States 
nationality, or on the ground of the wife's domicile as defined by the law of Nevada at 
the time of the proceedings.(418) Nevertheless, one might argue that the Nevada 
divorce would be denied recognition on the ground that the court was fraudulently 
induced to assume jurisdiction. The reason was that there was no bona fide domicile 
in Nevada as the wife had resorted there for the purpose of jurisdiction, so as to obtain 
a divorce enabling her to remarry. The fact of the case indicates clearly that the wife 
and the second husband have no intention to reside permanently in Nevada as they have 
decided to marry, and intended to establish their matrimonial home in England 
beforehand. (419) 
The central question in this case was as to whether the wife's second marriage in 
Nevada was to be regarded as a valid marriage simply because the Nevada divorce was 
entitled to recognition in England, notwithstanding that she lacked capacity by the 
Brazilian law under which the first marriage was valid and subsisting. The wife 
contended that her Brazilian domiciliary law, by not recognising the Nevada decree, 
regarded her as a married woman at the time of her marriage to the petitioner in Nevada, 
and her second marriage was consequently void for bigamy. The wife's antenuptial 
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domiciliary law was urged upon the court, as being the law so designated to determine 
capacity to marry by the English conflicts rule. 
At first instance Antony Lincoln J., being attracted by the view that there is no a priori 
assumption that the determination of all issues of capacity are to be referred to the same 
law, has rejected the argument, ruling that "while the dual domicile test has been 
applied over and over again, there is no case relating to a foreign divorce and a 
subsequent marriage in which the court have been confronted with a choice between the 
competing doctrines -dual domicile and intended matrimonial home. ,,( 420) The learned 
judge, satisfied that the wife would have nothing to do with Brazil provided that the 
marriage prospered and relying on a dictum of Lord Simon of Glaisdale taken from 
Vervaeke v. Smith, pointed out that bigamy relates to capacity to be governed not by 
the law of the antenuptial domicile but by the law of the intended matrimonial home, 
i.e. the law of the country with which the marriage has the most real and substantial 
connection. Since the parties "were looking to the future, to a married life in England 
and to establish a matrimonial home in this country,,,(421) the marriage was 
substantially connected with England. Accordingly, the second marriage was valid in 
England by virtue of the fact that the Nevada divorce was entitled to recognition, and 
thus the wife had capacity to marry by English law. However, it is worthy of note that 
the learned judge has confined his conclusion to the distinctive facts of the present 
cases, for he openly states 
" that contract of marriage entered into in such circumstances such as occurred in the 
instant case [where the domiciles become English] should be upheld rather than 
destroyed. If the application of the criterion of real and substantial connection results 
in the marriage being held valid and the application of the dual domicile results in 
invalidation, in my view the fonner should prevail. I leave open the question 
whether the vice versa proposition should also hold good. Nor is it necessary to 
resolve the question whether where the intended domicile is other than that of 
England, the criterion should apply, though I see no ground for such chauvinistic 
distinctions."( 422) 
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The members of the court of Appeal affirmed the decision by using various ways of 
reasoning. Ackner L.J., having rejected the view that the issue involved an incidental 
question on the ground that the general question of capacity to marry did not raise for 
decision, emphasised that the present case concerned with one species of alleged 
incapacity to re-marry arising out of the continued existence of the wife's first marriage 
contracted in Brazil. The wife's submission referred to above was rejected simply 
because it totally ignored the Nevada divorce granted the day before the Nevada 
marriage, the validity of which the English courts were required to recognise under 
section 3 of the 1971 Act. The most specific reason given by Ackner L.J. for refusing 
the wife's proposition was that since the Parliament had failed to provide that the 
validity of the divorce should only be recognised in England if it would be recognised 
by the law of each party's domicile, the non-recognition in the country of domicile 
appeared to be irrelevant. Moreover, section 8 of the 1971 Act had made no specific 
provision for excepting from recognition a divorce obtained by a party whose marriage, 
according to the law of his or her domicile, was indissoluble. The learned Lord 
Justice, having decided that the Nevada divorce was entitled to recognition under the 
1971 Act, submitted that 
"The essential function of a decree of divorce is to dissolve the marriage hitherto 
existing between the parties. I consider that it is plainly inconsistent with 
recognising a divorce to say in the same breath that the marriage which it purported 
to dissolve still continue in existence. Such a recognition would be a hollow and 
empty gesture.,,(423) 
However, His Lordship appears to suggest that the determination of capacity to remarry 
after divorce is to be referred to the law of the forum, as being the law to determine 
whether the divorce is to be recognised. Ackner L.J . therefore concluded 
"that any incapacity said to be due to a pre-existing marriage cannot be relevant where 
the validity of the divorce dissolving such a marriage has to be recognised under the 
Act.. .. Thus, in cases where the entitlement to remarry is based exclusively on an 
overseas divorce, we are required to consider whether the circumstances of that divorce 
are such as to oblige us (pursuant to the provision of the 1971 Act) to recognise its 
validity." ( 424) 
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Accordingly, the wife's second marriage is valid in England on the ground that the 
inevitable consequence of the court recognising the Nevada divorce under the 
provisions of the Act, is to recognise that it dissolved the prior marriage, and thus the 
wife has capacity to remarry. The learned Lord Justice's reasoning seems to be 
dogmatic, devoid of policy justification and too conceptualistic to be of much value as it 
give undue prominence to the unqualified counsel's proposition that properly 
interpreted the 1971 Act sanctions freedom to remarry abroad. However, the legal 
significance of recognising the divorce, it is thought, is simply that in the eyes of 
English domestic law the parties are free to remarry if, and only if, they are domiciled 
in England. Furthermore, it is submitted with respect that consideration of the marriage 
dissolution without consequential removal of a bar to remarriage as "a hollow and 
empty gesture" is otiose on the ground that capacity to remarry, though it is one of the 
several incidents of divorce, "is far from being the only important legal consequence of 
divorce under any system oflaw.,,(425) 
There is no doubt that the acceptance of this view as a general proposition would permit 
unwarranted assertions of extraterritoriality abhorrent to international comity and would 
create limping marriages, particularly in cases where the parties' matrimonial home is 
not in England. Suppose, for instance, that the parties in the instant case have 
established their matrimonial home in a country where capacity to re-marry, though the 
divorce is recognised there, remains dependable upon the parties' personal laws; or the 
divorce is altogether not entitled to recognition. Or suppose that the parties in this case 
have married illegally in Brazil and established their matrimonial home there. It is 
therefore reasonably clear that there is no possible policy justification for an English 
court to recognise the marriage in these circumstances, in which it would be regarded as 
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void in every country, "as nevertheless valid simply because it would be statutorily 
obliged to recognise the Nevada divorce as terminating a different marriage.,,(426) 
This view indeed gives rise to an even more subtle problem- what would have been the 
position if the wife, after the death of her first husband, remarried in Brazil. The 
English courts would have been bound, by the recognition of the wife's marriage in 
Nevada as valid and subsisting, to declare that marriage as bigamous, thereby creating 
yet another limping marriage. 
This approach might be criticised in that it creates an inelegant exception to the usual 
conflicts rule for capacity to marry. One might therefore argue that the prohibited 
degrees of relationship, for example, raise the same sort of issues as the capacity to 
remarry after divorce, and it is difficult to see what social or policy factors could there 
be for applying different choice of law rules. It is to be remembered too that the 
invalidity ab initio of the first marriage in the forum does not require the courts and 
the marriage authorities to permit the celebration of a second marriage. Therefore 
Carter has persuasively argued that "if the words of a statute requiring recognition of a 
divorce are to be construed as implying the recognition of freedom from incapacity to 
re-marry arising from the first marriage, it is hard to see why invalidity ab initio of that 
first marriage should not imply freedom to marry.,,(427) 
Purchas LJ have achieved the desired result on quite different, and, it is submitted, 
rather curious and erroneous reasoning. Having accepted that the issue raised an 
incidental question, the learned Lord Justice persuasively rejected the husband's 
counsel proposition that as a matter of statutory interpretation the court required to 
recognise freedom from incapacity arising from the first marriage. In support of this, 
His Lordship suggested that the Parliament could have provided in section 7 of the Act 
that the fact the divorce was not recognised in the country of domicile should not 
preclude either palty to the union from remarrying in the United Kingdom or cause the 
remarriage of either party contracted abroad to be regarded as void in this country. 
I-
I 
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Since the Parliament failed to do so, the restrictive words of section 7, which confined 
the recognition of freedom to remarry to cases of remarriage in the United Kingdom, 
remained unchalengeable. (428) 
However, Purchas LJ suggested that the issue in the instant case falls within the scope 
of the general conflicts rule which refers capacity to marry to the parties' antenuptial 
domiciliary laws. He went on to say that the wife was domiciled in Nevada, not in 
Brazil, for the purpose of the validity of the remarriage. The underlying justification 
for this lay in the interpretation given to section 3 (2) of the 1971 Act. It was argued 
that since by virtue of section 3 (2) of the Act the Nevada divorce had to be recognised 
on the ground of the wife's domicile as defined by the Nevada law, it was logical to 
assert that the wife's domicile in Nevada should be relevant as well for the purpose of 
determining her capacity to remarry "so long as no further events intervene". His 
Lordship therefore said: 
"In my judgment, it is an acceptable and logical step to assert that the domicile in 
Nevada acquired according to the laws of that state will be recognised by English law 
not only for the purpose of recognising a decree of divorce but also for recognising a 
resulting capacity to marry in the same state ... Since the wife was still clothed in her 
Nevada domicile recognised for the purposes of the divorce under the Recognition of 
Divorces and Legal Separations Act 1971, then she must be considered to have 
capacity to enter a marriage in Nevada if that capacity is recognised in that state. Her 
Brazilian domicile for this purpose had lapsed by virtue of her acquiring a domicile in 
Nevada recognised by the English courts. ,,( 429) 
The Learned Lord Justice seems to suggest that the question of capacity to remarry after 
a divorce should be determined by "the law of domicile as defined by the law of the 
place of divorce where remarriage occurs in the same place". 
This approach has been criticised severely in that it "is unsupported by prevIOUS 
authority, was not required by the terms of the 1971 Act, reflects no discernible policy, 
and constitutes a flagrant violation of the elementary and fundamental principle of the 
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choice of law process that a connecting factor (here domicile) is to be interpreted by 
reference to the criterion of thejorum.,,(430) Moreover, one might argue that this 
reasoning may create a certain difficulty, particularly in cases where the decree of 
divorce happens to be granted by the court on the basis of nationality or residence. The 
marriage in such circumstances could not be recognised as the propositus' original 
domicile would be unchanged. Hence, this view can be construed only as re-asserting 
the authority of the common law rule under which a divorce is to be recognised only if 
it is granted or recognised by the parties' domiciliary laws. (431) 
It is also submitted that Purchas LJ's judgement indeed gives rise to another problem 
where the wife had remarried after losing her Nevada domicile. His Lordship gave 
what was in effect an unqualified answer that the issue of capacity to remarry would 
depend on whether the lex loci celebrationis recognised the Nevada divorce. "Why 
that law should come into the picture in addition to the law of the domicile is not 
explained". (432) 
Finally, Sir davis Cairns appears to have relied upon two distinct grounds for 
upholding the wife's re-marriage in Nevada. The first ground is fully consistent with 
Ackner LJ's view that the recognition of a divorce "must a priori remove a bar (on the 
ground of bigamy) to re-marriage". The alternative ground appears to support a 
traditional incidental question under which capacity is to be determined by the law of 
the intended matrimonial home, for he said: "My own inclination would be to hold that 
either basis of recognition would suffice".c 433) 
The assessment of the decision and the reasoning of the judges in the court of Appeal 
have shown that they lack in consistency, and it is difficult for a lawyer to assert with 
rigour the ground on which the decision is founded. Whether Lawrence's case and its 
reasoning should stand as a general rule governing capacity to remarry after divorce is 
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not altogether a clear-cut authority. The underlying reason for this decision, it is 
argued, is to be derived neither from any "transposition of domestic policy attitudes into 
a transnational context", nor from the construction of the limited scope of the 1971 Act, 
the primary concern of which is the recognition of foreign divorces and legal 
separations. In his comments on the instant decision, Carter has pointed out that the 
"Policy justification for upholding the validity of the lawrence marriage derives from 
the fact that the parties intended to set up their matrimonial home in England, that they 
in fact did so, and that England was the country with which their marital relationship 
had had the most real and substantial connection".( 434) Moreover, the actual result in 
this case seems to be in accordance with the countervailing policy of validation which 
comes into operation where the validity of the marriage is examined ex post. A 
persuasive argument supporting this view is deducible from Antony Lincoln 1's 
decisive judgement, for he pointed out that "it was not necessary to argue and was not 
argued [in R. v. Brentwood Registrarl that the domicile of the intended matrimonial 
home could provide the governing law". (435) However, the decision in the present 
case must be construed only as a decision on facts with no coherent policy basis that 
may require the recognition ofthe second marriage validity simply because the divorce 
is entitled to recognition in England. It is therefore clear that the reasoning of the court 
of Appeal is not one to support or to encourage as a general rule in conflict of laws as it 
runs against the uniformity of results' claim on international scale, and rather increases 
the danger of limping marriages, particularly where England is not the country with 
which the marriage has the most real and substantial connection. 
Nevertheless, It has been submitted that the decision in Lawrence v. lawrence appears 
to be in favour of determining the incidental question by the law of the forum. A 
provision to this effect figured among the proposals for reform of the divorces' 
recognition rules put forwards by the Law commissions, ruling that the recognition 
rules of the forum should prevail over the marriage choice of law rules. The proposal 
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of the English and Scottish Law commissions suggests that the recognition of the 
divorce or annulment in England or Scotland requires the English or Scottish courts to 
reach out so as to confer capacity upon either spouse to contract a subsequent marriage 
locally and to treat the remarriage of either party [wherever it takes place 1 as valid, even 
though the divorce is not recognised by the remarrying party's domiciliary law.( 436) 
What is most curious, and indeed uncharacteristic, it is submitted, about the Law 
commissions' proposal is that they offered no conceivable policy reason for the 
application of the English forum rules as to recognition, nor explained why the 
traditional incidental question approach is to be abandoned. This proposal have been 
confirmed by section 50 of the Family Law Act 1986( 437) which provides that 
"Where, in any part of the United Kingdom- (a) a divorce or annulment has been 
granted by a court of civil jurisdiction, or (b) the validity of a divorce or annulment is 
recognised by virtue of this part, the fact that the divorce would not be recognised 
elsewhere shall not preclude either party to the marriage from remarrying in that part 
of the United Kingdom or cause the remarriage if either party (wherever the 
remarriage takes place) to be treated as invalid in that part." 
The main argument in support of the view that the lex fori should govern the incidental 
question of the divorce validity in the remarriage cases concerns the internal consistency 
among decisions within the forum, the reach of which would be impossible if the 
opposite approach were to be applied. Hence, it is submitted that the lex fori, unlike 
the lex causae, approach "ensures a uniform evaluation of the divorcee's status for 
whatever purpose the question fall for consideration in the forum country". (438) The 
proponents of this view appear to rely on the fact that the wide reference approach does 
not only compel the forum' authorities to regard a prior union as still subsisting despite 
a divorce validly granted or recognised by the forum and whose validity they are 
required to affirm in other contexts,(439) but also creates inequality between the ex-
spouses in cases where the divorce is only recognised by the personal law of one of 
them. The case which is most likely to arise in practice is where the divorce concerns a 
marriage between parties one of whom is subject to the lex fori as his personal law. If 
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the lex causae were to be applied in such cases, it is submitted, the party whose 
personal law declines to recognise the divorce will be in effect condemned to "perpetual 
celibacy", To this extent, Professor Palsson has argued that "Such legal constructions 
fail to take account of a marriage as an indivisible social fact which, from the view of 
each legal system, must reasonably either exist or not exist for both parties" ,( 440) 
Thus, it is also submitted that 
"There is nothing to be gained either practically or theoretically in recognising a 
decree of nullity or divorce and, at the same time, allocating the determination of its 
effect on the parties' capacity to marry to another system of law which denies it 
recognition. Limping marriages are inevitable but that hardly Justifies the same 
system simultaneously declaring the parties both fit and lame". (441) 
The fundamental defect of this view in terms of the policy issues relevant in marriage, it 
is submitted, is that it fails to consider capacity to remarry after a divorce as one of the 
species of legal capacity which is designed to prevent affront to public opinion on moral 
and religious grounds, and to prevent the commission of the crime of bigamy, It is also 
arguable that this view is indeed difficult to reconcile with the basic principle of private 
international law according to which the only country, in the ordinary course of events, 
that can be so intimately interested in asserting the protection of the public and the 
parties' interests is the country to which each party belongs at the time of the 
ceremony,( 442) 
It is commonly agreed, both in Common and Civil law countries, that the main purpose 
of referring capacity to marry to the parties' personal law is to guarantee the recognition 
of the marriage as universally valid, or at least in the parties home country, 
Accordingly, it can be assumed that the forum which has selected the personal law as 
the primary general choice of law rule governing capacity to marry would be unlikely to 
advance a claim for a rigid application of its domestic rules so as to permit the 
celebration of a marriage in defiance of the rules of the relevant foreign law so 
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designated. The underlying reason for this lies in the fact that the foreign incapacity 
based on the existence of a prior marriage is not so offensive to the forum's religion, or 
morality, or to any of its fundamental institutions, as to be repudiated on the ground of 
public policy which constitutes the only unquestionable bar to the normal application of 
the lex causae and its transitional provisions. 
However, conceding that this view is holding right, the remaining issue which requires 
consideration is whether the forum, in its capacity as the personal law, would be 
prepared to recognise the validity of the second marriage of one of its subjects 
celebrated in a foreign country where the the first union has been ended by a valid 
divorce, if the decree is not entitled to recognition in that country. The answer to this 
question is negative. It has been already indicated that the English, and probably the 
Scottish, courts are not prepared to uphold the validity of a marriage celebrated abroad 
between parties one of whom is an English or a Scots subject and whose foreign 
divorce is not recognised, simply because it has been celebrated to achieve internal 
consistency within the foreign system and to protect the remarrying party from being 
condemned to a "forced celibacy".(443) This reasoning appears to be in accordance 
with the English and Scottish statutory provisions the implication of which is, if 
interpreted in the framework of conflict of laws, that a married English or Scottish 
subject have no capacity to remarry either locally or abroad if his first union is not 
recognised as being dissolved under the English or Scots laws.C 444) However, David 
Pearl in his comments on the Family Law Act 1986 has assumed that if a divorce is not 
recognised because of a particular provision of the Act, a subsequent second marriage 
by the divorcee must necessarily be regarded as void in the U.K., even though it may 
be valid elsewhere. This implies that a subsequent marriage of an English subject, for 
instance, in a country where he has obtained a divorce decree which is not recognised 
under the 1986 Act, would be treated as void in England.(445 ) It is therefore 
reasonably clear that there is no adequate policy justification for the English or Scots 
I 
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courts to permit the celebration of a marriage, or to recognise the validity of marriage 
solemnised nevertheless, in the present case simply because it is statutorily obliged to 
recognise a divorce purporting to dissolve a different marriage. Nor is there, in the 
opinion of courts and writers reasoning, any tenable ground for such chauvinistic 
distinction which does not do justice to the foreign law, and to the forum's subjects. 
Moreover, Both Law Commissions in their joint report in 1985 have suggested that the 
law of the forum cannot form a basic choice of law rule in relation to capacity to marry, 
for it is uncertain, unpredictable and inoperative in the prospective situation where the 
question is whether the marriage should be allowed to take place. Since the ability of a 
person to remarry raises the same issues as his ability to marry in the first place, it is 
difficult to imagine any substantial policy reason requiring the consideration of capacity 
to remarry after a divorce as a separate and a special question of essential validity to be 
referred exclusively to the lex fori. However, the application of the narrow reference 
approach in the instant case, it is submitted, would provide an encouragement to 
forum-shopping; and would deprive the personal law of a basic part of its function, 
"indeed to the extent of reducing that rule to little more than a courteous affirmation". 
Finally, it is hard to disagree with Sachs J. when he pointed out that the application of 
this view is wrong in principle: 
"It would be unfortunate indeed if a marriage were to be held valid or invalid 
according to which country's adjudicated on the issue... It is surely a matter of some 
importance that the initial validity of a marriage should, in relation to all matters 
except form and ceremony ... , be consistently decided ... and that consistency cannot be 
attained if the test is lex fori".(446) 
In conclusion, it might be pointed out that there is no universal agreement on the 
question of whether, as a general proposition, the incidental question ought to be 
determined by the domestic law system designated by the conflict rules of the law 
governing the principal issue [lexcausael, or by that system designated by the forum's 
233 
conflict rules. It is interesting to underline that the conclusion of the lex fori approach 
advocates, that only the forum's recognition rules are relevant in deciding the 
divorcee's capacity to remarry in that country, or in determining the validity of his 
subsequent remarriage abroad, does not inspire confidence. This is because the 
arguments advanced in favour of this approach are inferred from the unconvincing 
interpretation of the existing judicial authorities which are based, not on general 
principles, but on the particular factual context of each case; and in none of them has the 
incidental question been identified and discussed in general terms. Therefore, the law 
of the forum has been applied in a number of cases on the ground that they present a 
sufficiently strong connection with the forum country. In Lawrence v. Lawrence, for 
instance, Antony Lincoln J., who delivered the only decisive judgement, has 
determined the validity of the Nevada marriage by English law, not as being the law of 
the forum, but in its capacity as the law of the country with which the marriage has a 
real and substantial connection.(447) 
It is also submitted in this respect that the application of the lex causae approach in the 
present case appears to be in accordance with a fundamentally-held principle in conflict 
of laws under which capacity is to be determined by the system of law indicated by the 
relevant forum's conflicts rule. Seeing the preventive function of the law governing 
capacity, and the relevance of the policy considerations which carry more weight at the 
time of the ceremony, it is suggested that the lex causae [the parties' antenuptial 
domiciliary laws] would prevent the creation of a marriage which would not be 
recognised as valid in the home country of the parties, and possibly in third countries as 
well. Although the dual domicile test seems to be the most appropriate, as a general 
conflict rule, to govern capacity to remarry at the time of the ceremony, it is argued that 
it does not provide a satisfactory rule in every case where the remarriage has been 
celebrated nevertheless in defiance of the parties' personal law, and the remarriage 
validity is examined ex post. 
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It is interesting to note that the conflicting approaches within the doctrine of incidental 
question have failed to recognise the established framework of private international law , 
as well as the importance of the time element which plays a major role in formulating an 
appropriate and reasonably sophisticated choice of law rule to operate within that 
framework. However, it might be suggested that there is no need to establish a general 
rule according to which the incidental question should always be determined in the 
instant case, for the practical consequences vary considerably in each situation. (448) 
Consequently, it is submitted that a sounder approach in the present case would have 
been to draw a distinction between cases where the remarriage has not yet taken place 
and the issue before the forum's authorities is whether the party, whose personal law 
declines to recognise the divorce, should be allowed to remarry; and cases where the 
second marriage has already been formed. There is no doubt that the only acceptable 
view, which would lay a certain respect between legal systems, that would be applied at 
the former stage is the parties' antenuptial domiciliary r nationalllaw or laws. The 
underlying reason is that this view would permit the marriage registrar to determine 
with certainty whether the parties have capacity to intermarry, and thus being able to 
prevent the creation of illegal and incestuous union that would not be recognised as 
valid in the parties home country. The marriage registrar and the Divisional court in the 
Brentwood case, however, by refusing the celebration of the marriage were able to 
prevent the creation of a limping union and to avoid the distortion of the established 
framework of English private international law . In so deciding the court in this case 
has given more consideration to the policy of promoting international uniformity of 
status and decisions, and of international comity which carry more weight at the time of 
the ceremony. It is also important to note that the application of this view at the time of 
the ceremony would curtail potential forum-shopping.( 449) Thus, there is no policy 
ground, it is submitted, for accepting that a remarriage may be allowed to take place on 
the sole ground that the parties intended to settle in a country where the remarriage 
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would be valid, inasmuch as the establishement of a domicile of choice, or even a 
habitual residence, in a given country is subject to the restrictive nature of its 
immigration regulations. 
Although the parties' antenuptial domiciliary [national] law should be held relevant so 
as to bar celebration of the second marriage, it is much more difficult to imagine any 
tenable ground which may support the application of this view, in general terms, where 
the remarriage has already entered into in contravention of the relevant foreign law. 
The reason is that the countervailing policy of validation, which is without significance 
at the former stage, comes into consideration once the union has been created. 
Accordingly, When the remarriage has been celebrated nevertheless, it would be held 
valid if it is regarded as such in the country where the parties have established a 
matrimonial home. It is the community of that country which has the most enduring 
interest in the parties' marital status in this particular regard. 
Moreover, it is submitted with respect that the second marriage will never be held 
invalid on the ground of bigamy if the parties have capacity under their antenuptial 
domiciliary [national] law, even if they have no capacity under what may be called the 
law of the matrimonial home. However, the rule of the matrimonial home would only 
be used to validate a marriage that would be invalid by the dual domicile rule and so 
offers at least a conceptual basis for the extension in favour of validity, inasmuch as it 
rests upon the desirability of giving effect, whenever it is possible, to the reasonable 
expectations of the parties. Thus, it would be contrary to principle if the law of the 
matrimonial home is applied to invalidate a marriage celebrated according to the general 
conflicts rule, for its substantial effect would be to make every marriage potentially and 
conditionally invalid.(450) It is also arguable that the courts of forum should not 
declare the remarriage as valid, if it is invalid under the law of the country with which 
236 
the marriage has a most real and substantial connection, as well as by the parties' 
antenuptial domiciliary [national] law. 
However, Section 50 of the Family law Act 1986, which extended the scope of section 
7 of the 1971 Act to the cases of remarriage abroad, expressly provides that if a foreign 
divorce is recognised in England and even the marriage have no connection with 
England, it inexorably follows that no subsequent marriage of either party of that 
divorce is ever to be denied validity in England simply on the grounds of non-
recognition of the divorce in another country. According to this provision the English 
courts should regard the non-recognition of the divorce under the lex loci celebrationis, 
the law of nationalities, domiciles and residences of the parties to the subsequent 
marriage, and the laws of the place of real and substantial connection [i.e. matrimonial 
home] as being irrelevant in determining the validity of the subsequent marriage. This 
is really the result of the piecemeal nature of the reform implemented by section 50 of 
the 1986 Act without any consideration of the wider ripples that it causes in the capacity 
and nullity pools. More generally, one may be tempted to inquire as to what would be 
the English court position if asked to annul the marriage on the ground of bigamy, or to 
recognise a decree of nullity in respect of that marriage obtained elsewhere. Would an 
English court then feel obliged to dismiss the petition simply because the marriage is 
valid in England, without giving consideration to its own choice of law rules in 
nullity?( 451) However, this provision may be criticised as a position devoid of policy 
justification, was not required by the decisions in Lawrence v. Lawrence and Perrini v. 
Perrini; and that likely to lead to unwarranted assertions repugnant to international 
comity. The rule seems hard to justify in principle since it shows a unilateral preference 
for the English or Scottish law of the forum. Consequently, this provision may be 
acceptable only if the English (or Scots) forum is prepared to recognise the validity of a 
subsequent union between parties one of whom is an English (or a Scottish), in cases 
where the facts are appropriately reversed. 
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Finally, there is certainly no authority that would stand in the way of the courts, when 
next given an opportunity to rule on this question, for adopting the rule here argued for. 
It is to be hoped that section 50 of the 1986 Act would be amended so as to provide that 
the remarriage of a divorcee, that has been celebrated nevertheless in contravention of 
the relevant foreign law governing capacity, will be held valid in the United Kingdom 
if, and only if, the parties have established a matrimonial home in a country where it is 
regarded as a valid union. 
2- The existence of a prior union recognised by the forum, but denied by the relevant 
foreign law: The general tendency, it is submitted, is that where the prior marriage is 
valid from the outset, or the foreign divorce or nullity decree is not entitled to 
recognition, in the forum, a subsequent marriage by either party will be barred even 
though the prior union is invalid or dissolved under the personal laws of the parties to 
the fresh union.( 452) The first instance which requires consideration within the present 
case is where the previous marriage has been validly entered into in the forum, but is 
invalid by the relevant foreign law to which the parties belong at the time of the 
marriage. It is commonly agreed that neither of the parties can remarry validly in 
England or Scotland if the prior marriage has not been terminated either by death, or by 
a divorce the validity of which must be recognised in these countries. It is also 
submitted that the remarriage, if it has been celebrated nevertheless, must be declared 
void ab initio for bigamy by the English or Scottish courts. However, the Scottish 
Law Commission(453) has recently examined this problem and suggested that "a 
marriage entered into in Scotland should be invalid if, according to Scottish internal 
law, ... (b) either party is already married ... ", notwithstanding that the parties have 
capacity under their respective domiciliary laws. The underlying reason is, it is argued 
beyond any doubt, that bigamy is deemed to be such a fundamental part of public 
policy, "going to the very basis of concept of marriage", in England and Scotland the 
laws of which have a paramount rule of monogamy. 
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The question which arises is, therefore, whether either party may remarry in England or 
Scotland if the prior marriage has been annulled or declared invalid by a court in the 
foreign country. The answer to this question depends on whether the decree of nullity 
or the declaration of invalidity is entitled to recognition under the English or Scots law 
of the forum. It is undoubtedly clear that recognition, according to English and Scots 
conflicts rules, is accorded to foreign nullity decrees granted by a competent court, the 
ground on which the decree was based and the law applied by the foreign court being, 
in principle, irrelevant. Hence, the fact that the marriage has been celebrated in England 
or Scotland with due observance of all formalities required by the local law is not a 
sufficient ground to prevent the recognition of a foreign decree whereby that marriage is 
declared invalid on grounds, for example, relating to form, provided that the decree 
was, according to English and Scots laws, granted by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.(454) Consequently, a party to a prior union which has been declared null 
and void by a competent foreign court may remarry in England or Scotland if, and only 
if, the decree of nullity is entitled to recognition there. Nevertheless, if the foreign 
nullity decree is not entitled to recognition as being so offensive to English or Scottish 
views of substantial justice,(455) neither can the marriage registrars permit the 
celebration of a subsequent marriage, nor can the courts uphold the validity of such a 
marriage if it has been celebrated nevertheless in such circumstances. 
However, similar problems may arise in a case where the previous union has been 
ended by a divorce which is validly granted or recognised by the courts of the foreign 
country concerned, but not so treated by the lex fori. The first situation of this type is 
where the divorce is obtained, in accordance with the parties' personal law, by means 
of extrajudicial proceedings, in the forum the law of which considers the judicial 
proceedings as the compulsory means by which a marriage can be ended in that 
country. It is indisputedly a rule of English and Scottish laws that a divorce obtained 
locally by extrajudicial proceedings is not effective to dissolve a marriage, even if it is 
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valid under the personal law of the parties. Section 44 of the Family Law Act 1986 
provides clearly: " ... no divorce or annulment obtained in any part of the British Islands 
shall be regarded as effective in any part of the United Kingdom unless granted by a 
court of civiljurisdiction".(456) Consequently, it is submitted that an extrajudicial 
divorce, if obtained in England or Scotland, is not a sufficient ground for remarriage 
there even though it is recognised as valid by the foreign law governing the capacity to 
marry of the parties to the fresh union. ( 45 7 ) 
The second situation within the instant category is where the divorce purporting to 
dissolve the prior union has been validly granted in a foreign country but is not entitled 
to recognition in the eyes of the lex fori. There is no doubt, it is submitted, that the 
prevailing view in this case is that the previous marriage constitutes a legal impediment 
to the remarriage in the forum, notwithstanding the divorce validity by the relevant 
foreign law which is decisive for the capacity of the parties to marry. This view 
appears to be adopted by the Scots Law commission in its recommendation, referred to 
above, the effect of which is that a marriage entered into in Scotland should be invalid 
if, according to Scottish internal law, either party is already married. Moreover, 
Hartley pointed out that the case of Shaw v. Gould, though the issue of incidental 
question did not arise for the excellent reason that the wife's capacity to remarry was 
governed by English law of the forum, is frequently referred to in this context. In this 
case, an English couple obtained a divorce purporting to end the prior union in Scotland 
where the wife married a Scottish domiciliary afterwards and lived with him there. The 
House of Lords decided that the wife's remarriage in Scotland is void ab initio simply 
because her first marriage is still subsisting as the Scottish divorce is not recognised in 
England. However, it is clear that this decision has been considered, as Hartley 
suggested, as an authority in favour of applying the lex fori approach in the present 
case since it is based solely on the assumption that the second marriage can only be 
celebrated if the divorce is recognised under English choice choice oflaw rules.(458) 
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Nevertheless, a different position has been adopted by the Ontario court of Appeal in 
Schwebel v. Ungar (45 9) where the second marriage has been already entered into and 
a child was born to the parties. The fact of this case were as follows: a husband and a 
wife, both Jewish, domiciled in Hungary, had decided to settle in Israel. When they 
arrived in Italy en route to Israel, the husband divorced his wife by a Jewish Ghet 
obtained before a rabbinical court. The divorce was not recognised by Hungarian law, 
the parties' domiciliary law at the time of the divorce, but it was recognised by law of 
Israel where they subsequently acquired a domicile of choice. While so domiciled, the 
wife went to Canada, and in the province of Ontario married a second husband who 
was domiciled there. Subsequently the second husband petitioned the Ontario court for 
a decree of nullity of his marriage on the ground that the marriage was bigamous as the 
wife had never been validly divorced, inasmuch as the Jewish Ghet granted by a 
rabbinical court in Italy was not entitled to recognition according to the Ontario conflicts 
rule. 
The main question in this case was the wife's capacity to remarry which, according to 
the Ontario conflicts rule, seems to be governed by Israeli law, i.e. her antenuptial 
domiciliary law. The law of Ontario and the Israeli law differ not as to the rule 
regarding capacity to marry but as to the rule respecting recognition of foreign divorces. 
The latter law apparently recognises any Jewish Ghet wherever granted irrespective of 
the parties' personal law in terms of domicile or nationality, so long as it has been 
obtained in accordance with the requirements of the Jewish religion. But Ontario law 
will refuse recognition to any divorce that would not be recognised by the parties' lex 
domicilii at the time of the divorce. The Incidental question therefore concerns the 
validity of the Jewish Ghet which was denied recognition by the Ontario conflicts rule, 
inasmuch as the parties were, at the time of the divorce, still domiciled in Hungary 
where the Ghet was not recognised. 
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It has been argued that one would have expected the supreme court of Canada, like an 
English or Scottish court, to solve the problem by applying the "historical approach" 
according to which the remarriage should be declared void ab initio as being 
bigamous. This is because the Ghet had been delivered to the wife when she and her 
then husband were domiciled in a country whose law would regard it as ineffective to 
dissolve their married status, that it was not recognised according to Ontario conflicts 
rule, and that they were still husband and wife when the wife remarried in Ontario. 
Accordingly, it is thought that the court would have regarded the wife and her first 
husband's status under Israeli law as quite irrelevant because they have acquired that 
status only according to the law of a subsequently acquired domicile. 
However, this process of reasoning has not been adopted by the Canadian court which 
inevitably would lead to deny to the wife capacity to marry in Ontario. The court has 
also expressly refused to inquire into the means whereby the wife had acquired her 
single status. Mackay J.A., who delivered the judgement on behalf of the court, has 
argued that the decision in the present case should be based on the marital status of the 
wife according to her antenuptial domiciliary law at the time of her remarriage in 
Ontario. The learned judge therefore pointed out that 
"To determine that status, I think our inquiry must be directed not to the effect to be 
given under Ontario law to the divorce proceedings in Italy as at the time of the 
divorce, but to the effect to be given to those proceedings by the law of the country 
in which she was domiciled at the time of her marriage to the plaintiff in 1957, 
namely Israel, ... , or, to put another way, the inquiry is as to her status under the law 
of her domicile and not to the means by which she acquired that status". (460) 
Since the wife's remarriage validity should be recognised in Ontario if it has been 
celebrated in Israel where it would be recognised as valid, his lordship submitted that it 
seems an acceptable and logical step to assert that the wife's domiciliary law should be 
decisive in the present case as the "legal result should not be different because the 
remarriage took place in Ontario". Moreover, Mr. Justice Mackay went on to say that 
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to determine the personal status of a person not domiciled in Ontario by the Ontario law 
instead of his domiciliary law would be contrary to the basic principle of international 
law and would result in the social evil referred to by Lord watson in the Le Mesurier 
case of a person being regarded as married in one jurisdiction and unmarried in another. 
Having decided that the wife acquired a domicile of choice in Israel at the time of the 
remarriage, the learned judge declared the Ontario marriage valid on the ground that the 
wife's status by the Israeli law of her domicile at the time of the second marriage had 
been that of a single woman, notwithstanding that the bill of divorcement was 
recognised neither by the law of the country where she and her then husband were 
domiciled at the time of the divorce, i.e Hungary, nor by the conflicts rules of the 
Ontario law of the forum. The Supreme Court of Canada, (461) affirming the decision 
of the court of Appeal, held that the remarriage was valid on the ground that the wife's 
capacity to remarry was to be governed by the law of her domicile and not according to 
the validity of her antecedent divorce. Consequently it has been argued that the issue of 
the incidental question was resolved by applying the law of the main question [capacity 
to remarry] and not by the conflicts rule of the forum. ( 46 2 ) 
From a social point of view, one might argue that the decision is welcome and it is 
hopefully that the conflict laws relating to status of married persons should be simple 
and easily understood to spare people finding themselves bigamously married because 
of the complexity of the laws, especially in this period of international mobility and 
frequent divorce. Further, the decision in this case helps also to bring about a certain 
harmony of decision as between the courts of the forum and the courts of the foreign 
country. But from a legal point of view, it has been submitted that the assessment of 
the Canadian case reveals that it is difficult to assert with confidence the basis on which 
the decision is founded as the court reasoning is rather confusing. This appeared from 
the judgement given by Ritchie 1. in the Canadian supreme court when he pointed out: 
"I am accordingly of opinion that at the time of her marriage in Toronto, the 
respondent had the capacity to marry according to the law of the country where she 
was then domiciled. This does not, however, solve the whole problem because as a 
general rule, under Ontario law a divorce is not recognised as valid unless it was so 
recognised under the law of the country where the husband was domiciled at the time 
when it was obtained, and although the validity of the Jewish divorce was at all times 
recognised in Israel where the Waktors established a domiciled of choice within three 
weeks of it having been granted, it was never so recognised according to the law of 
the husband's Hungarian domicile of origin. 
The court of Appeal of Ontario has treated these singular circumstances as 
constituting an exception to the general rule to which I have just referred. in the 
course of his reasons for judgement Mr. Justice Mackay has thoroughly and 
accurately summarised and discussed the authorities bearing on this difficult question 
and it would in my view be superfluous for me to retrace the ground which he has 
covered so well. I adopt his reasoning in this regard and agree with his conclusion 
that for the limited purpose of resolving the difficulty created by the peculiar facts of 
this case, the governing consideration is the status of the respondent under the law of 
her domicile at the time of her second marriage and not the means whereby she 
secured that status" . ( 4 6 3 ) 
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The decision of the Ontario court of Appeal and of the Supreme court of Canada has 
been severely criticised in that it is inconsistent with the traditional accepted rules of 
choice of law in Common law in respect of the validity of marriage. The court has 
declined to grant a nullity decree according to its own conflicts rules and applied the 
relevant foreign law. However, it has been submitted that the court of the forum has 
ceased to be master in its own house if it is willing to throw to the winds its own 
conflict rules bearing on recognition of foreign divorces, thus surrendering its own 
policy to that of any foreign country.(464) Although this might be persuasive, one 
might argue that English and Scottish courts, for instance, surrender their own public 
policy to that of any foreign society whenever they recognise the validity of a status 
acquired under a foreign law that would not have been so acquired under English or 
Scots law. However, it is inherently abhorrent to English or Scottish public policy for, 
let us say, an uncle and niece to marry one another, and yet it is not abhorrent to 
244 
recognise such a marriage if it has been celebrated abroad and valid under the relevant 
foreign law governing the parties' capacity to marry.( 465) One might suggest that the 
application of the foreign law in such cases does not connote any surrender of policy by 
the forum, inasmuch as the foreign law is designated by the forum's conflicts rules. 
In his comments on the instant decision, Lysyk has argued that the court upheld the 
validity of the remarriage without consideration being given to the dual domicile test 
exception, though quoted by Mr. Justice Mackay, i.e. a marriage should be invalid if 
the parties have no capacity under the law of the place of celebration. Hence the learned 
writer has pointed out that this exception "have an apparent relevance to the facts of 
Schwebel v. ungar, inasmuch as by the law of the jurisdiction in which the marriage 
was celebrated -Ontario- one of the parties would be under an incapacity to marry the 
other unless, ... , the wife's prior divorce could be recognised under Ontario's conflict 
oflaws rule relating to recognition of foreign divorces".( 466) This is questionable on 
the ground that, as already indicated, the application of this exception is only justifiable 
if the question has been raised at the time of the ceremony for the only consequence of 
its application then is the denial of celebration. But the application of a such rule at the 
time of the proceeding would only create an obstacle to the marriage validity, insofar as 
it would undermine the parties' reasonable expectations, violating the favor matrimonii 
principle, and thus creating a limping marriage as between the country of the forum 
qua lex loci and the country of the parties' domicile. Although Mackay, J.A. has 
quoted this exception, the decision seems to be in accord with the view referred to 
above that the rule requiring capacity to marry by the lex loci is to be applied only at 
the time of the ceremony since it is based on the ground of public policy which would 
not be infringed if the parties have only a transient connection with the country of 
celebration. The present writer therefore believes that the Ontario court of Appeal 
would have decided the case differently if the question arose for decision at the time of 
the ceremony. 
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The learned writer has also argued that Mackay J.A. has failed to consider the 
unilateral-bilateral dichotomy according to which neither a married person can validly 
contract a marriage in a monogamous country, nor a single person can validly contract a 
marriage with a married person in a monogamous country, if either party is already 
married by either's personal law. Consequently, the wife's remarriage in this case 
should be held void ab initio since the husband lacked capacity by the Ontario law to 
marry a married person, the wife having married status by ontario lawJ 467) Certainly, 
the marriage would have been declared void if this approach has been adopted by the 
Canadian court. Nevertheless, it might be assumed that this line of reasoning has not 
been altogether considered by the court on the ground that it may lead to injustice, 
inasmuch as the annulment of a marriage in such circumstances would be contrary to 
the parties' reasonable expectations and may have undesirable effect regarding the 
legitimacy of the child born to the parties before the proceedings. 
The consequence of such decision is, it is submitted, that the Ontario forum might be 
compelled in other proceedings in Ontario to hold that the wife's first marriage has not 
been dissolved. Suppose, for instance, that her first husband were to acquire a domicile 
in Ontario and married there a domiciled Ontario woman. The first husband remarriage 
in Ontario would be held invalid on the ground that his status under the law of his 
domicile is that of a married person as the Jewish Ghet granted by the rabbinical court 
in Italy is not recognised by the law of his domicile, i.e. Ontario law. Accordingly, it 
has been pointed out that the Ontario court, in such circumstances, "would be put in the 
invidious position of denying Hi's capacity to remarry on the grounds of his subsisting 
marriage to Wi, though in schwebel v. Ungar Wi had been found to be validly 
married to H2". The absurd result would then have been followed that the divorce 
would have been valid for the first wife but invalid for the husband. Such internal 
dissonance may happen whenever the principal question is one which is referred to the 
law of any country other than Israel as, for example, in matters of succession to 
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movables or immovables depending on whether or not the marriage between the parties 
was validly dissolved.{ 468) 
However, it has been argued that the law of the forum is the most appropriate law to 
determine the incidental question in the present case because of its being an elementary 
expression providing protection for the basic principle of monogamy according to 
which capacity to marry must be denied when the prior union is valid and has not been 
effectively ended under the lex fori. Another, at least equally important, argument in 
favour of this view is that the application of the law of the forum would prevent the 
forum's recognition of the unacceptable consequence to which the application of the 
opposite approach may lead, i.e. a person being lawfully married to two spouses at the 
same time. Consequently, Jaffey has expressly submitted that the application of the 
lex causae approach would imply the recognition of a kind of "legal bigamy" by the 
forum, and consequently "Intractable problems in relation to succession, matrimonial 
relief and other matters could thus arise". In explaining the lex causae unnecessary 
complications, the learned writer argues: 
"Suppose in such a case as Schwebel, the wife, after her second marriage had been 
held valid in England, became domiciled in England and died there intestate. The first 
husband would be entitled to succeed as the surviving spouse, for the divorce would 
not be recognised in England. What about the second husband, whose marriage had 
been held valid?". ( 46 9) 
Moreover, it has been respectfully submitted, and seems to be the implication which 
follows from Hartley's view, that the remarriage abroad of a party to a prior union, 
who had obtained a divorce, should also be held void ab initio by the English courts if 
the divorce is not entitled to recognition under English conflicts rules. The Law 
Commission and the Scots Law Commission, in an unpublished consultation paper in 
1983, have provisionally recommended to the effect that "a person whose foreign 
divorce or annulment is not recognised as valid in the U.K. should not be regarded as 
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free to remarry (whether in the U.K. or elsewhere), notwithstanding that the law of, for 
example, his domicile recognised the divorce or annulment" . (470 ) In his comments on 
the Family Law Act 1986, David Pearl seems to adopt the same view when he 
expressly said that the Act does not provide a solution to the problem of a woman, 
whose divorce is not entitled to recognition in the U.K. and, who remarries abroad, 
especially if she applies for entry clearance for settlement in this country as the wife of 
an English domiciliary. Relying on the fact that the validity of a marriage can affect 
matters of immigration and citizenship, the learned writer has concluded that 
"One must assume that in this situation priority would be given to the policy of the 
Act. Thus if a divorce is not recognised because of a particular provision of the Act, 
it will follow that a subsequent marriage by the woman must necessarily be treated as 
void in the u.K. even though it may be valid elsewhere, and even though its validity 
in this country could be achieved by referring to the conflict of law rules governing 
capacity to contract a marriage. Entry for settlement would undoubtedly be refused in 
these circumstances" . ( 4 7 1 ) 
The application of the law of the forum, as a general rule, to determine the incidental 
question of the divorce validity in the present case, however, seems neither warranted 
on principle, nor to be in accord with the existing judicial authorities on the matter 
which appears to be interpreted wrongly by the advocates of the lex fori approach. In 
fact most of the courts' decisions on this subject are reconcileable with the lex fori 
approach, but it appears to be the ratio decendi of none of them. The underlying 
justification is that the law of the forum has been applied by the courts nearly in all the 
cases where the incidental question is involved not because of its being the lex fori, but 
for the excellent reason that it is the personal law of one of the parties to the proposed 
union, who is a domiciliary or a national of the forum's country. The existing judicial 
authorities are thus alternatively and rightly open to the explanation that the courts have 
considered bigamy as a bilateral impediment which must be applied not only when the 
remarrying party is subject to the law imposing it, but also when it forms part of the 
other party's personal law. For instance, English law has been applied in Shaw v. 
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Gould on the ground that the wife was domiciled in England at the time of her second 
marriage, and thus the remarriage was held void for the reason that the Scottish divorce 
purporting to dissolve her first union was not recognised by her antenuptial domiciliary 
law, i.e. English law. Furthermore, one might also argue that there are apparently no 
cases where the courts have applied the law of the forum if neither of the parties to the 
fresh union is a subject of the forum's country. ( 472) 
The Law commission and the Scottish law commission have recently examined this 
problem of incidental question and refused to recommend any legislative provision to 
deal with the effect of non-recognition of foreign divorce on capacity to marry. The 
main argument given by the commissions was that the issue is not one of any practical 
significance and the likelihood of a conflict of mles is limited because even if the parties 
have capacity under the relevant foreign law, capacity under the law of that part of the 
U.K. in which remarriage is sought would also be required. It is also suggested that 
since the English and Scottish mles for the recognition of foreign divorce are so broad, 
a conflict with the personal law of the parties governing capacity is unlikely so far as 
remarriage abroad is concerned, except where recognition is denied in England or 
Scotland on ground of public policy. Finally, the Commissions have submitted that the 
non-recognition of a foreign divorce on the ground of public policy "ought not to be a 
bar to the recognition of the validity of a remarriage elsewhere".( 473) 
In conclusion, therefore, it might be said that the adoption of the lex fori approach in 
its generalised form is an over simplification which cannot be supported in principle or 
by authority. Apart from the fact that the proceedings are brought there, the country of 
the forum may have no connection with the marriage. However, it is difficult to 
imagine any conceivable policy reason for the forum to annul a marriage the validity of 
which is sustained both in the lex loci celebrationis and the lex domicilii of the parties 
simply because the divorce of either party is not entitled to recognition in that 
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country. (474) This is because the forum, in its capacity as the personal law of the 
parties, is not prepared to recognise a foreign decree annulling a marriage involving one 
of its subject simply because the foreign forum has applied its own law according to 
which a prior divorce is not recognised there, unless that country is the domicile of the 
other party. It is also undoubtedly clear that the application of this approach would be 
in direct conflict with the basic principles of the forum's conflict rules which refer 
capacity to the parties' personal law , whether determined by domicile or nationality. 
There is no doubt that the lex fori method of solution is well justified where the parties 
are, or one of them is, subject to the law of the forum as their personal law , for it is the 
only, or one of the relevant laws to decide whether the parties have capacity to marry, 
and whether they are single. The merits of this approach, on the other hand, are open 
to grave doubt where the parties are subject to a foreign country the law of which 
differs considerably as to the validity of the prior marriage. 
Certainly, the application of the lex fori qua lex loci so as to refuse the celebration of a 
second marriage locally is well founded if one of the parties is already a party to a prior 
subsisting union in the forum, on the sole ground of public policy as the allowance of 
the second union would be so offensive to the morals and religious concepts of the 
monogamy-insisting lex fori and would create a legal bigamy in that country. To this 
extent, It has been established in England and Scotland that a marriage registrar should 
not issue the necessary licence or certificate if the existence of any lawful impediment 
has been shown to his satisfaction. It is therefore clear that the application of the lex 
fori qua lex loci at the time of the ceremony is justified on the ground of public policy, 
as well as on the ground that the policy of validation is without significance at this 
stage.(475) 
Accordingly, it might be submitted that an incapacity due to a prior subsisting marriage 
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under the lex fori qua lex loci can hardly require the invalidation of a subsequent 
marriage if it has been celebrated locally in accordance with the lex causae, which 
would recognise the validity of that marriage. The underlying reason is that there is no 
policy justification for applying this principle which would create an additional obstacle 
to the validity of the remarriage, and would lead to limping marriages, especially if the 
remarriage has no connection with the forum's country. (476) The Canadian decision in 
Schwebel v. Ungar referred to above appears to be in favour of applying the view 
suggested here which seems to be consonant with the favor matrimonii principle and 
the best way in which the forum can further international uniformity of decisions. In 
view of the injustice that may be caused in such cases by the application of the the lex 
fori approach, the principle applied in the Canadian case has much to commend it, and 
it is to be hoped that an English or a Scottish court would adopt the same principle so as 
to sustain the validity of a remarriage celebrated locally in accordance with the parties' 
antenuptial domiciliary law. 
Finally, It might be suggested that the application of the lex fori approach in cases 
where the remarriage has been celebrated abroad is undesirable since "the parties cannot 
predict what is to be the future forum with whose law they must comply". However, it 
would be absurd to determine the validity of a marriage on the bais of whether the 
parties are single according to the law of the country's courts adjudicating on the 
matter. It is, therefore, clear that the policy of validation, the desire to eliminate limping 
marriages, and the policy of protecting the parties' reasonable expectations seems to 
demand the rejection of such an approach. 
3 - Prohibitions Against Remarriage After Divorce: It is well settled in various legal 
systems that the right to remarry of both parties, or one of them, to a properly dissolved 
marriage may be limited by different restrictions which has been imposed for achieving 
different purposes. These prohibitions, it is submitted, might be divided in two 
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categories, namely, those that are imposed on both parties to the dissolved union and 
those which are directed only against one of the parties. However, It has been pointed 
out that while the restrictions within the first category only come into question where 
the previous union has been ended by a decree of nullity or divorce, the prohibitions 
within the last category arises also when the prior marriage has been terminated by 
death of one of the parties. 
The main and the only prohibition which falls for consideration within the first 
category, and which has been considered most frequently in the courts of common law 
countries, is that which prevents either party to a properly dissolved marriage from 
remarrying within the time allowed for appeal from the divorce decree or until the 
appeal which is brought within that time has been dismissed. However, the rationale of 
such restriction is the desire to prevent the complications likely to arise from a second 
marriage if the decree is reversed on appeal. The practical effect of this prohibition, as 
Dicey has pointed out, "is the same as that of a system in which a decree nisi is granted 
in the first instance and decree absolute is pronounced only after all appeals have run 
their course". It has been submitted that this kind of prohibition must be applied if it 
forms part of the law of the country's court which granted the decree, notwithstanding 
that it is unknown to the law governing capacity of the divorcee to remarry. ( 477) 
The question of whether such prohibition are to be accorded extraterritorial effect has 
been considered in Warter v. Warter, (478) the leading English case on the matter, 
where the parties to the first union were divorced in India. The wife came to England 
shortly afterwards and married there a domiciled Englishman within six months after 
the divorce decree was granted. On the evidence, it appears that the Indian divorce Act 
1869, under which the proceedings were taken, prohibits either party from remarrying 
until six months after the decree absolute had expired and no appeal had been lodged. 
The remarriage was therefore held invalid notwithstanding the position of the parties' 
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antenuptial domiciliary law. The same view has been applied in the case of Miller v. 
Teale, (479) where the parties to the first marriage were divorced in the country of their 
domicile. The law of the parties' domicile contained a prohibition against remarriage of 
the kind now under consideration. After the divorce, the wife acquired a domicile of 
choice in another country where she married another man, who was also domiciled 
there, within the prohibited time. The court of the country where the wife remarried 
held that the prohibition of the lex divortii was applicable and the marriage was held 
invalid, even though the parties' capacity to the second union was governed entirely by 
the law of the forum qua lex domicilii. 
The same questions, it is argued, may also arise for decision in the country the law of 
which imposes the prohibition in situations where the lex fori and lex divortii are 
congruent. Professor Palsson has clearly pointed out that "The attitude of that country 
is even a matter of primary importance; for the courts of other countries cannot be 
expected to recognise that the restraint has extraterritorial effect unless it is treated as 
having such effect in its country of origin,,(480) Thus, this particular situation arose 
for decision in the early English case of De Thoren v. Att. Gen. , (481) where one of the 
parties to an English divorce remarried in Scotland before the expiry of the time allowed 
for appeal against the divorce decree. Although the marriage was initially invalid by 
English law at least as understood when the case came to be decided, it was held to 
have become valid by a presumed exchange of matrimonial consent in Scotland after the 
prohibition had expired. 
It has been argued that the ground on which the second union should be held invalid is 
not well settled beyond doubt. The general prevailing view which appears to be 
adopted in most of the relevant decisions on the matter is that the lex divortii's 
prohibition should be interpreted to the extent that the prior union is not completely 
dissolved before the expiration of the time allowed for appeal against the divorce 
decree. In Warter v. Warter, for example, the Indian law by virtue of which the 
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divorce decree had been pronounced was interpreted to the effect that the first marriage 
had not entirely come to an end while the restriction lasted and that it formed "an 
integral part ofthe proceedings by which alone both parties can be released from their 
incapacity to contract a fresh marriage" . ( 48 2) The same line of reasoning was clearly 
adopted in Boettcher v. Boettcher(483) by Wallington J. who was reported as saying 
that the restriction "had in English law the effect of making the marriage subsist" until 
the expiry of the time limit within which an appeal can be presented. It is undoubtedly 
clear that a second union celebrated while the restriction lasts is, according to this view, 
void for bigamy, and thus the position of the lex loci and that of the lex domicilii are 
irrelevant. 
The problem of the ground upon which the second marriage should be held invalid has 
been more fully considered in Miller v. Teale, where Wallington J.'s statement referred 
to above was regarded as being "perhaps too compendious a way of describing the 
position taken by English law" .(484) Having satisfied that the prohibition is "a 
temporary qualification of the effect of the decree", the majority of the judges thus 
concluded that 
"In English law a restraint on remarriage so as to allow time for appealing appears to 
be regarded as designed to give a provisional or tentative character to the decree 
dissolving the marriage so that it does not yet take effect in all respects. It is 
regarded as ancillary to the provision of the law which for a comparatively brief time 
makes the decree absolute for dissolution contingently defeasible in the event of 
appeal. It is as if there is a residual incapacity to remarry arising out of the previous 
marriage and not yet removed by the process provided for dissolving it". (485) 
Kitto J., on the other hand, having stated that the incapacity arising from the first union 
was removed by the divorce decree went on to hold that the wife's second marriage 
was invalid on the ground that the incapacity of the divorced spouses to remarry before 
the expiry of the time allowed for appeal originated from the lex divortii's prohibitory 
statute itself. Since the court of a foreign forum have jurisdiction to grant a divorce 
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purporting to dissolve a marriage as well as to reverse the decree on appeal, the learned 
judge pointed out that the restriction should be recognised in other countries simply for 
preventing the complications that may arise in case the judgement is reversed on 
appeal.(486) In line with this view, it was held in Marsh v. Marsh, where no issue of 
conflict of laws is involved, that the decree absolute dissolves the marriage from the 
moment it is pronounced by the court. "The fact that neither spouse could remarry until 
the time for appealing had expired in no way affects the full operation of the decree. It 
is a judgement in rem, and unless and until a court of appeal reversed it the marriage 
was for all purposes at an end."( 487) Accordingly, it has been submitted that "If this is 
the position under the law of the country which granted the decree it would seem 
strange if the marriage is held to be still in existence -even if only for a limited purpose 
-in the eyes of the law of other countries" .(488) 
Finally, it might be concluded that the rival view of Kitto J. seems preferable from the 
theoretical standpoint because the prohibition now under consideration is so closely 
linked to the divorce proceedings, and therefore cannot be referred to a separate choice 
of law rule. The underlying justification lies on the fact that the purpose of such 
prohibition would be exceedingly difficult to achieve if it is referred to a different choice 
of law rule than that applicable to the divorce, inasmuch as the foreign forum, which 
has granted the divorce decree, has also jurisdiction to reverse it on appeal. 
The first prohibition that to be examined within the second category is that imposed 
against the guilty party to the divorce who has committed a matrimonial offence. It is 
well established beyond any doubt that a prohibition imposed by foreign law "by way 
of punishement, dicipline or example" will not be applied in England or Scotland, 
irrespective of the parties' domicile. However, the decision in the English case of Scott 
v. Att. Gen. (489) seems to be a persuasive authority for the proposition that an 
incapacity to remarry imposed in poneam against the guilty party to the divorce must 
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be disregarded by English or Scottish courts if that party's remarriage is celebrated 
locally. In this case a husband domiciled in Cape colony divorced his wife there on the 
ground of her adultery. There was evidence that a person divorced for adultery, 
according to the law of the Cape, has no capacity to remarry so long as the injured party 
remained single. After the divorce, the wife acquired a domicile of choice in England 
where she married a domiciled English man. Satisfied that the divorce decree dissolved 
the marriage, Sir James Hannen P. declared the wife's remarriage valid on the ground 
that she has capacity to marry by the law of her domicile at the time of the second 
marriage, i.e. English law. It is intersting to note that the learned judge, on delivering 
the judgement of the court in Warter v. Warter, (490) justified the decision in Scott v. 
Att. Gen on a different ground, namely, the restriction on remarriage was intended to 
punish the guilty party, and thus must be disregarded in England as being penal and 
discriminatory. The practical effect of this explanation, however, is that the wife's 
remarriage in England would have been held valid on the ground of public policy, even 
though she had remained domiciled in the Cape colony. 
The last prohibition to be considered within the second category is that under which a 
former wife is prohibited from remarrying within a limited period of time taking effect 
from the date on which her prior union was ended. It is interesting to underline that 
this incapacity, though it attaches only to one party, is far from being discriminatory as 
it applies alike to widows and divorced women. The purpose of this restriction is, and 
it is too clear for argument, to prevent doubt arising as to the paternity of any child born 
to the widow or the divorced wife within that period of time, in other words to prevent 
turbatio sanguinis. It has been submitted that this prohibition, perhaps also the one 
imposed in connection with the right of appeal, should be applied whenever it forms 
part of personal law of the parties to the proposed union. (491) 
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The only case in point where the question of whether such a kind of restriction would 
be accorded extraterritorial effect is the Australian case of Lundgren v. O'Brien, (492) 
which concerned a breach of promise action. In this case, a couple obtained a divorce 
in Belgium and the wife's marriage to the respond ant was to take place in Australia 
within ten months of the Belgian divorce. The court refused to give effect to a Belgian 
provision by virtue of which the divorced woman was prohibited from remarrying 
within ten months after the divorce. The reason for this decision given by the court 
was that this incapacity was penal and discriminatory as it attached only to one party. 
Although there may be good policy justification for not according extraterritorial effect 
to foreign restrictions of this kind, it is unacceptable to consider such prohibition as 
penal, inasmuch as it applies equally to widows and divorced women. The correct 
decision, as Morris said, "should have been that if the plaintiff was still domiciled in 
Belgium, and by Belgian law she had no capacity to remarry until the ten month has 
expired, a remarriage at Victoria within that time would have been invalid; but if she 
had acquired a domicile in Victoria, the marriage would have been valid". (49 3 ) 
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Chapter Three 
Nullity of Marriage in The Conflict of laws 
Introduction 
Nullity of marriage constitutes one of the main selective areas of matrimonial causes 
where the conflict of laws problems loom large and where the lex fori is not applied 
automatically. In granting a decree of nullity the court declares the alleged marriage 
between the parties to have been and to be absolutely null and void to all intents and 
purposes whatsoever, and the pursuer to have been and to be free from all ties of 
marriage with the defender. It is important to bear in mind that the declaration of nullity 
of marriage is entirely different from a decree of dissolution of marriage "both in 
respect of its causes and of its effects". 
It is the object of the nullity decree to avoid a marriage ab initio and declare it to be 
legally non-existent on the basis of defects which can only be ex causae precedenti, 
while divorce dissolves a validly subsisting marriage a praesenti on account of 
supervening misconduct or objective disruption that can only be ex causae 
subsequenti. Professor Anton has pointed out that in nullity actions the court o~ders 
also "a mutual restitution of property to restore the parties, as far as possible, to their 
respective positions before the marriage, but in divorce there are special statutory 
provisions governing the spouse's proprietary rights from the date of the decree".(l) 
This logical distinction is now maintained in Scots law.(2) But it was only sustained in 
English law partly until the promulgation of the M.C.A. 1937 whereby it was provided 
that nullity can be based on a ground ex causae subsequenti, i.e. wilful refusal to 
consummate, and in part until the enactment of the Nullity of Marriage Act 1971 
whereby the vestiges of the retrospective effect of a decree annulling a voidable 
marriage has been abolished. (3 ) Section 16 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, re-
enacting the Nullity of Marriage Act 1971, provides clearly that "A decree of nullity 
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granted after 31 st July 1971 in respect of a voidable marriage shall operate to annul the 
marriage only as respects any time after the decree has been made absolute, and the 
marriage shall, notwithstanding the decree, be treated as if it had existed up to that 
time". 
Accordingly, it is commonly agreed that a distinction between void and voidable 
marriages exists in English and Scottish law because certain defects render the marriage 
legally non-existent, while others render it only voidable,{ 4) The essence of this 
dichotomy has been authoritatively stated in De Reneville v. De Reneville where Lord 
Greene M.R. submitted that "A void marriage is one that will be regarded by every 
court in any case in which the existence of the marriage is the issue as never having 
taken place and can be so treated by both parties to it without the necessity of any 
decree annulling it".(5) Along the same line of reasoning, Lord Morris has stated in 
Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith(6) that "A void marriage is no marriage. Considered 
literally the expression is self-destructive and contradictory. But without misleading 
anyone it serves to denote the situation where a ceremony of marriage does not bring 
about a marriage". There is no need therefore to institute proceedings so as to establish 
the nullity of a void marriage simply because it is in fact legally non-existent and cannot 
confer on the parties the status of husband and wife. Nevertheless, it is interesting to 
note that a decree of nullity should be obtained in all cases for the sake of certainty so as 
to clarify the parties' status, to obtain maintenance for any child of the marriage and to 
avoid any subsequent difficulties that may arise as to the remarriage of either party. (7) 
The underlying reason is that the parties are unable to know with certainty whether the 
alleged defect renders the marriage void or voidable unless they happen to be lawyers 
specialised in conflict of laws, since the effects of defects of marriage vary considerably 
between legal systems. It is undoubtedly clear that the effect of a decree annulling a 
void marriage is merely to declare authoritatively that the parties have never acquired the 
status of husband and wife. Moreover, a decree annulling a void marriage may be 
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sought by either party, or any person with a sufficient interest in establishing the status 
of the spouses, even after the death of both or one of them. (8 ) 
A voidable marriage, on the other hand, as Lord Greene has stated, "is one that will be 
regarded by every court as a valid subsisting marriage until a decree annulling it has 
been pronounced by a court of competentjurisdiction".(9) Consequently, a person 
whose marriage is voidable cannot remarry without first securing a nullity decree, and 
if it happens that he remarries nevertheless, the remarriage will be declared void for 
bigamy. A judicial declaration of nullity is therefore necessary in all cases in which the 
married status of the parties is merely voidable, since the marriage will be valid and all 
the legal consequences of a lawful union will ensue, both inter se and as regards third 
parties if a decree of nullity has not been pronounced by a competent court. However, 
the validity of a voidable marriage may only be attacked by one of the spouses during 
their joint lifetime, and thus it cannot be annulled after the death of either or both of the 
parties. (l 0) Moreover, the fundamental consequence of a voidable marriage, as far as 
jurisdiction at common law was concerned, was formerly that the wife did by the so-
called marriage automatically acquire the husband's domicile. (11) 
This distinction, of course, has been of paramount importance within the sphere of 
nullity at common law both in England and Scotland where the courts were obliged to 
put the cart before the horse, and proceed in this manner far down the road to discover 
whether a marriage is void or voidable before being able to come to a decision on their 
own jurisdiction. The existing judicial authorities illustrate clearly that English and 
Scottish courts' jurisdiction in actions of nullity involving void marriages was founded 
on a wider basis than in voidable marriages. Although the dichotomy is now of little 
jurisdictional significance in the u.K. after the enactment of Domicile and Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1973 which has simplified the jurisdictional grounds, it is still relevant 
in matters of choice of law and, to a lesser extent, of recognition of foreign nullity 
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decrees.(12) This seems to be well justified simply because there is no unified criterion 
which is in use in all legal systems for distinguishing defects rendering a marriage void 
from those treating it as merely voidable. An illustrative example is provided by the 
defect of non-age which amounts to the declaration of a marriage as being void both in 
English and Scottish laws, but renders it only voidable under Algerian and French law. 
A related problem requiring consideration here concerns the applicable law to detennine 
whether the alleged marriage is voidable or void. It is interesting to note that the 
academic authorities are divided with respect to characterisation by the law governing 
the ground of invalidity and classification by the lex fori. Seeing that the 
characterisation of any alleged defect in marriage as formal or essential is a matter to be 
entirely referred to the lex fori according to the general principles prevailing in conflict 
of laws, Dr. Morris(13) has submitted that the question of whether the alleged 
matrimonial defect renders the marriage void or voidable must be detennined by the law 
of the forum. In support of this view the learned writer stated two reasons which 
mainly concern the existing divergences between legal systems as to the classification 
of defects rendering a marriage either void or voidable. In the first place, It has been 
pointed out that the consideration of a marriage as void in many continental European 
countries cannot be construed in the sense of that term as understood in the United 
Kingdom, inasmuch as a decree of nullity of a competent court is always required by 
the laws of these countries.(14) Secondly, it has been submitted that in certain 
Canadian provinces, unlike in the United Kingdom, consanguinity and affinity IS a 
ground for treating the marriage as being not void but merely voidable. 
This view, it is argued, derives support from Corbett v. Corbett, where Bernard J. 
submitted that "Undoubtedly a marriage to which one of the parties had not the capacity 
to contract would be regarded as a void marriage by English law". (15) It is submitted 
that this means clearly that the classification of a marriage as void or voidable is to be 
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referred to the English law qua lex fori. Dr. Morris also supports this proposition on 
the ground that Lord Greene's judgement in De Reneville v. De Reneville "seems to 
have been overtaken by oblivion, and it may well be that it no longer represents the 
law". (16) This contention is mainly based on the authority of the House of Lords in -
Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith(17) where it was held that the English court had jurisdiction 
to annul a void but not a voidable marriage celebrated locally. Since the marriage in this 
case was characterised as voidable without any reference to the Scots law, i.e. the lex 
domicilii, the learned writer therefore openly stated that the House of Lords' 
judgement can only be read as implying the reference of this issue to the English law 
qua lex fori. It is suggested that Morris's view seems unlikely to reflect the true 
conclusion drawn at the end of Ross-Smith case, or the right interpretation of their 
Lordships' silence on this issue, inasmuch as the House of Lords takes judicial 
knowledge of Scots law. It is thus submitted in this respect that "Although a link in the 
chain of reasoning in the House of Lords is missing this is a feature all too common in 
nullity cases and the silence of the House of Lords on this issue provides scant 
authority against reference to the law of the domicile and in favour of the law of the 
forum".( 18) 
Moreover, the classification of a defect as rendering the marriage void or voidable is far 
from being relevant only in the jurisdiction context. It is also important as far as choice 
of law issues and recognition of foreign nullity decrees are concerned. To use the 
existing differences between legal systems as to the classification of defects as an 
argument in favour of characterisation by the lex fori is, with all respect, not apt. One 
can envisage situations where such an approach will be highly unsatisfactory and 
would work injustice to one of the parties, as well as creating a limping marriage. 
Suppose, for instance, there is a marriage celebrated in England between parties both of 
French domicile. After the death of the husband, a third party having an interest in 
annulling the union petitioned the English court for a decree of nullity on the ground 
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that the husband was under age at the time of ceremony in England. It is important to 
bear in mind that non-age renders the marriage void under English law, whereas it 
renders the marriage merely voidable by French law and becomes valid if an annulment 
has not been sought prior to "the under-age husband attaining the age of eighteen and 
half".(19) The English court would assume jurisdiction [at common law] on the 
ground that the marriage was celebrated in England, since the marriage is void 
according to English law qua lex fori. Therefore, the court would declare the marriage 
void ab initio, even though it is valid under the law of the parties domicile, unless a 
different classification is adopted when considering the choice of law issue,<20) 
Furthermore, it is cogently pointed out that the difficulty in classifying the marriage by 
the lex fori can be seen from the case of Corbett v. Corbett,(21) where it was held that 
the law of the forum is the most appropriate law to determine the characterisation of 
marriage. English law did not recognise religious incapacity as a ground for declaring a 
marriage either void or voidable. Yet, the judge classified the marriage as being void 
on the basis of the English rules relating to capacity to marry. 
On the other hand, the alternative view which appears to be adopted by the 
overwhelming majority of courts and writers assumes that the character of a marriage as 
void or voidable, as being a part of the issue of its validity or invalidity, must be 
determined by the law governing the latter issue under the relevant conflict rule. 
Professor Cheshire has expressly stated that "The role of the proper law, whether it is 
the law of the place of celebration or the law of the parties' domicile, is to determine 
whether the alleged defect is sufficient ground for annulment and if so what 
consequences ensue, assuming its existence to be proved" .(22) The underlying 
justification of Prof. Cheshire's view lies in the consideration of the marriage character, 
void or voidable, as the extent of the invalidity of the marriage. It is respectfully 
submitted, however, that the preliminary characterisation of the alleged defect as one 
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pertaining to formal validity or essential validity is a matter for English or Scottish law 
qua lex fori, according to the prevailing general principles in the modern conflict of 
laws. "Once that classification is made, the effect of the defect on the validity of the 
marriage will be determined not by the law of the forum but by that law which, 
according to English choice of law rules, governs alleged defect of that kind. ,,(23) 
This view was first envisaged by the English court of Appeal in De Reneville v. De 
Reneville,(24) where a wife, domiciled in England before her marriage and resident 
there at the time of the proceedings, petitioned for the annulment of her marriage to a 
domiciled Frenchman celebrated in France, on the alternative grounds of his impotence 
or wilful refusal to consummate. The husband was resident and domiciled in France at 
the time of the proceedings. The English courts could assume jurisdiction only if the 
wife was domiciled in England and that depended on the marriage being void. Lord 
Greene, with whose reasons Somervell L.l. agreed, held that French law must 
determine the character of the marriage as being void or voidable since it is the law 
applicable, by the appropriate English conflicts rule, to determine whether the marriage 
is valid or invalid. The Master of Rolls therefore expressly submitted that: 
"In my opinion, the question whether the marriage is void or merely voidable is for 
French law to answer. My reasons are as follows: The validity of a marriage so far 
as regards the observance of formalities is a matter for the lex loci celebrationis. But 
this is not a case of forms. It is a case of essential validity. By what law is that to 
be decided? In my opinion by the law of France, either because that is the law of the 
husband's domicile at the date of the marriage or (preferably, in my view) because at 
that date it was the law of the matrimonial domicile in reference to which the parties 
may have been supposed to enter into the bonds of marriage" .(25) 
Since French law on the matter had not been pleaded, it was assumed to be the same as 
English law by virtue of which the marriage was voidable, and thus the wife's petition 
was dismissed. Despite the various interpretations which have been placed on De 
Reneville, (26) there is no doubt that Lord Greene believed that the character of a 
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marriage as void or voidable must be determined by the law designated by the 
appropriate conflicts rule for governing the effect of an alleged defect on the validity of 
a marnage. 
The English and the Scots law Commissions have recently discussed the issue and 
recommended provisionally that the void or voidable character of marriage must be 
determined by the law governing its validity. This is because the adoption of any other 
solution "could result in the virtual negation of the choice of law rule in any case where 
a legal incapacity for marriage makes the marriage void ab initio by the law of the 
domicile, is not contrary to any country's public policy, but has no effect by the internal 
law of any other legal system" .(27) 
Although supporting the determination of the marriage as void or voidable by the law 
governing its validity, Dr. Cheshire has suggested that the effect of a decree of nullity 
[whether it operates retrospectively or prospectively] must be determined by the law of 
the forum. The most specific reason underlying this view is that the effect of a nullity 
decree is a procedural matter that comes within the scope of the lex fori according to 
the general principles of private internationallaw.(28) Suppose, for instance, a wife 
with a Scottish domicile is peti tioning in England for the annulment of her marriage to a 
domiciled Scotsman celebrated in Scotland on the ground of his impotence. The 
jurisdiction of the court is established on the parties' residence in England and the 
decree of nullity is granted on the ground that impotence renders the marriage voidable 
under Scots law, i.e lex domicilii. The decree of nullity in this case should operate 
prospectively since the marriage is merely voidable, even though a decree annulling a 
voidable marriage has retrospective effect under Scots law as the law of domicile. 
With the examination of these preliminary issues, we come to the purpose of this 
1- ' 
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chapter, which is to review the existing rules concerning the nullity of marriage in the 
conflict oflaws within two different and interrelated contexts, namely, jurisdiction, and 
choice of law. In the first place, jurisdiction, as logically the first matter for 
consideration in any action, will be examined with reference to the Domicile and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 by virtue of which the jurisdictional grounds have 
been simplified and placed on an exclusively statutory basis both in England and 
Scotland. It is important to bear in mind that the jurisdiction of the English and Scots 
courts for entertaining nullity proceedings at Common law was very complex , since 
the grounds upon which it was founded varied according to whether the marriage was 
void or voidable. For this reason, both English and Scots courts were involved in 
considering the difficult problem of choice of law before being able to decide the 
question of their jurisdiction. Moreover, the unity of domicile of the husband and wife 
had created many problems for a wife who had been deserted by her husband. The 
consideration of the Common law rules of jurisdiction, though now matters of 
historical interest, will be also analysed in order to understand the bases of the reforms 
brought into light by the 1973 Act. Nationality, as a ground of jurisdiction, though it 
has been rejected in the U.K, falls to be considered here since it forms an exception to 
the general rules of jurisdiction in the Algerian Civil Proceedings Code 1966. 
Secondly, the choice oflaw rules in nUllity, it is submitted, are essentially the same as 
those relating to the initial validity of marriage which have been already examined in the 
previous chapters. This has been justified on the ground that "a nullity decree is 
concerned with the validity of the creation of a marriage". However, the discussion of 
the choice of law rules in the context of nullity will be limited to the issues which are 
more problematical and which have perplexed the majority of the academic authorities. 
The most interesting question arising here concerns the choice of law for the physical 
defects, namely, impotence and wilful refusal to consummate. The English and 
Scottish authorities are far from clear as to what law is to govern these defects, and 
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academic authorities are mainly divided between the application of law of the domicile 
and the law of the forum. Seeing that a decree of nullity is concerned with the validity 
of the creation of a marriage, the question which requires consideration is whether 
impotence and wilful refusal to consummate, being a defect ex causae subsequenti, 
will be maintained as a ground of nullity. Another problem of choice of law which 
must be adverted to is whether the forum's court may annul a marriage on the ground 
unknown to the law of that country. 
Section One 
Basis of Jul'isdiction ovel' Nullity Pl'oceeding 
Before 1973 the jurisdiction of the Scottish and English courts to entertain nullity 
proceedings exhibited an alarming state of confusion and had not been precisely cleared 
by judicial authorities. The underlying reason was that the jurisdiction founded on 
various grounds depending on the distinction between void and voidable marriages, by 
which the courts felt obliged to consider as a first step the choice of law rules to identify 
the proper law which determined whether the alleged defect rendered the marriage void 
or voidable. It is submitted that both the Scots and English courts assumed jurisdiction 
on a wider basis in nullity cases involving void than in voidable marriages. This might 
be justified, it is argued, on the ground that a void marriage neither effects a change in 
the parties' status, nor confers the husband's domicile on the wife by operation of law. 
Another point of significant importance in the present context is the doctrine of unity of 
domicile by virtue of which the wife acquires automatically the domicile of her husband 
if the marriage is voidable. This has narrowed the jurisdictional grounds in cases 
involving voidable marriages creating hardship for the wife. The piecemeal legislation 
enacted to redress the hardships at common law had increased the inelegance of the law 
as to jurisdiction over nullity proceedings simply because of their inadequacy and 
r 
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unnecessary complexity. 
The position has been simplified by the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 
1973 by virtue of which the jurisdictional grounds in nullity rest exclusively on a 
statutory footing. With the consideration of void and voidable marriages dichotomy as 
no longer relevant as regards jurisdiction, as well as the abolition of the unity of 
domicile rule, domicile and residence are recognised as the only grounds upon which 
the courts in the United Kingdom may assume jurisdiction over nullity proceedings. 
The connecting factors which received judicial approbation at common law for the 
purposes of jurisdiction in the present context, namely, domicile, residence and the 
place of celebration of a marriage, will be considered in the present section. The 
second matter that falls for examination is the principle of nationality which has been 
accepted in nullity according to the Algerian Civil Proceedings Code 1966. 
A- Domicile as a basis of jurisdiction 
It is commonly agreed that the parties' common domicile was mainly treated at common 
law as the most relevant basis upon which the Scots and English courts assumed 
jurisdiction over nullity proceedings, whether the marriage was void or voidableJ28) 
However, the jurisdictional competence of the common domicile's courts has been 
established beyond any doubt by the House of Lords in Salveson v. Administrator of 
Austrian Property, (29) where the recognition of a foreign nullity decree was in issue. 
It should be noted that the parties in this case had each independently acquired a 
German domicile, whatever the legal standing of the marriage. Lord Phillimore has 
therefore expressly stated that 
"For the purpose of pronouncing upon the status of the parties as well as for the 
purpose of affecting that status, the court of the law which regulates or determines 
the personal status of the parties, if they are both subject to the same law, decides 
conclusively" ,(30) 
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It has been argued that this decision, though it concerns only the recognition of a 
foreign nullity decree, implies clearly that the Scots and English courts have jurisdiction 
in a case where the parties are domiciled in Scotland or England respectively. This is 
because it has been proceeded on the assumption that the court of common domicile is 
the natural forum to pronounce on the parties' status. 
There is no doubt that a common domicile is easily ascertainable in the case of a 
voidable marriage in so far as the husband's domicile is necessarily communicated to 
the wife by operation of law. However, the Scottish courts will have jurisdiction to 
entertain nullity proceedings if the husband is domiciled in Scotland. (31) Since a void 
marriage does not confer on the wife the husband's domicile, on the other hand, it is 
very difficult to ascertain that the parties share a common domicile unless the wife has 
acquired a domicile of choice in the country of the husband's domicile. Accordingly, if 
the jurisdiction of the Scots or English court is invoked by reason of a common 
domicile in a case where the wife was domiciled abroad at the time of the marriage, it 
must be proved that she has in fact acquired a Scottish or an English domicile of 
choice.(32) 
Since it may prove impossible to find a common domicile in the case of a void 
marriage, It has been submitted that either party's domicile is sufficient to found 
jurisdiction of the courts both in England and Scotland. The underlying reason lies in 
that if the courts of a common domicile have conclusive jurisdiction over nullity 
proceedings, the question of jurisdiction might be insoluble. In Balshaw v. Kelly, (33) 
however, Lord Kissen has clearly pointed out that: 
"There are bound to be anomalies in any case where there is an action of declarator of 
nullity of a marriage which is void ab initio because the woman does not take the 
man's domicile. It seems to me to be in accordance with principle that either party 
should be entitled to invoke the law of that party's domicile on the question of 
status". 
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It has been clearly established that the domicile of the petitioner, whether the husband 
or the wife, suffices to confer jurisdiction on the Scots and English courts. In White v. 
White, (34) for instance, the wife whose domicile was English petitioned in England for 
the annulment of her marriage to a domiciled Australian man celebrated in Australia, on 
the ground of bigamy. Bucknill J., having assumed jurisdiction on the ground that the 
petitioner was domiciled and resident in England, granted a decree notwithstanding that 
the respondent was neither resident nor domiciled there. Moreover, Lord Greene's 
judgement in De Reneville case proceeded on the assumption that if the marriage was 
void, the English domicile of the petitioner wife alone would have conferred 
jurisdiction on the English court. 
It has been also submitted that the jurisdiction of the Scottish and English courts can be 
found on the ground of the respondent's domicile in the forum. This jurisdictional 
ground was considered in the Scottish case of Aldridge v. Aldridge, (35) where a 
domiciled English woman, who was resident in England, petitioned in Scotland for the 
annulment of her marriage to a domiciled Scots man solemnised in Durham, on the 
ground of bigamy. Having decided that there was no binding authority which 
prevented, expressly or impliedly, the court of the defender's domicile from assuming 
jurisdiction, the Lord Justice Clerk declared the marriage void ab initio. The Lord 
Justice Clerk justified his view on the basis that if the petitioner's domicile alone was a 
sufficient jurisdictional ground, there are equally strong reasons for asserting the 
sufficiency of the respondent's domicile, namely, that the court of the respondent's 
domicile has power to determine his status. Moreover, it has been argued persuasively 
that it would be difficult to deny jurisdiction for the court of the defender's domicile, 
since the court of the respondent's residence had such power to adjudicate on the 
respondent's status.(36) 
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It has been submitted that serious difficulties emerged in the case of a voidable 
marriage, because the wife could not bring nullity proceedings in England or Scotland 
unless her husband was domiciled there,(37) This was because the wife was unable to 
acquire a separate domicile under the unity of domicile doctrine by virtue of which the 
husband's domicile would be communicated to the wife by operation of law. The 
hardship caused for the wife, whose husband was no longer domiciled in England, by 
the application of this rule had been partly alleviated by a statutory provision enabling 
the English court to exercise jurisdiction in nullity proceedings by a wife, inter alia in 
certain cases where she had been deserted by her husband or he had been deported. 
However, the court would assume jurisdiction in such cases if, and only if, the 
husband and therefore the wife were domiciled in England at the time of the desertion 
or deportation.(38) Although this exception contributed to the mitigation of the most 
serious hardships occasioned by the existing jurisdictional rule, it was generally 
considered inadequate, insufficient and unnecessarily complicated since it did not 
"establish the law on a rational and satisfactory basis". 
It has been thus argued that "The inconveniences and anomalies remaining are such as 
to throw doubt on the basis of the principle under which the wife acquires and retains 
her husband's domicile throughout her married life". (39) This rule has been judicially 
stigmatised as "the last barbarous relic of a wife's servitude",(40) and has been 
criticised as discriminatory and contrary to the modem established principle of equality 
of the sexes.(41) Consequently, it would surely be absurd to regard the wife's 
domicile as a basis of jurisdiction if the marriage is void, and yet she is unable to rely 
on independent domicile as a basis of jurisdiction for obtaining relief in the case of a 
voidable marriage where a decree is necessarily required for the annulment of that 
marriage. Although the rule that the husband's domicile is automatically communicated 
to the wife by operation of law might be justified in other legal contexts, it has been 
criticised as being extremely artificial in the jurisdiction context. The underlying 
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justification lies on the fact that that principle is mainly based on an outmoded legal 
concept which is neither applicable to the question of whether the marriage has been 
validly entered into, nor acceptable in the modem conflict of laws simply because the 
practice shows clearly that it is not the wife who necessarily acquires the husband's 
domicile.(42) 
However, the English and Scottish Law Commissions, though they limited the 
recommendation to jurisdictional purposes, came out strongly in favour of a separate 
domicile: "We are in danger of becoming the last country to cling to an obviously 
anachronistic and unjust rule", and thus "there seems to be everything in favour of, and 
nothing serious against, allowing a wife to have a domicile separate from her husband's 
for the purposes of matrimonial jurisdiction".(43) As a result, the Domicile and 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 went further and abolished the wife's dependent 
domicile not only in respect of jurisdiction but generally. Section 1 of this Act provides 
clearly that the domicile of a married woman, after the coming into force of the Act, 
should be ascertained separately from her husband's domicile for all purposes. It has 
been made clear that the established rules for the ascertainment of a domicile remain 
unchanged. ( 4 4) 
The dichotomy between void and voidable marriages is no longer significant in the 
context of jurisdiction. The 1973 Act has clearly stated that the Scottish or English 
courts have jurisdiction over nullity proceedings if either of the parties to the marriage, 
whether husband or wife, petitioner or respondent, is domiciled in Scotland or England 
at the time when the proceedings are begun, notwithstanding that the marriage is 
voidable or void'< 45) The domicile of either party to the marriage for jurisdictional 
purposes must be ascertained at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. It is 
therefore undoubtedly clear that a change of domicile between the filing of the petition 
and the actual trial is irrelevant. The rationale of this rule lies in the desire to prevent a 
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respondent domiciled in England or Scotland from frustrating the objectives of the 
pursuer, domiciled and resident abroad, by abandoning his domicile in order to prevent 
the trial of the case. Relying on the rule that "once competent, always competent", it 
has been submitted that the court will decide the action even if the party, whose 
domicile has been the basis of the court's competence, has severed all his relation with 
the forum's country before the case being heard.(46) 
One might therefore conclude that the importance of domicile, in its amended form, as 
an appropriate jurisdictional ground in nullity actions has been greatly increased simply 
because the wife's dependent domicile has been abolished. The underlying justification 
for this solution lies in the paramount policy consideration of protecting the interest of 
the petitioner, who, as the innocent party, is seeking relief and therefore should not be 
compelled to bring proceedings elsewhere. Since the domicile of the wife or the 
husband within the forum confers jurisdiction on the courts whether the marriage is 
void or voidable, it is no longer necessary for the courts to consider foreign law so as 
to determine the character of a marriage as void or voidable. 
So far as the Algerian law is concerned, the Algerian courts have jurisdiction to 
entertain nullity proceedings if the defender is domiciled in Algeria. ( 4 7) It is, however, 
interesting to note that the concept of domicile in Algerian law, unlike its counterpart in 
English and Scots laws, means ordinary residence, and will usually be interpreted in 
this way by the forum. The aim of the rule is, it is submitted, to permit domiciled 
foreigners to settle their matrimonial differences before the local courts instead of 
compelling them to travel to their national countries.{ 48) It might be argued that the 
paramount consideration for regarding the domicile of the defender as the basic 
jurisdictional ground in Algerian law is the desirability of avoiding hardships to the 
respondent. Since the establishment of a domicile is not subjected to vigorous 
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conditions, it has been submitted that the domicile of the petitioner is unacceptable as a 
ground for jurisdiction, inasmuch as it may lead to evasion of laws, and would open up 
the prospect of forum-shopping. 
B- Residence of the Parties 
As early as 1931, it was held in Inverclyde case that at common law the courts of the 
parties' common domicile have exclusive jurisdiction to annul a voidable marriage, 
since the effect of the so-called nullity decree is to dissolve an existing marriage and 
therefore changes the parties' status. (49) This decision has come in for severe criticism 
on the ground that the Lord Philimore's dictum in Salvesen case, even though it may 
be correct, is not a persuasive statement providing support for the decision in 
Inverclyde case, for celibacy is as much a status as marriage. Accordingly, this view 
had been overruled by the English court of Appeal in Ramsay-Faitfax v. Ramsay-
Faitfax, (50) where it was held that the residence of both parties in England at the time 
of the institution of the proceedings was a sufficient ground for nullity jurisdiction in 
the case of voidable as well as void marriages. The underlying justification is, as 
Denning L.J. pointed out, that jurisdiction in nullity cases derived from the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1857 which provided that the courts should act and give relief in nullity 
cases on the ground of principles developed in the ecclesiastical courts whose 
jurisdiction had been based on the residence, not the domicile, of the parties within the 
diocese. (51) 
Another persuasive argument in favour of common residence of the parties as a 
sufficient ground for jurisdiction in nullity cases is the desirability of avoiding hardship 
to the parties, and thus it is convenient for the spouses to settle their matrimonial causes 
in their country of residence. If, for instance, the courts of the parties' residence are 
not competent to entertain nullity proceedings, the parties will be compelled to travel to 
their country of domicile. It had been, however, argued that "It would be absurd that a 
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Canadian soldier married to an English woman should have to go to the courts of 
Canada to get his remedy (or, conversely, that she should) when they were both 
resident here,,(52) Wilmer, 1, therefore submitted that "Common sense and reason 
demand that the court of the common residence of the parties should have jurisdiction, 
subject to the proviso that the court applies the proper law, i.e the law of the 
domicile".(53) 
In Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith, Lord Morris said obiter there is no doubt that the case 
of Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax was rightly decided in ruling that " there is 
jurisdiction in the High court to grant a decree of nullity in respect of a marriage 
existing between persons who are resident within the jurisdiction". (54) While the court 
of Appeal in Ramsay-Fairfax case was concerned with the parties' common residence, 
the reliance on residence was solely justified on the ground that the ecclesiastical courts 
assumed jurisdiction merely upon residence. Denning, L.l., pointed out that, to the 
ecclesiastical courts, the residence of the respondent alone was the only important 
jurisdictional ground.(55) However, ithas been clearly submitted that the respondent's 
residence at common law in England was apparently a sufficient jurisdictional ground 
in nullity suits whether the marriage was void or voidable, inasmuch as the petitioner 
ipso facto submitted to the jurisdiction by invoking it.(56) Moreover, this viewpoint 
has been supported by various dicta from a number of subsequent cases. In Ross-
Smith v. Ross-Smith, for instance, it was pointed out that the decision in Inverclyde v . 
Inverclyde was clearly wrong in principle in that it did not recognise the respondent's 
residence in England as a sufficient ground for jurisdictional purposes.(57) 
The important consideration for requiring the proceedings to be brought in the 
jurisdiction of the respondent's residence was to prevent injustice, and hardship to the 
respondent, i.e. incurring great expenses and trouble in travelling to another jurisdiction 
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to defend the case. The respondent's ability to defend and to take part in the 
proceedings, as well as the ancillary facilities, are relevant to the practicability and 
fairness of the process determining the plaintiff's case and is a significant factor from 
which support for this jurisdictional ground appears to be derived. Consequently, it is 
argued that there seem to be considerable reasons of convenience and justice for the 
courts where the respondent resides to assume jurisdiction over nullity proceedings. 
The question that has been also considered is whether the residence of the petitioner is 
sufficient to found jurisdiction of the English courts. It is interesting to emphasise that 
the decisions in Roberts v. Brennan, (58) and Robert v. Robert(59) in which 
jurisdiction had been sustained on the ground of the petitioner's residence alone was 
emphatically rejected by the court of Appeal in De Reneville v. De Reneville. (60) It had 
been established quite clearly that at common law the petitioner's residence in England 
was insufficient to found jurisdiction of the court in respect of a voidable marriage, and 
it was very doubtful whether the sufficiency of this ground was accepted in the case of 
a void marriage.(61) However, the underlying justification was that the petitioner's 
residence alone as a ground of jurisdiction might cause intolerable hardship and 
inconvenience to the respondent, as well as promoting forum-shopping. Lord Greene, 
M.R. therefore expressly stated: 
"That a wife who is resident but, ex hypothesi, not domiciled here can compel her 
husband who is both domiciled and resident abroad to come to this country and 
submit the question of his status to the courts of this country appears to me to be 
contrary both to principle and convenience". (6 2 ) 
It is worth noting that the residence basis of jurisdiction in nullity had not been accepted 
in Scotland. To this extent, Professor Anton has submitted that at common law in 
Scotland "jurisdiction does not appear to have been assumed on the basis of the 
residence of the defender but, even if it had been, it has not expressly approved by 
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statute and must be held to have been superseded by the cases of Le Mesurier and 
Von Lorang". (63) It has been submitted that the only residential ground of jurisdiction 
acceptable in Scotland, and applicable in England is the statutory exception of the 
petitioner's residence introduced by the 1949 Act.(64) The Scottish or English courts 
had jurisdiction to entertain nullity proceedings instituted by a wife, notwithstanding 
that the husband was not domiciled in the forum, if she was resident in Scotland or 
England and had been ordinarily resident there for a period of three years immediately 
preceding the commencement of the proceedings provided that the husband was not 
domiciled in any other part of the British Isles. It has been submitted, however, that 
the term "ordinarily resident" has not been satisfactorily defined with precision, but it 
might be construed as connoting a physical presence with some degree of continuity 
and permanence. It has been clearly established that uninterrupted presence was not 
necessary for ordinary residence, and thus a temporary absence, e.g. for holiday 
purposes, might be innocuous.(65) 
This statutory exception has been criticised as being discriminatory in nature, inasmuch 
as jurisdiction on the basis of three years' ordinary residence was only available to a 
wife. The anomaly of this rule was, it is argued, that while the courts have jurisdiction 
to entertain a wife's nullity petition on the basis of her three years' ordinary residence, 
they had no jurisdiction to entertain a husband's cross-petition.(66) Although the 
exception was clearly designed to mitigate hardship and injustice to the wife by 
providing a compensatory jurisdictional ground for her lack of control over her 
domicile, it is unlikely that a nullity decree granted under this Act would attract 
international recognition. 
The English and Scots Law Commissions considered the question of whether residence 
is an appropriate jurisdictional ground. They expressly pointed out that the 
consideration of the petitioner's residence as a sufficient ground for jurisdiction may 
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open up the prospect of forum-shopping that may be alleviated by requiring a residence 
of a certain nature and duration. Moreover, if the residence of the respondent or of 
both parties is required this would allow the respondent to deny relief to the petitioner 
by moving his place of residence. The gordian knot, therefore, was cut by suggesting 
that jurisdiction should be based on the habitual residence of either party.(67) The 
underlying reason is, it is submitted, that domicile as an appropriate traditional 
connecting factor cannot be accepted as a conclusive jurisdictional ground in nullity 
even though it meets the needs of both those who have been settled permanently in, and 
those who live abroad with the intention of returning to, England or Scotland; for it 
may prevent those who have an established residence there, and whose future intention 
is uncertain, from seeking relief before English or Scottish courts.(68) 
The Law Commissions' recommendation was translated into law by the Domicile 
Matrimonial Proceedings Act 1973 which provides clearly that habitual residence of 
either party, whether husband or wife, in England or Scotland for one year is a 
sufficient jurisdictional ground in nullity, as well as in other matrimonial causes.(69) It 
is undoubtedly clear that the Scots or English courts may assume jurisdiction to 
entertain nullity proceedings if either the petitioner or the respondent was habitually 
resident in the forum throughout the period of one year ending with the commencement 
of the proceedings. Consequently, it is argued that the commencement of the 
proceedings has been determined as the only relevant date which may establish the 
court's jurisdiction on the sole ground of preventing the respondent from frustrating the 
petitioner's purposes by abandoning his habitual residence upon which the court has 
assumed jurisdiction. "This time factor", as Cheshire has pointed out, "is even more 
significant in the case of habitual residence than domicile for it is easier to change one's 
residence than domicile". (70) Therefore, it is clear that a party, who is domiciled and 
resident abroad, may petition for the annulment of a marriage on the ground of the 
defendant's habitual residence within the forum. 
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It is also submitted with respect that a spouse, who has severed all his connection with 
England or Scotland after being habitually resident there for one year, cannot invoke the 
courts' jurisdiction for annulling a marriage simply because he, or the respondent, was 
habitually resident there for a year back in the past before the commencement of the 
proceedings. This is because the 1973 Act provides that jurisdiction is founded on the 
ground of habitual residence in England, or Scotland, throughout the period of one year 
ending with that date when the action or proceedings are begun.(7i) Moreover, it has 
been suggested that it is not necessary that a spouse should be habitually resident in 
England or Scotland for the one year period as a married person,(72) and thus 
antenuptial residence would be significant for determining that required period. "A 
wife who had been habitually resident in Scotland for over a year but who had been 
married only for three months could use her habitual residence to found 
jurisdiction. ,,(73) 
It will be noticed that the residence founding jurisdiction of the Scots and English 
courts must be 'habitual'. The precise meaning of the term 'habitual residence' has 
caused difficulty, for the academic authorities are devided as to the exact meaning of 
that concept. The law commission has declared that 'habitual residence' is similar to 
'ordinary residence' that has conferred jurisdiction over the wife's petition under the 
1949 Act, but the former concept has been preferred because of its international 
acceptance. (7 4) This view has been applied in a case concerned with the issue of 
divorce jurisdiction, i.e. Kapur v. Kapur(75) where Bush J. has clearly stated that 
"There is no real distinction between 'ordinary' and 'habitual residence'. It may be 
that in some circumstances a man may be habitually resident without being 
ordinarily resident, but I cannot at the moment conceive of such a situation ... 
'Habitually' means settled practice or usually, ... the same as ordinary residence-a 
voluntary residence, with a degree of settled purpose". 
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The Scots law commission, on the other hand, has rejected "ordinary residence" 
because of the courts' failure to distinguish that concept from "residence".(76) 
However, this implies clearly that "habitual residence" differs markedly from "ordinary 
residence" in that the commission has suggested the adoption of the former as the type 
of residence providing a sufficiently close connection with the country to justify the 
assumption of jurisdiction. 
Consequently, Lane 1. in a case concerned with the recognition of a foreign divorce(77) 
has pointed out that "habitual residence" denotes a regular physical presence enduring 
for some time, and that it differs from "ordinary residence" in that the former is 
something more than the latter and is similar to the residence required as part of 
domicile, but excluding the animus manendi that is necessary in domicile. To describe 
habitual residence, it is argued, in terms of a regular physical presence enduring for 
some time would not appear to take one much further than ordinary residence. 
Moreover, to consider habitual residence as being similar to the residence required as 
part of domicile is not apt, inasmuch as the former is a qualified form of residence 
requiring demonstrable regularity of conduct which may show a more stable territorial 
connection than at times is necessary under the present complexities of the English and 
Scottish rules of domicile.(78) 
The core of the concept of "habitual residence" is distinguishable from that of domicile 
in that it does not require the necessary domicile element of animus manendi as to the 
future. To this extent, it has been submitted that habitual residence as a jurisdictional 
test is designed to meet the needs of the parties who have been living in the forum for 
some time, but who have not acquired a domicile of choice because of the strictness of 
the test which must be satisfied before a person can acquire such a domicile there. It is 
therefore clear that intention as to the future "is not needed to establish habitual 
residence; it can be proved by evidence of a course of conduct which tends to show a 
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substantial links between a person and his country of residence".(79) Moreover, Lane 
1.'s view, that an intention to reside is required for establishing habitual residence, has 
been stigmatised as being idiosyncratic, for "it is not by naked assertion, but by deeds 
and acts that one [habitual residence] is established". It has been nevertheless 
submitted that intention to reside, though it may clarify the nature of presence as well as 
a person's degree of connection with a country, is not in itself a sufficient policy factor 
for establishing habitual residence.(80) It is therefore clearly submitted that habitual 
residence is a factual situation dependent on the assessment of the relevant facts. This 
essentially factual nature "serves to exclude the legal artificialities of domicile such as 
domicile of dependency" . (81) 
Consequently, habitual residence has been regarded as the qualified type of residence 
that establishes the necessary connection upon which jurisdiction might be founded, for 
it is more than transient or casual residence. "Once established, however, it is not 
necessarily broken by a temporary absence.,,(82) It is suggested that this jurisdictional 
ground should be sufficiently strengthened by a specified period of time to discourage 
forum-shopping and to ensure the recognition of decrees pronounced on this ground 
abroad so as to obviate, as far as possible, limping marriages. Hence, The English and 
Scots Law Commissions have inclined in favour of regarding, and the 1973 Act 
provides clearly that, habitual residence for one year in the forum is sufficient to denote 
the necessary substantial connection that may found the English or Scottish courts' 
jurisdiction over the marriage.(83) It is interesting to note that this period of one year 
has been severely criticised in that it is too short, for ensuring the existence of 
substantial connection with the country of residence, as well as for discouraging 
forum-shopping. This line of argument has been decisively, and very properly, 
rejected on the ground that no length of residence is by itself a sufficient guarantee 
either for the durability of a person's connection with a country, or against forum-
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shopping. Hence, the one year period is fully justified solely because "the need to 
ensure durability of connection must be balanced against the need to ensure that a 
spouse whose marriage has in fact broken down should not have to wait too long for 
his matrimonial affairs to be regularised". Moreover, the dangers of forum-shopping 
are reduced by the fact that resorting to England or Scotland for jurisdictional purposes 
so as to obtain relief is frustrated by insuperable barriers, namely, costs and the 
strictness of immigration controls. (8 4) 
As regards Algerian law, it is well established that residence is a sufficient ground for 
jurisdiction generally, notwithstanding that the parties, or one of them, are foreign 
subjects. The Algerian courts have jurisdiction to entertain proceedings if the defender 
is resident in Algeria at the time of the commencement of the proceedings.(85) It is 
interesting to note that the term residence has been interpreted as meaning "residence de 
fait" [residence short of legal domicile] which is conceived as implying a mere presence 
within the jurisdiction that must not be casual or transient. According to the Algerian 
Civil Proceedings Act 1966, this connecting factor is only important where the 
defendant's domicile is abroad or unknown. The Act thus provides clearly that the 
defendant's residence as a jurisdictional ground is available to the courts if, and only if, 
his domicile is unknown.(86) 
The acceptance of the residence as a ground for jurisdiction has been justified on the 
basis that it is indefensible to exclude foreigners from referring to Algerian justice for 
settling their matrimonial affairs. It is submitted that the residence of the defender is the 
only relevant ground for the jurisdiction of the courts simply because it may discourage 
forum-shopping whilst avoiding hardship to the respondent and the petitioner so as to 
avoid the creation of limping marriages. (87) 
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C- Place of Celebration as a basis of jurisdiction 
It is commonly agreed that the place of celebration of the marriage was considered at 
common law, both in England and Scotland, as a well established jurisdictional basis in 
nullity cases involving void marriages. It is thought to be natural that the country where 
the marital status come into existence should also be given the opportunity to undo the 
act of creation. This argument has carried particular weight under the influence of a 
contractual view of marriage according to which the court of the place of celebration is 
the natural forum to determine whether the marriage is validly created. (88) 
According to English law, it was established beyond any doubt that the celebration of 
void, as distinct from voidable, marriage in England was in itself sufficient to found 
jurisdiction in nullity cases, even though the parties were neither domiciled nor resident 
in England. The jurisdictional competence of the forum celebrationis has been justified 
as early as 1860 in Simonin v. Mallac, (89) solely on the proposition that "the parties, 
by professing to enter into a contract in England, mutually gave each other the right to 
have the force and the effect of the contract determined by an English tribunal". 
However, it is noteworthy that the majority of the House of Lords submitted in the 
Ross-Smith case that this jurisdictional ground could not be supported on the reasons 
given by Sir Cresswell Cresswell, nor on historical grounds.(90) Nevertheless, the 
decision in the Simonin case had been affirmed firmly in so far as it related to void 
marriages simply because of its being a long-standing authority. 
However, Sir Jocelyn Simon P. had expressly submitted in Padolecchia v. Padolecchia 
that "Simonin v. Mallac and the cases which followed it are still authority for the 
jurisdiction in nullity of the English court in cases where the marriage is alleged to be 
void ipso jure" . (91) Although convenience is not sufficient to determine jurisdiction, 
the learned judge justified the jurisdictional competence of the forum celebrationis on 
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the considerations that he described as "public convenience". Accordingly, He pointed 
out that" the court of the place of the ceremony is especially well qualified to decide on 
validity of marriage in point of form" Moreover, the country of celebration has an 
interest to see that its civil registers are accurate.(92) 
The position of Scottish law is different, in so far as the celebration of the marriage in 
Scotland is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the courts unless the defender has 
been personally cited within the territory or consented to the exercise of 
jurisdiction.(93) Lord Sands clearly pointed out in the Von Lorang case(94) that the 
Scottish courts claim to exercise jurisdiction as the forum celebrationis only when the 
defender is personally cited in Scotland. Moreover, Lord Hunter, explaining the 
grounds of his decision in Miller's case, expressly submitted that the defender's 
consent to the exercise of the jurisdiction was equivalent to his personal citation in 
Scotland, for it satisfied the effectiveness of the decree to be pronounced.<95) 
Although the sufficiency of this jurisdictional ground as regards void marriages had 
been fully asserted, it was ascertained beyond any doubt that the competence of the 
forum celebrationis ought to be rejected in so far as it relates to voidable marriages. 
This view had been enunciated for the first time by the court of Appeal in Casey v. 
Casey. (96) In this case, the wife was petitioning in England for the annulment of her 
marriage to a domiciled Canadian man celebrated in England, on the ground of his 
wilful refusal to consummate. Bucknill LJ., having inclined in favour of the view that 
domicile should be the basis of jurisdiction in cases of voidable marriages, with a 
possible exception where both parties reside in the forum, submitted that there is no 
necessity for "making an exception on the ground that the marriage has been celebrated 
in the country where jurisdiction is invoked". (97) 
However, the question of jurisdiction over voidable marriages on the ground of local 
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celebration of the marriage was examined more fully by the House of Lords in Ross-
Smith v. Ross-Smith. (98) In this case the wife, who was resident in England, 
petitioned for a decree of nullity on the alternative grounds of her husband's impotence 
or wilful refusal. The husband was resident in Kuwait, and both parties were domiciled 
in Scotland. The majority of the House of Lords, Lord Hudson dissenting, decided 
that the fact that a marriage was celebrated in the forum could not confer jurisdiction 
upon a forum's court to hear a nullity suit in which it was alleged that the marriage was 
voidable. The essence of the House of Lords decision was that the jurisdictional 
competence of the forum loci celebrationis had not been maintained by the doctrine and 
the practice of the ecclesiastical courts,(99) as well as that the authorities upon which 
the decision in Simonin case was based were concerned more with choice of law, i.e. 
the law to be applied in determining the force and effect of the contract, than asserting 
the bases of jurisdiction.(lOO) 
Lord Morris, distinguishing Simonin v. Mallac as being related to a void marriage, was 
opposed to extending the rule to voidable marriages solely because of the insufficiency 
of celebration alone as a connecting factor to justify the forum celebrationis involving 
itself in the status of parties not domiciled or resident within the forum, for "the court is 
being invited to bring marriage status to an end and to do so with retrospective 
effect".(IOI) His Lordship thus concluded that there is no good reason "for applying 
the jurisdiction so as to cover one who is not domiciled or resident in England, and 
who is the respondent to a petition to annul a voidable marriage".(102) Finally, it is 
interesting to note that the House of Lords' decision in this case was mainly based on 
the desirability of preventing limping marriage, the promotion of which is inescapable if 
jurisdiction could be assumed merely on the ground of celebration in the forum, for the 
grounds of voidability vary considerably. For example: 
"Let me suppose that the ground is wilful refusal. In some countries no relief is 
given on this ground, in others it may be regarded as desertion. Suppose a casc where 
the law of the parties' domicile gives no relief on this ground. It seems to me quite 
contrary to principle that the wife should be able to come here and seek relief on that 
ground. If the husband goes to the court of the domicile, the validity of the marriage 
will beaffirmed".(I03) 
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The English and Scottish Law Commissions examined this jurisdictional ground and 
suggested that it should no longer found jurisdiction of the courts, both in England and 
Scotland, as regards void marriages, for it does not satisfy the requirement of real and 
substantial connection upon which the jurisdiction should be exercised. Furthermore, 
the celebration of marriage in England or Scotland does not mean that English or 
Scottish law will determine whether the marriage is void, "since it is the law of the 
domicile atthe date of the marriage which determines their [parties] capacity to marry", 
and one cannot assume that the case will always concern matters of correct form. It had 
also been submitted that the authorities in which the jurisdictional competence of the 
forum celebrationis was confirmed were all decided at the time when the unity of 
domicile principle was predominant, and thus "at the time when there was pressure to 
discover grounds of jurisdiction in favour of the wife". Consequently, it had been 
argued that the reasons referred to above in support of the forum celebrationis "are 
slender justifications for a departure from the general principle that matters of status are 
appropriately governed by a legal system which has a serious interest in determining the 
status of at least one of the parties to the marriage". For instance, the reason that the lex 
loci celebrationis is the proper law to determine the formal validity of the marriage 
should not be regarded as a sufficient justification for conferring jurisdiction on the 
forum celebrationis' courts. It is therefore suggested that the courts of the place of 
celebration might be extremely inconvenient to both parties if neither of them was 
domiciled or resident in that country. The Law Commissions concluded the arguments 
by recommending that this basis of jurisdiction should be abolished, for the only 
connection of the parties with the country of celebration "is wholly past and far too 
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slight in itself" so as to justify the assumption of jurisdiction over nullity suits.(104) 
This recommendation had been implemented by the Domicile and Matrimonial 
Proceedings Act 1973 the provisions of which provided that jurisdiction of the English 
or Scottish courts may only be founded on the domicile, or habitual residence for one 
year, of either party in England or Scotland, respectively.(105) 
D- Domicile and Habitual Residence at Death 
The Scots and English courts have jurisdiction to entertain nullity suits if the party, who 
died before the proceedings were instituted, was domiciled at death in Scotland or 
England, or had been habitually resident there for the year immediately preceding the 
death.(106) However, the distinction between void and voidable marriage remains 
important in this situation, for the nullity of a voidable marriage can only be invoked by 
one of the spouses and during their joint lifetime. It is therefore undoubtedly clear that 
the jurisdiction of the courts may be found on this particular ground if, and only if, the 
alleged defect renders the marriage void ab initio, even though this has been expressly 
stated by the provisions of the 1973 Act. The underlying justification for this special 
jurisdictional ground is, it is argued, that the nullity of a void marriage may be invoked 
after the death of one or both of the parties by a third party who has a sufficient interest 
in establishing the status of the would be spouses. It is also submitted that the validity 
of a marriage might be examined in a nullity action even after the death of one or both 
of the parties, as in cases of intestate succession or the legitimacy of children. (107) 
E- Nationality as a ground of jurisdiction 
Nationality has, in general, been widely adopted by civil law countries as a sufficient 
ground for exercising jurisdiction by the courts over their own nationals, in addition to 
its consideration as the appropriate test for determining personal law. Consequently, 
jurisdiction in nullity actions is often assumed when one of the parties is a national of 
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the forum country irrespective of their domiciles. The underlying reason is, it is 
argued, that the courts of the forum country are concerned primafacie with cases in 
which at least one of the parties is a national of the forum, for the nationality principle is 
to be regarded as "La base politique de la competence".( 108) Moreover, the acceptance 
of this principle within the sphere of jurisdiction has been supported on the grounds 
that most people do have real ties and, are substantially connected, with the country of 
their nationality, and that nationality is easily ascertained for a change of nationality 
involves a public act. Moreover, it is submitted that the universal recognition of the 
decrees in the country of nationality will be ensured. (1 09) 
However, the Algerian courts have jurisdiction to entertain nullity actions only if either 
the plaintiff or the defender is an Algerian national at the time when the action is begun. 
Although a narrow interpretation of articles 10 and 11 of the Civil Proceedings Code 
1966 may restrict the scope to the contractual obligation, it has been submitted that the 
reason for a wide interpretation appears to be evident inasmuch as the jurisdiction is 
founded not on the nature of the action but on the nationality of the parties.(llO) 
However, the Algerian Supreme court, affirming this view and proceeding along the 
lines of French courts, has submitted that this ground of jurisdiction is also available 
insofar as personal actions are concerned. This has been justified on the ground that 
the national law, as the personal law of the parties, is the proper law to determine the 
substantive requirements of the "statut personnel" of the parties. (111) 
Finally, it is interesting to underline that this jurisdictional ground is an exception to the 
general rules referred to above, namely, the defendant's domicile or residence within 
the jurisdiction, and thus it cannot be invoked if the defendant is domiciled or resident 
in Algeria. It is therefore evident that this particular ground can only be invoked for 
founding the courts jurisdiction in cases where the plaintiff is domiciled or resident in 
Algeria, or where neither of them has a domicile or residence there.( 112) 
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Section Two 
The Problem of Choice of Law in Nullity Proceedings 
A- Introduction 
It is universally agreed that a marriage complying with the lex loci celebrationis 
regarding formalities and with the law of each party's personal law [whether 
determined by domicile or nationality] as regards essential requirements cannot be held 
invalid or annulled, even if it is invalid by the law of the forum or by the law of the 
country where the parties have established their matrimonial home after the marriage 
ceremony. Consequently, it has been argued that it is very natural to determine the 
effects of marriage failure to meet those requirements, in general, by the law which 
should have been, but was not, properly observed and according to which the marriage 
is considered invalid. It is therefore clear that a marriage which fails to comply, say for 
instance with the formal requirements, cannot be invalidated unless it is regarded as 
such by the lex loci celebrationis. This solution is certainly very sound and logical 
inasmuch as the grounds of nullity decrees bears a necessary relation to the conflict rules 
on constitution of marriage relationship. However, it would be highly inconvenient and 
undesirable to refer questions of nullity to a legal system other than that governing the 
initial validity of the marriage. To apply the law of the forum to determine, for 
instance, the choice of law issues in nullity actions would distort the laws involved and 
produce unnecessary complexities in the structure of choice of law rules, as well as 
promote limping marriages. 
it is well settled, both in England and Scotland, that the choice of law issues in a nullity 
suit should be decided by the law which determines the validity of the marriage with 
respect to the matter on account of which the marriage is alleged to be invalid and null. 
The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provides clearly that where, apart from the Act, any 
matter affecting the marriage validity would, under the English conflict rules, fall to be 
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determined by foreign law, the provisions of sections 11 to 13 of the Act shall neither 
preclude the determination of that matter as aforesaid, nor require the application to the 
marriage of the grounds set forth therein.(113) It is interesting to underline that the 
ascertainment of the proper law in nullity actions depends mainly on the characterisation 
of the alleged defect. There is no doubt that an English or a Scottish court, after 
surmounting the issue of jurisdiction, would apply its own characterisation rules to 
determine whether the alleged defect is as to form or essential validity. It is a well 
established principle that the Lex Loci celebrationis as the only relevant law which 
decides all questions relating to the validity of the ceremony should apply in general if 
the allegation is that the marriage is void for want ofform.(114) Where, on the other 
hand, the allegation is that the marriage is void for want of capacity, the antenuptial 
personal law of each party appears to be the most appropriate law to decide whether the 
alleged defect renders the marriage invalid. (11 5 ) 
Although it seems well established that questions of formal defects must be referred to 
the lex loci celebrationis and the questions of essential defects to the parties' 
antenuptial domiciliary laws, the legal effect of alleged defects of physical incapacity, 
viz. impotence and wilful refusal to consummate,<I 16) is a matter of great doubt and 
uncertainty. The underlying reason appears to be that the courts in cases of nullity 
based on one or both of these grounds were mainly concerned with jurisdiction, and 
thus the issue of choice of law was not given adequate consideration. The purpose of 
the present section is to examine the various rules which have been proposed by judicial 
and academic authorities in order to determine the exact nature of these alleged defects, 
as well as the appropriate law which might govern the legal effect of such defects. 
Seeing that these grounds are not regarded as prohibitive impediments preventing the 
celebration of marriage, it is very important to consider the issue, which has been a 
subject of academic controversy, whether impotence and wilful refusal to consummate 
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should be retained as ground of nUllity. Another issue which will be adverted to is 
whether a marriage might be annulled on some ground unknown to the law of the 
forum. 
B- Impotence And Wilful Refusal as Challengeable Grounds 
It is well established that a marriage is voidable, according to English law, if it has not 
been consummated owing to the incapacity of either party or owing to the respondent's 
wilful refusal to consummate it.(117) The position in Scottish law, on the other hand, 
differs markedly insofar as a marriage is only voidable if one of the parties is incapable 
of consummating it (118) However, it is interesting to note that impotence, like the 
postnuptial fact of wilful refusal, is regarded not as an impediment preventing the 
celebration of a marriage but only as a ground for annulling it afterwards at the instance 
of either party. Furthermore, incapacity to consummate is less likely than wilful refusal 
to raise a conflict of law problem. The main justification, it is argued, is that impotence 
is fairly common ground for annulment nearly in all legal systems, whereas wilful 
refusal is not universally recognised as such, for it is sometimes a ground for divorce, 
as in French and Algerian laws, and sometimes is not an independent ground for 
matrimonial relief at all, as in Scots law.( 119) 
The question of which law is to determine the legal effect of these defects on marriage 
is the subject of much controversy and uncertainty amongst the English judicial 
authorities which provide support for various choice of law rules, viz. lex fori, lex 
loci and lex domicilii. In the first instance, it has been argued that in nearly all cases 
involving impotence and wilful refusal to consummate there is a strong tendency for 
applying the law of the forum by some means or other. Until 1947, it had been 
assumed that the English courts, after surmounting the question of jurisdiction, had 
applied the English domestic law as a matter of course without considering the choice 
of law issue and irrespective of the parties' domiciliary law,<120) This may be 
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illustrated by Hudson J.'sjudgement in Easterbrook v. Easterbrook,(121) in which a 
Canadian domiciliary petitioned for annulment of his marriage to an English woman 
celebrated in England on the ground of her wilful refusal to consummate. Having 
assumed jurisdiction on the ground of both parties' residence in England, the learned 
judge held the marriage to be invalid and null, notwithstanding that the alleged ground 
[wilful refusal to consummate] was insufficient for rendering the marriage voidable by 
the husband's prenuptial domiciliary law.(122) 
Further support for the application of the law of the forum may be drawn from the case 
of Magnier v. Magnier, (123) where a marriage between two Irish domiciliaries was 
celebrated in the Republic oflreland. The wife had subsequently established residence 
in England, and the husband sought a decree of nullity on the wife's wilful refusal to 
consummate the marriage. Judge Mais, being aware of the absurdity of annulling the 
marriage as neither the husband nor the wife could complain under the law of their 
domiciles or residence, (124) assumed jurisdiction on the basis of the respondent's 
residence in England, and consequently decided that English law would be the proper 
law to determine the legal effect of the wife's wilful refusal to consummate the 
marriage. 
It is interesting to underline that these decisions have been severely criticised in that the 
questions of choice of law in these undefended cases seem to have completely escaped 
the judges' notice. It is also argued that the judges have failed to indicate whether 
English law was applied qua lex fori, lex loci celebrationis, the respondent 
domiciliary law, or it was applied as the petitioner's domiciliary law on the principle 
that foreign law, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is presumed to be the same 
as English law.(125) One might thus conclude that these decisions are not very 
conclusive authorities on choice oflaw. 
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As regards Scottish law, it has been argued that there is no reported case in which the 
court of Session has granted a decree of nullity on the ground of impotence by applying 
other than Scots law. This position has been explained on the footing that Scottish law 
was possibly applied as being the law of domicile, for the court of Session had 
jurisdiction at common law in cases in which the parties were domiciled in Scotland, or 
in which the court was statutorily obliged to assume jurisdiction and to apply Scots law 
thereof'< 126) This explanation is questionable inasmuch as assumption of jurisdiction 
on the parties' domicile in Scotland does not mean the application of the Scottish 
domestic law as the law of the domicile. The underlying reason appears to be that the 
court must apply the laws which govern the initial validity of the marriage since the 
parties might have been domiciled in another country at the time of the marriage. (127) 
Although this explanation might have been correct in common law, it is by no means 
acceptable since the promulgation of the Domicile and Matrimonial Proceedings Act 
1973 by virtue of which the Scottish courts also assume jurisdiction on the basis of 
either party's habitual residence in Scotland for one year ending with the date when the 
action is begun. Consequently, it has been respectfully submitted that Scots law would 
remain applicable in cases involving impotence not as the lex domicilii but as the lex 
fori.(128) It is therefore undoubtedly clear that a Scottish court would grant a 
declarator of nullity on this ground whether or not it was recognised as a ground of 
nullity by the law of the domicile of either party or by the law of the place of 
celebration. (129) 
A general application of the lex fori has been justified by some academic authorities on 
the basis that actions of nullity on the ground of impotence and wilful refusal to 
consummate are analogous to those for divorce, which is admittedly determined by the 
law of the forum according to English and Scottish conflict of laws. Such anology is 
certainly well justified partly on the basis that these defects render, both in England and 
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Scotland, a marriage voidable only, and in part because a decree annulling a voidable 
marriage, like a divorce, operates prospectively in English law.(130) Apart from this 
pragmatic anology, it has been submitted that it would be highly inappropriate and 
undesirable from the practical point of view to characterise impotence and wilful refusal 
to consummate as prohibitive impediments binding prospectively on a marriage 
registrar or an authority who is asked to issue a marriage licence or perform a marriage 
ceremony. The underlying justification is that "the impotent can marry and so can those 
who later refuse marital intercourse, just as can the psychologically inadequate and 
those who later commit adultery" . (131) 
It has been also argued that practical convenience should not be underrated as 
desideratum underlying the lex fori rule which avoids numerous difficulties inherent 
in other solutions that impede the swift and inexpensive administration of justice. Such 
difficulties are, however, encountered both in framing and applying the relevant conflict 
rules and the relevant foreign substantive law. The latter task is particularly delicate 
inasmuch as the application of the substantive rules presupposes a through knowledge 
of the practice in the country of origin which often will not be available in the 
forum.(132) 
This view has been much criticised on the ground that it is based on the construction of 
existing judicial authorities of the weakest sort that is neither the right, nor the only 
interpretation which might be given to such decisions. The main justification lies 
mainly in the fact that the choice of law in such nullity cases appears to have escaped 
the judge's notice completely, the law of the forum being applied as a matter of course 
once the court assumed jurisdiction. This can be explained on the basis that foreign law 
was not pleaded or proved, as well as no authority against the lex fori was cited to the 
judge "-not that one would expect to be cited in an undefended case".(133) 
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There is no doubt that the anology with divorce carries particular weight where the 
nullity petition is based on the essentially post-nuptial fact of wilful refusal to 
consummate which was applied even to the existing marriages when it was first made a 
ground of nullity under English law "just as a new ground for divorce would have 
been". However, it has been suggested that one way to solve the problem is to apply 
different choice of law rules for impotence as an ante-nuptial defect, and the post-
nuptial defect of wilful refusal to consummate. Although this distinction is generally 
accepted, it would be awkward and highly undesirable to treat these alleged defects 
differently since in legal practice they are frequently alleged as ground of nullity in the 
alternative. Furthermore, it would be repugnant to general principles to apply different 
choice of law rules depending on whether non-consummation of a marriage was due to 
inability to consummate or unwilligness to do so. The underlying reason is that 
consistency requires the application of the same rule in all nullity cases, for inability or 
unwillingess to consummate are merely two side of the same coin. (13 4) 
One might also argue that it is not easily reconcilable to any sound reasoning to single 
out physical incapacity from the notion of capacity to marry and assign it to an 
independent choice of law rules, namely lex fori which has beem mainly justified on 
the ground of swift and inexpensive administration of justice that is neither warranted 
on principle, nor accepted in relation to choice of law in any context other than divorce 
and torts. This ground is rather precarious and unworthy of a place in conflict of laws 
where the principle of doing justice seems predominant. However, the reasons for 
rejecting the law of the forum in matters of legal capacity are in general equally 
applicable here. Lex fori rule seems unacceptable in principle for the outcome of the 
proceedings would be dependent on the petitioner's choice of the forum, and thus 
would open up the prospect of forum-shopping as well as lead to limping marriages. 
To this extent, one could not agree more with Sachs J.'s statement that, 
"[I]t would be unfortunate indeed if a marriage were to be held valid or invalid 
according to which country's courts adjuducated on the issue ... It is surely a matter of 
some importance that the initial validity of a marriage should, in relation to all 
matters except form and ceremony (to which a uniform general rule already applies), 
be consistently decided according to the law of one country alone ... and that 
consistency cannot be attained if the test is lex fori".(135) 
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Irrespective of the merits these arguments might have, the consideration of the lex fori 
as a general rule does not obviously fall in line with the courts' reasoning in certain 
cases on the subject matter. In Robert v. Robert, (136) for instance, a marriage was 
celebrated in Guernsey where both parties were then domiciled. The wife sought a 
decree of nullity on the ground of her husband's wilful refusal to consummate the 
marriage. Barnard J., having assumed jurisdiction on the petitioner's residance in 
England, declared that the issue whether a marriage should be annulled on the alleged 
ground of wilful refusal to consummate must preferably be determined by the lex loci 
celebrationis. Barnard J. went on to say that this view is appropriate on the basis that 
the alleged ground cannot be justified as a ground of nullity unless it is considered as a 
defect in marriage, "an error in the quality of the respondent". (137) 
The main criticism that may be levelled at this decision, however, concerns the 
reasoning on which it is based, which indeed seems almost incredibly artificial and 
conceptualistic, for wilful refusal as a ground of nullity is by no means dependent upon 
error. This is because section 13 (3) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 does not 
require the petitioner's ignorance of the alleged facts at the time of the marriage 
ceremony,(138) Furthermore, This decision seems to be an authority of doubtful merit 
not only because the lex loci celebrationis and the parties' domiciliary law coincide, 
and wilful refusal is equally treated in the same manner under Guernsey and English 
laws, but also because Barnard J. has questioned the appropriateness of the lex loci 
celebrationis. The learned Judge pointed out that the lex domicilii should apply 
according to Sottomayor v. De Barros,ct39) if the alleged defect was to be 
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characterised as a matter affecting the capacity of one of the parties,(140) 
The lex loci celebrationis is also supported by the Northern Irish case Addison v. 
Addison. (141) In this case the marriage took place in Northern Ireland between a 
woman then domiciled there and a man at all times domiciled in England. The wife 
sought a decree of nullity on the ground of her husband's impotence, or alternatively on 
the ground of her wilful refusal to consummate the marriage. Lord MacDermot pointed 
out that it is very doubtful whether the issue of capacity to marry, being a matter for the 
law of the domicile, has to do with more than juristic capacity. His Lordship went on 
to say that "Whether a contracting party is capable in the physical sense of discharging 
the obligations of matrimony seems to be so linked with nature and quality of those 
obligations as to be, naturally and aptly, a matter for the lex loci celebrationis".(142) It 
is interesting to note that this decision is not a very strong authority, for the question 
was not pursued to the length of a decision as there was no difference between the 
Northern Irish law and English law in substantive result. 
The application of the lex loci celebrationis to determine matters of impotence and 
wilful refusal has been heavily criticised on the ground that the defects in question 
cannot be characterised under any circumstances as relating to formalities of marriage. 
Moreover, the country of celebration may have no interest in such matters as the locus 
contractus is often chosen for temporary convenience. It would be therefore 
inappropriate and undesirable to assign these personal defects exclusively to the law of 
the place of celebration with which the parties may only have a fortuitous or fleeting 
connection. The adoption of the lex loci celebrationis as a general choice of law rule 
for physical incapacity would be, as Bishop pointed out, contrary "to the whole 
development of the English family law rules in the conflict of laws since Brook v. 
Brook".(143) 
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The predominant view which has emerged from the English case Ponticelli v. 
Ponticelli, (144) where the choice of law issue was considered at some length for the 
first time, is that impotence and wilful refusal must be determined by the lex domicilii. 
In this case, an Italian national who was at all material times domiciled in England 
married by proxy in Italy an Italian subject domiciled there. The husband sought a 
decree of nullity on the ground the wife had wilfuly refused to consummate the 
marriage. Sachs 1., delivering a judgement which is by far the most substantial on the 
subject matter, strongly rejected not only the distinction between choice of law rules for 
impotence and wilful refusal to consummate but also the characterisation of wilful 
refusal as an issue pertaining to form, as well as its anology with divorce. The learned 
judge has therefore established clearly that both impotence and wilful refusal to 
consummate should be considered as matters affecting personal capacity, and thus 
subject to the parties' domiciliary laws. His main reason was that: 
"It is surely a matter of some importance that the initial validity of a marriage 
should, in relation to all matters except form and ceremony ... , be consistently decided 
according to the law of one country alone ... and that consistency cannot be attained if 
the text is lexjori".(145) 
In view of the fact that a voidable marriage conferred the husband's domicile on the 
wife at that time as a matter of law, and since wilful refusal to consummate renders a 
marriage voidable only, Sachs 1. made it quite clear that the issue before him should be 
decided by English law not as the lex fori but as the law of the husband's domicile. 
He pointed out that the law of the domicile appears to be the most appropriate to apply 
for lilt would be unfortunate indeed if a marriage were to be held valid or invalid 
according to which country's courts adjudicated on the issue".(146) 
Although Sachs 1.'s decision stands out as the main and the most persuasive English 
authority on the subject matter, the merits of the solution endorsed by it, i.e. the law of 
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the husband's domicile seems questionable and is now hard to justify on any rational 
ground for it is based upon a rule which is obsolete and an outmoded legal concept in 
the contemporary private international law. This rule is neither acceptable since the 
promulgation of the Domicile and Matrimonial proceedings Act 1973 (147) whereby a 
married woman can acquire a separate domicile, nor consistent with the modem trend 
of sexual equality before the law. 
Nevertheless, the adoption of the lex domicilii as a general choice of law rule for 
impotence and wilful refusal has been justified by some writers on the ground that there 
is no satsifactory reason which requires the extraction of physical incapacity from the 
notion of capacity to marry, and thus asign it to independent conflicts rules. It is 
suggested that the application of law of the parties' domicile would guarantee 
consistency with the treatment of all grounds of invalidity inasmuch as wilful refusal, 
though is necessarily post-nuptial, has been reaffirmed in England by the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973(148) as a ground of nullity.(149) The adoption of the domicile rule 
would therefore avoid different choice of law rules for impotence and wilful refusal, as 
well as producing a welcome simplification in the structure, though at the structural 
level, of the conflicts rules.(150) 
Further, there is an authority for regarding impotence and wilful refusal as defects 
concerned with essential validity of a marriage. Denning L.J. pointed out, albeit in a 
jurisdiction case, that "no-one can call a marriage a real marriage when it has not been 
consummated; and this is the same ... whether the want of consummation is due to 
incapacity or to wilful refusal". (151) Palsson Lennart has also suggested that there is, 
as insinuated in cetain English cases, "the anology with consent to marriage, in 
particular mistake as to personal attributes". In view of the fact that questions of 
consent are determined by the law governing capacity to marry, the learned writer 
believes that "some thorny problems of delimitation will be avoided if the same choice 
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of law is adopted for impotence as a ground of nullity",(152) It is also interesting to 
note that the rules concerning physical incapacity are mainly designed not to protect the 
public interest of the interested country but to protect the parties' interests, for the 
marriage is a good and valid marriage unless one of the parties chooses otherwise by 
seeking a decree of nullity. In a stimulating article, Jaffey submitted that: "Whether in 
justice to the parties the marriage should be capable of being annulled on one of these 
grounds is most appropriately left to the standards of justice of the country to which 
both parties belong at the time of the marriage". (153) 
Nevertheless, the acceptance of the domicile rule as a general choice oflaw rule is not a 
conclusive solution for all the problems that may potentially arise in a conflict case, in 
particular if the parties are subject to different domiciliary laws, and more specifically if 
impotence and wilful refusal are considered as grounds of nullity only by one of the 
laws involved. The issues which require consideration here concern the determination 
of the relevant law to be applied if the parties are domiciled in different countries, the 
relevant date for determining the applicable law, and the solution which need be 
adopted in case the petitioner's domiciliary law regards impotence and wilful refusal as 
grounds of divorce. The judicial authorities supporting the domicile rule, as indicated 
above, inclined in favour of the law of the husband's domicile, a view formulated at a 
time when the unity of domicile principle was predominant. In fact this view is 
inconsistent with the contemporary trend of sexual equality, and unacceptable in 
principle for now a married woman can acquire an independent domicile. 
The general editor of Cheshire and North's private international law has submitted that 
given that the defect is revealed by the impotent or unwilling party, the most appropriate 
law to determine the effects of impotence and wilful refusal to consummate as grounds 
of nullity is the domiciliary law of the spouse alleged to be incapable. This view 
appears to be similar to that generally adopted within the sphere of unilateral 
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impediments such as lack of age, inasmuch as impotence and wilful refusal are only 
relevant if, and only if, they are regarded as ground of nullity according to the incapable 
party's domiciliary law. It is therefore justified on the ground that it is in tune with the 
general conflict of law rules by virtue of which matters of essential validity are 
decided. (154) 
Whatever merit this approach might have within the sphere of unilateral impediments, 
the application of the law of the incapable or afflicted party as a general choice of law 
rule is clearly unacceptable in principle simply because the aggrieved party in case of 
impotence and wilful refusal, unlike unilateral impediments, is the non-afflicted party -
the spouse who is rendered unable to consummate the marriage. Furthermore, it would 
cause injustice to the aggrieved party whose protection is at stake in case impotence and 
wilful refusal are not grounds of nullity under the domiciliary law of the incapable 
spouse. Let us suppose, for instance, that an English domiciliary who married a 
Scottish woman domiciled in Scotland raises an action before an English court seeking 
a decree of nullity on the ground that the wife had wilfully refused to consummate the 
marriage. According to this approach, the court must refuse to grant a decree of nullity 
to which the petitioner is entitled under his domiciliary law which provides for 
annulment on the ground of wilful refusal. It would be highly inappropriate and 
undesirable to expect the courts of a given country to which the aggrieved party belongs 
not to declare the marriage null simply because the impotent or unwilling party is 
domiciled in a country by the law of which these alleged defects do not affect the 
marriage. "It is one thing to take a spouse from another country and quite another 
thereby to forfeit some important right to redress of grievance -to wed not only the 
spouse but also his (or her) nullity law on the subject of non-consummation". (155) 
In a relatively recent article, Bishop has clearly submitted that in cases of true conflict, 
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where the parties' domiciliary law differ markedly on the matter and the petitioner is 
domiciled in the country the law of which considers both impotence and wilful refusal 
as grounds of nullity, the English court should opt for the law which grants relief to the 
aggrieved party; a choice that is best directed by the domestic law's choice -for English 
law recognises in domestic cases a legitimate grievance. The learned writer has 
therefore plausibly suggested that the most appropriate law "that ought to govern in 
cases of wilful refusal and impotence is the law of the petitioner's domicile at the time 
of the marriage". Relying on the anology with consent, he has pointed out that the 
rationale underlying this approach is that a party should only be entitled to the 
protection that the law of his own community confers on him, and thus the law of his 
alleged partner's domicile is irrelevant and ought to be ignored. (15 6) The adoption of 
this approach in this context seems to have the advantage that the petitioner would not 
be held unwillingly tied to a marriage which is regarded by the law of his own 
community as a defective marriage. It is therefore clear that the petitioner in the 
previous example would be able to obtain a decree of nullity on the ground of his 
wife's wilful refusal to consummate the marriage. 
Nevertheless, this approach might be criticised in that assimilation of impotence and 
wilful refusal cases to the cases of consent is neither right in principle, nor supported 
by the actual decisions, or at least by the reasoning, in all or nearly all English cases 
bearing on choice of law in this matter. while the aggrieved party whose protection is 
at stake in cases of consent is the spouse whose consent is allegedly defective, it is 
generally agreed that in cases of impotence and wilful refusal the party who is rendered 
unable to consummate the marriage by reason of his partner's inability or unwillingness 
to consummate is the only party who has a legitimate grievance. One might therefore 
argue that the application of the law of the petitioner's domicile in cases of impotence, 
where the nullity issue is raised by the incapable party, can hardly be justified on the 
basis of the rule that an aggrieved party should only be entitled to the protection the law 
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of his country confers on him. The reason underlying this formulation is that the 
impotent party is given the right to plead his own impotence not to protect his own 
interests but to free his partner whom he believes would be able to lead a happy and 
normal life if the impotent marriage is annulled. 
Although this approach might possibly be persuasive in cases of true conflict, the 
application of the law of the petitioner's domicile does not provide a workable test in 
cases of false conflict where the petitioner is domiciled in the country under the law of 
which impotence and wilful refusal do not affect the marriage, and in particular where 
the question of nullity is brought before the court by the impotent party. For instance, 
suppose that a Scottish domiciliary marries an English woman who is domiciled at all 
material times in England. The husband sought a decree of nullity before the English 
court on the ground that his wife had wilfully refused to consummate the marriage. 
According to this approach, the English court must refuse to grant a nullity decree on 
the ground that wilful refusal does not constitute a ground of nullity under the 
petitioner's domiciliary law, notwithstanding its acceptance as such under the law of the 
respondent's domicile.CI57 ) Furthermore, no satisfactory justification has ever been 
offered why the aggrieved party shoud be denied protection in case the law of the 
domicile of the impotent party, who pleaded his own impotence, does not consider 
impotence as a ground of nullity. 
Yet another approach which is suggested by Palsson is to apply the parties' personal 
laws cumulatively, in that the marriage will be annulled for impotence and wilful refusal 
to consummate if it is so by either party's personal law regardless of whether the defect 
is that of the party whose personal law contains the invalidating rule or that of the other 
party.c 158) It is therefore clear that the petitioner in both examples referred to earlier 
would be able to avoid the marriage on the ground of wilful refusal to consummate. 
This view appears to have the advantage of avoiding the restrictive elements of the other 
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two approaches examined beforehand, for the aggrieved party would not be held 
unwillingly bound to a marriage that he and/or his alleged spouse consider as an empty 
and a defective marriage. Palsson's view can, however, be justified on the ground that 
it accords with the policy issue of upholding the parties' reasonable expectations. 
Therefore, to destroy the aggrieved party's assumption of having a normal and 
consummated marriage can result in a quite natural sense of injustice. 
The general editor of Cheshire and North's private international law has argued that this 
approach leans heavily in favour of annulling a marriage, "with the result that the 
petitioner would succeed even though there were no grounds for annulment under the 
law of his domicil and even though he was the person alleged to lack capacity".(159) 
Indeed, this criticim stands if, and only if, the society to which the petitioner belongs 
has the slightest public interest to hold such a marriage valid. One might therefore 
argue that this view is the more appropriate in that it would seem odd and unjust to tie 
the aggrieved party unwillingly to an empty marriage relationship that achieves neither 
the religious aim of marriage, i.e. procreation, nor the civil aim of marriage that is best 
attained through consummation. 
It has been clearly submitted that the parties' domiciliary law should be applied as at the 
time of the marriage, inasmuch as the general choice of law rule applicable to matters of 
essential validity is that the law of the domicile preceding the marriage. There is no 
doubt that the parties' antenuptial domiciliary laws are applicable even in the case of the 
post nuptial of wilful refusal to consummate. The underlying justification is that 
consistency requires the application of the same connecting factor in all cases of nullity. 
Furthermore, wilful refusal and impotence, as indicated above, are often pleaded in the 
alternative. (160) 
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The adoption of the law of the domicile as a general choice of law rule for impotence 
and wilful refusal has been criticised on the ground that the petitioner might be denied a 
nullity decree if he is domiciled in a country whose law regards impotence and wilful 
refusal to consummate as sufficient grounds for divorce. A denial of a nullity decree in 
such cases, it is thought, is most certainly unacceptable and irrational for "it seem an 
absurd situation that both relevant laws end a marriage, one calling it nullity and the 
other calling it divorce, and yet because they call it by different names the petitioner, 
who might be indifferent between labels, cannot obtain relief".(161) Bishop has 
submitted that the relevant issue for consideration in such cases is a matter of 
characterisation: how the divorce decree in the foreign country is to be classified for the 
purposes of the English or Scottish choice of law rules as being the law of the forum. 
As indicated above, characterisation in conflict of laws should be made according to the 
rules of the lex fori, and the forum's court should consider in such a process the 
effects of the foreign decree.(162) Accordingly, it has been clearly submitted that an 
English court should grant a decree of nullity even if the law of the petitioner's 
antenuptial domicile regards the defect in issue as a ground for divorce, for it is a 
ground of nullity under English law. The underlying reason is that there is no practical 
difference between a decree of divorce and a decree annulling a voidable marriage for 
both decrees operate prospectively and the consequential rights as to financial 
provisions are identical. Bishop therefore believes that the most appropriate approach 
is that the foreign decrees of divorce based on impotence or wilful refusal to 
consummate should be properly classified as decrees of nullity in the English conflict of 
laws sense. 
It has been plausibly suggested that the position in Scots law seems rather different in 
that a Scottish court would not grant a nullity decree in such cases simply because a 
decree of nullity based on impotence operates retrospectively, and the court has no 
authority to grant financial relief following a declarator of nullity. Furthermore, it is 
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thought that the only possible solution even in the case of wilful refusal, assuming that 
a Scottish court can grant a decree of nullity on such a ground in a conflict case, is that 
the court should dismiss the petition. This view has been justified on the ground that a 
foreign decree of divorce based on wilful refusal cannot be classified as a nullity decree 
in the Scottish conflict of laws sense, since wilful refusal is not even a ground of nullity 
under Scots law.(163) 
It is important in this respect to point out that based on a thorough examination of a 
wide range of options which essentially amount to the application of either the law of 
the forum or the law of the domicile, the English and the Scottish Law Commissions 
have concluded in their 1985 joint report that the choice of law rules governing 
impotence and wilful refusal to consummate the marriage are uncertain, unclear and 
undeveloped. The Law Commissions have neither expressed a clear preference for 
either the law of the forum or the law of the domicile, nor specified which domiciliary 
law would be applicable in the event the law of the domicile is adopted. The underlying 
reason is that the comments submitted to the Law Commissions displayed very little 
consensus, providing them with no clear-cut basis as to the need for reform or the 
course any reform should take. Nevertheless, the Law Commissions have strongly 
recomended that whatever choice of law rule is adopted should govern both impotence 
and wilful refusal to consummate as they are frequently pleaded in the alternative.( 164) 
c- The relevance of retaining impotence and wilful refusal as gnnmds of nullity 
In Inverclyde v. Inverclyde, Bateson J. recognised the validity of the argument that the 
difference between suits for nullity on the ground of impotence and suits for dissolution 
of marriage was basically one of form. His position is grounded in the assumption that 
nullity of marriage on the ground of impotence constittutes fundamentally a suit to 
dissolve it insofar as "[t]he marriage remains a marriage until one of the spouses seeks 
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to get rid of the tie".(165) A Similar position is assumed by Lord Clyde L.P., who 
asserts that as concerns Scottish law, impotence is not" ... a bar to the constitution of 
the marriage, but only as a mean of setting it aside, or as a resolutive condition of the 
contract",(166) It is important to note that impotence as a ground of nullity, and not 
dissolution, before the reformation was justified on the basis that the ecclesiastical 
courts had no power to dissolve a marriage a vinculo, and, furthermore, the early 
canonical theory clearly established that a marriage comes into existence if, and only if, 
there had been a comixtio sexuum, i.e. there had been both consummation and 
consent. The question to be considered is wether it is worth preserving impotence as 
well as wilful refusal to consummate as grounds of nullity in the modern times where 
divorce is widely accepted by the Church. 
It has been submitted that it is no longer necessary to retain impotence and wilful 
refusal as grounds of nullity, particularly in the light of the greater readiness of the 
church to recognise divroce and of the fact that parties are now able to obtain a divorce 
on the irretrievable breakdown of their marriage. The argument in favour of this view 
is that divorce and nullity on these grounds are in substance similar and the difference 
between them is only a matter of form.(167) "[I]n each case there is a marriage valid 
until the decree is made and that decree terminates the marriage, but in case of nullity, 
the decree misleadingly declares the marriage to have never existed; and that being so, it 
is more logical to terminate the marriage by divorce which records the realities of the 
situation",(168) It is also important to note that the existence of wilful refusal as a 
ground of nullity is, as Dr Morris pointed out, hard to justify because it is necessarilly a 
post-matrimonial matter. ( 169 ) 
In 1970, after a far-ranging review of the law of nullity of marriage, the English Law 
Commission has nevertheless accepted as sound and logical the view in favour of 
retaining impotence and wilful refusal as grounds of nullity. The Law Commission 
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refused to recognise the validity of the argument that the dichotomy between suits for 
nullity of voidable marriages and suits for divorce is merely one of form, insofar as 
"the concepts giving rise to the two decrees are quite different". The Law Commission, 
therefore, went on to explain that: 
"the decree of nullity recognises the existence of an impediment which prevents the 
marriage from initially becoming effective, while the decree of divorce records that 
some cause for terminating the marriage has arisen since the marriage. This 
distinction may be of little weight to the lawyer, but is a matter of essence in the 
jurisprudence of the Christian Church". (170) 
It is true that nullity decree is granted for failure to comply with certain requirements 
that constitute prohibitions which prevent even the celebration of marriage if the 
marriage registrar is satisfied at the time of the ceremony that the parties have not 
complied with one or more requirements of marriage. Nevertheless, this line of 
reasoning is unacceptable and can hardly be invoked to support the view in favour of 
retaining impotence and wilful refusal as grounds of nullity. The underlying reason is 
that impotence cannot prevent the celebration of a marriage even if the marriage registrar 
is aware of the fact as long as the parties agreed to go along with the ceremony. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that a decree of nullity can be obtained for wilful 
refusal, a supervening factor which necessarily occurs after the marriage (and, indeed, 
it is important to underline that the majority of nullity decrees of voidable marriages are 
based on wilful refusal). It is therefore clear that impotence and wilful refusal do not 
constitute prohibitions on the marriage of the impotent or unwilling party and, "at its 
inception, the marriage is perfectly valid". The main reason, as Professor Clive pointed 
out, is that "the impotent can marry and so can those who later refuse marital 
intercourse, just as can the psychologically inadequate and those who later commit 
adultery".c 171) 
In view of the fact that the Church considers consent as an important prerequisite to 
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marriage, the Law Commission has also argued that impotence can be regarded as 
having the effect of vitiating consent on the ground that consent to marriage includes 
consent to sexual relations. The Law Commission therefore pointed out that 
"so radical a change as is involved in the substitution of a decree of divorce for a 
decree of nullity in respect of matters which the Church regards as relevant to the 
formation of marriage and irrelevant to divorce, is likely to be unwelcomed to the 
Church. It is also likely to be resented by people not necessarily belonging to the 
Church who associate a stigma with divorce and who would therefore prefer to see 
such matters as impotence and mental disorder, which are illnesess, remain grounds 
for annulling the marriage rather than causes for dissolving it", (17 2) 
This argument can be criticised on two bases: narrowly from the consideration of 
impotence as having the effect of vitiating consent, and on a much broader front from 
the objection of the Church to the extention of divorce. The consideration of impotence 
as having effect of vitiating consent is unacceptable and hard to justify simply because 
the law does not require the petitioner's ignorance of the alleged fact at the time of the 
marriage. Furthermore, impotence as well as wilful refusal do not constitute 
prohi bitions on the marriage of the impotent or unwilling party and, at its inception, the 
marriage is perfectly valid. This argument hardly stands up to a rigorous examination 
insofar as wilful refusal, which is recognised by the Law Commission as the alternative 
allegation to impotence, cannot be a defect in consent because it is difficult to establish 
its existence at the time of the ceremony, i.e. whether the party refusing to consummate 
have the intention to do so at the time of the ceremony. Secondly, the objection of the 
Church to the extention of divorce is hardly persuasive since the civil law has 
abandoned any reliance on religious doctrine. It is also important to note that 
"[i]ndividuals who attach importance to the attitude of the Church to the circumstances 
in which a marriage is terminated could no doubt seek approval from the Church which 
would apply the modem canon law". (173) 
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Another argument put forward in favour of retaining impotence and wilful refusal as 
grounds of nullity is that any reform that would cause offence to a significant body of 
opinion should only be carried out if there is some coresponding advantage to be 
gained. The Law Commission submitted that the only benifit in such a reform in this 
case (i.e. the ground of wilful refusal might be considered by some to fit in more neatly 
among divorces than among nullities) is not a strong reason to justify such a radical 
reform in itself.(174) Professor Cretney criticised this view on the ground that 
"[n]ullity proceedings involve, by reason of the nature of the allegations made and the 
methods by which evidence is obtained, considerable humiliation and distress". The 
learned author therefore submitted that there is a clear and worthy benefit to be gained 
from such a radical reform (i.e. the misery necessarily incidental to marital breakdown 
might be reduced) if a decree of divorce can be obtained without these personal 
problems being discussed in a court of law. (175) 
The English Law Commission has also considered the issue of whether wilful refusal 
to consummate (as a postnuptial fact which occurs after the marriage) is an appropriate 
ground for nullity that is in principle concerned solely with defects existing at the time 
of the marriage. The Law Commission had no doubt that wilful refusal to 
consummate, as the alternative alegation to impotence, should continue to be a ground 
of nullity simply because it is often uncertain whether the defendent's failure to 
consummate is due to his inability to consummate or to his unwillingness to do so. 
Therefore, it would be undesirable and very odd if "the nature of the relief should 
depend on the court's decision whether non-consummation was due to the respondent's 
inability or whether it was due to his unwillingness". (176) 
More recently, the Scottish Law Commission took a rather different view and 
recommended that the retention of impotence as a ground of nullity is inconclusive and 
345 
a very doubtful issue, since the retrospective effect of a nullity decree of a voidable 
marriage leads to unnecessary difficulties. The Scottish Commission has thus 
submitted that there is absolutely no policy justification whatsoever for amending the 
law to provide that a decree annulling a voidable marriage should only have prospective 
effect, for "[t]hat would simply be a divorce by another, and singularly inappropriate, 
name". (177) In the light of the availability of non-fault divorce, as well as the existence 
of various serious personal inadequacies at the time of the marriage which may lead to 
the irretrievable breakdown of marriage, it seems that there is no longer any policy 
consideration for singling out impotence for special treatment. The other convincing 
argument submitted by the Scottish Commission is that impotence as a ground of 
nullity leads to unnecessary distinctions void of any meaning "from the view point of 
the viability of a marriage". The Scottish Law Commission has therefore submitted 
that: 
"[w]hy should it matter whether impotency was present at the time of the marriage, 
or supervened a week later? If the sexual side of a marriage has been unsatisfactory 
from the start, is any good purpose served by a careful consideration of whether a 
person was capable on one or two occasions of sufficiently complete intercourse for 
legal purposes or only of insufficiently complete intercourse for such purposes? 
Why should incapacity for sexual intercourse make a marriage voidable but not a 
deliberate refusal to attempt sexual intercourse? Why should a woman who marries 
An impotent man, not knowing of his impotency, be able to obtain a declarator of 
nullity but a woman who marries a sterile man, not knowing of his sterility, be 
unbale to do so? In either case, if she accepts the position she does not need a legal 
remedy while is she cannot accept the position and the ,marriage breaks down 
irretrievably she has the remedy of divorce". ( 1 7 8) 
The Scottish Law Commission's view is to be welcomed. One might argue, by way of 
conclusion, that neither the historical reasons behind impotence as a ground of nullity 
seem to be compelling, nor there is any adequate policy justification for preserving 
impotence and wilful refusal as grounds of nullity at the present time when divorce is 
universally recognised as a remedy for marriage breackdown. Since there is no 
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prohibition on the marriage of the impotent or unwilling, it is submitted that the 
retention of defects as grounds of nullity would be inconsistent with the well 
established principle that the grounds of nullity bear a necessary relation to the initial 
validity of marriage. Relying on the fact that impotence and wilful refusal are no longer 
grounds of nullity once the marriage has been consummated, there is no doubt that 
these defects cannot be considered as relating to the formation of marriage. Moreover, 
it is argued that the reality of the matter is that impotence and wilful refusal are ways out 
of a marriage which are a kin to divorce. It is therefore clear that impotence and wilful 
refusal should cease to be grounds of nullity, insofar as nullity cannot be based on 
grounds other than those constituting prohibitions at the time of the marriage 
ceremony.(179) 
D- Nullity on foreign grounds unknown to the law of the forum 
It has been so far assumed that when conflict of law issues arise the ground on which 
nullity is sought is one which in essence is known to the law of the forum. But, 
practice shows that is not usually the case simply because grounds of nullity differ 
markedly from one legal system to another. For instance, it has been already indicated 
that English, unlike Scottish, law recognises wilful refusal to consummate and 
pregnancy peralium as grounds of nullity. Moreover, one might argue that certain 
legal systems have grounds which are unknown to English and Scottish domestic laws, 
such as Sterility (180) and mistake as to attributes of the other spouse.(181) The 
question for consideration here is whether English and Scottish courts qua lex fori 
would annul a marriage on some ground quite unknown to English and Scottish 
domestic laws. 
As regards English Law, there is a statutory recognition for the application of foreign 
law to any question affecting the validity of a marriage. Section 14(1) of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provides clearly that where, apart from the Act, any 
----- ---
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matter affecting the marriage validity would, under the English conflict rules, fall to be 
determined by foreign law, the provisions of sections 11 to 13 of the Act shall neither 
preclude the determination of the matter as aforesaid, nor require the application to the 
marriage of the ground set forth therein. It is ubdoubtedly clear that English courts will 
apply foreign law to nullity suits, and therefore will, subject to overriding effect of 
public policy, annul marriages on the ground of foreign rules as to invalidity. 
So far as the judicial authorities are concerned, it has been already indicated that English 
and Scottish courts will annul a marriage on the ground of formal invalidity if the 
formalities of the lex loci celebrationis are not conplied with, irrespective of whether 
the foreign ground is co-extensive with a similar English or Scottish groundJl82) It is 
equally clear that English and Scottish courts are prepared to annul a marriage on the 
ground of an incapacity laid down by the parties' antenuptial domiciliary laws, 
notwithstanding the marriage was solemnised in the forum and was essentially valid 
according to the domestic law of the forum. (183) For instance, in Sottomayor v. De 
Barros(l84) a marriage between first cousins was declared void simply because the 
parties were within the prohibited degrees under their domiciliary law, irrespective of 
the marriage validity under the law of the forum. It is important to note that this 
decision has been explained on the footing that the relevant foreign incapacity is simply 
a variant of a defect known to English law, i.e. a more extensive list of prohibited 
degrees. Dr North has submitted that it ought not in principle to make any difference if 
the defect imposed by the relevant foreign law is wholly unknown to the forum. The 
learned writer therefore pointed out that: 
"If the court is prepared to annul a marriage on the ground that the foreign law as to 
consanguinity has not been complied with, even though the marriage satisfies the 
domestic law, then this is in effect applying a ground unknown to the lex fori. It 
seems unduly pedantic to that the foreign law is applied because the prohibition on 
consanguinity is part of the lex fori, albeit with a different content".c 185) 
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It remains to consider whether English and Scottish courts will annul a marriage on a 
foreign ground, wholly unknown to English and Scottish domestic law, which renders 
the marriage voidable under the parties' domiciliary law. It is interesting to note that 
there is no reported case in which a marriage alleged to be voidable has been annulled 
on a ground unknown to English or Scottish domestic laws. Such authority as there is 
on Anglo-Scottish conflict of laws suggests that English and Scottish courts would 
refuse to annul a voidable marriage on grounds unknown to English and Scottish 
domestic laws, irrespective of the parties' domiciliary laws.(186) The main reason, it 
is argued, is that it would be unacceptable to public opinion if an English or a Scottish 
court would annul an English or a Scottish domiciliary's marriage, which is celebrated 
in England or Scotland, on a foreign ground which is quite unknown to the law of the 
forum. Moreover, to annul a voidable marriage on a foreign ground unknown to the 
forum is likely to prouduce greater disquiet than a case where the forum annul a 
marriage on the ground of foreign incapacity.<187) As regards Scottish law, one might 
argue that this view is the inevitable result of the rule that Scottish domestic law should 
continue to apply as the appropriate law to determine the substantive issues in actions of 
nullity of voidable marriages. (18 8) 
The English and Scottish Law Commissions in their 1985 joint report have neither 
expressed any positive solution to the problem in question, nor specified the best way 
to achieve the view that a court in the United kingdom should not be able to annul a 
marriage on grounds unknown to the lex fori. Nevertheless, the Law Commissions 
have pleaded for views as to whether a court in the United Kingdom should, or not, be 
able to annul a marriage on a ground unknown to the domestic law of the forum.(189) 
Moreover, the Scottish Law Commission has recently suggested that a marriage, which 
is initially valid according to the choice of law rules, cannot be annulled or declared null 
by a Scottish court on any ground other than incurable impotency. The Scots Law 
Cornrnissionjustified its position by arguing that the present issue is very similar to the 
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question whether Scottish courts should grant divorces on grounds unknown to Scots 
domestic lawJ190) 
Such an automatic application of the lex fori is of doubtful merit. Since the Scottish 
courts are prepared to assume jurisdiction on the ground of domicile or habitual 
residence of either party, and prepared to apply foreign law to questions of formal 
validity and legal capacity, it is difficult to see what social or policy justifications could 
there be for adopting such a restrictive view on choice of law in cases of physical 
incapacity. One might argue that such a restrictive view, however, seems neither 
warranted on principle, nor to be in accord with the decisions of the courts in other 
matters offormal validity and legal capacity. Although it has been argued that issues of 
formal validity and legal capacity renders the marriage void, it is very hard to assert 
with certainty why it should make any difference in principle if the foreign defect 
renders the marriage voidable, for "there cannot, surely, be any magic in the word 
'voidable"'.(191) It could also be argued that to deny application for the relevant 
foreign on the sole basis that it is rather different than the law of the forum is 
unsupported by previous authority, reflects no decernible policy and is inconsistent 
with the traditional accepted choice of law rules in respect of the validity of marriage. 
There seem to be no fundamental difference in principle between impotence and wilful 
refusal since both defects lead to non-consummation of marriage, or between mistaken 
belief as to the wife's virginity and mistaken belief that she is not pregnant by another 
man which is ground for nullity in English domestic law. It has been submitted, by 
way of conclusion, that English and Scottish courts should be prepared fully to accept 
the principle that matters of essential validity of the marriage are determined by the law 
of domicile even if the foreign ground is unknown to the law of the forum. The general 
editor of Cheshire and North's private international law submitted that: 
"it matters not whether the English court applies foreign grounds verbally similar to 
English grounds such as consanguinity or non-age, even though the substance of the 
rule be different, or a foreign ground which is a variant of the English ground, such 
ass declaring a marriage voidable on the ground that at the time of the the marriage 
another woman is pregnant by the husband, or a foreign ground substantially different 
from any under English law, such as the incapacity of a person of one religion to 
marry a member of anotheror annulment on the ground of a mistake as to the 
attri butes of the other spouse". ( 19 2) 
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One might therefore conclude that English and Scottish courts should be prepared fully 
to annul a marriage on a foreign ground which is quite unknown to the law of the 
forum, irrespective of whether it renders the marriage void or voidable. However, 
English and Scottish courts should not refuse to apply foreign grounds of invalidity, 
unless they are contrary to the public policy of the forum. The overriding effect of the 
lex fori public policy would achieve the same result, and thus the existence of the rule 
suggested by the Scottish Law commission is quite unnecessary. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
In the doctrine and practice of private international law the story of choice of law rules 
for marriage has attained prominence and remains one of the most debated subject; its 
very reputation as an arcane field accounts for the fascination it has exerted on lawyers, 
scholars as well as the courts . Indeed, the rules relative to the conclusion, the 
requirements and the nullity of marriage in different legal systems are extremely varied, 
for they are so closely connected with morality, religion and the fundamental principles 
prevailing in each society that their application is often regarded as a matter of public 
policy. It follows that the present conflict of law problems concerned with marriage are 
mainly caused by the interrelation between different social, religious and legal cultures. 
Without any value judgement it can hardly be admitted as a principle that European 
family laws and Islamic family regulations are equivalent and therefore interchangeable. 
However, it is not surprising that in spite of all the valiant intellectual efforts lavished 
on the subject, and the voluminous literature that has been built up over the years, the 
choice of law rules for marriage remain mired in mystery and confusion. One reason 
for this state of affairs is the surfeit of new theories that instead of shedding light, 
obscure the discipline, for their advocates failed fully to examine the implication of such 
new suggestions and their impact on those who have, outside the court, to apply the 
law. The very prolefiration of ideas based on the policy of favor matrimonii distracts 
attention from the question of choice of law rules to govern the validity of a marriage 
that is about to be celebrated. The discussion of conflict of law problems of marriage in 
England and Scotland seems to provide a good example, inasmuch as it is exclusi vely 
concerned with judicial decisions which usually involve the validity or the nullity of a 
marriage already celebrated rather than problems arising at the time when the union is 
formed. But conflict problems of marriage, whether involving form or substance, may 
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in principle arise in different situations: on the one hand, at the stage of the formation of 
a marriage; on the other when a marriage has already been entered into and its validity is 
being examined ex post. However, choice of law rules for marriage must have a 
twofold function. In the first place, they should serve primarily as directives for the 
civil or religious officials lending their cooperation to the performance of the marriage. 
Secondly, they should contain an indirect regulations, laying down the choice of law 
which must have been observed when the marriage was celebrated in order for it to be 
held valid by a court of the forum which may have to decide the issue of validity. In 
any event, a conflict approach to the choice of law problems of marriage, which might 
claim universal acceptability in the subject matter, must offer choice of law rules by 
virtue of which the registrar may be able to decide the validity or invalidity of a 
marriage at the time ofthe ceremony. Therefore, there must be a great deal of merit in 
choice of law rules which, while retaining a degree of flexibility, may provide a 
solution without necessitating resort to courts. 
It is generally agreed, both in Common and Civil law countries, that there is no choice 
of law rule more firmly established than the one which attributes the determination of 
formal validity of marriage to the lex loci celebrationis, the law of the place where the 
ceremony takes place. A marriage celebrated in accordance with the form prescribed, 
or one of the forms permitted, by the local law of the country of celebration, or 
complying at least with the mandatory formal requirements of that law, will always be 
recognised as formally valid almost everywhere. This is because the recognition of 
such a marriage as valid under the parties' personal laws and in third countries will 
normally be ensured as a result of the wide acceptance of the locus regit actum. 
It is evident that the submission of the formal validity of marriage to the lex loci 
celebrationis reflects the importance that countries attach, as an incident of their 
sovereignty, to regulating just how and by whom marriages may be solemnised within 
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their territories. It is true that the country of the place of celebration, though it may be a 
transient place of resort for the would-be spouses, has an interest in prescribing the 
formalities which must be observed in order to bring about the issue of a marriage 
licence and the registration of a marriage for purpose of proof. Furthermore, the 
application of the lex loci celebrationis to determine matters relating to formalities of 
marriage is clearly consistent with the lex magistratus principle by virtue of which 
public authorities in a given country must decide their competence to celebrate 
marriages on the ground of their domestic law and proceed to do so in accordance with 
formalities required under the same law . It is therefore apparent that marriage officials 
in the country of celebration cannot reasonably be expected to celebrate marriages in 
accordance with the law of other countries. 
Indeed, the lex loci celebrationis appears to be the most convenient and appropriate law 
to govern the formal validity of marriage not only because it protect the public interest 
of the country of celebration, but also because it eliminates the vast majority of practical 
problems to which the unfortunate concept of referring formal validity to any other law 
may give rise. It is equally clear that the principle is one of convenience; parties to a 
marriage must be free to use a form which is required or available to them where they 
are at the time of the ceremony simply because they have easy access for local legal 
advice. The suggested rule would seem to have the advantage of achieving legal 
certainty, predictability , uniformity of decisions, as well as reducing the possible 
occasions for limping marriages. Furthermore, the policy considerations of upholding 
the reasonable expectations of the parties, safeguarding the reliability of local records, 
validation and international uniformity of decisions seem to be in favour of referring 
formal validity to " the most settled principle of enlightened jurisprudence". 
Certainly, the lex loci celebrationis rule has the undoubted attraction of si mplicity, and 
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would be a most attractive one if it was interpreted in quite the same sense and applied 
with entire consistency among legal systems. Although this rule clarified the situation 
and the insuperable difficulties which existed when the forms of marriage celebration 
were governed by the law of the husband's domicile; the rule itself is surrounded by 
enormous problems which may render it an intricate and a difficult rule to apply. In the 
first place, the varying interpretations to which the locus regit actum rule is subjected 
among legal systems is clearly one of the reasons for the spreading of limping 
marriages. In many legal systems, including English and Scottish laws, the rule is 
expressed in a sense that the application of the law of the place of celebration to the 
formalities of marriage is imperative and compulsory, irrespective of whether the 
marriage takes place within the forum or abroad. According to this approach, which 
appears to be based on the concepts of sovereignty and convenience, compliance with 
the local form is not only sufficient but also necessary for the validity of the marriage. 
No marriage celebrated in any other form, for example, one provided by the parties' 
personal law , will be recognised as valid; unless the law of the place of celebration 
regards such a form as sufficient for the validity of the marriage or unless under the 
"local law impossible" argument. This contrasts with the position in some legal 
systems, where the locus regit actum rule is facultative by virtue of which the parties 
have a choice to comply either with the form required by the local law or with the form 
laid down by their personal laws. It is therefore clear that in those systems a marriage 
is formally valid if it is solemnised according to the formalities prescribed by either the 
local law or the parties' personal laws. It is also interesting to emphasise that most 
legal systems adopt a rather startling view based on a combination of both these rules: 
parties celebrating their marriage within the forum must comply with local law 
formalities; but parties marrying abroad must observe the formalities prescribed either 
by the law of the place of celebration or by their personal laws. This approach is too 
much lex fori-oriented and therefore inappropriate and unacceptable in the field of 
conflict of laws, where international comity requires that, on questions of form, each 
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legal system should recognise the marriage laws of another system. Nevertheless, the 
main reason is that this view does not recognise the strong and legitimate interest of the 
foreign country of celebration in the application of its own formal requirements to 
marriages solemnised within its territory, an interest which the forum strongly claims 
for itself as being the lex loci celebrationis. 
The difficulties which these different interpretations of the lex loci celebrationis cause 
when the legal systems adopting them interact are very well known. The situation 
where the marriage is celebrated in a form prescribed by the parties' personal law but 
not considered as such by the law of the place of celebration would certainly create a 
limping marriage and would also give rise to certain problems insofar as the recognition 
of the marriage in third countries is concerned. Suppose that two Scottish subjects 
domiciled in Scotland celebrated a marriage in France in accordance with Scottish law 
formalities. The marriage will be declared void in Scotland as the French forms has not 
been observed. Nevertheless, if an Algerian court has to decide the issue of validity of 
this marriage it will be declared valid for it is celebrated according to the parties' 
personal law , i.e. Scottish law. This is because the maxim locus regit actum, although 
recognised in principle, is regarded as a facultative rule in Algerian law under which 
compliance with the common personal law of the parties is sufficient for the validity of 
the marriage. 
The present writer believes that the seductive simplicity of the lex loci celebrationis 
would neither facilitates the conclusion of marriage, nor promotes the prevailing policy 
considerations as to universal validity of marriage, international uniformity of decisions 
and extirpation of limping marriages; unless it is understood and applied in quite the 
same sense among legal systems. It is interesting to emphasise that the imperative 
approach of the lex loci celebrationis seems neither warranted by the historical reasons 
behind the introduction of the maxim locus regit actum as a choice of law rule, nor to 
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be in accord with the existing divergences between legal systems which regards the 
marriage as a sacrament, and those considering it as a secular act. The underlying 
reason is that the exceptions to which the lex loci celebrationis rule is subjected to 
among legal systems strongly assert that the general choice of law rule should not be 
applied imperatively especially where it would entail hardship to the parties 
disprop0l1ionate to the benefit of the law of the country of celebration. The imperative 
character of the lex loci celebrationis does not work satisfactorily in many cases 
involving certain religious orders, particularly when the parties' personal law insists on 
extraterritorial observance of the religious form and the country of celebration demands 
compliance with its own civil form within its boundaries. In such cases, it would seem 
that the only acceptable solution in the conflict of laws literature is that the parties must 
go through both ceremonies in order to affect a universal valid marriage. Although this 
might not seem an undue hardship -and perhaps not a precaution which would be 
unreasonable to suggest- a better optional rule can be devised. It could be therefore 
argued that the imperative approach of the lex loci celebrationis is unsupported by early 
precedents which indicate the principle is in essence flexible, reflects no decernible 
policy and is inconsistent with the traditionally accepted principle, i.e. international 
comity. Furthermore, international uniformity of conflict of law rules strongly requires 
cooperation among legal systems to the extent that they should respect the rules of each 
other, as far as they do not offend their public policy. One might therefore argue that 
consideration of the form prescribed by the parties ' personal law in the country of 
celebration does not offend the public policy of that country. 
Consequently, there is some reason to believe that the facultative approach is indeed the 
most appropriate view which supports the maxim locus regit actum, the prevailing 
policy of justice, as well as materializing the interwoven objectives of a conflict solution 
which is fair to the parties and a result which corresponds to their justified expectations. 
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Relying on the fact that marriage is an act of such importance and personal character 
affecting both the parties and the ethical well-being of society, it would be short-sighted 
to ignore the fact that the parties often desire to avail themselves of the familiar form of 
their own law even when they have the legal possibility to use the form prescribed by 
the foreign lex loci celebrationis. Apart from this pragmatic assertion, the facultative 
approach is also consistent with the main reason behind the introduction of the maxim 
locus regit actum as a choice of law rule so as to facilitate celebration of marriages, and 
more importantly is in favour of promoting the relevance of the above mentioned policy 
considerations in respect of the validity of marriage. Certainty, predictability, 
international uniformity of decisions, the policy of upholding the parties' reasonable 
expectations,Javor matrimonii principle, and above all the desire to eliminate limping 
marriages provide therefore an impressive support for this approach. Certainly, the 
facultative approach of the lex loci celebrationis would have the merit to bring about a 
certain rapprochement between legal systems which regards marriage as a sacrament 
and those systems under which it is considered as a civil act. 
Nevertheless, one might argue that this approach is inconsistent with the traditionally 
accepted principle of lex magistratus by virtue of which the marriage officials in the 
country of celebration cannot reasonably be expected to be aware of, and comply with, 
the laws of other jurisdictions. Justified by the practical advantages of its application 
within the sphere of formal validity of marriage, the facultative approach would not 
require any local authority of the country of celebration to celebrate marriage within 
their territory according to foreign laws. The approach can be expressed only in the 
sense that the parties have the right to avail themselves of the familiar form prescribed 
under their personal law by celebrating their marriage before the diplomatic or consular 
representatives of their country in the place of celebration. It is interesting to note that 
this view has been adopted by new German Act 1986 relative to private international 
law. Article 13 (3) provides that a marriage in Germany can be solemnised only in the 
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form prescribed by German law; but nevertheless a marriage of parties neither of whom 
is German national can always be celebrated before any person duly authorised by the 
law of the country to which either of the parties belong and in accordance with the form 
prescribed by that law. 
Accordingly, celebration of marriage before diplomatic and consular representatives, or 
any other persons authorised by the sending state for that matter is the only way 
through which the facultative approach can be implemented successfully, a way that 
appears to be generally acceptable among legal systems. Consular marriage can be seen 
as an option, or an additional service offered by the sending state to its subjects, even 
though sufficient facilities exist under the local law . It is also important to argue that 
the English and Scottish view, by virtue of which an authorised diplomatic or consular 
officer cannot celebrate a marriage if there are sufficient facilities under the local law, is 
now ripe to be abandoned. The application of the lex loci celebrationis facultatively 
would render the situations, where the use of the local form is impossible, scarce if not 
non-existent. 
The universal adoption of the facultative approach of lex loci celebrationis might 
remove or mitigate the human hardships and legal problems arising out of clashes of 
different policies. It is reasonable to think that, for avoiding criticism, this approach 
must be held in check by some restricting conditions, i.e. the parties may use their 
personal law forms if they belong to a common personal law, or if the forms prescribed 
by their personal laws coincide. It is clear that the lex loci celebrationis applies 
imperatively in cases where (i) one the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the 
country of celebration, (ii) the personal laws of the parties require different forms. 
Secondly, it is obvious that the application of the lex loci celebrationis rule in its 
present form faces certain problems arising from the existing divergences as to the type 
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of marriage ceremonies among legal systems. In principle, as has already been pointed 
out, a fundamental difference of attitude concerning forms of marriage exists between 
legal systems where marriage is regarded as a secular act, and those systems where it is 
viewed as a sacrament. As regards this issue, one might distinguish three different 
systems. In most legal systems, including English and Scottish laws, the nature of the 
ceremony is irrelevant, if the necessary celebration has taken place in accordance with 
the legal requirements prescribed by their own domestic law. Accordingly, a marriage 
would be held valid if it is solemnised either in a civil or religious ceremony. This 
contrasts with the position in certain legal systems where the fonn of marriage has been 
secularised, on one hand, and those systems under which marriage remains a purely 
religious institution on the other. In legal systems where civil ceremony is compulsory, 
a marriage can only be solemnised before the civil officials who have the authority to 
celebrate marriages within their territories. It is equally clear that in most of these 
systems, though the religious marriage is not precluded and not legally binding, the 
parties to a marriage cannot even go through a religious ceremony before the civil one 
has taken place. Nevertheless, they recognise as formally valid marriages solemnised 
by their citizens abroad in accordance with lex loci celebrationis, even if the ceremony 
is a religious one. For instance, if a French person marries in Cyprus where the 
religious ceremony is compulsory, the marriage will be held valid as to form in France, 
notwithstanding the fact that French domestic law only countenances the civil ceremony 
of marriage. The position is different in the legal systems where the religious ceremony 
is compulsory, for they require extraterritorial application of this principle for marriages 
taking place abroad. Accordingly, celebration in the proper religious form is not only 
sufficient but also necessary for the validity of the marriage whenever one of the parties 
owe allegiance qua personal law to one of these countries, regardless of the place of 
celebration. A matter of notoriety among English and Scottish conflict lawyers after the 
Maltese marriage cases. 
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The problems which these imperative rules cause when they interact with the laws of 
those countries which require a civil ceremony as a matter of strong public policy 
would certainly render the simplicity and the relevance of the lex loci celebrationis as 
an appropriate choice of law rule exceedingly difficult to be maintained in conflict of 
laws. This is particularly obvious when a person whose personal law requires extra-
territorial observance of the religious ceremony attempts to marry in a country where 
compliance with the local civil ceremony is essential to the validity of the marriage. In 
these situations the marriage will certainly be a limping one whether it is celebrated in a 
religious ceremony or in a civil ceremony. Looking for an escape from the dilemma of 
an insoluble conflict, most scholars suggest that the only conclusive way to avoid the 
impasse and thus safeguard the universal validity of marriage is that the parties should 
go through both the civil ceremony required by the law of the country of celebration 
and the religious ceremony prescribed by their personal law . 
In pursuance of such an unprincipled approach, certain legislators and academic writers 
on the continent have argued the need to encourage the parties to adopt this course as 
essential if the solution would stand a chance of achieving its aim. The West German 
Service Instructions Act 1968 seems to provide a good example of such existing 
practices which serve as a reminder for the parties of the requirements of their personal 
law in order to prevent limping marriages. Where the parties' personal law insists on 
extraterritorial observance of a religious ceremony for the creation of a valid marriage, 
the 1968 Act provides that the registrar should urge the parties to produce a certificate 
by virtue of which the minister of the Church to which they belong declares himself 
prepared to celebrate the marriage in religious form once the local civil ceremony has 
been performed. This provision does not, however, afford any watertight guarantee 
against the creation of limping marriage, for the registrar has to celebrate the marriage in 
civil form even if the parties fail to produce the relevant certificate, notwithstanding that 
it will not be recognised by the parties' personal law. 
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A more radical academic approach, which has not been accepted in practice, designed to 
prevent limping marriages is that the civil form prescribed by the lex loci celebrationis 
should not be available to the parties unless the necessary religious ceremony required 
by their personal law has been performed. This view can be criticised on the basis that 
it is difficult to imagine how is the marriage officer of the lex loci to know that the 
personal law has been complied with? It is true these solutions, though they may 
reduce the number of unnecessary limping marriages, and whether they are framed 
subjectively or objectively, cannot safeguard the values of certainty, predictability, 
international uniformity of decisions, as well as the universal validity of marriage. It is 
also clear that this unprincipled approach can only be seen as a good illustration of the 
unwillingness of many legal systems to compromise their traditional rules of choice of 
law, a factor that stands in the way of international cooperation. This approach would 
be virtually unworkable in the situations where the religious body to which the parties 
belong does not exist in the country of celebration, as well as where the parties have not 
received any legal advice to that effect. 
If the compulsory systems remains as they stand at present, one might argue that the 
only realistic option is that the law of the place of celebration would have to admit the 
exigence of the religious ceremony required by the parties' personal law . Furthermore, 
the state which requires such form as essential to the validity of marriage would have to 
restrict the application of its own law to marriages between parties both of whom owe 
allegiance qua personal law to that state. It is therefore clear that where the parties 
belong to the same faith and are domiciled or nationals of a country which regards 
religious ceremony as essential, the lex loci celebrationis must allow the parties to use 
the religious form in order to create a universally valid marriage. But the local form 
becomes imperative if one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the country of 
celebration, or the parties belong to different countries which require different forms for 
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the celebration of marriage. In these situations, it is clear that the party's personal law 
which requires a religious ceremony as essential must recognise the validity of the 
marriage. This view clearly commends itself on practical and policy grounds, namely, 
favor matrimonii principle and the desire to prevent limping marriages. 
Aside from this pragmatic approach, the present writer believes that the compulsory 
systems are now ripe to be abandoned, insofar as they are historical relics for which 
there is hardly sufficient justification at the present time. There is no doubt that the 
present compulsory civil system is based on tradition and a postulate of 'lalcite' dating 
back to the nineteenth century by virtue of which the civil form of marriage became 
imperative in the domestic laws of the countries in question where it was thought 
necessary to fight for the complete secularisation or separation of state and church. It is 
also equally clear that the present compulsory religious system rests not only on the 
tradition that the imperative character of religious ceremony has its roots in the concept 
of marriage as a sacrament, but also on the desire to prevent secularisation from gaining 
support within the territories of the countries concerned. This can be illustrated by the 
fact that certain countries where religious ceremony is compUlsory, like Egypt and 
Israel, do not insist on extraterritorial application of this principle for marriages 
celebrated abroad. Moreover, one might argue that the systematic exclusion of foreign 
laws requiring religious forms of marriage is too conceptualistic and unacceptable in 
practice for it often violates the religious convictions of the parties, leads to limping 
marriages and it stands in the way of international cooperation. Along the same lines, 
one might point out that the insistence on religious ceremony even for foreigners whose 
personal law prescribes a civil ceremony, though it does not lead to limping marriages 
in most cases, is also unacceptable for it is contrary to the demands of international 
cooperation, and the prevailing policy by virtue of which the celebration of marriage in 
a purely civil form must be guaranteed. It is interesting to note, however, that the 
prevalence both of secular and religious matrimonial laws are firmly established to the 
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extent that they are no longer require the fortifying support of conflict of laws. 
One might therefore say that the system of optional civil or religious form of marriage is 
the most appropriate and the realistic option which would certainly eliminates the vast 
majority of practical problems to which the unfortunate compUlsory systems give rise. 
This system would not then entail the anomalous and wholly unacceptable consequence 
that the status of marriage resulting from civil ceremony is something radically different 
form that produced by a religious ceremony. Clearly the optional system commends 
itself on practical grounds. The characteristic feature of this system is that both civil 
and religious ceremony relate to form, and thus they can only be considered as different 
ways leading to the same result since the status of marriage produced in each case is 
clearly identical. The underlying reason is that the ceremony of marriage is not an aim 
in itself [as it is considered in the compulsory systems], but it is only the material 
support and the external conduct in which the consent of the parties is expressed. It is 
also clear that the purposes which the formalities serve, such as the publication and the 
finality of the solemnised act, are common to any kind of marriage ceremony. 
Unlike the compulsory systems, the optional approach would certainly achieve legal 
certainty, predictability, international uniformity of decisions, universal validity of 
marriage, and above all would render the creation of limping marriages exceedingly 
difficult if not impossible. The policy of upholding the reasonable expectations of the 
parties, favor matrimonii principle, and the prevailing policy of justice seem to provide 
support for this approach. Certainly, the optional system would have the merit of a 
solution which is fair to the parties and support a result which corresponds to their 
justified expectations. It is interesting to note that this view has been adopted both by 
the Greek Civil Marriage Act 1982 and the Spanish Marriage Act 1981 which provide 
that the parties have the option to celebrate their marriage in civil or religious forms. It 
is therefore clear that the universal adoption ofthis system would certainly eliminate the 
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human hardships and legal problems arising out of clashes of the compulsory systems. 
An optional rule -allowing the celebration of a marriage in either ceremony- should be 
preferred to an imperative one based on a pre-eminence of either type of ceremony, and 
the above mentioned Greek and Spanish tendency in this direction is to be welcomed. 
Nevertheless, there is some reason to think that the celebration of marriage in a 
religious form may raise certain practical problems as far as the registration of marriage 
is concerned. Whatever merits this argument might have, it can hardly justify the 
rejection of an approach that is appropriate and acceptable to most legal systems in the 
world. None of these problems, however, seems unsurmountable, as may easily be 
seen in the countries where the optional system is already in force. The English and 
Scottish laws seem to provide a good example, inasmuch as the state exercises control 
over the legal preliminaries to, and subsequent registration of, religious marriages. The 
Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, for instance, provides clearly that a religious celebrant 
cannot solemnise a marriage unless the parties produce to him a marriage schedule 
which serves as a marriage licence authorising the celebrant to perform the marriage. 
The application of the lex loci celebrationis rule faces another difficulty which is related 
to the problem of characterisation arising out of the dichotomy of form and substance. 
As a practical matter, however, the issue of characterisation has been considered only in 
the context of parental consent; the selective area where conflict of law problems 
commonly arise. It has been already indicated that characterisation of parental consent, 
in English and Scottish laws, as a matter of formality in all cases is subjected to much 
academic criticism, and it appears to be out of touch with present day social realities. 
This approach is a historical relic, which is based on the cases decided at a time when 
both formal and essential validity were governed by the lex loci celebrationis, for 
which there is hardly any logical or policy justification today. The decision in Ogden v. 
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Ogden, for instance, is a very much descridited authority not only because it 
contravenes international comity doctrine, but also because it undermines the very basis 
of the English and Scottish choice of law rules, and promotes limping marriages. A 
better rule would perhaps have been found if it was not for the misleading habit of 
English judges and writers in asserting that parental consent is a formality, instead of 
only stating that it does not invalidate a marriage in English matrimonial law . 
Certainly, the law of the forum must decide whether the relevant foreign rules relate to 
the formalities or to the essentials of marriage not only because characterisation is an 
issue for the lex fori, but also because the real issue is one of establishing a choice of 
law rule. It is submitted that the most rational method by which full and proper effect 
can be given to the forum's choice of law rules is that foreign rules establishing 
impediments to marriage should be examined in their foreign setting in order to decide 
whether they relate to the forms or the essence of the marriage. The underlying reason 
is that it is impracticable and unsatisfactory to characterise all requirements of parental 
consent, for example, automatically as pertaining to form; a view that would promote 
rather than prevent limping marriages. It is thus clear that this approach has the merit of 
being consistent with the relevant policy considerations in respect of the validity of 
marriage. It is also true that it is consistent with policy consideration behind section 3 
(5) of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 which is designed to discourage "runaway" 
marriages. Finally, the proposed approach would have certainly resulted in a different 
decision in the case of Bliersbach v. MacEwan and in the much criticised case of Ogden 
v.ogden. 
The determination of a general choice of law rule to govern the substantive validity of 
marriage is an even more complicated and confused area in the doctrine and practice of 
contemporary conflict of laws -not least because the significance of the institution of 
marriage is so closely connected to the morals and religious attitudes prevailing in each 
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society. Divergences between conflict approaches within the present subject-matter 
lies, however, not only in the existing fundamental differences among legal systems as 
to the nature and the purpose of the essential requirements, but also in the disregard of 
the importance of the temporal dimension of conflict rules. Moreover, the existence of 
conflicting theories is clearly a consequence of the unfortunate disagreement among 
scholars on the nature of the appropriate policy considerations that can best provide a 
principled basis for a general choice of law rule leading to a just result in the vast 
majority of normal cases, and setting up a clear guide to be of assistance to the 
registrars and similar officials who have, outside the courts, to ascertain the validity of 
marriage at the time ofthe ceremony. 
It has been submitted that the idea of submitting the entire validity of marriage to a 
single law system, namely, the lex loci celebrationis, is the most appropriate and 
convenient approach leading to a simple and fair solution of the present problems. The 
underlying reason is that it favours legal certainty and predictability, and it facilitates the 
role of the marriage officials to the extent that they do not have to investigate and apply 
foreign law to determine the issue of capacity to marry. Certainly, one might argue that 
reliance on the law of the place of celebration would be universally acceptable if, and 
only if, the fundamental requirements for marriage are uniform among legal systems -a 
uniformity which is beyond reach because of the existence of different social, religious 
and legal cultures. There is little merit, moreover, in the application of the law of the 
place of celebration which may only have a fortuitous or fleeting connection with the 
marriage, for it enables the parties to evade their personal laws, leads to limping 
marriages and renders the non-universal impediments more or less illusory. The 
equation of essential with formal validity is no longer appropriate insofar as it is hardly 
realistic to expect that the country to which the parties belong will be prepared to 
recognise the validity of the union if it is contrary to its public policy. Therefore, it 
does seem to be a retrograde step to re-introduce into the field of substantive validity of 
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marriage an approach, abandoned some 120 years ago, which would achieve neither 
legal certainty and predictability, nor international uniformity of decisions. 
It is interesting to see that the flexible approaches seemingly based on the English 
judicial opinions voiced in more recent years, suggesting the accommodation of the 
needs of each individual case, have only succeeded in adding further confusion to an 
already confused subject. What is most curious, and indeed uncharacteristic, about 
these approaches is that they are based on the assumption that the purpose of a choice 
of law rule is the determination of the essential validity at the time of the proceedings, 
insofar as the validity of marriage is regarded as retrospective concept: the real issue is 
whether the ceremony which allegedly took place had the legal effect of creating a valid 
marriage. The advocates of the alternative views have failed, however, to recognise the 
importance of the role that marriage officials assume among legal systems to prevent 
illegal and incestuous marriages; a role that is countenanced by the preventive nature of 
the essential requirements of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage officials have no 
constructive role at all in the determination of the validity issue for they are required to 
perform the marriage ceremony anyway and advise the parties to set up a matrimonial 
home in a country which would validate the marriage. In practice, this would amount 
to stripping from the marriage officialls an essential part of their function -indeed to the 
extent of reducing their role to little more than a courteous presence, as well as to the 
disregard of the preventive nature of the substantive requirements of marriage. Hence, 
it is clearly unacceptable to leave the marriage in limbo until the parties move to an 
accommodatingjurisdiction. 
Certainly, it is difficult to imagine any relevant policy considerations, which are far 
more important at the time of the ceremony, that might provide a sound policy basis for 
either the real and substantial connection test, alternative reference test, elective dual 
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domicile test, or even for the intended matrimonial home test. The adoption of any of 
these flexible tests as a general choice of law rule to determine the essential validity of 
marriage, however, seems neither warranted on principle, nor to be in accord with the 
more recent English judicial opinions interpreted by the advocates of these approaches 
in a manner which is far from being the reasonable and valid interpretation. In fact, 
there is absolutely no evidence to be found in the decisions in Radwan v. Radwan and 
Lawrence v. Lawrence, for instance, to support the contention that the judges have 
identified and discussed the most pertinent issue, namely the appropriate general choice 
of law rule to govern the essential validity of marriage. With the knowledge of English 
lawyer's case-minded approach to law it is perhaps not astonishing that the advocates 
of the alternative views have found it impossible to concede that the above decisions did 
not establish a general choice of law rule for the solution of the problem. Furthermore, 
the doctrinal mishmash found in these judicial opinions misleads because the reasoning 
of the court does not adequately explain the true ground for the decision reached; a 
matter that lead to different academic interpretations. Nevertheless, one might argue 
that the only thing that the judges did actually decide in the above cases was that there 
was no compelling reason for invalidating a long-standing relationship which was valid 
under the law of the country where the parties have established their actual matrimonial 
home. While it seems that the policy of upholding the parties' reasonable expectations 
and the Favor matrimonii principle justify the acceptability of the actual outcome in 
these cases, there is hardly any logical justification for considering these policy issues 
as fundamental bases for a general conflict rule. This is because the principle of favor 
matrimonii should not be interpreted in a sense that the validity of marriages must be 
upheld irrespective of other considerations; but it does simply mean that a marriage 
should not be invalidated without good reason. It is clear that the alternative views can 
only be seen as vague and perverse ideas, suggesting the determination of the validity 
of marriage on the basis of elusive concepts such as intention, or real and substantial 
connection, which furnish little guidance in conflict cases. Consequently, these views 
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offer no reasonable solution for the problem for they fail to deal with the underlying 
malaise in the subject-matter, whose root cause is the inappropriate way in which the 
traditional general choice oflaw rule is applied at the time of the marriage ceremony. 
In any event the new approaches have highlighted the tension between predictability 
and flexibility -the hallmark of conflict oflaws in the second half of this century. It is 
an overstatement to say that certainty and flexibility are inconsistent because "certainty 
requires rigid rules, and flexibility is the antithesis of rigidity". The new approaches 
have abandoned generally accepted notions about nature of legal rules and judicial law-
making, insofar as they suggest that the elaboration of rules must be rejected because of 
their rigidity -their failure to accommodate interests other than certainty. However, the 
new approaches seem unnecessarily lopsided ways in which to resolve the tension 
between certainty and flexibility in conflict of laws. Furthermore, the flexibility that 
has been introduced is so unguided for it would undermine legal security, and certainly 
would not achieve the uniformity of decisions in the international context. Therefore, 
the better view seems to be the recognition of the existence of the tension and make 
continued efforts to achieve an acceptable balance which should be expressed in results 
from decisional practice rather than through repudiation of rigid rules. There can be no 
doubt that the English judges in Radwan v. Radwan and Lawrence v. Lawrence have 
shown initiative and an ability to deal with the occasional outrageous results to which 
the application of the general choice of law rule in the subject matter may lead. 
It is also through concern for realism and flexibility that, not surprisingly, certain 
English writers have put forward an even more radical approach according to which the 
insufficient relation between various issues of essential validity embodied in the present 
broad category of capacity to marry justifies the application of different choice of law 
rules for different issues. It is argued that this approach cannot be regarded as the 
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realistic and appropriate way in which the needs for choice of law rules can be 
reconciled with the demands of justice. It is certainly hard to argue against the desire 
for justice but, in fact, that is not a sufficient justification for the acceptance of a 
cumbersome and unwieldy test that creates confusion, uncertainty and inconsistency. 
The theoretical bases for this approach are inadequate for they are inferred from yet 
another unconvincing interpretation of the more recent English judicial opinions which 
are based, not on general principles but, on the particular factual context of each case. 
In the first place, it is reasonably clear that Cumming-Bruce J.'s statement (it is an 
over-simplification for the Common law to assume that the test for purposes of choice 
of law applies to every kind of incapacity ... ) in Radwan v. Radwan would have never 
amounted to anything more than a strong desire to avoid the pitfalls of the traditional 
choice of law rule, if it is interpreted in the whole context of his judgements. Secondly, 
the decisions in Radwan v. Radwan and Lawrence v. Lawrence, being based on the 
considerations of justice, are not authorities for the repudiation of the traditional choice 
oflaw rule altogether, let alone authorities for such a new approach which would only 
produce unnecessary complexity in the structure of the conflict of law rules. It is also 
clear that the argument that a choice of law rule needs to achieve perfect justice every 
time it is invoked in order to be an appropriate rule is not easily reconcilable with any 
generally accepted notions about the nature oflegal rules and judicial law-making. It is 
also difficult to imagine the achievement of perfect justice in every case as a basis for a 
test which would not achieve such a goal even in the above cases, from which it is 
seemingly inferred, if the facts were appropriately reversed. 
In addition to its wholly inadequate theoretical foundations, the approach's conceptual 
instrumentarium is seriously deficient. If the occasional outrageous results of the 
traditional choice of law rule are disturbing, so are the consequences that follow from a 
piecemeal approach which increases the possibility of depe9age -that is to say the 
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application of substantive rules derived from more than one legal system to determine 
different aspects of essential validity of the same marriage. Moreover, this test would 
afford too uncertain a guide to be followed by the marriage officials administering this 
part of the law, for they are in an unfavourable position to carry out investigations into 
one foreign legal system, let alone different legal systems at the same time. Therefore, 
one might argue that the remedy for the occasional outrageous result of the traditional 
choice of law rule lies in a carefully considered approach, not in an unprincipled test 
which, though boldly creative, distorts the preventive nature of the essential conditions 
of marriage and applies principles which, torn from their context, may lead to result 
different from those which were expected. 
In my opinion, any conflict approach dealing with the determination of an appropriate 
general choice of law rule in the present subject-matter must reflect the basic preventive 
nature of the essential requirements of marriage which has been completely ignored by 
all the valiant intellectual efforts lavished on the subject. The underlying reason is that 
these requirements can be seen as rules of immediate application, non-observance of 
which should prevent the celebration of marriage altogether, insofar as their purpose is 
to prevent the creation of relationships which are offensive to the morals and religious 
principles prevailing in the country concerned. Accordingly, marriage officials must 
not proceed with the celebration of a marriage unless they are satisfied that there is no 
impediment to the proposed union under the relevant law. It is also interesting to note 
that reconciliation of the dichotomy between the selection of the applicable law and the 
concern for the just substantive result does not certainly require the repUdiation of a 
choice of law rule for its rigidity or inability to achieve perfect justice in the occasional 
hard cases arising when the marriage validity is examined ex post. No one denies that 
the traditional general choice of law rule may, in certain cases, lead to undesirable or 
even absurd results the redress of which can easily be achieved, not by the repUdiation 
of the rule but, through the judges' ability to disregard it and find the just substantive 
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result required by the particular factual context of such cases. Furthermore, if the 
conflict of laws is concerned only with the questions of the workability of any rule 
within the court process and what is the proper result instead of what is the proper 
rationale for the feasibility of any rule outside that process, the danger of parochial 
decision-making is great. 
It is, of course, clear that the general choice of law rule governing substantive validity 
of marriage, that may claim universal acceptability, should be a rule that can be applied 
primarily at the time of the formation of the union insofar as the real issue is what legal 
requirements the parties must satisfy at that time in order to contract a valid marriage. 
The present writer therefore believes that the existing general choice of law rule, both in 
Common and Civil law countries, is the most appropriate rule to determine the matter in 
question simply because the parties' prenuptial personal laws -whether determined by 
domicile or nationality- can be easily ascertained and applied effectively at the time of 
the marriage ceremony. The great merit of this approach is that it identifies clearly the 
necessity of respecting the impeccable nature of the essential requirements of marriage 
the observance of which must be irrevocably settled at the time of the formation of the 
union. It is also clear that it provides an immaculate and effective guide for marriage 
officials to determine with certainty whether the parties have complied with the essential 
requirements of marriage under their personal laws. If the marriage official proceeds 
with the solemnisation of a marriage without deciding the issue of whether the parties 
have capacity to marry, the result will be virtually the denaturation of the substantive 
requirements or, which is the same, the conclusion that they do not in reality constitute 
legal impediments which would prevent the creation of illegal and incestuous 
marriages. In practice, the preventive application of the personal law is therefore far 
more important than its application within the court process when the validity of a 
marriage is examined ex post. There is no doubt that the protection of the personal law 
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should not be denied to the parties, nor should the parties be allowed to frustrate the 
requirements of that law by anticipating a change of domicile or nationality which may 
occur subsequently, a matter that may not happen in practice at all. 
Indeed, the present approach is based on impeccable logic and the level of predictability 
of result one may expect is very high. With its emphasis on the application of the 
choice of law rule outside the courtroom process, this approach does in reality foster 
the conception of normative principles, namely, the preventive nature of the substantive 
requirements in question, certainty and stability of marriage status which is a matter of 
public concern. Reliance on the true conflict values and the efficiency of normative 
criteria clearly demands the adoption of this test as a rule in which all values that affect 
the choice of law process can be coordinated. The test would necessarily entail a 
certain respect between legal systems, promote international uniformity, and would 
help to eliminate limping marriages. It is also consistent with at least the parties' major 
expectation, i.e. the validity of their marriage, as it enables them to know their legal 
position without necessitating resort to courts. Accordingly, it would simplify the 
judicial task inasmuch as its effective application at the time of the ceremony would 
render the hard cases, where it may lead to outrageous results, rather rare. 
It has been argued that the prenuptial personal law approach, however, is not quite the 
force to simplify the judicial task and to prevent evasion that it is claimed to be. From a 
theoretical point of view this may be true, but one cannot lay the blame for this on the 
normative criteria of the general conflict rule. In fact, the fault lies in the inappropriate 
way in which the general conflict rule is applied at the time of the marriage ceremony. 
That is the result of the existence of certain antiquated legal rules which obfuscate rather 
than illuminate the present choice of law problem. The ingenious French bureaucratic 
legal rule is a perfect example. Although, according to French legal theory, the capacity 
to marry depends on the parties' prenuptial national laws, the French registrars have 
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been instructed not to inquire into foreign law ex officio. Accordingly, the registrars 
should solemnise marriages whenever French domestic law requirements are fulfilled, 
notwithstanding that "Ie certificat de coutume" produced by the parties reveals the 
existence of an impediment under the relevant foreign law. It is obvious that this rule 
diminishes the preventive function of the relevant conflict rule as it substitutes the lex 
loci celebrationis for the parties' personal law. Furthermore, the discussion of choice 
of law problems of marriage in England and Scotland, that is exclusively concerned 
with the judicial decisions, provides another good example. Although English and 
Scottish registrars are instructed to give effect to any legal impediment brought to their 
notice, it is not a normal practice for the registrars to establish ex officio the content of 
the relevant foreign law. This can be seen, for instance, through section 3(5) of the 
Marriage(Scotland)Act 1977 by virtue of which a foreigner who is, not domiciled in 
the United Kingdom, a party to a marriage intended to be celebrated in Scotland is 
required to submit a certificate of capacity, issued by a competent authority in the state 
of his domicile, to the effect that he is not known to be subject to any legal incapacity. 
In my opinion, these legal rules are now ripe to be abandoned because they render the 
structure of the relevant choice of law rule unduly complex, lead to numerous limping 
marriages and are contrary to the demands of international cooperation. The present 
practices rest on a postulate of marriage officials' less favourable position to inquire 
into foreign law ex officio that, given the recent developments of information 
technology, no longer requires the fortifying support of legal rules. The systematic 
exclusion of foreign laws at the time of the marriage ceremony amounts only to 
stripping from the relevant conflict rule an essential part of its function, indeed to the 
extent of reducing that rule to a little more than a courteous affirmation. The abolition 
of these rules is needed to eradicate uncertainty and complexity, and to ensure that the 
general conflict rule can be applied effectively so as to accomplish its modest goal of 
preventing the existence of illegal and incestuous relationships. 
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Certainly, the realization of an effecti ve application of the general conflict rule lies in the 
fact that marriage officials must play an active role in determining the issue of capacity 
to marry, indeed to the extent of establishing the content of the relevant foreign law ex 
officio. This is because invalidation of a marriage ex post has undesirable effects as 
the validity of most issues of status and of property depends upon whether the parties 
are validly married or not. But the usual sanction for failure to meet the requirements of 
marriage at the time of the ceremony is limited to the denial of celebration. Being aware 
of the marriage officials' unfavourable position for carrying out investigations into 
foreign laws, certain devices such as "certificate of custom" and certificate of capacity 
to marry have been adopted in some legal systems -enabling them to apply the relevant 
foreign law without misinterpretations. The French tradition with the "certificat de 
coutume" is not a reliable way for providing precise knowledge of the relevant foreign 
law as it involves greater risks that that law will be misinterpreted or mis-applied. The 
main reason is that such a certificate is not delivered by an official authority of the 
relevant foreign country, but it is issued by a lawyer of that country or even by a lawyer 
or an authority of the county of celebration. Moreover, it concerns only the 
reproduction of the relevant foreign legal rules, and it does not actually offer a minute 
examination of the pertinent questions -namely the ascertainment of the exact facts of 
the proposed union, the interpretation and application of the foreign provisions in issue-
that appear to be left to the ill-equipped local marriage officials. 
Indeed it has been argued that the most important device, which can assure the correct 
application of the foreign law and thus prevent the creation of limping marriages, is the 
certificate of capacity to marry if it is issued by the competent authorities of the foreign 
country concerned. However, apart from the fact that this certificate relieves the 
marriage officials from the necessity of ascertaining capacity motu proprio, it is my 
opinion that, given its status and non-universal character in the present legislations, it 
, 
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might fail to secure the correct application of the relevant foreign law, nor achieve 
international uniformity and decisional harmony. There is little merit in a certificate 
which relates only to the party's general capacity to marry and does not cover the exact 
facts of the proposed marriage, such as whether the parties are within the prohibited 
degrees of consanguinity and affinity. Furthermore, the practical importance of this 
certificate is now much reduced, for it is delivered without any serious investigation, 
and it does only prove that the party concerned has capacity to marry without specifying 
whether he or she is already married. Accordingly, the certificate of capacity to marry 
would not achieve even the very goal anticipated by its western promoters, namely, the 
protection of the institution of monogamy in western legal systems. 
The fact that the parties are exempted, in certain cases, from producing the certificate of 
capacity to marry is another practical reason which suggests its inability to assure the 
correct application of the relevant foreign law. According to English and Scottish laws, 
for instance, a foreigner is exempted from complying with this requirement if he has 
resided in the U.K. for two years preceding the marriage. This seems to be based on 
the fact that it is socially unacceptable for a person to leave his partner for such a long 
period of time. But reality shows that this factual situation goes even further than two 
years as far as immigrants from the third world countries, where polygamy is the norm, 
are concerned. In my opinion, the waiver of this certificate on the ground of two years 
residence in the United Kingdom should be abolished altogether as it goes against the 
very modest purpose of the certificate itself. 
It is my argument that creation of a coherent and completely satisfactory solution is only 
possible if each legal system is prepared to compromise its traditional rules of choice of 
law, to respect foreign laws, and to provide assistance for foreign marriage officials in 
order to ensure the correct application of its legal rules. There is no doubt that a 
uniform system of international mutual assistance would facilitate the task of marriage 
387 
officials to determine capacity to marry ex officio, relieve the parties concerned from 
the burden of substantiating foreign law and, above all, would contribute to the 
attainment of international uniformity of decisions. In practice, I believe, this system 
can be only achieved through the establishment of a marriage bureau in each country so 
as to deal with requests of foreign marriage officials, indeed to the extent of providing 
authentic and detailed information with regard to the issue of whether the parties have 
capacity to marry under the law of the country concerned. The formulation of an exact 
and precise reply does, of course, presuppose that the marriage official's request 
should not only state the necessary facts for its proper understanding, but also should 
be accompanied by copies of any official documents which may clarify its scope and, 
most importantly, should specify in exact terms the questions with which the marriage 
bureau should be concerned. This is because reliance on questions begging only the 
determination of the party's general capacity to marry does not establish precisely 
whether there is no legal impediment altogether to the proposed marriage. An English 
or a Scottish registrar, for instance, would be unable to find out whether the Algerian 
party is already married or not, if his request is based on the question whether the party 
concerned has capacity to marry. In this case, the marriage bureau in Algeria where 
polygamy is permitted would have no other alternative than replying in the affirmative 
even though that person is already married. 
The receiving marriage bureau must provide detailed information in an objective and 
impartial manner that would permit the foreign marriage official concerned to determine 
with certainty the issue of capacity, and thus apply the relevant foreign law without any 
misinterpretations. In practical terms, the relevant legal texts and judicial decisions 
must be enclosed simply because they are essential for the appropriate understanding of 
the reply. It is also logical that additional documents, such as explanatory notes and 
extracts from doctrinal works, must be attached where deemed necessary to clarify the 
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content of the reply. It is interesting to note that the preparation of such a conclusive 
reply requires the extension of the marriage notice period. For instance, it is obvious 
that the two weeks' marriage notice in England and Scotland is hardly sufficient for the 
formulation of the reply, let alone for the necessary investigations to be carried out. 
Although it might be argued that this minimum period should be retained as a general 
rule, marriage officials should not proceed with the celebration of a marriage involving 
a foreign element before they receive a reply from the marriage bureau of the country 
concerned. 
However, it might be argued that this system of international mutual assistance impedes 
the swift and inexpensive administration of law and justice, as well as being contrary to 
the prevailing policies of facilitating the solemnisation of marriages and upholding the 
reasonable expectations of the parties. In my opinion, this is hardly a valid argument. 
In the first place, it is obvious that the swift and inexpensive administration of law and 
justice is a futile and an unsound concept in areas such as conflict of laws marriage 
questions, where it is inappropriate. This is because considerations of justice outweigh 
the factor of time and cost, involved in the appropriate application of legal rules, that 
can only be seen as an acceptable price for the attainment of more rational and 
satisfactory solutions. Above all, the alignment of the proper application of the general 
choice of law rule to the particular necessities of the principle of universal validity of 
marriage demands that the true and faithful administration of the designated foreign law 
is not to be avoided on this precarious concept which is unworthy of a place in conflict 
of laws. It is therefore clear that the proposed system of international mutual assistance 
provides a suitable corrective mechanism. 
Secondly, it is hard to justify the principle of facilitating the solemnisation of marriages 
as a ground for rejecting the true and faithful administration of foreign law, insofar as 
the judicial authorities of the lex loci celebrationis qua lex fori will be obliged to annul 
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the marriage afterwards through the application of its general conflict rule. This is 
because the main purpose of the reference to foreign law is to ensure that the marriage 
is universally valid. Accordingly, the proposed system is rational inasmuch as this aim 
can only be achieved if the relevant foreign rules are effectively applied at the time of 
the marriage ceremony. It is equally true that a wise application of this system would 
promote the idea of a standard of international due process which includes special 
concern for the parties' reasonable expectations, mainly because the proper application 
of the general conflict rule at the time of the ceremony would foster certainty and 
predictability -the important values that are greatly needed for the endorsement of those 
expectations. It is therefore my opinion that this system is consistent with the 
reasonable expectations of the parties for the "plain man's view" that the marriage is 
valid once it has been celebrated should be upheld. 
It might further be argued that this system is unacceptable as it requires the extension of 
marriage notice period; a requirement which is enacted in the first place to be applied in 
domestic cases. From a theoretical point of view this may be true, but the present 
writer believes that the length of the marriage notice period, even in domestic cases, is 
not very important especially in the Western societies where people may live together 
for years before even they consider marriage. Furthermore, a layman would be 
prepared to wait for an extended period if that is what it takes to establish his reasonable 
expectation as to the universal validity of the marriage. 
In any event, the universal adoption of the idea of a marriage bureau as an efficient 
means of creating a system of international mutual assistance would certainly mitigate 
the human hardships and legal problems arising out of the consideration of the true and 
faithful administration of foreign laws as an onerous task, among legal systems, at the 
present time. It is submitted that the proposed solution provides a practical device 
leading to the proper application of the general choice of law rule at the time of the 
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ceremony, inasmuch as it offers the country to which the parties belong a chance to 
direct the ill-equipped foreign marriage officials to the right interpretation of its legal 
rules. It is thus a matter of principle that the country to which the parties belong at the 
time of the marriage ceremony should not be able to refuse recognition of the marriage 
on the ground of any incapacity if, and only if, there are no fraudulent circumstances or 
undisclosed facts affecting capacity to marry. But if the parties have not disclosed 
certain necessary facts that would have effect on the outcome, the marriage would be 
held void both in the country of celebration and the country of the personal laws. It is 
also clear that if the marriage officials failed to ask the right questions in a very concise 
and precise manner, the marriage once it has been celebrated should be held valid if it is 
regarded as such by the parties' personal laws, even though its celebration would not 
have been permitted in the fisrt place for reasons of public policy. 
The proposed solution has the merit of achieving legal certainty, predictability, 
universal validity of marriage, international uniformity of decisions, the prevailing 
policies as to the extirpation oflimping marriages and upholding the parties' reasonable 
expectations. Quite evidently, this solution would also render the hard cases, where the 
application of the general choice of law rule ex post would lead to undesirable results, 
rather rare in practice. This is because a marriage official should only celebtate a 
marriage ifthe essential requirements under the relevant law have been complied with, 
or if the only incapacity existing by that law is one which falls to be disregarded by the 
lex loci for reasons of public policy. 
Certainly, the arguments in favour of the parties' pre-marital personal laws as a general 
choice of law rule are so convincing that this principle ought to be the starting-point in 
the courtroom process when the forum's judicial authorities examine the validity of the 
marriage ex post. This, however, does not in itself rule out the possibility of departure 
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from this principle when its application leads to the outrageous result of invalidating a 
long-standing relationship which no longer has any connection with the country of the 
parties' prenuptial domicile or nationality. It is therefore a matter of principle that this 
judicial deviation should depend entirely on the circumstances of the case in question 
and especially the law of the country with which it has its present connection, for the 
marriage has in fact come into existence and the parties lived in the reasonable belief 
that they are husband and wife. The underlying reason, as already indicated, lies in the 
fact that whatever flexibility is required to cover any special circumstances of the 
parties' marital relationship should be a part of choice of law decision for the validity of 
the marriage at the time of the proceedings. 
Quite evidently, this practice provides courts with the most appropriate mechanism to 
avoid the absurd result to which the general choice of law rule may give rise, and the 
ability to achieve justice, in many hard cases. Furthermore, this view is also well 
justified on policy grounds, namely, the prevailing policy of upholding the parties' 
reasonable expectations, and the principle of favor matrimonii which comes into 
consideration once the marriage has come into existence. Above all, it is my opinion 
that this view is ultimately prescribed by the fact that most atypical cases have been 
created mainly because marriage officials have disregarded the only impediment 
existing under one of the parties' pre-marital personal laws as being fundamentally 
contrary to the lex loci public policy. Accordingly, it is difficult to justify the 
invalidation of a marriage in a truly objective way in such cases insofar as it will 
discredit the very essence of public policy in conflict of laws, especially if the parties 
have severed all connections with that country after the marriage ceremony. 
Nevertheless, the need to accommodate the competing policy considerations relevant in 
the field of marriage does not actually justify the change of the existing general conflict 
rule in question to a flexible one based on the principles of favor matrimonii, and 
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justice in the individual atypical case -policy issues that should not contribute to the 
elaboration oflegal rules, particularly in private international law . This is because the 
absurd result which the application of the general conflict rule produces in hard cases is 
clearly not a special weakness of that rule as the application of any flexible approach 
mentioned above might equally result in the invalidation of a marriage that is initially 
valid under the parties' prenuptial personal laws. The application of a real and 
substantial connection test, for instance in normal cases, would not achieve even the 
very objective that it is designed to pursue, i.e. the validity of marriage. It is therefore 
clear that this flexible approach may exact a cost entirely out of proportion to whatever 
benefits they promise in atypical cases. 
Indeed, it is my opinion that considerations of policy and justice demand that the 
attainment of more rational solutions in atypical cases should be left to the initiative and 
the ability of judicial authorities to make adjustments for the general conflict rule. This 
is because justice in atypical cases is an aim that should be pursued outside the legal 
rules. However, the forum's judicial authorities should proceed with caution as they 
are bound to the law. Accordingly, they must use this discretion in a truly objective 
way and must not for the sake of convenience fall back to the lex fori which may have 
nothing to do with the parties and the facts of the case in question. This is because the 
accommodation of the competing policy considerations requires the application of the 
law of the country with which the marriage in issue has its present connection once it 
has been performed. 
Quite rightly the forum's judicial authorities should never hold as void a marriage that 
is initially valid under the parties' prenuptial domiciliary [or national] law designated by 
the forum's general conflict rule. This is because the invalidation of marriage in such 
normal cases would result in the virtual negation of the general conflict rule. Reliance 
on the law of, the matrimonial domicile or, the nationality of the parties at the time of 
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the proceedings to invalidate a marriage in a normal case would only reflect a parochial 
concept that every marriage is potentially and conditionally invalid -a concept that is 
neither warranted on principle, nor reconcilable to any policy considerations which are 
important once the marriage has come into existence. 
Hence, it is certainly true that the forum's judicial authorities can only disregard the 
general conflict rule if its application leads to the invalidity of a union which, according 
to Common and Civil law systems, is valid under the law of, the matrimonial domicile 
or, the nationality of the parties at the time of proceedings, respectively -i.e any 
variation in the rules must be to positive effect. In fact, the courts in such hard cases 
should only rely on actual changes of domicile or nationality, notwithstanding the 
presumed intentions of the parties. The proposed solution seems to be consistent with 
the policy of validation. In Radwan v. Radwan, for instance, Cumming-Bruce 1. was 
of opinion that it was difficult to imagine what useful purpose would have been served 
by applying the wife's prenuptial domiciliary law to invalidate a long-standing 
relationship which is valid under Egyptian law, the law of the matrimonial domicile 
where the marriage has existed nearly for 20 years. The Lex loci celebrationis and the 
parties' prenuptial personal laws should recognise this decision in order to prevent 
conflicts between the relevant laws, unless there is some overwhelming policy reason 
which prevent this. 
It is, however, my opinion that the learned judge would have never considered the 
marriage as valid in this case if the parties had established their matrimonial home after 
the marriage ceremony in England, the country of the wife's pre-marital domicile, 
under the law of which the marriage was initially void from its inception as being an 
actually polygamous union. Accordingly, the forum's judicial authorities should only 
declare a marriage void if, and only if, it is void by both the parties' antenuptial 
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personal laws, and the law of the country where the union has existed after the marriage 
ceremony as the law to govern [in the eye of the forum] the effects of the parties' 
marital relationship, notwithstanding its validity under the lex fori. The reason is that 
it is hard to find any conceivable justification why the forum's courts should declare 
the marriage as nevertheless valid in these cases. In Lawrence v. Lawrence, for 
instance, English law was primarily applied, not in its capacity as the law of the forum 
but, as being the law of the matrimonial domicile. The only thing the judge can do in 
such cases is to base his decision on the fact that the marriage, though is valid by the 
lex fori, is regarded as void under both parties' antenuptial personal laws, and the law 
of the country where the union has existed once it is performed. This may not be a 
solace for the parties but at least will give them an understandable ground for the 
judicial decision. 
Indeed, the effectiveness of the proposed rules would be difficult to achieve in practice 
because of the existing parochial and nationalistic focus in choice of law leading to the 
formulation of subsidiary rules that, almost invariably, give preference to the lex fori 
or the lex loci celebrationis, as the case may be, in the present matter. The underlying 
reason lies in the existing lenient practice among legal systems as to the enforcement of 
foreign laws that tends not only to erode the general rule determining capacity to marry 
by the parties' prenuptial personal laws, but also aborts any practical proposition 
seeking to bridge the distance between different choice of law tendencies -a matter that 
is countenanced by the importance of coordinating the competing policy considerations 
relevant in the field of marriage. In practical terms, this unprincipled focus in choice of 
law tends actually to restore the kind of territorialism that, in the past, characterised 
certain doctrines of statutists, as well as the antiquated notion of lex fori predominance 
in conflict of laws. Although one cannot ignore the fact that the growing concern to 
avoid an inadequate and unjust result revolves around the special circumstances of each 
individual case, there is no justification for imposing even the forum's minimum 
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standards of essentials of marriage in a case where there are no policy reasons requiring 
the exclusive application of the law oftheforum. 
In Sottomayor v. De Barros [N° 2], for instance, the English court rejected the relevant 
foreign law designated by the English general conflict rule simply because one of the 
parties was domiciled, and the marriage was celebrated, in England -a rule under which 
the foreign element provides little additional dimension. The application of the lex fori 
qua lex domicilii of either party seems to be based here on the desire to protect English 
domiciliaries fo rm the injustice alleged to result if the prohibitions imposed by the 
foreign party's domiciliary law were to be applied. This rule is surely excessive insofar 
as it reduces the application of the relevant foreign law to pure lip-service, and it 
perpetuates the existence of a limping marriage which is socially undesirable and unjust 
to the parties. Furthermore, this unprincipled rule would not achieve even the very goal 
of justice upon which it is based, particularly if the relevant foreign prohibition is not 
contrary to the forum 's public policy. The problematic nature of this rule becomes 
apparent in the case where the foreign party obtains a nullity decree in the foreign 
country concerned and remarries there. In such a case, this rule would inflict injustice 
on the local party rather than achieving justice, insofar as the forum's subject would be 
deprived of his right to remarry, and thus would be forced into celibacy, unless he 
obtains a divorce in the forum. Quite evidently, the illogical nature of this rule and the 
complexity that it introduces into the structure of choice of law rules strongly justify its 
condemnation as "unworthy of a place in a respectable system of conflict of laws". It is 
therefore my opinion that the attainment of an effective application of the proposed rules 
highly requires the abolition of this kind of rules, for it is an unprincipled inductive 
process necessarily leading to ad hoc decisions. The English and Scottish Law 
Commissions has recommend, in their 1985 joint report, has recommended its removal 
from English and Scottish conflict of laws -a view that can be seen as a positive step 
I 
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towards modernisation of conflict of laws. 
Another and, from the present writer's perspective, perhaps even more damaging rule 
in the present subject-matter is that by which the parties are also required to comply 
with the essentials of marriage under the lex loci celebrationis qua lex fori. As is 
apparent, English and Scottish courts would held a marriage void if the parties lacked 
capacity by English and Scottish laws qua lex loci celebrationis, irrespective of its 
validity under the parties' prenuptial domiciliary laws and the law of the matrimonial 
domicile. The application of the lex loci qua lex fori is certainly undesirable as being 
of illogical and discriminatory nature which may create rather than prevent limping 
marriages. It is certainly true that that the application of this rule even in its generalised 
form -as suggested by English and Scots Law Commissions- has little to recommend it, 
as it is in direct opposition to the policy of validation. Furthermore, it is also hard to 
justify the maintenance of this rule at the present time as the judicial and academic 
authorities are in favour of the validity of a marriage once it has come into existence, 
irrespective of its invalidity even under the parties' prenuptial personal laws. Therefore, 
it is very difficult to see what useful purpose would have been served by invalidating a 
marriage that is celebrated, and performed in good faith, according to the general choice 
of law rule governing essential validity. The reason is that the policy of validation 
seems to demand this if the marriage is valid under both the parties' prenuptial personal 
laws and the law of the country where the parties have established their matrimonial 
home. 
Certainly, it is evident that no country would allow a marriage to take place within its 
territory in defiance of its prohibitory rules, on the basis that it is fundamentally against 
public policy. It is therefore my opinion that this rule is only acceptable to prevent 
celebration of marriages, and not to invalidate marriages that had already taken place in 
contravention of the law of the forum qua lex loci celebrationis. The reason is very 
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clear that the country of celebration may only have a fortuitous or fleeting connection 
with the marriage, particularly if the parties have returned to their home country where 
the union is valid. While it may be in accordance with the principle for the lex loci 
celebrationis to prevent the celebration of a marriage which offends the policy of the 
lex loci, or which appears to the officials of the lex loci to flout the parties' personal 
laws, a favor matrimonii approach may yet be appropriate in cases where marriages 
have been celebrated, parties hace acted on the faith of its, and its validity is examined 
ex post. Accordingly, there is no need for a rule that would render the choice of law 
rules' structure unduly complex -especially if one of the parties has decided to remarry 
in the forum- since public policy ground is sufficient to cover the cases where marriage 
officials cannot celebrate marriages in defiance of the lex loci's prohibitory rules. The 
better view seems indeed to be that an existing marriage should be sustained if it is valid 
by the parties' prenuptial personal laws and the parties lived in the reasonable belief that 
they are husband and wife, even though it is invalid by the lex loci celebrationis. It is 
therefore to be hoped that sections 1(2) and 2(l)(a) of the Marriage (Scotland) Act, and 
section 21(l)(a) of the Family Law (Scotland) Bill 1992, will be reconsidered in the 
near future, indeed to the extent that the Scottish prohibitory rules qua lex loci 
celebrationis should only be invoked at the time of the celebration. 
Finally, the most stringent stumbling block in the way of the proposed rules is the rule 
enacted by section 50 of the Family Law Act 1986, as a result of piecemeal reforms 
suggested by English and Scottish Law Commissions without any consideration of the 
wider ripples that it causes in the capacity and nullity pools. This provision expressly 
provides that where a divorce has been granted, or recognised, in England or Scotland, 
the fact that it is not recognised elsewhere shall not preclude either party to the marriage 
from remarrying, or cause the remarriage, wherever it takes place, to be treated as void, 
in England or Scotland. This rule certainly disregards the parties' personal laws 
designated by the forum itself in order to be substituted by the recognition rules of lex 
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fori, producing a rule which, it is submitted, has neither been accepted as a general 
conflict rule in the present subject, nor can be seen as a subsidiary rule that may achieve 
justice in the hard cases referred to above. The main reason is that the adoption of lex 
fori qua lex fori in this case renders the structure of choice of law unduly complex, and 
it is inconsistent with the prevailing policies of legal certainty, predictability and 
international uniformity of decisions that are relevant in the field of marriage. It is also 
evident that English or Scottish forum may have no real connection with the second 
marriage, particularly where jurisdiction has been assumed on the ground of one year's 
habitual residence, or the forum is only a convenient place of celebration. As is 
apparent, there is no policy judgement indicating that capacity to remarry after divorce 
or nullity decrees ought to be governed exclusively by lex fori, insofar as it raises the 
same questions as general capacity to marry. In fact, this rule can only be justified as 
the necessary effect of the United Kingdom ratification of 1970 Hague Convention on 
the Recognition of Divorces and Legal separations. Nevertheless, it must be admitted 
that the United Kingdom recognition rules are reasonable and of many years standing. 
It is my opinion that the application of this rule, especially at the time of the ceremony, 
exacts a cost entirely disproportionate to whatever benefits it promises in atypical cases 
where the second marriage has actually its present connection with the forum country. 
To allow a remarriage to take place on the sole ground that a prior divorce is recognised 
as valid in the forum qua lex loci -even though it is invalid under the parties' prenuptial 
personal laws- would certainly achieve national uniformity of decisions in the forum 
for the greater and unacceptable price of creating a limping marriage and endangering 
the remarrying party's life if he returns to his home country, where he can be 
prosecuted and convicted for bigamy. The main reason is that the chances of that 
person returning to his home country are considerably higher than his chances of 
settling down in the forum or in a third country where the remarriage might be 
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recognised as valid, insofar as the establishment of a domicile in, or the acquisition of 
the nationality of, a given country is subject to its restrictive regulations of immigration. 
The point is not, as the adherents of the lex fori approach in regard to incidental 
question seem to suggest, that internal consistency should be maintained simply 
because the right to remarry is a legal consequence inherent in the divorce decree. The 
question is rather whether the attainment of internal uniformity of decisions within the 
forum is worth taking the risk of creating a limping union, and above all endangering 
the remarrying party's life who might be found guilty of bigamy in his home country. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the parties' prenuptial personal laws would be prepared 
to recognise the remarriage simply because it has been celebrated, to achieve internal 
uniformity of decisions in the forum qua lex loci. In Russell v. Russell, for instance, 
the House of Lords declared the second marriage void ab initio and found the husband 
-whose divorce had not been recognised by English law as being the law of domicile-
guilty of bigamy. The present writer therefore believes that a divorcee should not be 
allowed to remarry in England or Scotland if the divorce has not been recognised by his 
domiciliary law. The attainment of internal consistency is certainly not a sufficient 
ground for the forum to permit the celebration of a second marriage on the authority of 
a locally, or recognised foreign, valid divorce. 
The position is certainly different where the remarriage has already entered into in 
contravention of the relevant foreign law. Here it is also true that lex fori qua forum 
should not be applied on the sole ground that the divorce is recognised as valid there, 
for the favor matrimonii principle -that comes into consideration once the marriage has 
been created- requires the validation of a marriage where, and only where, it is valid in 
the country with which it has its present connection. It is very clear that English and 
Scottish courts, when examining the validity of a marriage ex post, should consider 
the position of the country where the parties have established their actual matrimonial 
home. In Lawrence v. Lawrence, for instance, English court upheld the validity of the 
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marriage on the basis that it was valid under the law of the matrimonial home, namely, 
England, the country which has the most enduring interest in the parties' marital status 
in this particular case. But if the parties have established their matrimonial home in a 
country where the remarrying party's divorce was not recognised as valid, it is hard to 
find any conceivable reason why an English or a Scottish court should declare the 
marriage as nevertheless valid. It is therefore to be hoped that section 50 of the 1986 
Act will be amended so as to provide that the remarriage of a divorcee, that has been 
celebrated nevertheless in contravention of the relevant foreign law governing capacity, 
will be held valid in the United Kingdom if, and only if, the parties have established 
their actual matrimonial home in a country where it is regarded as a valid union. 
As regards the converse situation where the prior marriage is valid from the outset, or 
the foreign divorce or nullity decree is not entitled to recognition, in the forum, the 
application of the lex fori qua lex loci so as to prevent the celebration of a second union 
is well founded on the sole ground of public policy. This is because the celebration of 
the second marrriage would be so offensive to the morals and religious concepts a 
monogamy-insisting lex fori and would creat a legal bigamy in that country. To this 
extent, it has been established in England and Scotland that a marriage registrar should 
not issue the necessary licence or the marriage schedule if the existence of any lawful 
impediment has been shown to his satisfaction. It is therefore clear that this would be a 
case where the certificate of capacity from the foreign marriage bureau, if asked for, 
would be disregarded simply because the remarrying party has no capacity under the 
lex loci celebrationis. 
Accordingly, it is my opinion that an incapacity due to a prior subsisting marriage under 
the lex fori qua lex loci can hardly require the invalidation of a subsequent marriage 
once it has been celebrated if it is valid under the parties' personal laws. Quite rightly, 
there is no policy justification for the application of the lex fori qua lex loci in such 
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cases insofar as it is in direct opposition to the policy of validation, as well as leading to 
limping marriages, particularly if the second marriage has no connection with the 
forum's country. The Canadian decision in Schwebel v. Ungar, for example, appears 
to be in favour of applying the view suggested here which seems to be consonant with 
the favor matrimonii principle and, the best way in which the forum can further 
international uniformity of decisions. It is therefore to be hoped that English and Scots 
courts, when given an opportunity to rule on this question, would adopt the rule here 
advanced. 
From an objective view, it is very clear that the argument of internal consistency rests 
on misunderstanding. When an English or a Scottish court determines the validity of a 
divorce as an incidental question in a case of remarriage, which is governed for instance 
by French law, the court should not decide whether the divorce is valid in England or 
Scotland, but whether the divorcee has capacity to remarry under French law and thus 
whether the remarriage is valid. The decision that a divorcee has no capacity to remarry 
under French law, i.e. the law of the country to which the party belongs by domicile or 
nationality, does not actually frustrate a previous decision that the divorce is recognised 
as valid by English or Scottish law. It is therefore submitted that this decision does not 
lead to any internal inconsistency, insofar as the court is concerned in such cases with 
the examination of the validity of the second marriage in relation to two different legal 
systems. 
Indeed, it is fair to say that comprehensive legal reforms, either at the domestic or 
international level, must concentrate on the eradication of conflict oflaws' encrustations 
and their root cause, i.e the parochial and nationalistic focus in the present field, rather 
than on finding the "lowest common denominator" that is inadequate and satisfies no 
one. The English and Scottish Law Commissions have, in their 1985 joint report, put 
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forward certain recommendations that seem to be a modest step in the right direction to 
introduce some rationality and certainty into the field of marriage. The Law 
Commissions have actually identified some of the antiquated barriers which stand in the 
way of the efficient application of the general choice of law rules in the present subject-
matter, namely, the parochial and nationalistic rule of Sottomayor v. De Barros the 
abolition of which has been strongly recommended. But it is unfortunate that the Law 
Commissions have failed to realise the undesirable effect of the application of the lex 
loci rule as to capacity, especially when the validity of the marriage is examined ex 
post. 
It is essential to note that in 1987 the Law Commissions also declined to propose any 
comprehensive legislative intervention on the choice of law rules in marriage, as they 
believe this might be harmful. The main reason is that there is no major area where, in 
practice, the present law seems to lead to absurd results, and the clarification of certain 
undeveloped choice of law rules in marriage would be best left to judicial authorities. 
One might think that these reasons are not very convincing insofar as some at least of 
the most recent innovative judicial developments have achieved nothing more than 
adding confusion to the most confused subject of conflict of laws. As regards the 
judicial experience of the last hundred years, it is very unlikely that the judicial 
authorities will in fact provide the necessary clarification needed in choice of law rules 
of marriage. However, the Scottish Law Commission has finally realised, as indicated 
in its 1992 report on family law, that the haphazard nature of the most recent judicial 
developments and the fact that the choice of law rules of marriage require application 
outside the court primarily at the time of celebration point to comprehensive legislation 
as the answer for providing clarity, stability and certainty in law. The Commission has 
thus proposed the inclusion of choice of law rules on marriage in the new Scottish 
family law code. It is to be hoped that the English Law Commission would follow the 
Scots Commission's step in order to conform English law to the most appropriate 
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standards through which the coordination of the policy considerations relevant in 
marriage can be achieved. 
It is also regrettable that the 1976 Hague cenvention, the main international initiative to 
harmonise the choice of law rules of marriage has ultimately failed to achieve the very 
objective that it was designed to pursue, for it provides an inadequate and incomplete 
set of choice of law rules that do not actually form a sound basis for law reform. The 
underlying reason is that the convention is mainly concerned with the identification of 
compromises of the "lowest common denominator" that might bring about a certain 
rapprochement between legal systems insisting on the exclusive application of the lex 
loci celebrationis and those systems which favour the traditional dichotomy between 
formal and essential validity. In its effort to achieve such compromises, the convention 
has laid down certain choice of law rules for celebration and recognition of marriages 
that are far from being adequate rules, without taking into consideration that the conflict 
problems are inherent in the stringency of the marriage laws of the countries concerned, 
as well as in the parochial and nationalistic focus in choice of law. 
Quite evidently, the convention has failed to recognise the relevance of coordinating the 
policy considerations relevant in the field of marriage. It only promotes the principle of 
favor matrimonii, and the unfortunate general tendency to facilitate the celebration of 
marriages. It is certainly true that chapter one of the convention promotes the creation 
of limping marriages insofar as it obliges the authorities of the country of celebration to 
celebrate a marriage if the future spouses have complied with the essential requirements 
of the lex loci celebrationis and one of them is a national or a habitual resident of that 
country. Accordingly, chapter one appears to preserve the very essence of the English 
rule in Sottomayor v. De Barros by virtue of which a foreign incapacity must be 
ignored if one of the parties is domiciled in England, a perpetuation that is rather 
! I 
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unfortunate in the light of the rule's stigmatisation as "unworthy of a place in a 
respectable system of conflict of laws". Furthermore, the authorities of the country of 
celebration are also bound to celebrate a marriage if their conflict rules are satisfied, 
irrespective of the fact that the celebration is fundamentally contrary to the lex loci 
public policy. However, this conventional rule is undesirable as it is very unlikely that 
many countries would be prepared to reject their practice of requiring marriages in their 
own territories to comply with their law, particularly at the time of the celebration. It is 
thus clear that this unprincipled compromise undercuts decisional harmony, and defeats 
the objective of uniformity of approach that is sought in an international convention; a 
criticism that is evidenced by the optional nature of chapter one of the convention. 
It is also interesting to emphasise that chapter two, the core of the convention falls well 
short of harmonisation of choice of law rules to govern essential validity, inasmuch as 
the primacy it gives to the lex loci celebrationis in the matter of recognition is far from 
being self-evidently justified. It is in essence a compromise between Common law 
systems which apply the law of domicile and Civil law systems which prefer the 
national law -a compromise that certainly suffers the fate of satisfying no one. The 
renunciation of the personal law concept in favour of the excessive "Yankeeism" of the 
reliance on the lex loci celebrationis is unfortunate in the light of the present 
condemnation of this rule even in the U.S.A. as is evidenced by the look warm that the 
Hague convention has received there. Finally, it is clear that the convention does not 
really achieve very much, because it attempts to solve the very complicated conflict 
problems in marriage by the use of an over simple formula: something which has been 
tried only too often, in an upsurge of cosmopolitan enthusiasm and in disregard of 
reality. 
In conclusion, it is to be hoped that any future legal reforms, either at the domestic or 
international level, should give particular attention to the coordination of the competing 
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policy considerations relevant in marriage, and the attainment of the proper application 
of the general choice of law rules in the present subject. The efficient solution to the 
conflict problems of marriage, in general, would be a complete reconsideration of 
English, Scottish and Algerian conflict rules in marriage in a more straight forward 
fashion. It is a difficult task to achieve but the problems cannot be left to the piecemeal 
effect of statutory changes to existing rules or occasional judicial innovations. The best 
conflict system would therefore remain pure theory as long as legal systems are 
unwilling to compromise their traditional rules, and the courts are not prepared to apply 
such a system as part of their law. 
Appendix I 
ALGERIAN CIVIL CODE 
[Ordonnance nO 75-58 du 26 September 1975] 
CHAPITRE I 
DES CONFLITS DE LOIS DANS LE TEMPS 
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Art. 6: Les lois relatives a la capacite s'appliquent a toutes les personnes qUi 
remplissent les conditions prevues. 
Lorsqu'une personne ayant la capacite juridique aux termes de l'ancienne loi, 
devient incapable d'apres la loi nouvelle, cette incapacite n'affecte pas les 
actes anterieurement accomplis par elle. 
Art. 7: Les nouvelles dispositions touchant la procedure s'appliquent immediatement. 
Toutefois, em matiere de prescription. les regles concernant Ie point de depart, 
la suspension et I 'interruption, sont celles determinees par l'ancienne loi pour 
to utes la periode anterieure a l'entree en vigueur des nouvelles dispositions. 
Il en est de meme en ce qui concerne les delais de procedure. 
Art. 8: Les preuves preconstituees sont soumises a la loi en vigueur, au moment OU la 
preuve est etablie ou au moment OU elle aurait dO etre etablie. 
CHAPITRE II 
DES CONFLITS DE LOIS DANS L'ESPACE 
Art. 9: En cas de conflit de lois, la loi algerienne est competente pour qualifier la 
categorie a laquelle appartient Ie rapport de droit, objet de litige, en vue de 
determiner la loi applicable. 
Art. 10: Les lois concernant l'etat et la capacite des personnes, regissent les Algeriens 
meme residant en pays etranger. Toutefois, si l'une des parties, dans une 
transaction d'ordre pecuniaire con clue en Algerie et devant y produire ses 
effets, se trouve etre un etranger incapable et que cette incapacite soit Ie fait 
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d'une cause obscure qui ne peut etre facilement decelee, cette cause n'a pas 
d'effet sur sa capacite et la validite de la transaction. Les personnes morales 
etrangeres, societes, associations, fondations ou autres qui exercent une 
activite en Algerie, sont soumises a la loi algerienne. 
Art. 11: Les conditions relatives ala validite du marriage sont regies par la loi nationale 
de chacun des deux conjoints. 
Art. 12: Les effets du mariage, y compris ceux qui concernent Ie patrimoine, sont 
soumis ala loi nationale du mari, au moment de la conclusion du marriage. 
La dissolution est soumise a la loi nationale de l'epoux, au moment de l'acte 
introductif d'instance. 
Art. 13: Dans les cas prevus par les articles 11 et 12, si l'un des deux conjoints est 
Algerien, au moment de la conclusion du mariage, la loi algerienne est seule 
applicable, sauf en ce qui concerne la capacite de se marier. 
Art. 14: L'obligation alimentaire entre parents est regie par la loi nationale du debiteur. 
Art. 15: Les regles de fonds en matiere d'administration legale, de curatelle et autres 
institutions de protection des incapables et des absent, sont determinees par la 
loi nationale de la personne a proteger. 
Art. 16: Les successions, testaments et autres dispositions a cause de mort, sont regis 
par la loi nationale du de cujus, du testateur ou du disposant au moment du 
deces. 
Toutefois, la forme du testament est r/ gie par la loi nationale du testateur, au 
moment du testament ou par la loi du lieu OU Ie testament a ete etabli. II en est 
de meme de la forme des autres dispositions a cause de mort. 
Art. 17: La possession, la propriete et les autres droits reels sont soumis, pour ce qui 
est des immeubles, ala loi de la situation de l'immeuble et pour ce qui est des 
meubles, ala loi de lieu OU se trouvait Ie meuble, au moment OU s'est produit 
la cause qui a fait acquerir ou perdre la possession, la propriete ou les autres 
droits reels. 
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Art. 18: Les obligations contractuelles sont regies par la loi du lieu OU Ie contrat a ete 
conclu, a moins que les parties ne conviennent qu'une autre loi sera 
appliquee. 
Toutefois, les contrats relatifs a des immeubles sont soumis a la loi de la 
situation de l'immeuble. 
Art. 19: Les actes entre vifs sont soumis, quant a leur forme, ala loi du lieu OU ils ont 
ete accomplis. lIs peuvent etre eegalement soumis a la loi nationale commune 
aux parties. 
Art. 20: Les obligations non contractuelles sont soumises a la loi de l'Etat sur Ie 
territoire du quel se produit Ie fait generateur de l'obligation. 
Toutefois, lorsqu'il s'agit d'une obligation nee d'un fait dommgeable, la 
disposition de l'alinea precedent n'est pas appliquee aux faits qui se sont 
produits a l'etranger et qui, quoique illicites d'apres la loi etrangere, sont 
consideres comme licites par la loi algerienne. 
Art. 21: Les dispositions qui precedent ne s'appliquent que losqu'il n'en est pas 
autrement dispose par une loi speciale ou par une convention internationale en 
vigueur en Algerie. 
Art. 22: En cas de pluralite de nationalites, Ie judge applique la nationalite effective. 
Toutefois, la loi algerienne est appliquee si la personne presente, en meme 
temps, la nationalite algerienne, au regard de l'Algerie et, une autre 
nationalite, au regard d'un ou de plusieurs Etats etrangers. 
En cas d'apartridie, la loi a appliquer est determinee par Ie judge. 
Art. 23: Lorsque les dispositions qui precedent renvoient au droit d'un Etat dans lequel 
existent plusieurs systemes juridiques, Ie systeme a appliquer est determine 
par Ie droit interne de cet Etat. 
Art. 24: L'application de la loi etrangere, en vertu des articles precedents, est exclue si 
elle est contraire a l'ordre public ou au bonnes moeurs en Algerie. 
Appendix II 
CODE DE L'ETAT CIVIL 
[Ordonnance n° 70-20 du 19 Fevrier 1970] 
TTTREIV 
L'ETAT CIVIL EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
CHAPITRE UNIQUE 
ETAT CIVIL DES ALGERIENS ET ETRANGERS 
A L'ETRANGER 
Section I 
Etat civil local 
409 
Art. 95 Tout acte de l'etat civil des Algeriens et des etrangers etabli en pays etranger, 
fait foi, s'il a ete redige dans les fonnes usitees dans ledit pays. 
Art. 96 Tout acte de l'etat civil des Algeriens en pays etranger, est valable, s'il a ete 
re9u, confonnement aux lois algeriennes par les agents diplomatiques ou par 
les consuls. 
Art. 97 Le mariage contracte en pays etranger entre Algeriens ou entre Algerien et 
etrangere, est valable, s'il a ete celebre dans les formes usitees dans Ie pays, 
pourvu que l'AIgerien n'ait point contrevenu aux conditions de fond requises 
par sa loi nationale pour pouvoir contracter mariage. 
II en sera de meme du mariage contracte en pays etranger entre un Algerien et 
un etrangere, s'il a ete celebre par les agents diplomatiques pourvu d'une 
circonscription consulaire ou par les consuls d'Algerie, conformement aux 
lois Algeriennes. 
Toutefois, lorsque Ie conjoint etranger n'a pas la nationalite du pays d'accueil, 
ce mariage ne peut etre celebre que dans les pays qui seront determines par 
decret. 
410 
Art.98 Lorque l'acte a ete omis, en raison de l'inexistence dans Ie pays etranger, 
d'actes instrumentaires constatant l'etat civil, il est procede a l'inscription de 
l'acte sur les registres consulaires, par ordonnance de president du tribunal 
d'Alger. 
Art. 99 Lorsque l'acte a ete omis en raison d'un defaut de declaration, il y a lieu soit 
de faire etablir l'inscription de l'acte si la loi locale admet les declarations 
tardives, soit de provoquer une ordonnace du president du tribunal d'aIger 
prescrivant son inscription sur les registres consulaires. 
Art. 100 Le president du tribunal d'Alger est competent pour ordonner la rectification 
des actes de l'etat civil instrumentaires dresses a l'etranger dans les formes 
locales et concernant les Algeriens. 
L'acte ainsi rectifie est transcrit d'office, a la requete du ministere public, sur 
les registres consul aires. 
Art. 101 Lorsque l'acte a ete perdu ou detruit et que la loi etrangere ne contient aucune 
disposition relative aa sa reconstitution, l'Algerien peut saisir Ie president du 
tribunal d'Alger. 
Art. 102 L'ordonnace rendue par Ie president du tribunal d'Alger est immediatement 
adressee par Ie procureur de la Republique, pour transcription de ces actes sur 
les registres deposes au ministere des affaires etrangeres qui detient Ie second 
original des registres consulaires. 
Art. 103 Les actes de I' etat civil dresses en pays etranger, qui concernent des 
Algeriens, sont transcrits soit d'office, soit sur la demande des interesses, sur 
les registres de l'etat civil de l'annee courante, tenus par les agent 
diplomatiques pourvus d'une circonscription consulaire ou les consuls 
territorialement competents. 
Seules sont transcrites les indication qui doivent etre portees dans les actes de 
l'etat civil algerien correspondant. 
Lorsque, du fait de labsence des relations diplomatiques ou de la fermuture du 
poste diplomatique ou consulaire territorialement competent, la transcription 
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ne peut etre faite dans les conditions prevues aux alineas precedents, l'acte est 
depose au ministere des affaires etrangeres qui peut en delivrerexpedition. Des 
que les circonstances Ie permettent, Ie minitere fait pro ceder a la transcription 
de l'acte dans les conditions precitees. 
Les expeditions et extraits des actes transcrits sont delivres par les consuls, les 
agent diplomatiques pourvus d'une circonscription consulaire ou par Ie 
ministere des affaires etrangeres. 
Section II 
Etat civil consulaire 
Art. 104 Les vice-consuls peuvent etre autorises a suppleer, d'une maniere 
permanente, Ie chef de poste consulaire, par decision du ministre des affaires 
etrangeres. 
Les agents consulaires peuvent etre autorises, par arrete du ministre des 
affaires etrangeres, soit a recevoir les declarations de naissance et de deces, 
soit a excercer les pouvoirs complets d'officier de l'etat civil. 
En cas d'empechement momentane de l'agent excen;;ant les fonctions 
d'officier de l'etat civil, ses pouvoirs passent a l' agent designe a cet effet, par 
Ie ministre des affaires etrangeres, sous reserve qu'il s'agisse d'un agent de 
carriere. 
Art. 105 Les agents mentiones aux articles I et 2 dressent, conformement aux 
dispositions de la presente ordannance, les actes de l'etat civil concernant les 
ressortissants algeriens sur des registres tenus en double. 
Ils transcrivent, egalement sur les memes registres les actes concernant ces 
ressortissants qui ont ete re9us par les autorites locales dans les formes usitees 
dans Ie pays. 
Art. 106 Les registres de l'etat civil sont cotes par premiere et derniere et paraphes, sur 
chaque feuille, par Ie chef de poste. 
En fin d'annee, ils sont clos et arretes par lui; l'un des examplaires est 
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addresse au ministere des affaires etrangeres qui en assure la garde; l'autre est 
conserve dans les archives du poste. A se dernier registre qui peut contenir 
les actes de plusieurs annees, restent annexees les pieces produites par les 
interesses, telles qu'expeditions et traductions des actes etrangers transcrit et 
procurations. 
Lorsqu'au cours d'une annee, aucun acte n'a ete dresse ou transcrit, Ie chef de 
poste adresse au minnistre des affaires etrangeres, un certificat pour neant. 
Les formalites de cloture et de reouverture des registres sont, en outre, 
obligatoires a chaque changement de chef de poste. 
Art. 107 En cas de perte ou de destruction des registres, Ie chef de poste en dresse 
proces-verbal et l'envoie au ministere des affaires etrangeres. 
La reconstitution est faite par une commission interministerielle. 
Un decret determinera les modalites d'application du present article ainsi que 
la composition et Ie fonctionnement de ladite commission. 
Art. 108 Aucun acte de l'etat civil re9u dans unposte diplomatique ou consulaire ne 
peut, pour motif d'erreurs ou d'omissions, etre rectifie, si ce n'est par 
ordonnance du president du tribunal d'Alger. Si un acte transcrit sur les 
registres de l'etat civil, est rectifie par une decision judiciaire etrangere, celle-
ci doit recevoir l'exequatur du tribunal d'Alger. 
Art. 109 De meme, lorsque, pour une cause autre que celles prevues a l'article 99, les 
actes n'ont pas ete dresses, il ne peut etre supplee que par ordonnance du 
president du tribunal d'Alger. 
Art. 110 Les agents exer9ants les fonction d'officier de l"tat civil auront soin de 
recueilliretde transmettre au ministre des affaires etrangeres, soit au moyen 
d'actes de notoriete, soit de toiute autre maniere, les renseignements qui 
pourraient etre utiles pour ractifier les actes qu'ils sont dresses ou transcrit ou 
pour y suppleer. 
Ses actes de notoriete seront dresses sur les registre des actes divers et des 
expeditions pourront en etre delivrees aux interesses. 
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Art. 111 Des copies conforme des actes de naissance ne peuvent etre de1ivrees a des 
personnes autres que celles prevues a I'article 65, que sur demande ecrite 
adressee a I'agent qui a dresse I'acte. En cas de refus, Ia demande peut etre 
portee par Ie requerant devant Ie ministere des affaires etrangeres. 
Appendix III 
ALGERIAN FAMILY LAW CODE 
[Loi n° 84-11 du 9 Juin 1984] 
CHAPITRE I 
DU MARIAGE ET DES FIANCAILLES 
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Art. 4 Le mariage est un contrat passe entre un homme et une femme dans les formes 
legales. It a entre autres buts de fonder une famille basee sur l'affection, la 
mansuetude et l'entraide, de proteger moralement les deux conjoints et de 
preserver les liens de famille . 
Art. 5 Les fian~ailles constituent une promesse de mariage; chacune des deux parties 
peut y renoncer. 
S'il resulte de cette renonciation un dommage materiel ou moral pour l'une 
des deux parties, la reparation peut etre prononcee. 
Si la renonciation est du fait du pretendant, il ne peut reclamer la restitution 
d'aucun present. 
Si la renonciation est du fait de la fiancee, elle doit restituer ce qui n'a pas ete 
consomme. 
Art. 6 Les fian~ailles peuvent etre concomitantes a la fatiha ou la precedeI' d'une 
duree indeterminee. 
Les fian~ailles et la fatiha sont regies par les dispositions de l'article 5 ci-
dessus. 
Art. 7 La capacite de mariage est reputee valide a ving et un (21) ans revolus pour 
l'homme et a dix huit (18) ans revolus pour la femme. 
Toutefois Ie judge peut accorder un dispense d'age pour une raison d'interet 
ou dans un cas de necessite. 
Art. 8 , II est'pennrs de contracter mariage avec plus d'une epouse dans les limites de 
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Ia Chari'a si Ie motif est justifie, Ies conditions et I'intention d'equite reunies 
et apres information prealable des precedente et future epouses. L'une et 
l'autre peuvent intenter une actionjudiciaire contre Ie conjoint en cas de dol ou 
demander Ie divorce en cas d'absence de consentement. 
DES ELEMENTS CONSTITUTIFS DU MARIAGE 
Art. 9 Le mariage est contracte par Ie consentement des futurs conjoints, la presence 
du tuteur matrimonial et de deux temoins ainsi que la constitution d'une dot. 
Art. 10 Le consentement deecoule de la demande de l'une des deux parties et de 
I'acceptation de l'autre exprimee en toute terme signifiant Ie mariage legal. 
Sont valides la demande et Ie consentement de l'handicape exprimes sous 
toutes formes ecrites ou gestuelles signifiant Ie mariage dans Ie langage ou 
l'usage. 
Art. 11 La conclusion du mariage pour la femme incombe a son tuteur matrimonial 
qui est soi son pere, soit I'un de ses proches parents. 
Le judge est Ie tuteur matrimonial de Ia personne qui n'en a pas. 
Art. 12 Le tuteur matrimonial [W ALI] ne peut empecher la personne placee sous sa 
tutelle, de contracter mariage si elle Ie desire et si celui-ci lui est profitable. En 
cas d'opposition, Ie judge peut autoriser Ie mariage, sous reserve des 
dispositions de l'article 9 de la presente loi. 
Toutefois, Ie pere peut s'opposer au mariage de sa fille vierge si tel est 
l'interet de la fille. 
Art. 13 11 est interdit au wali [tuteur matrimonial] qu'il soit Ie pere ou autre, de 
contraindre au mariage la personne placee sous sa tutelle de meme qu'il ne 
peut la marier sans consentement. 
Art. 14 La dot est ce qui est verse a la future epouse en numeraire ou toute autre bien 
qui soit legalement licite. Cette dot lui revient en toute propriete et elle en 
dispose Iibrement. 
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Art. 15 La dot doit etre determinee dans Ie contrat de mariage que son versement soit 
immediat ou 'a terme. 
Art. 16 La consommation du mariage oulle deces du conjoit ouvrent droit a I' epouse 
a l'integralite de sa dot. 
Elle a droit a la moitie de la dot en cas de divorce avant la consommation. 
Art. 17 Si avant la consommation du mariage, la dot donne lieu a un litige entre les 
conjoints ou leurs heritiers et qu'aucun ne fournit une preuve, i1 est statue, 
sous serment, en faveur de l'epouse ou de ses heritiers. Si ce litige intervient 
apres consommation il est statue sous serment, en faveur de l'epoux ou de ses 
heritiers. 
DE L'ACTE ET DE LA PREUVE DE MARIAGE 
Art. 18 L'acte de mariage est conclu devant un notaire ou un fonctionnaire legalement 
habilite, sous reserve des dispositions de l'article 9 de la presente loi. 
Art. 19 Les deux conjoints peuvent stipiler dans Ie contrat du mariage toute clause 
qu'ils judgent utiles a moins qu'elle ne soit contraire aux dispositions de la 
presente loi. 
Art. 20 Le futur conjoint peut se faire valablement representer par un mandataire 
investi d'une procuration pour ce faire, dans la conclusion de l'acte de 
mariage. 
Art. 21 Les dispositions du code de l'etat civil sont applicables en matiere de 
procedure d'enregistrement de l'acte de mariage. 
Art. 22 Le mariage est prouve par la delivrance d'un extrait du registre de l'etat civil. 
A defaut d'inscription, il est rendu valide par judgement si, toutefois, les 
elements constitutifs du mariage sont reunis confermement aux dispositions 
de la presente loi. Cette formalite accomplie, il est inscrit a l'etat civil. 
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CHAPITRE II 
DES EMECHEMENTS AU MARl AGE 
Art. 23 Les deux conjoint doivent etre exempts des empechements absolus ou 
temporaires au mariage legal. 
Art. 24 Les empechements absolus au mariage legal sont: 
1- La parente, 
2- L'alliance, 
3- L'allaitement. 
Art. 25 Les femmes prohibees par la parente sont les meres, les filles, les soeurs, les 
tantes paternelles et maternelles, les fille du frere et de la soeur. 
Art. 26 Les femmes prohiMes par alliance sont: 
1)- Les ascendantes de l'epouse des la conclusion de l'acte de mariage. 
2)- Les descendantes de l'epouse apres consommation du mariage. 
3)- Les femmes veuves ou divorcees des ascendants de l'epoux a l'infini. 
4)- Les femmes veuves ou divorcees des descendats de l'epoux a l'infini. 
Art. 27 L'allaitement vaut prohibition par parente pour toutes les femmes. 
Art. 28 Le nourrisson, a l'exclusion de ses freres et soeurs, est repute affilie a sa 
nourrice et son conjoint et frere de l'ensemble de leurs enfants. 
La prohibition s'applique a lui ainsi qu'a ses descendants. 
Art. 29 La prohibition par l'allaitement n'a d'effet que si ce dernier a lieu avant Ie 
sevrage ou durant les deux premieres annees du nourrisson independamment de la 
quantite de lai tete. 
Art. 30 Les femmes prohibees temporairement sont: 
1- La femme deja mariee, 
2- La femme en periode de retraitre legale a la suite d'un divorce ou du deces 
de sont conjoint, 
3- La femme divorcee par trois fois par Ie me me conjoint pour Ie meme 
_I 
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conjoint, 
4- La femme qui vient en sus du nombre legalement permis. 
nest egalement interdit d'avoir pour epouse deux soeurs simultanement, ou 
d'avoir pour epouses en meme temps une femme et sa tante paternelle ou 
maternelle, que les soeur soient germaines, consanguines, uterines ou soeurs 
par allaitement. 
Art. 31 La musulmane ne peut epouser un non musulman. 
Le mariage des algeriens et algeriennes avec des etrangers des deux sexes 
obeit a des dispositions reglementaires. 
CHAPITRE III 
MARIAGE VIelE ET MARIAGE NUL 
Art. 32 Le mariage est declare nul si l'un de ses elements constitutifs est vicie ou s'il 
comporte un empechement, une clause contraire a l'objet du contrat ou si 
l'apostasie du conjoint est etablie. 
Art. 33 Contracte sans la presence du tuteur matrimonial, les deux temoins ou la dot, 
Ie mariage est declare entache de nullite avant consommation et n'ouvre pas 
droit a la dot. Apres consommation, il est confirme moyennant la dot de 
parite [Sadaq el Mithl] si l'un des elements constitutifs est vicie. II est declare 
nul si plusieurs de ses elements sont vicies. 
Art. 34 Tout mariage contracte avec l'une des femmes prohibees est declare nul avant 
et apres sa consomrnation. Toutefois, la filiation qui en decoule est confirmee 
et la femme est astreinte a une retraite legale. 
Art. 35 Si l'acte de mariage comporte une clause contraire a son objet, celle-ci est 
declare nulle mais l'acte reste valide. 
I, 
f · 
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